ASEAN and Security Institutions: Focusing on the ASEAN Regional Forum and the ASEAN Political-Security Community

by

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Certification

I, Almagul AISARIEVA hereby declare that this report is my own work and has not been submitted in any form for the award of another degree or diploma at any university or other institute of tertiary education. Information derived from the published and unpublished work of others has been cited or acknowledged properly. For any errors or inadequacies that may remain in this work, of course, the responsibility is entirely my own.
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Abstract

This study addresses factors and functions of ASEAN to develop Southeast Asia’s security cooperation by focusing on two main regional security institutions – the ARF and the APSC. Through qualitative methodology, which involves an interpretive, naturalistic approach, the research will analyze what factors have encouraged ASEAN to develop Southeast Asia’s security cooperation; and also what functions of regional institutions to manage security affairs. Representative organizations for the regional security institutions are the ASEAN Regional Forum and the ASEAN Political-Security Community.

As for the ARF, in terms of institutional strength, it has been relatively successful in engaging the great powers (which was of importance for ASEAN member states) and promoting confidence building; however, ASEAN’s attempt to cooperate tactically with external powers appears to be a mere “talking shop” with no strategic significance. In case of the APSC, its plan almost failed when ASEAN member states were not able to take an action toward Thai-Cambodia conflict. The main reason is that ASEAN is still weak and had not strengthened and deepened cooperation in many fields of security yet. Till today ASEAN did not maintain its relevance. As a result, the APSC may not able to respond effectively to globalization and its dramatic impact on political life and even values of ASEAN members. As most researchers say, the APSC is being famous for talking big and acting modestly by giving big noise in its meetings only without any result.
Key words: ASEAN, APSC, ARF, regional organization, security, regional security institution, Southeast Asia, Asia Pacific, ASEAN Way, ASEAN role.
Abbreviations

ADMM ASEAN Defense Ministers’ Meeting

ADMM-Plus ASEAN Defense Ministers’ Meeting-Plus

AEC ASEAN Economic Community

AMM ASEAN Ministerial Meeting

APEC ASEAN Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation

APSC ASEAN Political Security Cooperation

ARF ASEAN Regional Forum

ASC ASEAN Security Community

ASCC ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community

ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations

ASO ASEAN Security Outlook

ASTOP ASEAN Senior-level Talks on Non-proliferation

CBMs Confidence Building Measures

CSCAP Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific
CSCE Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe

CSOs Civil Society Organizations

EAS East Asian Summit

EPS Eminent Persons Group

EU European Union

HADR Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief

ISM CT-TC Inter-Sessional Meeting on Counter-Terrorism and Transnational Crime

PD Preventive Diplomacy

PMC Post-ministerial Conference

SCO Shanghai Cooperation Organization

SEA Southeast Asia

SEANWFZ Southeast Asian Nuclear Weapon Free Zone

SEARCCT Southeast Asia Regional Centre for Counter-Terrorism

SEATO Southeast Asia Treaty Organization

SOM Senior Official Meeting

TAC Treaty of Amity and Cooperation
UN United Nations

VAP Vientiane Action Plan

ZOPFAN Declaration on Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality
Chapter I

Introduction

1.1. Background

The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has the reputation of being most successful indigenously produced regional organization in the developing world (Narine, 1998: 195). This regional organization was established on 8 August 1967 in Bangkok, Thailand, with the signing of the ASEAN Declaration by founding Fathers, the original members are Indonesia, Malaysia, The Philippines, Singapore and Thailand (other members of ASEAN joined later one by one).\(^1\) The main aims of the creation was to promote regional peace and stability through abiding respect for justice and rule of law in the relationship among countries of the region as well as economic, cultural, and political purposes.\(^2\) The uniqueness of ASEAN is that this organization developed a method of interaction that alleviated tensions among its member states. This method is referred to as the “ASEAN Way” and involves the use of extensive consultation and consensus building to develop intramural solidarity (Narine, 1997: 961-962).

\(^1\) Brunei Darussalam joined in 1984, Vietnam in 1995, Lao PDR and Myanmar in 1997, lastly Cambodia joined in 1999 by completing all Southeast Asian countries in this organization.

\(^2\) [http://www.aseansec.org/about_ASEAN.html](http://www.aseansec.org/about_ASEAN.html)
One more purpose of creating ASEAN was to provide the small states of Southeast Asia with some degree of influence over regional events (Narine, 1997: 965). When ASEAN was formulated, Communism was a threat in Southeast Asia, and the small and weak nations feared that they would be pawns in international power competitions (Hussey, 1991: 87-88). The communist threat posed by Vietnam in particular was an external challenge which motivated ASEAN and strengthened its cohesion (Buszynski, 1997/1998: 555). Singapore’s minister George Yeo once declared that “Without the Vietnamese threat, it is doubtful that ASEAN would have become the regional grouping it is today”. At that time in the beginning ASEAN was a sub-regional organization that represented the non-Communist part of Southeast Asia. As an institution ASEAN acted as a diplomatic vehicle for the coordination of regional positions in relation to the Communist subversion and the Cambodian conflict in particular. ASEAN helped foster international efforts to bring peace and stability to the region, specifically in the aftermath of the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia (Buszynski, 1997/1998: 556-561). During the Cold War, ASEAN was the major vehicle for curbing the outbursts of intraregional hostility and conflicts that marred relationships among the member countries. The members are committed to peace and stability throughout the region, and the organization has been an effective forum to resolve many disputes (Hussey, 1991: 97).

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An ASEAN Community is projected to be established comprising three pillars, namely political and security cooperation, economic cooperation, and socio-cultural cooperation that are closely intertwined and mutually reinforcing for the purpose of ensuring durable peace, stability and shared prosperity in Southeast Asia (Severino, 2006: 342-344). The ASEAN Political-Security Community (APSC) aims to ensure that countries in the region to live at peace with one another and with the world in the just, democratic and harmonious environment. The members of the Community pledges to rely on peaceful processes in the settlement of intra-regional differences and regards their security as fundamentally linked to one another and bound by geographic location, common vision and objectives. It has the following components: political development, shaping and sharing of norms, conflict prevention, conflict resolution, post-conflict peace building, and implementing mechanisms. The APSC blueprint envisages ASEAN to be a rules-based community of shared values and norms; a cohesive, peaceful, stable and resilient region with shared responsibility for comprehensive security; as well as a dynamic and outward looking in an increasingly integrated and interdependent world. The APSC marks out several areas where intensified political and security cooperation is to take place: setting values and norms; maritime security; weapons of mass destruction; terrorism and transnational crime; defence cooperation; the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and cooperation with the United Nations (UN) (Severino, 2006: 355-356).

4 ASEAN official webpage: http://www.aseansec.org/18741.htm
For ASEAN, the end of the Cold War came with Vietnam military withdrawal from Cambodia in late 1989. In spite of the decline of the Soviet Union, ASEAN security policy did not change much because of its northern neighbors. Concerns aroused by China’s rapid growth, its military build-up, and military emphasis which increased toward Taiwan, Hong Kong, and the Spratly Islands. In addition to this, worrying questions such as Japan’s future role in the region, disputes in the Korean Peninsula, and uncertainty about the American commitment to Southeast Asian security came up without answers. Beside these larger issues, there are numerous smaller territorial disputes and political tensions in Southeast Asia. Reacting to these uncertainties and to the inescapably superior power, the ASEAN governments have adopted a multipurpose array of security policies – the ARF. ASEAN seeks through the ARF to expand its consensus-building, conflict avoidance process to the region as a whole (Denoon and Colbert, 1997/98: 508-509).

ASEAN leaders recognized that their security to a considerable extent would depend on the Asia-Pacific security dialogue that would involve all major actors, but they tried to protect their organization from the consequences. With this in mind ASEAN leaders attempted to orchestrate the development of regional security dialogue in a way that would retain the regional organization as its central feature. The ARF was an attempt to meet the need for Asia-Pacific security regionalism while maintaining the ASEAN structure. According to the 27th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting (AMM) in 1994, the ARF was to become an effective consultative Asia-Pacific
forum for promoting open dialogue on political and security cooperation in the region. At the 28th AMM in 1995, ASEAN’s role is emphasized as the primary driving force of the ARF (Buszynski, 1997/98: 570-572). The ARF was founded to build confidence between states and to reduce the likelihood of conflict between them by promoting the notion of “comprehensive security”⁶ (Severino, 2009: 18-19).

1.2. Objectives of research

This research tries to attain following objectives:

- To find out what kind of role ASEAN Security Cooperation plays in Southeast Asia;
- To find out factors which influence ASEAN Security Cooperation;
- To examine how these factors are important for intra/extra-regional security of member states.

⁶ Comprehensive Security was first formally coined in Japan in the 1970s. The concept is used and interpreted in very different ways in different parts of the region. In ASEAN it is interpreted as ‘an over-arching organizing concept for the management of security in the region which might be agreeable to all states’ (Capie and Evans, 2007: 65-74).
1.3. Significance of the research

ASEAN includes cultural, identical very diverse countries. ASEAN provides an important and rich area of investigation into the study of security communities. Since its formation, ASEAN is portrayed variously as a “region of revolt”, the “Balkans of East” and so on. The weak socio-political cohesion of the region’s governments, intra-regional ideological polarization, interstate territorial disputes, intervention by external powers were marked features of the geopolitical landscape of Southeast Asia. These conflicts posed a threat not only to the survival of some of the region’s new states, but also to the prospects for regional order as a whole (Acharya, 2001: 4-5).

In the beginning, the establishment of ASEAN did not inspire much hope for peace and stability in the region. At that time, Southeast Asian states were facing a number of security issues within and/or among states such as domestic instability (armed insurgency, religious movements, regime legitimacy and political succession), territorial conflicts (disputes over land borders), maritime disputes (disputes overlapping exclusive economic zones, continental shelf) (Thayer, 1998: 100-103). But ASEAN survived. By the early 1990s, ASEAN members could claim their grouping to be one of the most successful experiments in regional cooperation in the developing world.
Beside this, there is so much criticism as well as support over the issue of whether ASEAN Way could play an indeed role as an ASEAN model vis-à-vis Western models of regional cooperation, which are based on legalistic and formalistic institutions (Acharya, 2001: 158-163). Some scholars argue that the ASEAN Way succeeded as a norm, but at the same time there are a lot critical opinions that give controversial arguments. It needs to be studied to what extent it is controversial.

1.4. Limitations of the study

There are two limitations in this study, firstly most of articles related to ASEAN studies are done on the basis of international relations theories by supporting one of the theories. In my study, research will not be based on theories because of my lack of knowledge on theories.

Secondly, this study will be based on secondary sources only such as articles, books, newspapers, official reports, related websites etc. The secondary sources may not be as effective as primary source such as interview from informants or any information directly collected from originators of the evidence to develop my own argument.
1.5. Chapter outlines

Chapter II captures several related articles, which explain mainly if ASEAN is successful or not as a regional organization in terms of security. Since most researchers focus on ASEAN’s success and/or failure, literature review section is divided into three groups by providing ASEAN’s success supportive articles, ASEAN’s success criticizing articles and also articles, which are not related to above-mentioned two groups. In other words, the third group does not explain about success or failure, but organization itself. Of course, articles related to the ARF are also included, since the ARF is ASEAN-led security institution. Accordingly, this chapter includes research questions and methodology how to conduct this study.

Chapter III is about the ARF, one of the main regional security institutions of ASEAN, which also covers whole the Asia Pacific. In this chapter mainly the reasons why ASEAN needed to create multilateral framework in a wide Asia Pacific to claim ASEAN’s role among great powers is explained. And also it is complimented with the argument if ASEAN could manage its leading role in this highly discussed organization among researchers. At the same time it provides information of establishment, development of the institution.

