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Abstract

Hosting sports mega-events like the FIFA World Cup or the Olympics Games has become a significant economic strategy for nation states. Convinced by studies suggesting positive economic benefits from hosting these events, nations compete vigorously for the right to host them. The pursuit for hosting sports mega-events is influenced by suggestions that nations can use them to boost their tourism sector, develop infrastructure, establish a national brand, expand their domestic sponsorship markets, and encourage foreign investment. But what impact do these events have on host nations? Do developed and developing nations approach hosting mega-events in the same way? Could the soft power of sports be used to achieve diplomatic objectives? What impact do sports mega-events have on a host nation's competitive advantage? What is the relationship between corporate sponsorships and sports mega-events? What is the impact of ambush marketing in sports events?

In an attempt to provide answers to some of these questions, the thesis will present a comparative analysis of the FIFA World Cup co-hosted by Japan and Korea in 2002 and the 2010 South Africa World Cup. The main idea is to highlight the similarities and differences between the two World Cups in terms of the way they were approached, prepared and the impact they had on their respective nations. The discussion will apply conflict theory and the analysis of costs and benefits to analyze the political, economic and cultural impact of the two World Cups. This thesis will show that the success of hosting a sports mega-event depends heavily on the cooperation and interplay between different sectors of society that perform different functions on the international, regional and national levels.
Contents

Chapter 1----------------------------------------------------------12

Introduction--------------------------------------------------------12

Summary of the thesis---------------------------------------------13

Scope of the research---------------------------------------------13

Research Questions-----------------------------------------------14

Thesis structure--------------------------------------------------16

Research Methodology---------------------------------------------20

Primary and Secondary Sources------------------------------------20

The Qualitative Approach: Action Research method----------------21

Theoretical Framework--------------------------------------------22

The foundations of conflict theory------------------------------22

Sport, politics and society--------------------------------------24

Cultural theory of sports----------------------------------------28

Literature review-----------------------------------------------30

Sociological research of sports mega-events----------------------30

Defining Mega-events---------------------------------------------32

Impact Studies of Sports mega-events----------------------------35

Outlining the `positive versus negative `impact debate-----------35
The economic impact: Identifying the long term and short-term benefits---------38
The political impact of sports and mega-events-----------------------------------40
The cultural impact: The Intangible benefits--------------------------------------44
Conclusion----------------------------------------------------------------------------------45

Chapter 2-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------49

Sports Diplomacy and FIFA World Cup; A Global Peace Building

Initiative---------------------------------------------------------------------------------49
Introduction---------------------------------------------------------------------------------49
Sports Diplomacy and International Politics-----------------------------------------------50
Sports Diplomacy and Ideological Conflicts-----------------------------------------------52
Sports Diplomacy and Globalization--------------------------------------------------------54
The impact of Media on Sports Diplomacy---------------------------------------------------56
The Positive use of media in the promotion of sports diplomacy-----------------------------57
The negative use of media and sports diplomacy---------------------------------------------58
Sports Diplomacy and 1930 Uruguay World Cup---------------------------------------------59
Sports Diplomacy and the 2002 Korea-Japan World Cup---------------------------------------62
The co-hosting decision and Japan-Korea relations------------------------------------------62
Sports Diplomacy and the 2010 South Africa World Cup---------------------------------------72
An appeal for national reconciliation and economic growth-------------------------------72
The colonial and Apartheid Eras---------------------------------------------73

The post-Apartheid era-----------------------------------------------------75

South Africa's lost bid to host 2006 FIFA World Cup and the subsequent 2010 South Africa World Cup decision-----------------------------------------------78

Conclusion-------------------------------------------------------------------84

**Chapter 3**-----------------------------------------------------------------87

*States and Mega-event: Impact on host nation’s Economic*

**Competitive Advantage**---------------------------------------------------87

Theoretical Framework--------------------------------------------------------88

Porter's Nations Competitive Advantage diamond model-------------------------88

Critique of Lakshman’s (2008) Methodology------------------------------------93

The case of Japan and hosting the 2002 FIFA World Cup: Impact on Economic
growth and competitive advantage---------------------------------------------98

Factor Conditions: Infrastructure Development-------------------------------98

The 1964 Tokyo Olympic Games: Japan signals recovery from WWII

and re-admission to the international stage------------------------------------98

Japan as a “Construction State”: The reason behind Japan’s rapid Infrastructure
development---------------------------------------------------------------------100

Japan’s 2002 FIFA World Cup Stadia Development: Increasing Japan’s competitive
advantage in architectural design and technology-------------------------------102

The 2002 FIFA World Cup and Football in Japan: Advancing the J-League’s

Competitive Advantage-------------------------------------------------------105
1. **South Africa's state of competitiveness**
   
   **Factor Conditions:**
   - **Transportation Infrastructure development:** Enhancing connection between labor and industry.
   
   **Factor Condition:** Safety and Security Infrastructure and Competitive advantage

2. **The Safety and security legacy of the 2010 South Africa World Cup**
   
   **The 2010 South Africa World Cup Stadia Development:** An imputes for job creation and skill development strategy.

3. **The 2010 South Africa World Cup and development of the national football league (PSL)**

4. **Conclusion**

5. **Chapter 4**

   **Capitalism and Mega-events: Sponsorship and broadcasting rights;**

   **Marketing and Ambush Marketing**

6. **Literature review**

7. **Sponsorship benefits**

8. **The Ambush Marketing Strategy**

9. **Defining Ambush Marketing:** Distinction between the 'Narrow' and the 'Broader' approach

10. **Effects of Ambush Marketing:** Creating confusion about the identity of the event
Categories of Ambush Marketing

Purchase and use of television coverage sponsorship

Airing of television commercials during the sponsored events

Sponsorship of individual teams or athletes

Promotional advertising or activities at the event

Congratulatory and salutatory messages

Conclusion

Chapter 5

Impact of Mega-events on Tourism: A collaboration and network System

Approach

Introduction

Sports Tourism; Destination Marketing and imaging

Collaboration and Network Theory

Collaboration and Network Systems in promoting South African Tourism

The trend of Japanese travel to South Africa; Background and figures

JATA South Africa working group focus on the 2010 South Africa World Cup event

South African Tourism (Tokyo office): Adopting a fusion of re-active and pro-active media strategies to set up tourism agenda
Conclusion