The APSC, one of the subsections of accelerated ongoing plan of ASEAN Community 2015, is covered in the chapter IV. The APSC’s uniqueness is being ASEAN based security community, which is dedicated to solve inter-state security
problems among ASEAN member states. At the same time it includes ASEAN non-member countries in some activities such as ADMM-Plus in order to keep up with neighboring countries level. It also provides argument if this ASEAN-based security community is managing well issues of member states.

Finally, chapter V concludes overall sections of this study by providing answers to the main questions of this research. The chapter consists of overview of the research, answers of the research questions finalizing with the suggestion to the future researches.
Chapter II

Literature Review

2.1. Introduction

There are numerous studies for ASEAN in different aspects since its establishment. Most of scholars seem to be eager to analyze this regional organization from different perspectives of international relations theories. As a result, most of studies create mainly two groups according to the opinions of scholars. The first one is supportive, in that scholars have positive opinions about ASEAN security cooperation as a regional organization. The second one is critical, in that scholars have negative or critical opinions about ASEAN. Accordingly, I will divide literature into three groups: a) articles with supportive opinions b) articles with critical opinions and c) other ASEAN or ARF related articles.

2.1.1. Articles with supportive/positive opinions

A constructivist scholar Haacke (2003) argued that due to concerns about ASEAN’s image and reputation, some of shared understandings intrinsic to
ASEAN’s long-standing diplomatic and security culture have been relaxed, particularly the principle of non-interference. Norms associated with the ‘ASEAN way’ are still perceived to serve the important and necessary function of helping to mediate estrangement and insecurity among ASEAN leaderships, as well as limiting interference by non-ASEAN states. According to the analysis demonstrated, the majority of ASEAN governments, while prepared to refine their approach to preventive diplomacy and norms of intramural conduct, remain unprepared to accept the loss of salience of the original meaning of the core norms of the Association’s long-standing diplomatic and security culture. It is highlighted the value of insights in relation to the significance of seeking recognition in international politics. The article showed how individual ASEAN countries have accepted in general that the Association’s international recognition depends on leaving behind certain aspects of the ‘ASEAN way’, particularly – albeit not exclusively – as regards the norm of non-interference.

Another constructivist scholar Acharya (2001) argues that the concept of security community is the most useful framework to examine the evolution and nature of ASEAN’s political and security role and identify constraints it faces in developing a viable regional security community. The framework of this study focuses on the interplay of norms, socialization and identity formation in ASEAN’s approach to regional order and assesses how this interplay shaped ASEAN’s progress and potential to be regional security community. Regional socialization is important,
because the existence and the continued survival of ASEAN have been highly improbable on the basis of the traditional indicators of regionalism. The sheer diversity among ASEAN members in terms of size, populations, cultural and linguistic differences, and political systems predisposes Southeast Asia against a viable form of regionalism. Acharya concludes his book by mentioning that in promoting peaceful intra-regional relations; ASEAN – one of the most successful regional organizations in the developing world – now is in serious need to reinvent itself. The nature and extent of this transformation will be crucial to determining whether it will be an ascendant or redundant instrument of regional peace and stability.

Ba (2005) is continuing the debate by offering a constructivist reply to the review by Khoo (2004) on Amitav Acharya’s book. She argues that a realist scholar Khoo may miss an important point that this is an organization that was formed in a particular context and to respond to particular kinds of problems. Ba adds to Acharya’s argument that ASEAN achieved at least nascent security community status, which is strengthened by a more pointed discussion of the building-up processes (e.g. social learning, communicative process, quality of interaction). This process is

associated with the first stages of security communities. Ba concludes that both Acharya and Khoo provided us with much to think how to stimulate discussions about theory and causation and the role of norms and institutions, as much as about evolving international relations in Southeast Asia.

2.1.2. Articles with critical/negative opinions

Narine (1998) argues that ASEAN’s ability to manage regional security in Southeast Asia is limited by two factors. The first factor is the interests and actions of great powers. These interests and actions define the parameters of ASEAN’s security policies. The second is divergent security perceptions and interests within ASEAN. They explain the limits of intra-organizational cooperation and made it difficult to evaluate the significance of ASEAN’s stated security objectives. Moreover Narine holds that the aforementioned factors affecting ASEAN during the Cold War are still at work even after the Cold War and it significantly limits its ability to shape the regional environment. Different opinions of ASEAN states over security perceptions created internal tensions, and ASEAN was largely dependent on external support in order to be an effective regional actor. As another factor, ASEAN significantly improved its internal relationships, but a strong sense of collective identity still eluded the member states. Many political, cultural, and historical barriers were standing in the way of such an identity. For the most part, their commitment to
ASEAN remained limited by a narrow understanding of their self-interests. In the post-cold war period, regional uncertainty created the impression that the region’s security environment may be amenable to ASEAN’s corporate influence.

Narine (1997) in his another article argues that the political, economic, and strategic considerations that have made ASEAN a success within Southeast Asia do not necessarily apply to the more powerful states of the Asia Pacific region. He explains his argument by emphasizing the importance of understanding the context in which ASEAN evolved and secondly, by examining the limitations of the ASEAN Way. 8 As author contends the qualities accounting for ASEAN’s success do not assume the same configuration within the ARF. The ARF includes the world’s militarily powerful states and encompasses the entire Pacific Rim. ASEAN’s techniques are unique to the conditions of the time in which they developed and the nature of its members.

Scholar Khoo (2004) is arguing that Amitav Acharya’s recent claim that a nascent security community is emerging in Southeast Asia is flawed for at least four reasons: 1. Acharya fails to adequately explain why the norms he privileges emerged

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8 ASEAN has developed a method of interaction that has alleviated tensions among its member states. This method is broadly referred to as the "ASEAN way" or the "ASEAN process," and involves the use of extensive consultation and consensus-building to develop intramural solidarity. Many ASEAN political leaders and observers have suggested that ARF adopt the ASEAN way of approaching security issues in the Asia-Pacific region: "The emphasis . . . [for ASEAN] is on process (Narine, 1997: 962).
as ASEAN’s dominant norms. According to Khoo’s theoretical perspective, the book represents a missed opportunity to engage in the burgeoning theoretical literature 2. A critical flaw in Acharya’s argument relates to its tautological nature. There is a failure to conceptualize norm robustness independent of the effects attributed to norms, thus leading to tautology. 3. From an empirical perspective, the dependent variable, the nascent ASEAN security community, has arguably never existed. The author thinks that Acharya’s emphasis on norms, socialization and identity as causal variables leading to a security community is really much ado about nothing. 4. Alternative explanations for ASEAN are not fully explored. Author is mentioning that a problem of many [constructivist] studies is a neglect of alternative explanations, particularly realist ones, for the effects attributed to norms. According to the Khoo’s argument, this analysis suggests that constructivists should recalibrate their research lenses.

2.1.3. Other related articles

Collins (2007) analyzed the formation of a security community by taking lessons from ASEAN. The author is arguing that ASEAN has never been a nascent security community but has instead been a security regime and therefore its norm compliance does not provide evidence of community building. However, ASEAN’s norms indicate that it is a nascent security community ready to transform itself into a fully-fledged security community. According to Collin’s opinion, if ASEAN is to form a security community, it is only when the governing elite enables elites representing regional civil society organizations (CSOs) to have an influence on
policy formation that such a community can be established. This is because regional CSOs can generate a common identification among the people, which is essential for community formation and by representing that common identification in the decision making process, CSOs can play a prominent role in decision making. Such a development encourages community formation because it enables the people to take ownership of the community’s development, thus both endangering a greater sense of common identity and introducing to the decision-making process.

Katsumata (2004), in answering the question “Why has ASEAN diplomacy been changing?”, addresses two supplemental questions: first, why it was in the late 1990s that ASEAN diplomacy began to change; and second, why some of the members have promoted a flexible interpretation of the non-interference principle, while others are rather reluctant to modify the ASEAN Way of diplomacy. Katsumata gives explanation from the point of two different opinions. A conventional/rationalist explanation holds that the ASEAN countries began to have open and frank discussion in order to deal with new challenges, such as economic and environmental issues, in an efficient way. Constructivists explain ASEAN’s change by focusing on the global normative shift, which emphasizes human rights and democracy.

In another article Katsumata (2006) seeks to offer a sounder explanation from a constructivist perspective to a conventional explanation of the establishment of the ARF that it was an attempt on the part of ASEAN to maintain US military engagement in Asia while tactically promoting cooperative relations with China in
the post-Cold War era. He tries to answer according to different perspectives of international relations theories and finds that the most appropriate view is constructivist, since the ARF is a norm-oriented framework. Other neo-liberal and realist views’ explanations are not entirely wrong, but insufficient. In the norm-oriented framework of the ARF, the participants seek regional peace and cooperation, because cooperative behavior meets the standard of appropriateness in the light of relevant norms. Therefore, for constructivists, the cooperative security is significant in terms of norms, although it may appear a “talking shop” with no strategic significance.

Heller (2005) discusses the structure and functioning of the ARF and analyses the relevance of the ARF to the interests of its central members such as ASEAN states and most powerful national actors such as the United States, Japan and China. The author argues that the ARF is a forum that reflects the convergence strategic interests of both regional and external actors. It is concluded by stating that the ARF is not sufficiently effective to secure peace and stability in the Asia Pacific, nevertheless there are no institutions, which could offer alternative solution.

2.2. Critical assessment of the past literature

Most of articles of past literature were focusing on ASEAN/the ARF security issues from the point of theoretical perspectives and argued that ASEAN either is a
successful regional organization or unsuccessful one. It is not so clear if ASEAN was successful in terms of what. Some studies are done by arguing if ASEAN is nascent security community or ascendant one and there is a big discussion among scholars. As a result it is still not decided which one is more appropriate for ASEAN as a regional organization.

There is not much study about ASEAN Political-Security Community. Since this community is one of the main components of ASEAN’s community-building I will try to give more comprehensive analysis of the ASEAN Political-Security Community as well as the ARF and any other security cooperation studies of ASEAN.

2.3. Research questions

1. What factors have encouraged ASEAN to develop Southeast Asia’s security cooperation?
2. What are the functions of regional institutions to manage security affairs (APSC and the ARF)?

2.4. Research methodology

The method of this research is qualitative, which involves an interpretive, naturalistic approach to its subject matter (Denzin and Lincoln, 1998: 3). In this
research it consists of a set of interpretive, material practices that are collected from secondary sources such as articles, books, newspapers, and websites and so on. In addition, data will also be collected from respective government reports, and other official documents which will provide useful information for the regional organization.

The approach for the qualitative method will be case study, which provides in-depth understanding of a case (in this study the case is regional security institutions in Southeast Asia) by analyzing data through description of the case and themes of the case (Creswell, 2007: 73-81). The general structure of the approach includes problem questions, case study, data collection, description of the case, development of issues, details about selected issues and also assertions.
Chapter III

ASEAN Regional Forum

3.1. Introduction

ASEAN’s efforts to manage regional security in the post-cold war era are exemplified by the creation of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). By establishing the ARF, which is known as the first truly multilateral security forum covering the wider Asia Pacific region, ASEAN was attempting to use the present state of regional uncertainty to its own advantage by adopting new policies and creating new structures. According to some scholars’ opinions including Acharya (2001: 165-167), the ARF was seen by ASEAN as a device for engaging great powers such as the US, Japan, Russia, and China in the region so as to maintain a stable regional balance of power.

This chapter consists of three sections. The first explains the process of the establishment of the ARF by providing motivations to establish the ARF. The second section discusses the development of the ARF including the Concept Paper, which is the core rule of the ARF followed by expansion of new members to the ARF. It also includes objectives and achievements of the ARF by giving prominent scholars’ arguments whether it is successful and/or useful institution or not in order to support
my own analysis. And finally, the role of the ARF in ASEAN will follow previous sections. The conclusion of this chapter provides main findings relevant to my research questions.

3.2. Establishment of the ARF

At the end of the Cold War, some regional specialists and policy-makers suggested that traditional bilateral security arrangements would not be sufficient to address a rising regional interdependence and cope with the uncertain security environment in East Asia. This led to a variety of proposals to promote multilateralism (Emmers, 2003: 30-31). Some leaders in 1986 called for the creation of an Asian-Pacific equivalent to the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). At the ASEAN-PMC in 1990, foreign ministers of Australia and Canada suggested separately an Asia-Pacific conference on security and cooperation. But this was opposed by the United States that feared the potential weakening of its bilateral security arrangements. In addition, most East Asian leaders felt uncomfortable with a European model for cooperation (Emmers, 2003: 111-113).

With Foreign Minister Nakayama’s proposal for a multilateral forum in 1991, Japan played an active role in promoting a security dialogue in Asia and Pacific region. Together with the first dispatch of Japanese Self Defense Forces in 1992 and positive statement by Prime Minister Miyazawa in Bangkok in 1993, the establishment of the ASEAN Regional Forum became a diplomatic success from the

The proposal did not receive much pronounced support on the spot. In hindsight, however, the Nakayama proposal and subsequent Japanese diplomacy arguably made significant contributions to the establishment of the ASEAN Regional Forum.

3.2.1. The process of establishment of the ARF

About the reason why the ARF was established, Fukushima (2003: 276-277) mentions that unlike Europe, which has multilateral and multilayered security governance institutions such as the NATO, the EU and the OSCE, Asian countries do not share common threat and they did not have multilateral security frameworks during even after the cold war. On the contrary, they are mutually suspicious of the military intentions of other states within the region. In this context, Severino (2009: 7-8) gives following reasons why the concept of CSCE was not applicable for the Asia Pacific.

After all, there were numerous territorial disputes, major and minor, between Asia Pacific states, in which neither protagonist was willing to back and down – between Japan and China, Japan and Russia, Japan and Koreas, Indonesia and Malaysia, Malaysia and Singapore, Malaysia and the Philippines, Cambodia and Thailand, Cambodia and Vietnam, and there was
the whole question of the overlapping claims to all or parts of the South China Sea. Freezing
the borders across the board would obviously not be possible or acceptable, as it was in
Europe. Indeed, Japan rejected any analogy with the CSCE, fearing that that would damage
its efforts to regain the “northern territories”, islands that the Soviet Union had seized at the
end of the Pacific War. More broadly, the conditions in Europe and the Asia Pacific were
immensely different in a great number of ways, including the vast variety of the political
systems in the Asia Pacific.

Post-Cold War multilateral security cooperation in the Asia Pacific seemed to
be dependent on an extension of the ASEAN model to a wider region. The idea of
using PMC as a forum for regional security was officially discussed during the 1991
AMM and confirmed at the highest level during the fourth ASEAN summit, held in
Singapore in 1992. Encouraged by Tokyo and Washington, a first ASEAN-PMC
Senior Officials Meeting (SOM) was organized in Singapore in May 1993. The
foreign ministers of ASEAN countries and of the seven dialogue partners – Japan,
South Korea, Australia, New Zealand, the United States, Canada, and the EU –
decided at the meeting to invite the foreign ministers of China, Russia, Vietnam, Laos,
and Papua New Guinea, to a special session in the same year. In the same year, it was
agreed that the first working session would take place in Bangkok one year later. The
first ARF meeting took place in Bangkok on 25 July 1994 (Emmers, 2003: 30-31).
3.2.2. ASEAN’s motivations to establish the ARF

Amidst the power shifts and uncertainties of the post-Cold War era, many states in the Asia Pacific region particularly ASEAN, saw the need for a new political security framework that would help them maintain the necessary equilibrium for sustainable peace and prosperity in the region (Caballero-Anthony, 2005: 124-125). ASEAN leaders were very conscious of the danger that an Asia Pacific security dialogue would result in the displacement of the organization. At the 26th AMM, the Prime Minister of Singapore Goh Chok Tong stressed that ASEAN must not allow its future to be decided by external powers and emphasized the need to maintain organizational cohesion.  

Severino (2009: 12-13) mentions following statement: “ASEAN also saw that grafting the new forum onto ASEAN would ensure that Southeast Asians had a voice in whatever arrangements and processes would emerge in the new security environment.” ASEAN’s decision to establish the ARF resulted from several motivations. The most important of them were the end of the Cold War, fear of American strategic retreat from the region, intra-regional relations of ASEAN countries, and rise of China in Asia.

The end of the Cold War confronted ASEAN with new challenges as well as opportunities for trying to reshape regional order. The end of the US-Soviet and Sino-
Soviet rivalries contributed to a substantial reduction in regional tensions and the prospect for competitive external intervention in Southeast Asia. However, ASEAN members became concerned about a “power vacuum” in the region, which might lead to new kinds of conflicts and rivalry involving external powers (Acharya, 2001: 167-168). The Southeast Asian countries were concerned about East Asia being dominated by a more assertive Japan and a rising China. Moreover, the smaller Southeast Asian countries were eager to maintain their diplomatic status in the regional arena. These circumstances at the end of the Cold War were an impetus to reshape the regional order through the of Asia-Pacific multilateralism (Emmers, 2008: 194-196).

One of other motives was to keep the United States engaged in Southeast Asia despite its traumatic experience in Indochina and the end of the Cold War and despite Washington’s misgivings about multilateral security arrangements in the Asia Pacific, might tend to undermine its bilateral defense alliances or be perceived as a cover for American withdrawal. Changes in the regional strategic environment forced the ASEAN countries to question their sub-regional approach to security. This primarily resulted from the external origins of post-Cold War security challenges and the strategic and economic interdependence linking their sub-region to the rest of the Asia Pacific. It was regarded by ASEAN as a diplomatic instrument to promote a continuing the US involvement in the region and to encourage China into habits of good international behavior. Furthermore, the creation of the ARF was meant to
ensure the ongoing relevance of ASEAN. Its members needed to avoid being excluded from a strategic architecture that was chiefly dependent on a Sino-Japanese-US triangle. ASEAN hoped therefore to consolidate its diplomatic position by further developing its stabilizing role in Southeast Asia and beyond.

However there was a motivation for the possibilities of intra-regional organization, which ASEAN’s own contributions to regional security. Intra-regional relations of ASEAN countries may be divided into three categories. Firstly, the spillover affect of domestic conflicts, especially ethnic, political, ideological challenges to state structure and regime security. Secondly, disputes over territory between Malaysia-Singapore, Malaysia-Indonesia, Thai-Malaysia, Malaysia-Brunei, Philippines-Malaysia, which leads to interstate tensions bordering on violence. Additionally, disputes exist in the maritime arena over issues such as boundary demarcation, exclusive economic zones, fishing rights and resource exploitation. Thirdly, relations of countries are tested by lingering animosities which have ethnic, cultural, religious and nationalist roots. It creates big tensions between especially neighbor countries (Acharya, 2001: 129-133, 178). As the Philippine’s Defense Secretary Fidel Ramos argued: “The foundation of regional stability and security in our region would be truly solid if the ASEAN countries could forge collaborations
among themselves and reduce their dependency on outside actors for their defense and nation-building requirements.”

In the post-Cold War era, a possible scramble among regional powers namely Japan and to lesser extent, India raised fears in ASEAN members. But especially China’s rising power was the most central issue facing the ASEAN members (Emmers, 2001: 119). Potential regional hegemony by China feared especially Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines regarding the growing salience of problems such as territorial disputes in the South China Sea by encouraging ASEAN states to be in the driver seat of the ARF (Acharya, 2001: 177-179). The ASEAN members appeared to believe that the ARF norms based on standard international norms would encourage China not to threaten its smaller partners (Emmers, 2001: 117-118). In this way ASEAN states considered how to manage rise of China by promoting and strengthening conditions for regional peace and stability (Ba, 2009: 179-184). However, China could not afford to be left out of a multilateral security forum that included the most significant regional states (Emmers, 2001: 117). China also had its own political and economic interest to maintain with other powerful states as well as relatively small partners.

3.3. Development of the ARF

The 26th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting and Post Ministerial Conference, which were held in Singapore on 23-25 July 1993, agreed to establish the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). The First Meeting of the ARF was held in Bangkok on 25 July 1994 in accordance with the 1992 Singapore Declaration of the Fourth ASEAN Summit, whereby the ASEAN Heads of State and Government proclaimed their intent to intensify ASEAN’s external dialogues in political and security matters as a means of building cooperative ties with states in the Asia-Pacific region. Attending the Meeting were the Foreign Ministers of ASEAN, ASEAN’s Dialogue Partners⁷, ASEAN’s Consultative Partners China and Russia, and ASEAN’s observers or their representatives Vietnam, Laos, and Papua New Guinea. The Minister of Foreign Affairs of Thailand, served as Chairman of the Meeting.¹² It was the first time that ministers of countries in East Asia and of the major powers with interests in the

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¹¹ ASEAN’s Dialogue Partners included Australia, Canada, the European Union, Japan, New Zealand, Republic of Korea, and the United States which were ASEAN’s major trading partners with the aim of secure technical assistant for regional cooperation projects; promote trade and economic relations; and strengthen political relations with third countries and regional groupings by Pushpanatan, (2003) ASEAN’s Strategy towards its Dialogue Partners and ASEAN Plus Three Process, ASEAN COCI Seminar on ASEAN New Issues and Challenges: http://www.asean.org/15397.htm
region sat down together to discuss issues having to do security and stability in the Asia Pacific, including measures to strengthen regional security and stability (Severino, 2009: 14-15).

The main objectives of the ARF are following statements as confirmed in the First ARF Chairman’s Statement (1994):

1. To foster constructive dialogue and consultation on political and security issues of common interest and concern;

2. To make significant contributions to efforts towards confidence-building and preventive diplomacy in the Asia-Pacific region.\(^{13}\)

### 3.3.1. The ARF’s development process

The 27th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting (1994) stated that "The ARF could become an effective consultative Asia-Pacific Forum for promoting open dialogue on political and security cooperation in the region. In this context, ASEAN should work with its ARF partners to bring about a more predictable and constructive pattern of

\(^{13}\) The First ARF, 1994, ARF Chairman’s Statement: http://www.aseanregionalforum.org/PublicLibrary/ARFChairmansStatementsandReports/ChairmansStatementofthe1stMeetingoftheASE/tabid/201/Default.aspx
relations in the Asia Pacific". The ARF was an attempt to meet the need for Asia Pacific security regionalism while maintaining the ASEAN structure. External actors recognized that ASEAN was the only effective substructure for an Asia-Pacific security dialogue and were willing to accommodate ASEAN needs in this respect (Buszynski, 1997-1998: 570-571).