Chapter 6

The 'Gambatte' Project; An Action Research Application

Introduction

Theoretical framework

The conflict between the international media’s coverage and the host nation’s self-image campaign; the case of 2010 South Africa World Cup

The First Story: ‘The 2007 National elections in South Africa’

The Second Story: The so-called ‘xenophobia attacks’ of 2008

The Third story: Labor disputes on 2010 World Cup construction sites

Introducing the Gambatte Project; methodological processes and application

Establishing the collaborative network of the Gambatte Project

The South African Tourism office in Japan

The South African Embassy in Japan

The South African Government Communication and Information System (GCIS)

Former Governor of Oita City: Mr Hiramatsu

Emirates Airline

The research Narrative; initiating the projects, failures and successes

Attracting the Media
Table of Figures

Figure 1: Roches’s summary of types of events------------------------------------------34
Figure 2: Organic link theory of sports mega-events-------------------------------------46
Figure 3: Porter’s Nation’s Competitive Advantage Diamond-------------------------------89
Figure 4: Competitive Advantage Diamond for Japan-------------------------------------93
Figure 5: Competitive Advantage Diamond for South Africa-------------------------------97
Figure 6: List of 2002 Japan World Cup stadiums-----------------------------------------105
Figure 7: Social contact crime ratios per province 1April -31 March 2011-----------------116
Figure 8: Crime rates in South Africa 2004 – 2010--------------------------------------121
Figure 9: 2010 South Africa World Cup Stadiums-----------------------------------------127
Figure 10: Attitudes to the 2010 World Cup---------------------------------------------133
Figure 11: List of World Cup Sponsors--------------------------------------------------139
Figure 12: Graph showing Japanese International Departures-------------------------------163
Figure 13: Total Japanese Arrivals to South Africa--------------------------------------164
Figure 14: Economic Impact of visitors to South Africa 2003 – 2004----------------------168
Figure 15: Total number of the 2010 South Africa World Cup tourists per region---------171
Figure 16: Tourism Impact of the 2010 South Africa World Cup---------------------------172
Figure 17: Online media coverage and global perceptions about the 2010 South Africa
2010 World Cup---------------------------------------------------------------181

Figure 18: Stakeholder Participation Matrix----------------------------------186

Figure 19: 2010 South Africa World Cup sources of awareness---------------199
Chapter 1.

Introduction

Like Japan, South Africa has always embraced sports as an integral part of the nation’s culture. The use of sports for promoting social cohesion and national pride is relevant across the developing versus developed nation divide. However, the commercial development of sport, as illustrated by sports mega-events such as the FIFA World Cup and the Olympic Games, has caused many nations to adopt economic strategies incorporating these events. In the past, hosting sports mega-events was a virtual monopoly of Europe, North America and to a lesser extent, Latin America. Motivated by capitalist principles, FIFA decided to allow nations outside these three regions to host the FIFA World Cup. The decision led to the first FIFA World Cup hosted in Asia when Japan and Korea were co-hosts in 2002. Following this, South Africa in 2010 became the first African nation to host the FIFA World Cup. The successful hosting of the World Cup in Japan provided a unique opportunity to showcase football as the global game, and to extend and promote the market for it within Asia. The experience of the Korea Japan World Cup, in terms of the way it was approached and the subsequent benefits and losses thereof, poses interesting questions about how developing nations like South Africa perceive and make use of the hosting of sports mega-events. In this instance, issues relating to infrastructure development, tourism marketing and social cohesion are viewed as critical areas for assessing the multiple implications of hosting a sport mega-event.

For developed nations, hosting sports mega-events offers an opportunity to showcase the strength and robustness of their economies, their political stability and their cultural maturity. In the case of developing nations, sports mega-events are perceived to play two significant roles. Firstly, they allow developing nations to position themselves in a global context characterized by inequalities in terms of power relations between the core states and the ones in the periphery. Thus, hosting these events enables developing nations to compensate for a relative lack of political power and economic influence in the international context. Secondly, hosting sports mega-events is critical for domestic considerations related to development objectives and nation building. South Africa is a
relatively new democracy after enduring many years of racial segregation, economic exclusion of the majority of the population, and under-development as a result of the apartheid policies. Therefore, hosting the 2010 South Africa World Cup was approached as a mechanism to pursue the political, economic and cultural ambitions of the nation. More significantly, hosting the event provided the state with an opportunity to redress the infrastructural imbalances of the past and to showcase post-apartheid and post-Mandela South Africa. However, despite the positive spinoffs from hosting the event, there are also negative ripple effects that have the potential to threaten the stability of the state and the harmony of society.

Summary of the thesis

This thesis consists of six chapters and each looks at the impact of sports mega-events on a host nation from a different perspective. My goal is to examine the political, economic and social impacts of these events in a comparative framework within the context of the modern world system. Therefore, the discussion presented will show that sports and the hosting of sports mega-events have developed into an important global economic and political force. Furthermore, the thesis will show why, even after much criticism of the mega-event strategy, governments, businesses and societies still seek to host them with the expectation of a positive impact. Finally, the discussion aims to add to the existing body of research about sports mega-events and hopes to stimulate further research.

Scope of the research

The focus of this thesis is on the impact of hosting sports mega-events on the host nation in terms of three levels of society, namely politics, economy and culture. The discussion will provide a comparative analysis of the impact of the 2002 World Cup held in Japan and the 2010 South Africa World Cup. On the political level, the analysis will highlight how Japan and South Africa used their sports mega-events to gain specific political advantages and disadvantages that are associated with domestic and foreign policy issues. On the economic level, the research seeks to understand the different
economic benefits that accrue as a result of hosting sports mega-events: these include tangible benefits such as infrastructure development and tourism factors, as well as intangible benefits in the realm of destination marketing and image issues. These intangible benefits will vividly illustrate the differences in the nature and scope of the economic impact of hosting sports mega-events between the developed nations (Japan) and those still developing (South Africa). On the cultural level, the discussion demonstrates how hosting the FIFA World Cup in Japan and South Africa helped the countries to integrate their communities. In the case of Japan, cultural exchange activities and the ending of the embargo on cultural trade between Japan and Korea are relevant issues in that regard. For South Africa, the notion that the hosting of the 2010 South Africa World Cup was a catalyst for the racial reintegration of the population previously divided by the apartheid system is explored. At the core of the thesis is the notion that sports mega-events are part and parcel of the capitalist system: they are governed by capitalist principles that prioritize profits, and they lead to both costs and benefits for the stakeholders involved in them. However, sports mega-events are also recognized as a powerful tool for social change.