The chairman of the first meeting made his following statement:

Being the first time ever that high-ranking representatives from the majority of states in the Asia-Pacific region came to specifically discuss political and security cooperation issues, the Meeting was considered a historical event for the region. More importantly, the Meeting signified the opening of a new chapter of peace, stability and cooperation for Southeast Asia. The participants of the Meeting held a productive exchange of views on the current political and security situation in the Asia-Pacific region, recognizing that developments in one part of the region could have an impact on the security of the region as whole. It was agreed that, as a high-level consultative forum, the ARF had enabled the countries in the Asia-Pacific region to foster the habit of constructive dialogue and consultation on political and security issues of common interest and concern. In this respect, the ARF would be in a position to make

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significant contributions to efforts towards confidence-building and preventive diplomacy in the Asia-Pacific region.\textsuperscript{15}

Moreover the first meeting agreed to convene the ARF on an annual basis and hold the second meeting in Brunei Darussalam in 1995. It also endorsed the purposes and principles of ASEAN’s Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) in Southeast Asia, as a code of conduct governing relations between states and a unique diplomatic instrument for regional confidence-building, preventive diplomacy, and political and security cooperation (Severino, 2009: 15). These principles include the peaceful settlement of inter-state disputes, the renunciation of the use or threat of force in the relations between states, and non-interference in one another’s internal affairs.\textsuperscript{16}

The second meeting of the ARF ministers in Bandar Seri Begawan on 1 August 1995 was devoted largely to shaping and defining the forum’s nature, purposes, and processes. These were embodied in two documents. One was the Concept Paper drawn up in ASEAN and cleared with the other ARF participants. The other was the Chairman’s Statement drafted by the Brunei chair, worked out within ASEAN, and negotiated with the other participants. The chairman’s statement defined the character of the ARF as “a forum for open dialogue and consultation on regional political and security issues, to discuss and reconcile the differing views

\textsuperscript{15} The First ARF, 1994, ARF Chairman’s Statements and Reports: http://www.aseanregionalforum.org/PublicLibrary/ARFChairmansStatementsandReports/ChairmansStatementofthe1stMeetingoftheASE/tabid/201/Default.aspx

\textsuperscript{16} Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia: http://www.aseansec.org/1217.htm
between ARF participants in order to reduce the risk of security”. According to the statement, the ministers agreed that the ARF should “move at a pace comfortable to all participants” (Severino, 2009: 16-17).

In the statement organization of the ARF is mentioned in the following way:

✓ There shall be an annual ARF in the context of the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting and Post Ministerial Conferences to be preceded by ARF-SOM;

✓ The ARF process would move along two tracks. Track one activities will be carried out by ARF governments. Track Two activities shall be carried out by strategic institutes and relevant non-governmental organizations to which all ARF participants should be eligible. To be meaningful and relevant, the ARF Chairman shall ensure that Track Two activities result from full consultations with all ARF participants; and

✓ The ARF shall be apprised of all Track One and Track Two activities through the current Chairman of the ARF, who will be the main link between Track One and Track Two.\(^\text{17}\)

The following table shows the annual ARF meeting and important decisions taken in the meetings every year.

\(^{17}\text{Chairman’s Statement of the 2}\text{nd Meeting of the ARF:}\n\text{http://www.aseanregionalforum.org/PublicLibrary/ARFChairmansStatementsandReports/ChairmansStatementofthe2ndMeetingoftheASE/tabid/199/Default.aspx}\n
### Table 3.1. The process of the ARF activities according to each year meetings

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>#</th>
<th>Place, date</th>
<th>Joined members</th>
<th>The ARF process</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Bangkok, 25 July 1994</td>
<td>ASEAN (except Cambodia, Myanmar), dialogue, consultative partners and observers</td>
<td>Agreed to endorse the purposes and principles of ASEAN’s Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia, as a code of conduct governing relations between states and a unique diplomatic instrument for regional confidence-building, preventive diplomacy, and political and security cooperation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Bandar Seri Begawan, 1 August 1995</td>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>Considered and endorsed the Report of the Chairman of the ARF-SOM. They adopted the proposals in the context of the Concept Paper.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Jakarta, 23 July 1996</td>
<td>India, Myanmar</td>
<td>Considered the guiding principles and criteria suggested in the Chairman’s Paper on Criteria for Participation in the ARF as recommended by the ARF-SOM.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Subang Jaya, 27 July 1997</td>
<td></td>
<td>Welcomed the entry into force of the SEANWFZ Treaty 18 which represents an important effort of Southeast Asian</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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18 The Southeast Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (SEANWFZ) Treaty or the Bangkok Treaty of 1995, is a nuclear weapons moratorium treaty between 10 Southeast Asian member and obliges its members not to develop, manufacture or otherwise acquire, possess or have control over nuclear weapons. [http://www.nti.org/e_research/official_docs/inventory/pdfs/seanwfz.pdf](http://www.nti.org/e_research/official_docs/inventory/pdfs/seanwfz.pdf)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Action and Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Manila, 27 July 1998</td>
<td>Mongolia</td>
<td>Agreed to consider the call of the TAC High Contracting Parties for non-Southeast Asian states, particularly the major powers, to accede to the Treaty after the Second Protocol enters into force.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Singapore, 26 July 1999</td>
<td></td>
<td>Recognized the Treaty of Amity and Co-operation in Southeast Asia (TAC) as a key regional instrument for strengthening security in the region.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Bangkok, 27 July 2000</td>
<td>Democratic People’s Republic of Korea</td>
<td>Welcomed the establishment of the ARF Register of Experts/Eminent Persons to be available for use by ARF members on the voluntary basis, and the first volume of the ARF Annual Security Outlook (ASO), produced by individual participants on a without editing by the ARF Chair.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Ha Noi, 25 July 2001</td>
<td></td>
<td>Agreed to adopt the Paper on the Enhanced Role of ARF Chair, of which most of the work done by Japan.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Bandar Seri Begawan,</td>
<td></td>
<td>Welcomed the establishment of an Inter-sessional Meeting on Counter-Terrorism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Location</td>
<td>Event Description</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------</td>
<td>------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 July 2002</td>
<td></td>
<td>and Transnational Crime (ISM on CT-TC) and noted a Concept Paper submitted by the United States and Malaysia would serve as a good basis for the work of the new ISM.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Phnom Penh, 18 June 2003</td>
<td>Welcomed the establishment of the Southeast Asia Regional Centre for Counter-Terrorism (SEARCCT) in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, and also the establishment of the APEC Counter-Terrorism Task Force.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** ARF Documents Series: http://aseanregionalforum.asean.org/library/arf-publication/459.html

### 3.3.2. The ARF’s Concept Paper

The Concept Paper was drawn up in ASEAN and was approved with the other ARF participants. The Concept Paper noted the region’s great diversity in size, level of development, culture, ethnic make-up, religion and history. Because of this diversity, the ARF participants had different approaches to matters of peace and security, which in turn, required what it called “a consensual approach to security issues”. In this paper, it was stressed that the ASEAN model of cooperation could be emulated by the rest of that region, since ASEAN fostered habits of cooperation, and provided the catalyst for encouraging regional cooperation in the wider Asia-Pacific region. Then, the paper recommended three stages for the evolution of the ARF –
confidence building, the development of mechanisms for “preventive diplomacy”, and over the long term, modalities for conflict resolution. In terms of process, the ministers noted that “ASEAN undertakes the obligation to be primary driving force” while assuring the other participants of their “active, full and equal participation”.

The Concept Paper laid down some ground rules for the forum. One was that the ministerial meeting would take place annually on the occasion of the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting under ASEAN chairmanship. The ARF would not have a secretariat. Decisions would be made by consensus. The forum would progress “at a pace comfortable to all participants”. This was evidently to give reassurance that nobody would railroad or ram through measures that others might deem to be threatening to them. The third stage – originally “development of conflict-resolution mechanisms” – would now be “elaboration of approaches to conflicts”. According to Severino (2009: 17) these cautious formulations are the result of the worry of some delegations, notably the Chinese that attempts at multilateral conflict resolution would give certain powers the sanction to get involved in issues like, for example, the South China Sea or the Taiwan problem, not to mention internal dissent or separatism.

The concept of the Preventive Diplomacy was first introduced by former U.N. Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, which is “action to prevent disputes from arising between the parties, to prevent existing disputes from escalating into conflicts, and to limit the spread of the latter when they occur”, An Agenda for Peace, 1992 cited Yuzawa, (2006: 787) ‘The Evolution of Preventive Diplomacy in the ASEAN Regional Forum: Problems and Prospects’, *Asian Survey* 46 (5): 785-804.
3.3.3. Expansion of new members to the ARF

At the official level, the creation of the ARF started with the call of the ASEAN Summit for ASEAN to use the Post-ministerial Conference (PMC) to intensify its external dialogues in political and security matters. The ASEAN Dialogue system, of which the PMC is the centerpiece, originally intended to link ASEAN with leading developed countries for economic purposes as well as to intensify discussion of political and security issues in the past particularly with respect to the Asia Pacific. As preparations got underway it became clear to ASEAN’s officials and Dialogue Partners that discussion of regional political and security matters would not be effective without the participation of China, Russia or Vietnam, none of which was at that time an ASEAN member or Dialogue Partner. Therefore, it was quickly decided to bring in ASEAN’s “consultative partners” – China and Russia, and observers – Laos, Papua New Guinea and Vietnam.

In addition to the ARF’s initially conceived members – ASEAN’s members, Dialogue Partners, consultative partners and observers – the ARF had the European Community (to expand later into the European Union), the only non-state participant in the ARF. France and United Kingdom sought to take part in the ARF on their own, separately from the EU. Their claim was based on several factors such as being permanent members of the UN Security Council, being recognized nuclear-weapon
states and so on. However, ASEAN has not been able to reconcile the proposed separate involvement of France and United Kingdom with continued participation of the EU.

From the beginning, the ARF made it clear that it was open to participation by others in addition to its original composition. According to the ARF’s Concept Paper, “Applications to participate in the ARF shall be submitted to the Chairman of the ARF who will then consult the other ARF participants”.20 Being requested by the second ARF ministerial meeting, the Indonesian chairman produced a paper proposing criteria for admission to the forum in the round of consultations with other ARF participants (Severino, 2009: 23-24).

The participation criteria adopted in July 1996 by the ARF are following:

✓ **Commitment:** All new participants, who will all be sovereign states, must subscribe to, and work cooperatively to help achieve the ARF's key goals. Prior to their admission, all new participants should agree to abide by and respectfully the decisions and statements already made by the ARF. All ASEAN members are automatically participants of ARF.

✓ **Relevance:** A new participant should be admitted only if it can be demonstrated that it has an impact on the peace and security of the

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20 The ARF’s Concept Paper:
"geographical footprint" of key ARF activities (i.e. Northeast and Southeast Asia as well as Oceania).

✓ **Gradual expansion:**

Efforts must be made to control the number of participants to a manageable level to ensure the effectiveness of the ARF.

✓ **Consultations:** All applications for participation should be submitted to the Chairman of the ARF, who will consult all the other ARF participants at the SOM and ascertain whether a consensus exists for the admission of the new participant. Actual decisions on participation will be approved by the Ministers.\(^2\)

In its third year, the ARF participants were concerned about any rapid expansion of the forum. Prudently, ASEAN and the other ARF participants agreed that the ARF should expand carefully and cautiously. As the ARF process is barely three years old, it would be advisable to consolidate the ARF process before expanding it rapidly. Efforts must be made to control the number of participants to a manageable level to ensure the effectiveness of the ARF.\(^2\)

In 2000, North Korean Foreign Minister Paek Nam-sun wrote to the ARF chairman seeking participation in the regional forum, and an application was swiftly

\(^{21}\) The ARF Participation Criteria: [http://aseanregionalforum.asean.org/about.html](http://aseanregionalforum.asean.org/about.html)

\(^{22}\) The Third ARF, 23 July, 1996, Guiding Principles (iii):
granted. From 1994 to 1999, the Korean situation had been intensively discussed at the ARF in the absence of North Korea. Since Pyongyang’s admission, the ARF has continued to express support for negotiations on the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. From 2001 to 2007, North Korea contributed to no less than five issues of the ARF’s Annual Security Outlook. The ARF managed to bring North Korea into a comprehensive multilateral forum on security issues, the only one outside the United Nations in which Pyongyang sits together with the US, Japan and other developed countries. In the ARF North Korea can state and clarify its positions in a multilateral setting and listen to those of other participants. At the same time, the ARF has been an interested bystander in the complex process of bringing about the denuclearization of Korean Peninsula, with its accompanying threats and counter-threats, diplomatic moves and counter moves, and mutual accusations of non-compliance with previous agreements.

India joined the ARF in 1996 becoming Dialogue Partner from Sectoral Dialogue Partner. Pakistan joined the ARF in 2003 after ASEAN resolved the disagreements among its members on the matter, although India initially opposed the joining not only because Pakistan was considered to be outside the ARF “footprint”, but also because of concerns that Pakistan might raise its bilateral disputes with India at ARF meetings. Timor Leste joined the ARF in 2004 after its independence in 2002. But Timor Leste is remained ambivalent on ASEAN membership. In 2006 and 2007,
Bangladesh and Sri Lanka joined the ARF with the view that South Asia should not be represented in the ARF by India alone (Severino, 2009: 27-29).

The current participants in the ARF are as follows: Australia, Bangladesh, Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Canada, China, European Union, India, Indonesia, Japan, Democratic Peoples' Republic of Korea, Republic of Korea, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Mongolia, New Zealand, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Russian Federation, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Timor Leste, United States, and Vietnam.\(^{23}\)

### 3.3.4. Achievements of the ARF

On the tenth year of the ARF, the ARF Ministers met in Phnom Penh on 18 June 2003 and declared that "despite the great diversity of its membership, the forum had attained a record of achievements that have contributed to the maintenance of peace, security and cooperation in the region." They cited in particular:

- The usefulness of the ARF as a venue for multilateral and bilateral dialogue and consultations and the establishment of effective principles for dialogue and cooperation, featuring decision-making by consensus, non-interference, incremental progress and moving at a pace comfortable to all;

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\(^{23}\) The ARF current members: http://aseanregionalforum.asean.org/about.html
✓ The willingness among ARF participants to discuss a wide range of security issues in a multilateral setting;
✓ The mutual confidence gradually built by cooperative activities;
✓ The cultivation of habits of dialogue and consultation on political and security issues;
✓ The transparency promoted by such ARF measures as the exchange of information relating to defense policy and the publication of defense white papers; and
✓ The networking developed among national security, defense and military officials of ARF participants.²⁴

Being existed for more than 15 years, one of the main objectives of ASEAN countries, to keep the US in the region, in establishing the ARF was achieved. The US is still deeply involved in Asian security affairs. Its ongoing presence is a great source of stability although its commitment to multilateral institutions is little. The reason is that the US is giving preference to the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum (Emmers, 2009: 8). The other little success is that the South China Sea, a source of potential conflict in the region during the early 1990s, was relatively calm until 2009. One of the major reason is that China agreed to discuss the South China Sea disputes at the multilateral level with ASEAN at the level of conflict prevention.

If ASEAN could successfully negotiate with China and move the South China Sea disputes from conflict prevention to meaningful cooperation, it would greatly enhance its prestige as a regional body (Beckman, 2009: 159-160).

Despite aforementioned achievements, it is often argued that the ARF has lost its momentum. The forum cannot influence the Taiwan, North Korean, Kashmir and other issues in spite of the fact that these flashpoints could seriously destabilize the region. Crucial differences also contrast Northeast Asian from Southeast Asian security relations as well as other members. The territorial disputes seem to have increased rather than decreasing. The US, Japan, and China also have different expectations and strategic perspectives that cannot implicitly be ignored in the “ASEAN Way” (Emmers, 2009: 8-9). According to Katsumata (2006: 195), the ARF was ASEAN’s attempt to cooperate tactically with external powers, although it appears to be a mere “talking shop” with no strategic significance. In sum, it can be mentioned that in terms of institutional strength, the ARF has been relatively successful in engaging the great powers and promoting confidence building; however, it has generally failed to move toward preventive diplomacy (Emmers, 2008: 194-195).
3.4. The role of the ARF for ASEAN

The ARF is important for ASEAN for several reasons. First, it can help contribute to peace, stability and mutual understanding in the Asia Pacific region, of which Southeast Asia is an important and strategic part. To some extent, adverse security developments in other parts of the region impact negatively upon ASEAN’s wider political, security and economic interests. Second, the ARF enables ASEAN to play a leading role in shaping the security processes in the wider Asia Pacific region. ASEAN seeks to foster processes that are in harmony with its views on how security cooperation should proceed in the region. Third, the ARF process allows small and middle powers to hold a significant voice in regional security affairs and inhibits the major powers from dominating and dictating the regional security agenda. Fourth, ASEAN’s leadership of the process facilitated the participation of countries like China which would otherwise hesitate due to concerns that the process may be dominated by the United States and its friends. China’s participation is critical to ASEAN because of China’s centrality in many issues (Hassan, 1998: 57-59).

ASEAN settled on the name of the ARF in order to ensure the centrality of the Southeast Asian association’s role in it (Severino, 2009: 13). The role of ASEAN in the ARF is mentioned in the Concept Paper of the ARF also as following:
ASEAN has a pivotal role to play in the ARF. It has a demonstrable record of enhancing regional cooperation in the most diverse sub-region of the Asia-Pacific. It has also fostered habits of cooperation and provided the catalyst for encouraging regional cooperation in the wider Asia-Pacific region. The annual ASEAN Ministerial Meetings have contributed significantly to the positive regional environment today. There would be great hope for the Asia-Pacific if the whole region could emulate ASEAN's record of enhancing the peace and prosperity of its participants.25

As Simon (2008: 264) mentions, Southeast Asia contains no great powers with global reach. This region pales in comparison to its Northeast and South Asia neighbors.26 Yet, Southeast Asia is where most Asian regional organizations originate and whose structures and procedures are determined by Southeast Asian preferences. For example, ASEAN is able to maintain its pivotal position in Asian affairs, especially in the ARF. Organizationally, the ARF's highest level is its annual foreign minister’s meeting, always chaired by the ASEAN country occupying the rotating chairmanship. In addition to this, ASEAN goal with respect to outside powers joining

25 ARF’s Concept Paper:
26 Simon Sheldon (2008: 265) explains it by following sentences: “From a geopolitical perspective, the Asian littoral divides into three sub-regions: Northeast Asia, Southeast Asia and South Asia. Both Northeast Asia and South Asia contain political and economic Great Powers. Japan, China, South Korea and Taiwan play significant global economic roles, while Tokyo and Beijing are also major political-security players. By contrast, Southeast Asia contains no Great Powers with global reach.”
the ARF was to extend the aims and principles of ASEAN's TAC to ARF members, meaning that all agree to resolve disputes peacefully. The activist states within the ARF (the United States, Japan, Australia and Canada) have promoted a PD agenda, but the ASEAN Way procedure requiring consensus has effectively blocked it. Here, we it can be mentioned that ASEAN plays crucial role in the ARF.

3.5. Conclusion

As it is pointed out in a number of researches, the end of the Cold War motivated ASEAN to establish a multilateral security institution to engage great powers, but at the same time to show its centrality in it. As a result, the ARF was established based on the principles of inclusiveness and cooperative security in order to focus on dialogue, confidence building and the sharing of information.

ASEAN’s decision to establish the ARF was the end of the Cold War, fear of American strategic retreat from the region, intra-regional relations of ASEAN countries, and rise of China in Asia. Existing for more than 15 years, ASEAN, in some extent, achieved its objectives by keeping the US in the region, and to keep small ASEAN states among big states through the organization, driven by ASEAN.

However, there are arguments by lots of scholars that ASEAN’s attempt to cooperate tactically with external powers resulted with a mere “talking shop” with no strategic significance. The ARF has been relatively successful in engaging the great
powers and promoting confidence building; however, it has generally failed to move toward preventive diplomacy.
Chapter IV

ASEAN Political-Security Community

4.1. Introduction

The ASEAN Political-Security Community (APSC) is one of the pillars of the ASEAN Community by enhancing political and security cooperation to a higher plane. The APSC aims to ensure that the countries in Southeast Asia live in peace with one another and with the world in a just, democratic, and harmonious environment. Rather than a military alliance, the APSC is a framework based on the idea of comprehensive security with the strategic thrusts of conflict prevention, peaceful conflict resolution, and post-conflict peace building. A framework of this nature represents one of the ultimate goals of ASEAN, which has achieved a record of political cooperation since its inauguration (Shoji, 2008: 17-18).

This chapter consists of three sections. The first section explains what the APSC is including the creation of the APSC. The second section discusses the establishment of the APSC. This section includes the Bali Concord II and the Vientiane Action Plan. The third section discusses the evolution towards the APSC by analyzing achievements and role of the APSC. This part consists of three
subsections – ASEAN Charter, the ADMM and lastly Thai-Cambodian conflict. The conclusion of the chapter provides main findings relevant to the research questions.

**4.2. What is the APSC**

The APSC is one of the pillars of an ASEAN Community by 2020, which was established at Bali ASEAN Summit with so-called Bali Concord II in 2003. The APSC was first known as ASEAN Security Community and was renamed as the APSC in the ASEAN Charter in 2007. The APSC is to serve as the umbrella for bringing ASEAN’s political and security cooperation to a higher plane (Sukma, 2012: 136). In order to strengthen ASEAN integration ASEAN Leaders decided to accelerate the establishment of the ASEAN Community by 2015. Moreover it was agreed to accelerate the establishment and signed at the *Cebu Declaration on the Acceleration of an ASEAN Community by 2015* in 2007.\(^{27}\) ASEAN Community was initially resolved to establish by ASEAN Leaders at the 9th ASEAN Summit in 2003. At this declaration, the concrete outcomes of the First Coordinating Conferences for the ASEAN Security Community Plan of Action were welcomed.

The APSC has its own blueprint with the main aim to ensure that countries in the region live at peace with one another and with the world in a just, democratic and harmonious environment. The APSC Blueprint envisages ASEAN to be a rules-based

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\(^{27}\) *Cebu Declaration on the Acceleration of an ASEAN Community by 2015*: http://www.aseansec.org/19260.htm
Community of shared values and norms; a cohesive, peaceful, stable and resilient region with shared responsibility for comprehensive security; as well as a dynamic and outward-looking region in an increasingly integrated and interdependent world.  

The members of the Community pledge to rely exclusively on peaceful processes in the settlement of intra-regional differences and regard their security as fundamentally linked to one another and bound by geographic location, common vision and objectives, which includes political development; shaping and sharing of norms; conflict prevention; conflict resolution; post-conflict peace building; and implementing mechanisms.

The APSC subscribes to a comprehensive approach to security, which acknowledges the interwoven relationships of political, economic, social-cultural and environmental dimensions of development. It promotes renunciation of aggression and of the threat or use of force or other actions in any manner inconsistent with international law and reliance of peaceful settlements of dispute. In this regard, it upholds existing ASEAN political instruments such as the Declaration on Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN), the Treaty of Amity and Co-operation in South East Asia (TAC) and the Treaty on the Southeast Asian Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone (SEANWFZ), which play a pivotal role in the area of confidence building.

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29 Webpage of ASEAN Political-Security Community: http://www.aseansec.org/18741.htm
measures, preventive diplomacy and pacific approaches to conflict resolution. It also seeks to address non-traditional security issues.\(^{30}\)

**4.3. Proposals for the establishment of the APSC**

The establishment of the APSC initially started at the Bali Concord II. The proposal of the ASEAN Security Community came from Indonesia. According to Sukma, ASEAN had been floating without a sense of purpose since the 1997 economic crisis.\(^{31}\) But at the same time it was also motivated by Jakarta’s desire, as it was assuming the chairmanship of the ASEAN Standing Committee to reaffirm its leadership in ASEAN, which called some doubt by its neighbors since the downfall of Indonesia’s leader Suharto (Acharya, 2009: 259-260). It allowed Jakarta to reclaim its position as the strategic center for regional security. Sukma’s comment gives clear example for the proposal: “If Indonesia did not push for closer security cooperation through the APSC now it will need to wait for ten years before its turn come again”.\(^{32}\)

Sukma had other reasons behind the Indonesian initiative such as concerns over

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\(^{30}\) Non-traditional security issues are challenges to the survival and well-being of peoples and states that arise primarily out of non-military sources, such as climate change, resource scarcity, infectious diseases, natural disasters, irregular migration, food shortages, people smuggling, drug trafficking and transnational crime, Consortium of non-traditional security studies in Asia: http://www.rsis-ntsasia.org/ourConsortium/history.html

\(^{31}\) A key architect of the proposal of ASC, Jakarta based think-tank, Center for Strategic and International Studies

\(^{32}\) Straits Times, 21 July, 2003: http://www.straitstimes.com
Singapore-Malaysia tensions, the need to dilute the non-intervention principle, and the need for a security pillar for ASEAN to complement the Singapore-proposed ASEAN Economic Community (there could not be an economic community without a political-security foundation).