Research questions

There are a limited number of studies that compare the multiple impacts of sports mega-events across the developed and developing nation divide. The rising interest in hosting sports mega-events and the significant investment needed to host these events warrant a closer look at the impact of these events on the host nation from the developing versus developed nation perspective. The main objective of this thesis is to investigate whether hosting the FIFA World Cup was beneficial for host nations in terms of infrastructure development, tourism and political power. This suggests three general research questions, namely:

(1). What is the nature of the relations forged between states and, at the domestic level, between social groups as a result of hosting the World Cup?
(2). Do developed nations and developing nations approach hosting sports mega-events in the same way?

(3). Are the extensive investments spent on hosting sports mega-events worth the benefits or the risks?

These in turn lead to these more specific questions that will form the framework for the discussion in the rest of the thesis:

(a). Chapter 2: The use of sports mega-events in soft power diplomacy for achieving political objectives. What was the motivation for choosing hosts in the cases of the co-hosted 2002 Korea Japan World Cup and the 2010 South Africa World Cup?

(b). Chapter 3: What are the long-term and short-term benefits of hosting sports mega-events on the host nation with regard to improving the nation’s economic competitive advantage? In this respect, issues relating to infrastructure development, tourism, destination marketing and imaging are considered.

(c). Chapter 4: What are the trends of sports mega-events sponsorship and can sponsors retain control over the flow of information? Arising from this, the thesis also explores how unauthorized “ambush marketing” affects sponsors, host nation’s trade laws and an international sports organization such as FIFA.

(d). Chapter 5: What is the impact on tourism in terms of (1) improving the image of the host nation;(2) expanding tourism products; and (3) opening new tourism markets?

(e). Chapter 6: How effective is action research as a method of academic inquiry and also as a pragmatic tool to influence the processes involved in the organization of sports mega-events for the purpose of contributing towards social change, and what light does it shed on the aims and practices of stakeholders at the micro level in sports promotion?
Thesis structure

Chapter 1

This thesis applies conflict theory to discuss the political, economic and cultural, costs and benefits of sports mega-events for different stakeholders in society. This method is considered to be useful for explaining how these resources are activated and converted into capital by the different social groups in the capitalist global football industry. Conflict theory helps to explain the complex nature of sport in terms of its social function and its commercial dynamism in relation to issues such as economic and political impact, tourism, questions of legacy, globalization effects in terms of collaboration (regional, national and international) and inter-institutional relationships. In this respect, relevant issues include the tendency by nation states to approach sports mega-events as a means of soft power aimed at achieving diplomacy. The discussion will provide evidence of conflict in sports mega-events, the integration capacity of hosting these events, consensus and systematic connections with other social dimensions such as politics, economic and culture. Moreover, this approach will allow the discussion to view both the structural conflicts in global sports and the broader conflict in global society. As a result, this thesis will explore the way in which sports mega-events reflect many of the conflicts found in the larger society.

Furthermore, this chapter will also provide a review of various literatures concerned with sports mega-events. The discussion will attempt to provide a clear understanding of the concept and issues involved in the organization and hosting of these events. In addition, the chapter will highlight some contrasting views with regards to the impact of mega-events on host nations. There are some studies that argue that hosting mega-events has a positive impact, and there are others which do not agree with that notion.

However, as will be shown in the discussion, a lot of studies indicate that economic issues are the main factors supporting the strategy of hosting sports mega-events. At the same time, to a large extent, a country’s image and the process of nation building have
also been put forward as significant issues for consideration. Nonetheless, in order to maintain balance and provide a context, studies arguing for the negative impact of hosting sports mega-events will also be presented. Furthermore, the economic impact of hosting mega-events will be examined, paying attention to long term versus short-term debates and arguments about tangible and intangible benefits. Finally, these concepts will form the basis of other issues discussed throughout the thesis.

**Chapter 2**

The exchange between normative principles and economic considerations is a key point in understanding the processes involved in the systems of global football. However, on the other hand, the notion of achieving diplomatic aims through sports mega-events cannot be overlooked. This chapter will seek to understand how sports mega-events like the FIFA World Cup and the Olympics are increasingly used for political purposes. In this regard, the discussion will highlight how sports, through a soft power approach, are fast becoming the peace-building model of choice for many nations. Systemic processes involved in issues of politics, economy, culture and society will be taken into consideration throughout the discussion.

More specifically, the argument will show how hosting sports mega-events could be used as a tool for improving relations between states (the international level), within a state (the national level), and within a business organization (the structural level). Therefore, the chapter aims to show that despite conflict, greed, war talk, discrimination and violence in sports, the concept of “peace” as the fundamental value inherent in the FIFA World Cup or the Olympic Movement, is sometimes used as a tool for sports diplomacy. The idea of promoting peace and unity through sports is maintained taking into account the financial considerations involved. Therefore, the thesis explores how far the decisions by FIFA to award the World Cup to Uruguay (1930), Japan and Korea (2002) and South Africa (2010), were informed by notions of peace, reconciliation and nation building, compared to other considerations. In the light of this, the intangible benefits of hosting sports mega-events will also be discussed.
Chapter 3

This chapter owes much to Lakshman’s (2008) study of the impact of sports mega-events on a host nation’s competitive advantage. His research focus and methodological approach have profoundly influenced the style and manner in which this chapter is conceived. Based on his framework, this thesis will analyze comparatively Japan’s experience of hosting the 2002 FIFA World Cup and the 2010 South Africa World Cup. The factor conditions as outlined by Lakshman (2008) and the additional sub-factors as adopted from Porter (2007) will be applied in terms of their impact on the host nation’s economic growth and global competitive advantage.

This will require us to consider other economic activities that are triggered by hosting mega-events like the FIFA World Cup. In addition, we will look at how these economic investments affect society in the short and long term. Furthermore, we will also need to approach the discussion from a political economy perspective. That will ensure that we view the issues within a certain historical context. The thesis holds that there are huge differences between a developed country such as Japan and a developing nation such as South Africa in terms of the way they approach these events and the expected benefits thereof. By understanding the nature of the differences and the scope of enquiry, we may begin to attempt to answer two questions: (1) What were the short term and long term benefits, if any, of hosting the 2010 South Africa World Cup? (2) Does hosting the FIFA World Cup have a positive or negative impact on a nation’s economic competitive advantage? To answer some of these questions, the thesis will consider issues related to tourism, destination marketing (including imaging and branding) and infrastructure development.
Chapter 4

Sports mega-events depend heavily on the sponsorship contributed by the business sector. In fact, sports organizations like FIFA and IOC have formed strategic economic alliances with multinational corporations through sponsorship. This chapter will focus on the sponsorship trends in the FIFA World Cup and their contribution in making the World Cup the biggest sporting event in the world. The thesis will also discuss problematic areas relating to sponsorship in terms of costs involved and the expected benefits. In other words, we will look at some of the reasons behind companies’ willingness to engage in sports sponsorship.

Lastly, the chapter will provide a discussion of the impact of “ambush marketing” in sports sponsorship, as a way in which the control by sponsors of the flow of information can be undermined. For that purpose, the argument will be concerned with the following questions: (a) How is ambush marketing defined? (b) What effect does ambush marketing have on sponsorship? (c) What are the techniques or examples of ambush marketing practice? This chapter aims to show the significance of sports sponsorship in terms of the economic support it provides in the organization of sports mega-events.

Chapter 5

The aim of this chapter is to view the impact of mega-events on host nations from a tourism perspective. The discussion will provide a better understanding of how mega-events can be used to (1) improve the image of the destination, (2) open new tourism markets, and (3) expand tourism products. The first part of the chapter provides a theoretical framework based on a tourism perspective about the impact of mega-events on host nations. The second part consists of a discussion of the ideological concepts of collaboration and network theory prominent in studies of tourism for mega-events.

The last part is a case study of the South African Tourism branch office in Japan, and how it used collaboration and network systems to boost efforts to maximize the volume of tourism for the 2010 World Cup event and beyond.
The case study explores how far collaboration between South African Tourism (Japan) and the Japan Association of Travel Agents (JATA) in marketing and promoting South African tourism in Japan had an influence in increasing the number of Japanese travelers to South Africa over the years.

Chapter 6

This chapter will provide an understanding of the scope and nature of networks involved in organization of sports mega-events at the micro level. For that purpose, issues relating to the organization of the 2010 South Africa World Cup will be discussed from a participatory or insider perspective. In this regard, reference will be made to my own action research project known as the “Gambatte Project.” This provides insights into how organizations and the media use local projects to advance wider marketing objectives and reach new audiences. The aim of the project was to stimulate media coverage in Japan about activities related to the 2010 South Africa World Cup. Therefore, the discussion will highlight the relationship between sports mega-events, tourism and the media, seen through the perceptions, aims and actions of participants in one country, namely Japan.

Research Methodology

Primary and Secondary Sources

As a starting point, I looked at primary sources and various bodies of literature from a variety of disciplines discussing the nature and scope of sports mega-events in the world system. I recognized that hosting sports mega-events is as much an economic strategy as it is a political one. Therefore, I began to consult sources derived from government reports and legislation about the economic, political and social implications of mega-events. Furthermore, as this thesis will show, international sports organizations such as FIFA and the Internal Olympics Committee are significant actors in the global political economy. They play a huge role in facilitating relations between the nation states, the global business community and global society.
Therefore, I found it necessary to consider secondary sources in the form of publications by international sports organizations, multinational corporations, local business organizations, international agencies such as human rights watch groups and non-government organizations. Also included in the body of secondary sources were newspapers reports, magazines articles, web publications and broadcast media. The impact of media technology on sports mega-events cannot be ignored.

*The Qualitative Approach: Action Research method.*

To address the research questions, the thesis adopts a qualitative method based on principles found in “participant observer” and “action research” strategies. The decision to choose these two methods was informed by the idea that sports mega-events are complex in nature and therefore require a complex research methodology. Kemmis and McTaggart (1990: 5) view action research as “a form of collective self-reflective inquiry undertaken by participants in social situations in order to improve the rationality and justice of their own social or educational practices, as well as their understanding of these practices and the situations in which these practices are carried out.” Rapoport (1970:499) saw action research as aiming to “contribute both to the practical concerns of people in an immediate problematic situation and to the goals of social science by joint collaboration within a mutually acceptable ethical framework.”

As Bell, Gaventa and Peters (1990:98) conclude, “without practice there’s no knowledge.” Therefore, my choice of methodology was influenced by the desire to apply theoretical concepts and practical experiences within a social framework for the purpose of developing knowledge. In addition, as a result of the collaboration and networks involved in the research process, the research went through a number of cycles in terms of planning, acting, observing and reflecting. Furthermore, this methodology was selected because it offers the researcher an opportunity to actively interact with the people and organizations that are the subjects of the research in question. In other words, the method can assist researchers to get closer to their sources, and at the same time become part of the environment under study. Moreover, the approach could also help to increase the chance of widening participation in the project gradually to include others affected by the
process such as the local communities and small businesses. In terms of my own experience, I used action research to organize and collaborate with different stakeholders to promote the 2010 South Africa World Cup and the host nation in Japan. The process involved participating in planning and strategy implementation with regards to marketing the World Cup and branding South Africa.

**Theoretical Framework**

*The foundations of conflict theory*

Conflict theory as developed by Karl Marx emphasizes economic inequalities in society as the main reason for social conflict and social change (Rummel, 1977). The notion of class structures is prominent in Marxist social theory and forms the basis of conflict theory. In this respect, society is divided into two main groups, the capitalist class and the working class. Central to the Marxist analysis is the notion that different social groups live in a constant state of struggle over the control and consumption of scarce social resources. There are some similarities between Marxist conflict theory and functionalism in relation to their interpretation of the significance of power or domination in society. However, they differ in the way they deal with public consensus and shared values in society.