However, the proposal was greeted by skepticism and big discussion from the beginning. Most of the ASEAN members related it to the acknowledgement on Indonesia’s part that some of the initial ideas introduced were highly problematic. While ASEAN members are generally supportive of the APSC concept, it was in the specific details and actual modalities of the APSC that objections and obstacles arose. One of the highly discussed points in the concept was “Peace Keeping Force”. Being author of the original APSC concept paper, Sukma explained that there was a lack of clarity over APSC because Indonesia had not adequately explained the concept.33

Singapore’s Foreign Minister Jayakumar argued that ASEAN was the wrong entity to play a peacekeeping role, re-emphasizing that ASEAN was not a security or defense organization. By supporting Singapore’s argument, Vietnam’s Foreign Minister Nguyen Dy Nien stated that it was ‘too early’ to consider establishing a peacekeeping force, and such a peacekeeping force would be fraught with difficulties because ‘each country has its own policy about politics and the military’ (Acharya, 2009: 264-265). Thailand’s Foreign Affairs Minister Surakiart Sathirathai also rejected the idea of a peacekeeping force. He was saying that it was unnecessary to

form an ASEAN Peacekeeping Force because ‘there is no conflict in the region which would need the mobilization of such a force.’ The Philippines expressed its concern that the APSC would replicate the failure of earlier regional security organizations. The Philippines’ Foreign Minister Blas Ople recalled the failure of the US-sponsored Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), warning that it was important that the wider Asian community did not interpret the APSC as a case of ASEAN ‘ganging up against anybody’.

Malaysia has not issued any official pronouncement on the proposed ASEAN Peacekeeping Force. However, Foreign Minister Syed Hamid Albar’s comments are as followed: “We [ASEAN Leaders] agree that it is not our goal to create a military bloc. Our focus for the ASEAN Security Community is on coming up with a caring society and human security.”34 He added that defense cooperation between members was on a bilateral basis and that such an issue should not be included in the APSC (Kuah, 2004: 1-3). Consequently, based on aforementioned comments of ASEAN member states, the mechanisms such as ASEAN Peace Keeping Force, ASEAN Maritime Forum, ASEAN Maritime Safety and Surveillance Unit, and ASEAN Non-Aggression Treaty were dropped in the final version (Acharya, 2009: 264). But in the finally approved draft, such mechanisms as the ASEAN Mutual Legal Assistance

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Agreement, the ASEAN Extradition Treaty, and the ASEAN Convention on Counter Terrorism were accepted from the original Indonesian draft.\(^{35}\)

With the motivation of Jakarta’s proposal to create the ASEAN Security Community, Indonesia tried to strengthen its role in ASEAN after the downfall of Suharto (Acharya, 2007: 25). The other reason was still ongoing neighborly disputes and civil unrest among ASEAN member countries, which gave challenges to regional peace and security. For example, border disputes between Cambodia and Thailand, civil unrest in Thailand, domestic instability in Myanmar should be solved by the APSC to preserve the well-being of the community (Lim, 2011: 33-34). The creation of the APSC would help to strengthen relations of ASEAN member states. Even though most of ASEAN member states were against in the beginning, it was a very important motivation for all the members to implement their own security potential in the relations of neighboring countries of ASEAN in the intra-region level.

Although most ASEAN states were arguing regarding some parts of the concept paper by Indonesia, the general idea of the security community was good point for ASEAN. Sukma’s paper referred to the salience of addressing non-traditional threats, which was important for ASEAN. Because ASEAN has recently been interested in non-traditional security concerns, including terrorism and piracy, illegal migration, environmental degradation, pandemic diseases, and natural disasters. Along with and based on arguments in the academic society, ASEAN has developed the APSC

\(^{35}\) ASEAN Security Plan of Action: http://www.aseansec.org/16826.htm
concept, which focuses on non-traditional security as one of its major fields of cooperation for the purpose of realizing a “comprehensive” security community (Shoji, 2008: 24).

4.3.1. Bali Concord II

A Bali ASEAN Summit in Bali 2003 was important for signing of the “Bali Concord II”, signifying a rededication to the political, economic and social goals expressed at the first Bali Summit in Indonesia. The goal was to create a dynamic, cohesive, resilient and integrated ASEAN Community by the year 2020. Among three pillars, the ASEAN Security Community (APSC) was promoted by Indonesia. The goal is heightened political and security cooperation. The Indonesian proponents underline that it is not a military alliance or defense pact. It does not provide for new regional security structures. It is based on existing instruments such as the ZOPFAN, SEANWFZ, and TAC (Weatherbee, 2009: 105). The Bali Concord II reaffirms the basic principles and policies of ASEAN regional security.

The Bali Concord II charts the future direction of ASEAN security cooperation by setting forth the next steps to be taken in this regard. Basically, it is stated as “to bring ASEAN’s political and security cooperation to a higher plane” and

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36 Declaration of ASEAN Concord II (Bali Concord II): http://www.aseansec.org/15159.htm
it marks out seven areas where intensified political and security cooperation is to take place:

- Setting values and norms;
- Maritime security;
- Weapons of mass destruction;
- Terrorism and transnational crimes;
- Defense and cooperation;
- The ASEAN Regional Forum;
- Cooperation with the UN (Severino, 2006: 355-367).

As shown in the previous premises, the Bali Concord II sets out the basic framework of the APSC as follow. The aim of the APSC is to ensure that ASEAN countries live at peace with one another and with the world in a just, democratic and harmonious environment. It then stipulates that ASEAN members shall rely exclusively on peaceful measures to settle intra-regional differences. It further states that the APSC seeks comprehensive security with broad political, economic, social and cultural aspects, rather than a defense pact, military alliance or joint foreign policy.\(^\text{37}\)

The contents of the Bali Concord II make it clear that the APSC concept is the culmination of security cooperation fostered by ASEAN since its inception. It lists by

\(^{37}\) Declaration of ASEAN Concord II (Bali Concord II): http://www.aseansec.org/15159.htm
name the various treaties and declarations concluded by ASEAN in the past and the statement in the preamble that ASEAN members “are determined to ensure their stability and security from external interference in any form or manner” is similar to the expression used in the ZOPFAN Declaration.

4.3.2. Vientiane Action Plan

The Vientiane Action Plan (VAP) is adopted in Vientiane at the Tenth ASEAN Summit in 2004. The Chairman’s Statement announced the adoption of the VAP to realize the end goals of the ASEAN Vision and the Bali Concord II at a time when Southeast Asia faced changes in the regional and international situation such as terrorist attacks and avian flu. In this action plan ASEAN member states included the initiation of “the preparatory activities to develop an ASEAN Charter” as a goal in the VAP, which was formalized into mandate in 2005 (Villacorta, 2011: 306). It strengthens further ASEAN as institutional framework both in terms of its structure and process to ensure that it is responsive to the challenges and needs of moving towards an ASEAN Community, including in terms of coordination and efficiency as well as in strengthening its ability to shape events in Southeast Asia and beyond.

The VAP began with items related to the APSC; it stated that the APSC subscribes to the principle of comprehensive security, and that it viewed political and

38 Chairman’s Statement of the 10th ASEAN Summit: http://www.aseansec.org/ADS-2004.pdf
social stability, economic prosperity, and equitable development as strong foundations for the ASEAN Community. The VAP was to implement the proposed APSC by growing a democratic, tolerant, participatory and transparent community (Emmerson, 2005: 180). Being consistent with the APSC Plan of Action, the VAP for the APSC shall be pursued along five strategic thrusts, namely, political development, shaping and sharing of norms, conflict prevention, conflict resolution, and post-conflict peace-building, the implementation of which shall focus on actions that are conceivably achievable by 2010.39

Conscious that the strengthening of ASEAN integration through accelerated establishment of the ASEAN Community will reinforce ASEAN’s centrality and role as the driving force in charting the evolving regional architecture, the ASEAN Leaders decided to accelerate the establishment of the ASEAN Community by 2015. At this acceleration the ASEAN Security Community was changed slightly and renamed as the ASEAN Security Political Community, which includes political aspect as well. In 2009, the VAP was replaced by the Roadmap for the ASEAN Community, known as Cha-am Hua Hin Declaration, which was signed by ASEAN leaders in Thailand.40

40 Roadmap for an ASEAN Community:
4.4. Evolution towards the APSC

The evolution of the APSC discussions are still underway and the cooperative framework has yet to be fully formed (Shoji, 2008: 17). However, over the period from 2003 to 2006, discussions gave rise to a number of concrete results paving the way toward the establishment of the APSC, including the Declaration of ASEAN Concord II (the Bali Concord II) of 2003, which called for the establishment of the APSC; the Vientiane Action Program of 2004, ASEAN Charter in 2008, which put forward the policy challenges to be overcome in order to form the APSC; and the ASEAN Defense Ministers’ Meeting, which represents the first step in the formation of the APSC.

4.4.1. ASEAN Charter

The ASEAN Summit in 2005 appointed an Eminent Persons’ Group (EPG) to guide the development of the ASEAN Charter as a step towards the development of the ASEAN Community. The charter initiative was aimed at transforming ASEAN from non-binding political association to becoming an international organization with a legal personality and a rule-based organization with an effective and efficient organizational structure (Acharya, 2009: 267). The ASEAN Charter serves as a firm foundation in achieving the ASEAN Community by providing legal status and institutional framework for ASEAN. It also codifies ASEAN norms, rules and values;
sets clear targets for ASEAN; and presents accountability and compliance. The ASEAN Charter entered into force on 15 December 2008. A gathering of the ASEAN Foreign Ministers was held at the ASEAN Secretariat in Jakarta to mark this very historic occasion for ASEAN. With the entry into force of the ASEAN Charter, ASEAN will henceforth operate under a new legal framework and establish a number of new organs to boost its community-building process. The ASEAN Charter has become a legally binding agreement among the 10 ASEAN member states.41

The ASEAN Charter would establish the association as a juridical personality and legal entity. It would make clear the association’s objectives. The charter would envision arrangements for the further integration of the regional economy and define the institutions, mechanisms and processes for dealing with transnational problems. Indicative recommendations for the contents of the proposed the ASEAN Charter are preamble, establishment, flag, logo and the ASEAN Day, objectives, principles, economic integration, collective responsibility, the ASEAN Summit, council of foreign ministers, council of economic ministers, council of finance ministers, other ministerial bodies, senior officials and technical committees, ASEAN standing committee, Secretary-General, secretariat, funding, decision-making, settlement of disputes, entry into force, amendment, language, and conclusion (Severino, 2005: 7-29).

41 ASEAN Charter: http://www.aseansec.org/21861.htm
There were at least two possible motivations for ASEAN to establish the ASEAN Charter. According to the opinion of Malaysian Prime Minister Abdullah Badawi, first one was to create an international legal personality for ASEAN. Second one was the legal framework for incorporating ASEAN decisions, treaties and conventions into the national legislation of the member states (Acharya, 2009: 268). In my opinion, the other motivation was to define ASEAN’s objective in a clear way, which was almost lost in its way, and also argued and mostly criticized by lots of scholars since its establishment for 40 years. Severino (2005: 7) confirms it by his following sentences: “The Charter would enshrine the values and principles to which the association’s members adhere. The charter would envision the arrangements for further integration”. It establishes set of rules and new structures.