Functionalism, as developed by Durkheim and Max Weber, emphasizes cohesion within society as an important factor for social change (Scaff, 1987). Marxist conflict theory stresses friction and strife as critical factors. In addition, the functionalist theorist considers the notion of public interests as a critical factor in society while for the Marxist theorist, it is seen as something invented to benefit the class interests of the dominant forces. The real issue for the Marxist theorist is the question of social classes and the inequalities within society due to the contradictions of the capitalist system. As Wiley (1983:32) states, classical Marxism considers the “economic infrastructure of forces and relations of production” as the fundamental cause of social change. Andersen and Taylor (2007:14) confirms Wiley's view by arguing that social change manifests itself as a result of the “tensions or conflict” inherent in a capitalist system.
Locating Marxist conflict theory within the broader context of international society, reference is made to the concept of the modern capitalist world-system (Wallerstein 1974). The primary priority of the system is the maximum extraction and accumulation of monetary benefits by the main capitalist nations. Some Marxist theorists have applied this analytical framework to examine the issue of accumulation in the capitalist world economy. Fine (2010:99) assert that the accumulation process involves “the quantitative expansion of productive capital” through global corporations under an extensively organized restructuring within the modern world system. Borg (1992:263) asserts that the modern world system is “a self- contained economic-material entity” based on an “extensive division of labor.” Wallerstein (1974) has used the modern world-system perspective to examine issues of social inequalities in capitalist society. In terms of this theory, society is viewed as existing in a material reality governed by economic principles critical in production processes relating to raw materials, labor, infrastructure; technology and profits. Therefore, the modern world system approach reduces all social interaction to economic behavior between interdependent actors.

One of the most important analytical tools of the modern world system is the division of the capitalist world economy into three main categories, namely (a) core, (b) semi-peripheral and (c) peripheral areas (Wallerstein, 1974). The three groups exist under the harsh reality of the struggle between them for scarce resources in society. This form of classification is not only limited to nation states, but it also includes corporations, labor and other social groups. Therefore, the structural competition for the means of production perpetuates the existence of a periphery at the international, national and organizational levels. On the national level, this may occur as a result of a conflict between the dominant groups, represented by the state and the elite classes, and the subordinate groups at the peripheral level, that include the working class and households. The conflict manifests itself as different groups compete for the control of and access to national resources.

Meanwhile on the international level, conflict may arise as different nation states move to expand their influence and reach in search of new markets and increased profits. Cerulo (1993:249) asserts that, “the placement of nations [within these three categories] is a rather static phenomenon.” The states in peripheral positions suffer from severe
underdevelopment in terms of economic power, technological advancement and basic infrastructure. As a result, nations from the core area exploit them for their resources in the form of cheap labor and raw materials. Therefore, the core states continue their advantage over the process of production and this perpetuates the inequalities between nation states. In other words, the processes involved in the modern world system are responsible for legitimating a nation's sense of purpose, its sovereignty and territorial claims (Wallerstein, 1974). In the same vein, international sports events as pursued by the state also exist within the context of the modern world system and are therefore governed by a world system of capitalism.

Sport, politics and society

Numerous studies confirm that sports and politics interact at different levels of social existence (Howell, 1975; Coakley and Dunning, 2003; Strenk, 1979; Lapchick, 1979; Sage, 1979; Acemoglu, 2003; Coate and Morris, 1995). There's an overwhelming agreement that in reality, sports and politics are intertwined and difficult to separate. Strenk (1979) considers the many ways in which sport has been used for political reasons historically. He states that nation states have used sports for “diplomatic recognition or isolation”; “protest and propaganda”; “internal social control”; and also as a “stimulus to modernization and unification” (Strenk 1979:129). Therefore, the underlying implication is that the interplay between sports and politics is critical for driving social change. This notion applies in cases of social interaction where sport is approached as a political weapon or as a cultural phenomenon. This thesis suggests that sports and politics are mainly linked in three particular dimensions.

Firstly, sport is often applied to articulate the political ideology of the state. This notion refers to the use of sports to encourage the ethics and values and raise the perceived prestige of the nation. In this context, issues relating to the explicit expression of extreme nationalism or concepts of nation building through sports are relevant. To illustrate this point, Howell (1975) gave a perfect example. In his study, he argued that Hitler and Nazi Germany used the 1936 Olympic Games “to display its superiority” and as a propaganda platform for its Third Reich ideology (Howell, 1975:137). In other
words, under the doctrine of Nazi Germany, sport was used to promote sentiments of nationalism and solidarity amongst the German people. Therefore sport is a significant social institution for the ideological and legitimation processes of the state. It is appropriated by the state as a tool to achieve three main objectives, (1) internal stability, (2) social control and (3) international status. Eitzen (2000:25) asserts that the strategies of “ideological control and direct intervention” are two distinct methods of social control. Using the Third Reich ideology as an example to illustrate the point, this thesis suggests that the concept of ideological control refers to the intention of the state to push its political agenda and enhance its control over the nation's economic resources through propaganda and manipulation. On the other hand, direct intervention deals with the means by which the state rewards and punishes those who conform and those who resist its legitimacy respectively. In this case, the coercive force of the state in terms of the military, the police and the judicial system is relevant in that regard. They are used to maintain social order, assist in the unequal distribution of social resources and are also vital for the promotion of social behavior that respects the rule of law as defined by the state.

Secondly, sport has also been used as a means of expression of political opposition against the nation state or colonial powers. Lin, Lee and Nai (2008:27) confirm this view by noting the case of Korea during the Japanese colonial era (1910-1945). Their study reveals that during the colonial period, “the formation of sports groups was among the ways in which Koreans could organize against Japanese cultural and political hegemony and encourage independence from the Japanese.” Bairner (2011:234) highlights the role played by sports in Taiwan under Japanese colonial rule and confirms that it helped the local population to build a sense of “belongingness”, i.e. “space, culture, and centralized administration.” Meanwhile Keech (2001) recognizes the contribution of sport against the apartheid regime in South Africa in terms of its political influence by urging the international community to impose sanctions against that regime. The subsequent result was the total isolation of South Africa from major international sports events including the FIFA World Cup and the Olympic Games. Interestingly, what is evident from all the three cases mentioned is that sport as an instrument of social change helped to define the
end of the capitalist colonial system. Instead of cementing the pillars of social control and domination, the use of sports was crucial as a catalyst for national unity and identity formation. On the contrary, dominant groups often intend to use sport to foster social integration as a form of social control (Houlihan, 2000). In this regard, the state encourages social participation in sport in order to instill a shared sense of values, togetherness and obedience in society. However, the transformative nature of sports and the way sports adapts to the evolving challenges posed by capitalism are able to serve the interests of different groups at different levels of social development. Therefore, in terms of conflict theory, an analysis of sports as a social discourse should consider the notion of sports as not only as weapon for the continuation of social domination by one group over the other, but also as a shield against the inequalities of capitalism.

Lastly, sport is also a critical aspect of the nation state's diplomatic mission. The role of sports in diplomacy has often been shown in academic studies. Sage (1979) notes how diplomacy and sports interact in the politics of the United States of America. He asserts that historically the country's heads of state had “publicly associated themselves with sports” for diplomatic motives (Sage 1979:6). Sports as 'soft power' is seen as a platform to manage conflicts and improve relations between nation states. Strenk (1979:129) highlights how President Nixon utilized the soft power of sports in the form of table tennis to open relations between America and communist China. In addition, he notes how the dictatorial regimes of two Latin American nations, Argentina and Brazil, sought success in soccer to improve their images. The underlying notion is that sport is also recognized as crucial for the state's aspirations in terms of global recognition and prestige. In other words, participation in international sports events may assist the state to appear as a responsible international actor that adheres to international norms. For the conflict theorist, the concept of sports diplomacy in this instance has implications at the domestic and national level of the nation state. On the national front, international recognition may foster national pride and solidarity among the population. It may also help to encourage civil participation in sport and thus help to legitimize sports education policies in the country.
Another prominent feature of conflict theory analysis deals with the question of social exclusion as a means to achieve social control. Collins (2003) examines this topic within the context of sports and concludes that the issues of poverty and social capital are significant factors responsible for social exclusion. His study reveals that participation in certain sports is based on class structures to the detriment of the subordinate group. Critical questions under this analytical framework include questions of access to opportunities or lack thereof for the dominated group and issues relating to the monopoly control of certain socio-economic resources of society. Tomlinson (2006) and Roberts (2009) have extended this line of analysis by highlighting the role of wealth and education in determining participation in elite sports like tennis or golf. The studies indicate that golf and tennis are mostly reserved for the rich and well educated in society. Acemoglu (2003) has focused on the question of social exclusion by asking why governments may choose to adopt “disastrous” policies for their citizens. He argues that such policies may be adopted because they are intended to serve the interests of the politicians, the dominant group.

Social conflict in this respect is focused on “internal conflict within society which [often leads] to insufficient choices and those for which insufficient institutions and policies are imposed on society from the outside, e.g by colonial powers”(Acemoglu 2003:4). The underlying suggestion is that the state, through its policies, is regarded as the custodian of the interests of the dominant group. This notion may explain why politicians support bids to host sports mega-events despite evidence suggesting that the strategy does not produce any significant economic benefit for the host nation and, more important, the strategy does not serve the interests of the marginalized groups in society either. Instead, hosting sports mega-events, especially in the case of developing nations, often diverts resources from more significant social priorities such as the health care system, education, service delivery and poverty reduction. However, issues of infrastructure development and legacy projects as a result of hosting sports mega-events should inform any sociological research on this subject.
Cultural theory of sports

The cultural Marxist perspective considers sports as a cultural domain where resistance and struggle against social inequalities and hegemony occur. Furthermore, culture is also viewed as a tool used by the capitalist system to disguise and carry out their political and economic objectives. Thus, the analytical focus of cultural Marxists in respect of socialization in sports stresses that sport as a cultural phenomenon occurs under conditions of conflict perpetuated by the economic inequalities of the capitalist system. Under this approach, sport takes the form of a commoditized and commercialized activity which is used to create false consciousness and solidarity (Lang, 1990) between the dominated group and the capitalist owners. Young (1986:16) argues that “the mythic structure of modern adversary sports” in a capitalist system “resonates” with the lived experiences of the dominated groups. Therefore, the cultural Marxist perspective views sports as a response to the structural problems that exists within the capitalist system. In contrast, the functionalist approach considers the question of social integration through sports as far more important that the economic factors emphasized by the cultural Marxist school of thought. The former regards sports as a power source for achieving social harmony in a capitalist system.

However, numerous studies have challenged both Marxist conflict theory and the functionalist approach to sports. At the core of the criticism is the perception that both analytical frameworks adopt a deterministic approach to the concept of social change (Frey and Eitzen 1991; Bairner; 2009; Chien-Yu Lin, Ping-Chao Lee and Hui-Fang Nai 2008; Hargreaves 1992; Lamont and Lareau 1988; Stoddart 1988; Yosso 2005; Stempel 2005). In addition, Marxist conflict theory is attacked for its perceived failure to recognize the critical importance of cultural imperatives in sports. Frey and Eitzen (1991) amplify this notion by concluding that sport is a socially constructed arena that reflects cultural expressions of social life. Therefore, it is important to take into account cultural issues when analyzing sport and social change. Moreover, the implication is that when sport is viewed in its cultural dimension, it appears to exist and function in its emotive form, outside the influence of politics and economics objectives. Hargreaves (1992) notes the power of sports to appeal to cultural elements that enable people to foster shared
experience and form identities. Bairner (2009) supports this notion by asserting that sport is used to highlight national identities. Dimeo (2001:105) adds that sport is also approached as a means to “reproduce” identities and strengthen social formations. Therefore, from a cultural perspective, the significance of sport lies in its integrative and unifying power in society.

Furthermore, the question of sport as a form of social entertainment is also prominent in the cultural theory of sport. Beeman (1993) focuses on sports events and sees them as social “spectacles” that serve an important function as social symbols. He states that “the meaningfulness of the sport spectacle and the elements represented therein are only significant if they appeal to the cultural and emotional life of the public” (Beeman, 1993:380). This notion is suggestive when analyzed within the context of sports mega-events. Stevenson and Alaugh’s study (2002:457) identifies four frames that characterize the Olympics Games; they are referred to as “spectacle, festival, ritual and game.” There are other scholars who have noted the ritual element of sport in society. The general view is that sport has the capacity to convey meta-messages of society (Stevenson and Abdul, 2000; Geertz, 1972; Moore and Myerhoff, 1977). Thus, the cultural dimension of sports events is located in the messages that are implicitly or explicitly transmitted to bring about social change. As Frey and Eitzen (1991:511) explain, often nations approach sports mega-events with the intention to promote social integration and to counteract “racial, ethnic, regional and class divisions.” Lin et al (2008) support this view by highlighting how sport in Korea during Japanese colonial rule was instrumental in asserting Korean national identity.