The ASEAN Charter is expected to be a positive development, which could move ASEAN ahead in terms of security as well. But, it was a disappointment. ASEAN was at a crossroads, with the adoption of the Charter, ASEAN member states decided to codify existing norms, which is the ASEAN Way – the lowest common denominator for all ASEAN states. ASEAN did less than it could have done (Desker, 2008: 1). About the activities of the charter Katsumata (2007: 2-3) mentions that ASEAN is now seeking to reverse the trend of its declining credibility, therefore he does not wonder if the content of the Charter is probably impressive. At the same time, he suggests that ASEAN should focus on what the ASEAN members will do after the summit, rather than on what they will announce at the summit. The real
challenge for them is to implement the provisions of the Charter, after announcing them, in other words, their challenge is to translate their big talk into concrete actions, and to take concrete steps to reform their association.

The charter should not simply be drafted to maintain the status quo, but it should give new dynamism to ASEAN and should be forward looking. Simply codifying the existing norms, rules, and practices will be far from adequate. The charter should also make ASEAN more people-oriented and move away from being state-centric, as is largely the case at the moment (Wanandi, 2006:86). The Charter can still provide an opportunity for change that should not be missed (Caballero-Anthony, 2008: 80-82). The standing of ASEAN Charter has a potential of a key player in the Asia Pacific region. As Singapore’s representative Tommy Koh (2007) points out in his paper, ASEAN Charter is just a piece of paper, which will need political will in order to transform ASEAN into a strong, more united and effective organization, unless it will remain as a paper like so many constitutions of countries.  

4.4.2. ASEAN Defense Ministers’ Meeting

The ASEAN Defense Ministers' Meeting (ADMM) is the highest defense mechanism within ASEAN. Meanwhile, the ADMM was one of the results arising in

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42 The Straits Times, 8 August, 2007: http://www.straitstimes.com
2006 from the movement to form the APSC. The APSC Plan of Action had set working toward convening an annual ADMM as one of its objectives, with the aim of enhancing confidence-building measures to prevent conflict. The concept paper drawn up by the secretariat stated that the ADMM would complement the existing security dialogues of cooperative frameworks such as the ARF.

The annual ADMM facilitates the ASEAN defense ministers to discuss and exchange views on current defense and security issues and challenges faced in the region. The ADMM aims to promote mutual trust and confidence through greater understanding of defense and security challenges as well as enhancement of transparency and openness. The ADMM is the newest Sectoral Ministerial Body for ASEAN. Its inaugural meeting was convened in Kuala Lumpur, 2006. The main aim of the creation of the ADMM was to contribute to the establishment of the ASEAN Security Community as stipulated in the Bali Concord II and to promote the implementation of the VAP on the ASEAN Security Community (Chalermpalanupap, 2011: 20). Convening regular ASEAN defense ministers meetings has become an important element in realizing the ASEAN Security Community, specifically its Plan of Action for conflict prevention. This meeting is a new step signifying ASEAN's shift in focus to embark upon closer military ties (Prawindarti, 2006: 1)

To guide the ADMM cooperation, the Three-Year ADMM Work Program (2008-2010) was adopted at the 2nd ADMM in Singapore in 2007. The Work Program (2008-2010) included measures and activities in five areas, namely – a) promoting regional defense and security cooperation; b) shaping and sharing of norms; c) conflict prevention; d) conflict resolution, and e) post-conflict peace building.

At the 2nd ADMM meeting in 2007, the ADMM-Plus Concept Paper was adopted. Following this, in October 2010 the inaugural ADMM-Plus was convened, opening up ASEAN’s now highest level security and defense mechanism with eight of its dialogue partners – the US, Russia, Australia, New Zealand, China, Japan, India and the Republic of Korea. The purpose is to bring expertise, perspectives and resources from extra-regional countries to bear on shared security challenges. At all times, ASEAN countries should collectively weigh the benefits of engaging extra-regional countries. The ADMM Plus will serve as an integral part of the ADMM, bringing together ASEAN and its dialogue partners to forge common security outlooks and set in place practical defense cooperation and collaboration (Haywood, 2011: 3). At the Inaugural ADMM-Plus meeting, the Defense Ministers agreed on five areas of practical cooperation to pursue under this new mechanism: a) maritime security, b) counter-terrorism, c) disaster management, d) peacekeeping operations

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45 ADMM Three-Year Work Program: http://www.aseansec.org/21214.pdf
and e) military medicine. To facilitate cooperation on these areas, five Experts' Working Groups (EWGs) were established. By the end of 2011, all of the EWGs have held their inaugural meetings.\textsuperscript{48} Concept Paper of the EWG was adopted.\textsuperscript{49}

In establishing ADMM-Plus, ASEAN has explicitly acknowledged the important role which extra-regional powers have to play in securing its members and the Southeast Asian sub-region from non-traditional security threats (Rolls, 2011: 11). According Rolls (2011: 5-8) it is clear that “ASEAN’s survival and role have been dependent on, and shaped by, a wider regional balance of power system”. One of the objectives of the ADMM is to complement the ARF, which means the ASEAN-driven regional architecture that addresses political and security challenges in the Asia Pacific region is now more complete. Although the difference between the ARF and ADMM Plus is very little, current focus of ADMM Plus is security of non-traditional variant, which includes humanitarian assistance, disaster relief and even working with civil society organizations on non-traditional security issues. The establishment of the ADMM Plus is important in a political aspect in order to keep close relations with East Asian Summit members, and to keep balance of power regarding to rising China as well.

\textsuperscript{48} ADMM-Plus: http://www.aseansec.org/18816.htm
At the inaugural meeting of the ADMM, Myanmar was absent, which put an immediate test to the notion of the ASEAN Security Community (Prawindarti. 2006: 2). The absence of Myanmar, which maybe probably due to pressing domestic concerns and domestic engagements, was accepted as limit of the ADMM. ASEAN states are cautious that there may be still the possibility that the problem of Myanmar might intensify and develop serious discord in the region (Shoji, 2008). Nonetheless, this fear is less possible, since there is happening drastic change in the political situation of Myanmar. On the contrary, political situation in Myanmar was courage to create and develop the ADMM initiation. Nonetheless, ADMM is being not enough efficient without its dialog partners (ADMM Plus), which indicates that ASEAN itself is still weak and dependent on great powers.

4.4.3. Thai-Cambodian conflict

The Thai-Cambodian conflict played a crucial role for ASEAN especially the APSC, in order to check efficiency of ASEAN member states to use the potential role of the APSC.

The clashes that erupted on February 4th of 2011 were the fiercest since July 2008, when the two armies first began rumbling at each other in the vicinity of Preah Vihear, an 11th-century Khmer temple that Cambodia wants to develop for mass tourism. Six people died and dozens more were injured during four days of fighting.
The temple itself was slightly damaged. Each side accused the other of firing first into populated areas.\textsuperscript{50} For centuries, the ancient Preah Vihear temple, a Hindu masterpiece, has stood largely unmolested on a cliff overlooking the Thai-Cambodian border. However, over past three years, the temple has been an increasing point of conflict between Thailand and Cambodia that appears to be fomented for purely domestic political motives.\textsuperscript{51}

The historical basis of the dispute goes back at least five centuries. The year 1421 heralded the decline of the Khmer Empire; for that was the year the Thais captured the Angkar Wat – the symbol of the Khmer glory. During French expansion into Indochina in the 19th century, in the Franco-Thai Treaties of 1887 and 1893, the Siamese Government renounced all claims to the whole of the territories on the left bank of the Mekong river. By another series of treaties during 1904-07, Thailand ceded to France the border provinces of Battambang, Sisophon and Siem Reap. Thailand took advantage of the Second World War to regain part of what it had lost. As a reward for their cooperation with the Japanese, Thailand got back the border provinces in the Tokyo convention of March 1941.

In 1959, Cambodia instituted legal proceedings against Thailand before the International Court of Justice. In May 1961, the Court rejected the preliminary objections of Thailand and ruled that it possessed competence. On 15 June 1962, the

\textsuperscript{50} The Economist, February 10, 2011: http://www.economist.com/node/18119225

\textsuperscript{51} The Irrawaddy, February 10, 2011: http://www2.irrawaddy.org/article.php?art_id=20722
World Court declared, with nine votes for and three against, that Cambodia held sovereignty over the temple of Preah Vihear. In consequence, Thailand was under an obligation to withdraw any military or police forces or other guards or keepers, stationed by her at the temple or in its vicinity.

Tensions between Thailand and Cambodia increased in 2008, when the crumbling 11th-century Preah Vihear Hindu temple – which the International Court of Justice ruled belonged to Cambodia in 1962 – was declared a United Nations World Heritage Site over staunch Thai objections. The sovereignty of the land around the temple remains in dispute, as do other swaths of land containing other temples built during the Khmer Empire’s reign. The clashes around temples in disputed areas starkly illustrated the tensions between countries in ASEAN that could derail plans to create a single community by 2015, and the apparent inability of the bloc to deal with disagreements.

According to the ASEAN Secretary-General, the recent ruling of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) on the Thai-Cambodian border conflict was cited as proof of ASEAN’s leverage, with the court ordering both parties to allow an ASEAN observer team in. He said the world court had rendered a judgment that


would help Thailand and Cambodia find common positions on the way forward to resolve the conflict between them. Echoing Secretary-General Pitsuwan, Marty said that while he had not read the court’s decision in its entirety, it was encouraging. “It is encouraging to note that the United Nations Security Council and now the ICJ recognize that ASEAN has a role to play in helping facilitate resolution of this issue,” he told a press briefing after an ASEAN Ministerial Meeting (AMM) here.54

The role of the APSC or generally ASEAN in Thai-Cambodia disputes is discussed in a different way. According to Haywood (2011: 3), ASEAN approached the Thai Cambodian crisis as a significant opportunity to try to engender a more effective body vis-à-vis regional security, particularly on more sensitive security issues. Indonesia’s efforts, and its successes, although minimal and incremental, do suggest that ASEAN’s modus operandi, including its apparent limitations of dialogue and persuasion, certainly has some practical value. However at the same time critical opinions also exist. For instance, Southeast Asian leaders failed to achieve any breakthrough to end deadly border skirmishes between Thailand and Cambodia that overshadowed a regional summit in Jakarta supposed to showcase progress toward economic integration. In this article ASEAN’s role in this dispute is mentioned as follow:

54 The Jakarta Post, April 18, 2012:
ASEAN, a collection of authoritarian states and nascent democracies, has a policy of non-interference in each other’s domestic affairs, and so has struggled to resolve the border dispute which – although on the surface about ownership of some ancient temples – is being driven by domestic political dynamics in both Thailand and Cambodia.55

And also an analyst at OSK-DMG Group in Singapore Enrico Tanuwidjaja said “If the Cambodia and Thailand situation gets worse, then I'm afraid they might have to postpone it to 2020 or even put it on hold”.56 The clash has already abused the commitment of ASEAN members to the ASEAN Security Community, which defines an agreement not to use force to settle differences (Singh, 2011: 3).

4.5. Conclusion

The proposal Jakarta to create the ASEAN Security Community started with the political intention to gain back its role after the downfall of Suharto. There was also a very important motivation for ASEAN member states to implement their own security potential in the relations of neighboring countries of ASEAN at the intra-
region level. After the approving of the proposal, it was followed to the creation of the ASEAN Charter, which has a potential of a key player in the Asia Pacific region as well as ASEAN states. The ASEAN Charter is just a piece of paper, which will need political will in order to transform ASEAN into a strong, more united and effective organization, unless it will remain as a paper.