Contrary to the notion of social integration through sports, other cultural perspectives have focused on the opposite effects of the role of sports in society. In this case, sport is analyzed as a tool for the perpetuation of social exclusion. Bourdieu (1989) formulated the concept of cultural capital to explore the use of culture, including sports, by dominant groups as a system of exclusion. Lamont and Lareau (1988:158) state that the dominant groups in society use cultural capital to “mark cultural distance and proximity, monopolize privileges, and exclude and recruit new occupants of high status positions.” The concept is seen to have power dimensions in terms of “legitimating the
claim that specific cultural norms and practices are superior” to others, and thus “institutionalizing these claims to regulate behavior and access to resources” (Lamont and Lareau 1988:159). Stempel (2005) suggests that the concept of cultural capital when applied within the context of sports addresses two key questions. Firstly: it deals with the issues of “how different classes and class fractions embody (often unconsciously) their points of honor and schemes of evaluation in their sporting practices”; and secondly it looks at “how the dominant classes use sports, done in rarified ways and at exclusive venues, in order to distance themselves from others” (Stempel 2005:411). In other words, cultural capital is seen as a form of social ranking or status by those recognized as possessing the appropriate or legitimate cultural traits. More importantly, the concept is regarded as a power resource that encompasses economic, political, scientific and technical expertise in society (Bazelon, 1963). This power resource is exclusively available for disposal and manipulation by the dominant group in society, and to the exclusion of subordinate groups.

**Literature review**

*Sociological research of sports mega-events*

Research on sports mega-events is a recent phenomenon in sociology. Horne and Manzenreiter (2006: 1) find it surprising that “the sociological and social scientific study of sport – ritualized, rationalized, commercial spectacles and bodily practices that create opportunities for expressive performances, disruptions of the everyday world and affirmations of social status and belonging – was still seen as something as a joke by mainstream sociology until recently.” Dollesa and Söderman (2008: 148) argue that research on sport and its impact on society was “until recently, seen as something of a lightweight area, compared to established fields of research.”

According to Greene (2003: 169), what is more surprising is the “dearth of research on the impact of event-related development” on developing countries and low-income communities within wealthy nations. Black (2004: 2) confirms Green’s observation, arguing “What is surprising is that with a handful of exceptions (e.g., Houlihan 1994;
Allison 1993; Hill 1996; Allison and Monnington 2002), international sport in general and major games in particular have been widely neglected by scholars of International Studies and International Political Economy.”

Snyder and Spreitzer (1974:468) attempt to offer some suggestions to the question, why the sudden research interest in sport within sociology? The authors emphasize that “If, in fact, sociology is a residual field that assimilates topics unclaimed by more established fields, why it is that sports (also, leisure and recreation) were not an early part of the sociological package?” Perhaps, as the authors suggest, one answer to this question lies in the “increased salience of these spheres as concomitants of economic development and affluence” (Snyder and Spreitzer, 1974: 468). Furthermore, the dominant view of the past that maintained that sports were primarily physical, and therefore devoid of any sociological significance, is also raised to explain the lack of research on sports mega-events. At the same time, the notion that sports are “illusionary, fantasy, and a sphere apart from the ‘real’ world” could have been responsible for the lack of scholarly research in sports (Snyder and Spreitzer, 1974: 468).

Dollesa and Söderman (2008:148) offer a proposal to resolve the problem by suggesting that “sport should be studied in specialist journals, on the grounds that it is ‘not generalizable.’” However, the authors acknowledge that sport has unique characteristics that are significant in terms of the way it internationalizes and in the extent of its globalization. Andreff and Szymański (2006:197) argue that “in view of the socio-economic importance of World Cups it is however surprising that they are under researched in sports economics.” Furthermore, the authors maintain that mainstream literature on the economics of football, like that reviewed in Dobson and Goddard (2001), have ignored events like the World Cup. On the other hand, while Dauncey and Hare (1999) commend the amount of research done on the 1998 France World Cup, the authors are also critical, stating that most studies mainly focused on social and cultural issues.

However, as this thesis holds, sports mega-events have changed both in structure and form in terms of the way they are approached and produced. Three factors are identified
as key drivers for the heightened research interest in this subject, namely the implications of their (a) economic, (b) political and (c) cultural impact. Emery (2002:3) recognizes Gratton and Henry’s (2001) argument that “sport is increasingly being recognized as having the potential to make a significant contribution to contemporary society.”

Bunce (1995 cited in Emery 2002) holds that cities from around the world are increasingly choosing sport and hosting high profile sports events as a potential growth strategy plus a means to achieve strategic corporate objectives. In addition, sports mega-events are not only “central stages for athletes competing for excellence” (Dollesa and Söderman 2008: 146), but they are also “increasingly becoming trademark properties with the capability of showcasing the sport itself as well as the cities, countries and sponsors associated with the event” (Swart and Urmilla 2004:1311).

Defining Sports mega-events

Horne and Manzenreiter (2006: 2) argues that “whilst there have been a number of earlier discussions about “special,” “hall-mark” or “mega-events” it is Maurice Roche’s definition of them that commands our attention today.” Roche (2000: 1) defines mega-events as “large-scale cultural (including commercial and sporting) events, which have a dramatic character, mass popular appeal and international significance.” Roberts (2004: 108) on the other hand defines them as events that are “discontinuous, out of the ordinary, international and simply big in composition.” Some authors place special emphasis on the duration (short term) and the purpose (economic, political and cultural motives) as the main characteristics defining a sport mega-event. Ritchie (1984: 2) confirms this assertion by defining sports mega-events as “major one-time or recurring events of limited duration, developed primarily to enhance the awareness, appeal and profitability of a tourism destination.”