Rather than a military alliance, the APSC is a framework based on the idea of comprehensive security with the strategic thrusts of conflict prevention, peaceful conflict resolution, and post-conflict peace building. Moreover the new threats posed by international terrorism and weapons of mass destruction, there were plus the new strategic developments and balance in East Asia that have and will come with the dramatic rise of China, and possibly soon also of India. But for now ASEAN members had not answered yet these new challenges adequately. One of these challenges was Thai-Cambodia conflict. The APSC plan almost failed when ASEAN member states were not able to take an action toward Thai-Cambodia conflict even though ASEAN Secretary-General mentioned this conflict as an opportunity. The main reason was that ASEAN is still weak and had not strengthened and deepened cooperation in many fields of security yet. Till today ASEAN did not maintain its relevance. As a result, the APSC is not able to respond effectively to globalization and its dramatic impact on the economy, political life and even values of ASEAN members. As Katsumata argued, the APSC is being famous for talking big and acting modestly by giving big noise in its meetings only without any result.
Chapter V

Conclusion

5.1. Overview of the research

The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has the reputation of being the most successful indigenously produced regional organization in the developing world (Narine, 1998: 195). One of the purposes of creating ASEAN was to provide the small states of Southeast Asia with some degree of influence over regional events (Narine, 1997: 965). When ASEAN was first formulated, Communism was a threat in the region, and the nations being small and weak feared that they would be pawns in international power competitions. During the Cold War ASEAN was the major vehicle for curbing the outbursts of intraregional hostility and conflicts that marred relationships among the member countries (Hussey, 1991: 87-88). This situation led ASEAN member states to think about their own security regarding neighboring states as well as great powers.

The ARF was initiated by ASEAN member states. ASEAN leaders recognize that their security to a considerable extent would depend on an Asia-Pacific security dialogue that would involve all major actors, but they try to protect their organization
from the consequences. The ARF was founded to build confidence between states and to reduce the likelihood of conflict between them by promoting the notion of comprehensive security (Severino, 2009: 15-19).

The ASEAN Political-Security Community is one of the pillars of an ASEAN Community by 2020, which was established in 2003 with the aims to ensure that countries in the region to live at peace with one another and with the world in a just, democratic and harmonious environment. The members of the Community pledges to rely on peaceful processes in the settlement of intra-regional differences and regards their security as fundamentally linked to one another and bound by geographic location, common vision and objectives.

5.2. Answer to Research questions

5.2.1. The ARF

Being existed for more than 15 years, one of the main objectives of ASEAN countries, to keep the US in the region, in establishing the ARF was achieved. The US is still deeply involved in Asian security affairs. Its ongoing presence is a great source of stability although its commitment to multilateral institutions is little. The reason is that the US is giving preference to the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum (Emmers, 2009: 8). The other little success is that the South China Sea,
a source of potential conflict in the region during the early 1990s, was relatively calm until 2009. One of the major reasons is that China agreed to discuss the South China Sea disputes at the multilateral level with ASEAN at the level of conflict prevention. If ASEAN could successfully negotiate with China and move the South China Sea disputes from conflict prevention to meaningful cooperation, it would greatly enhance its prestige as a regional body (Beckman, 2009: 159-160).

Despite aforementioned achievements, it is often argued that the ARF has lost its momentum. The forum cannot influence the Taiwan, North Korean, Kashmir and other issues in spite of the fact that these flashpoints could seriously destabilize the region. Crucial differences also contrast Northeast Asian from Southeast Asian security relations as well as other members. The territorial disputes seem to have increased rather than decreasing. The US, Japan, and China also have different expectations and strategic perspectives that cannot implicitly be ignored in the “ASEAN Way” (Emmers, 2009: 8-9). According to Katsumata (2006: 195), the ARF was ASEAN’s attempt to cooperate tactically with external powers, although it appears to be a mere “talking shop” with no strategic significance. In sum, it can be mentioned that in terms of institutional strength, the ARF has been relatively successful in engaging the great powers and promoting confidence building; however, it has generally failed to move toward preventive diplomacy (Emmers, 2008: 194-195).
The ARF is important for ASEAN for several reasons. First, it can help contribute to peace, stability and mutual understanding in the Asia Pacific region, of which Southeast Asia is an important and strategic part. To some extent, adverse security developments in other parts of the region impact negatively upon ASEAN’s wider political, security and economic interests. Second, the ARF enables ASEAN to play a leading role in shaping the security processes in the wider Asia Pacific region. ASEAN seeks to foster processes that are in harmony with its views on how security cooperation should proceed in the region. Third, the ARF process allows small and middle powers to hold a significant voice in regional security affairs and inhibits the major powers from dominating and dictating the regional security agenda. Fourth, ASEAN’s leadership of the process facilitated the participation of countries like China which would otherwise hesitate due to concerns that the process may be dominated by the United States and its friends. China’s participation is critical to ASEAN because of China’s centrality in many issues (Hassan, 1998: 57-59).

As Simon (2008: 264) mentions, Southeast Asia contains no great powers with global reach. This region pales in comparison to its Northeast and South Asia neighbors. Yet, Southeast Asia is where most Asian regional organizations originate and whose structures and procedures are determined by Southeast Asian preferences. For example, ASEAN is able to maintain its pivotal position in Asian affairs, especially in the ARF. Organizationally, the ARF's highest level is its annual foreign minister’s meeting, always chaired by the ASEAN country occupying the rotating
chairmanship. In addition to this, ASEAN goal with respect to outside powers joining the ARF was to extend the aims and principles of ASEAN's TAC to ARF members, meaning that all agree to resolve disputes peacefully. The activist states within the ARF (the United States, Japan, Australia and Canada) have promoted a PD agenda, but the ASEAN Way procedure requiring consensus has effectively blocked it. Here, it can be mentioned that ASEAN plays a crucial role in the ARF.

As it is pointed out in a number of research, the end of the Cold War motivated ASEAN to establish a multilateral security institution to engage great powers, but at the same time to show its centrality in it. As a result, the ARF was established based on the principles of inclusiveness and cooperative security in order to focus on dialogue, confidence building and the sharing of information.

ASEAN’s decision to establish the ARF was the end of the Cold War, fear of American strategic retreat from the region, intra-regional relations of ASEAN countries, and rise of China in Asia. Existing for more than 15 years, ASEAN, in some extent, achieved its objectives by keeping the US in the region, and to keep small ASEAN states among big states through the organization, driven by ASEAN. However, there are arguments by lots of scholars that ASEAN’s attempt to cooperate tactically with external powers resulted with a mere “talking shop” with no strategic significance. The ARF has been relatively successful in engaging the great powers and promoting confidence building; however, it has generally failed to move toward preventive diplomacy.
5.2.2. The APSC

With the motivation of Jakarta’s proposal to create the ASEAN Security Community, Indonesia tried to strengthen its role in ASEAN after the downfall of Suharto (Acharya, 2007: 25). The other reason was still ongoing neighborly disputes and civil unrest among ASEAN member countries, which gave challenges to regional peace and security. For example, border disputes between Cambodia and Thailand, civil unrest in Thailand, domestic instability in Myanmar should be solved by the APSC to preserve the well-being of the community (Lim, 2011: 33-34). The creation of the APSC would help to strengthen relations of ASEAN member states. Even though most of ASEAN member states were against in the beginning, it was a very important motivation for all the members to implement their own security potential in the relations of neighboring countries of ASEAN in the intra-region level.

Although most ASEAN states were arguing regarding some parts of the concept paper by Indonesia, the general idea of the security community was a good point for ASEAN. Sukma’s paper referred to the salience of addressing non-traditional threats, which was important for ASEAN. Because ASEAN has recently been interested in non-traditional security concerns, including terrorism and piracy, illegal migration, environmental degradation, pandemic diseases, and natural disasters. Along with and based on arguments in the academic society, ASEAN has developed the APSC
concept, which focuses on non-traditional security as one of its major fields of cooperation for the purpose of realizing a “comprehensive” security community (Shoji, 2008: 24).

There were at least two possible motivations for ASEAN to establish the ASEAN Charter. According to the opinion of Malaysian Prime Minister Abdullah Badawi, first one was to create an international legal personality for ASEAN. Second one was the legal framework for incorporating ASEAN decisions, treaties and conventions into the national legislation of the member states (Acharya, 2009: 268). In my opinion, the other motivation was to define ASEAN’s objective in a clear way, which was almost lost in its way, and also argued and mostly criticized by lots of scholars since its establishment for 40 years. Severino (2005: 7) confirms it by his following sentences: “The Charter would enshrine the values and principles to which the association’s members adhere. The charter would envision the arrangements for further integration”. It establishes set of rules and new structures.

The standing of the ASEAN Charter has a potential of a key player in the Asia Pacific region. The ASEAN Charter is just a piece of paper, which will need political will in order to transform ASEAN into a strong, more united and effective organization, unless it will remain as a paper like so many constitutions of countries.\footnote{The Straits Times, 8 August, 2007: http://www.straitstimes.com} In establishing the ADMM-Plus, ASEAN has explicitly acknowledged
the important role which extra-regional powers have to play in securing its members and the Southeast Asian sub-region from non-traditional security threats (Rolls, 2011: 11). According to Rolls, it is clear that “ASEAN’s survival and role have been dependent on, and shaped by, a wider regional balance of power system”. One of the objectives of the ADMM is to complement the ARF. The establishment of the ADMM Plus is important in a political aspect in order to keep close relations with East Asian Summit members, and to keep balance of power regarding to rising China as well.

Jakarta’s proposal to create the ASEAN Security Community started with the political intention to gain back its role after the downfall of Suharto. There was also a very important motivation for ASEAN member states to implement their own security potential in the relations of neighboring countries of ASEAN at the intra-region level. After the approving of the proposal, it was followed to the creation of the ASEAN Charter, which has a potential of a key player in the Asia Pacific region as well as ASEAN states.

Rather than a military alliance, the APSC is a framework based on the idea of comprehensive security with the strategic thrusts of conflict prevention, peaceful conflict resolution, and post-conflict peace building. Moreover, the new threats posed by international terrorism and weapons of mass destruction, there were plus the new strategic developments and balance in East Asia that have and will come with the dramatic rise of China, and possibly soon also of India. But for now ASEAN
members had not answered yet these new challenges adequately. One of these challenges was Thai-Cambodia conflict. The APSC plan almost failed when ASEAN member states were not able to take an action toward Thai-Cambodia conflict even though ASEAN Secretary-General mentioned this conflict as an opportunity. The main reason was that ASEAN is still weak and had not strengthened and deepened cooperation in many fields of security yet. Till today ASEAN did not maintain its relevance. As a result, the APSC is not able to respond effectively to globalization and its dramatic impact on the economy, political life and even values of ASEAN members. As Katsumata (2007: 1) argued, the APSC is being famous for talking big and acting modestly by giving big noise in its meetings only without any result.

5.3. Suggestion to the future researches

The APSC, which is one of the main parts of the ASEAN, includes a number of ongoing projects such as the Vientiane Action Plan, ASEAN Charter and so on. Since these plans are not finished yet, the APSC should be researched more with more detail regarding accomplishment of the plans.

Since this study is not based on theoretical perspectives, for the future researches it is better to conduct research based on related theoretical perspectives. Additionally, comparative study of several theories is also highly recommended.
Finally, comparative study of ASEAN with other regional organizations with a similar nature such as Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), which is also established by small, relatively weak states of Central Asia, is suggested. Such kind of comparative researches would provide more arguments by pointing out weak and strong sides of each organization.
References


Other documents:

ADMM-Plus Experts’ Working Group Concept Paper. Available at


ASEAN Political-Security Community Blueprint. Available at

Roadmap for an ASEAN Community 2009-2015. Available at

The ARF’s Concept Paper. Available at

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