What becomes apparent from the various definitions presented thus far is that mega-events have two distinct features. First, they have profound implications for the host nation politically, economically, culturally and socially. Secondly, as Roberts (2004) notes, they have the power to attract considerable media coverage. Roche (1999) appears
to agree with this notion and suggests that the main criteria in defining mega-events should be based on their impact on the host nations in relation to the political economy and social issues. In addition, Sola (1998) argue that mega-events are defined based on their impact on issues relating to tourism, publicity, imaging and infrastructure development.

Roche (2001) also classifies the huge media interest or the capacity of an event to attract a global television audience as an important requirement of a mega-event. Moreover, Whitson (2004), as noted in Horne and Manzenreiter (2006:3), argues that rapid development in “mass communication technology” such as “satellite television” has had a profound impact on events like the FIFA World Cup and the Olympic Games by creating a global audience on an unprecedented scale. In other words, sports mega-events are considered to have a far-reaching media audience spread across the globe. Davis (2006) notes that two million visitors were credited to the 2006 Football World Cup in Germany and a record 4 billion viewers tuned in to watch the Athens 2004 Olympic Games. Nonetheless, some authors like De Moragas (1996) perceive the media interest or television viewership criteria as insufficient in defining the mega-event concept. He argues that what is required is an all-inclusive approach that considers the different factors involved in sports mega-events in terms of the way they are organized, financed and supported. Therefore, using the media criteria alone could produce unreliable results when attempting to determine the status of a mega-event. Sports mega-events have multidimensional impacts on the host nation and the international community.
Figure 1: Roches’s summary of types of events

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Event</th>
<th>Example of Event</th>
<th>Target Attendance/Market</th>
<th>Type of Media Interest</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mega-event</td>
<td>Expos</td>
<td>Global</td>
<td>Global TV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Olympics</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>World Cup soccer</td>
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<tr>
<td>Special Event</td>
<td>Grand Prix (F1)</td>
<td>World Regional/National</td>
<td>International TV</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>World Regional Sport</td>
<td></td>
<td>National TV</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(e.g. Pan-Am Games)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Event</td>
<td>National Sport Event</td>
<td>National</td>
<td>National</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(e.g. Australian Games)</td>
<td>Regional</td>
<td>Local TV</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Big City sport/festivals</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community Event</td>
<td>Local community Event</td>
<td>Local</td>
<td>Local TV/Press</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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The boundaries dividing sport and politics, business and sustainable development, culture and religion, local and global, rural and urban, developed and under-developed, technology and art, men and women, sponsorships and ambushers, and simple and formal, appear to be shrinking as a result of the impact of mega-events on world systems. At the local level, Getz (2007: 202) argues that in the 1980's and 1990's, sports, tourism and entertainment were viewed as a major source of revenue by American cities. Also, Gratton and Kokolakakis (1997: 13) assert that some cities in the UK saw hosting sports events as “the main platform for economic regeneration.” Carlsen and Taylor (2003) examined the way the city of Manchester used the Commonwealth Games to (a) heighten the city’s profile, (b) give impetus to urban renewal, and (c) create a social legacy.
Therefore, this thesis adopts a broader definition of mega-events, taking into account factors such as (1) the multiple impacts of these events, (2) the duration of the event from the bidding stage to the post event period, (3) the complexity of the organization, (4) the inclusive nature of the events in terms of sectors such as government (international/national/local), sports organizations, multinational corporations and civil society, and lastly (5) the legacy issues.

Impact Studies of Sports mega-events:

*Outlining the `positive versus negative` `impact debate*

Matos (2006) argues that mega-events seem to be paradoxical when analyzed in relation to their business characteristics. He argues that, although they are “ephemeral in nature, lasting one day, a weekend, or at most one month,” the economics required to stage them are “substantial” (Matos 2006:1). Therefore, the author poses a question: “if the costs of staging a sports event that lasts at most 4 weeks is in the order of billions of dollars and resources have to be committed to preparing the event for periods of approximately a decade (from the preparation of a bid to the closing ceremonies), what moves businessmen and politicians to ‘fight’ so fiercely for them?” (Matos 2006:1). This thesis asserts that Matos’ question is reflective of the difference in core issues between supporters and opponents of the mega-events strategy.

Arguments advocating a positive impact from hosting mega-events include economic growth, infrastructure legacy and image promotion. Matos (2006) has coined the phrase, the “holy trinity” of mega-events, to refer to the arguments proclaiming these positive benefits from hosting them. According to Chen (2008:1), applying Matos’ holy-trinity argument in terms of “economic growth, infrastructure legacy and image promotion,” “both positive and negative effects are found for mega-events across a period of 40 years.” Factors such as the amount of money invested in the event, the number of tourists or fans attracted to the event and the scope of the host nation's political influence in relation to the event and the image projected internationally, are critical in assessing the positive and negative sides of mega-events.
Malfás et al. (2004:218) argue that “a review of the enormous amount of literature on the socio-economic, socio-cultural, physical and political impacts of Olympic Games, concludes that ‘economic benefits are the prime motive’ for interests involved in hosting them.” However, Matos (2006) reveals that different studies suggest that “improvement of host country image is one of the potential benefits of organizing mega-events (Baloglu and Brindberg, 1997; Brown, Chalip, Jago, and Mules, 2004; Echtner and Ritchie, 1991; Gethard, 2006; Kim and Morrison, 2005; Lee, Lee, Lee, 2005; Smith, 2005).”

Furthermore, Emery (2002; 317) argues that despite the debate for or against the use of the mega-event strategy, the reality is that idea of “‘place marketing’ and ‘civic boosterism’” has increased the number of cities bidding to host sports mega-events. Dunn and Shaw (2001: 37) refer to Van der Westhuizen (2001) who seems to confirm Emery’s viewpoint by advocating that “hallmark events, sports and cultural industries are perceived as useful means for semi-peripheral societies to attract a ‘CNN presence’ and, concomitantly, tourism, capital, students and similar multiplier effects.” Horne and Manzenreiter (2006: 9) state that the positive impact on “employment (or rather unemployment), additional spending in the community hosting an event, visiting tourist/spectator numbers, the ‘show-case effect’ (Hiller, 1989:119) of media coverage on an event locality, and some (usually unspecified) impact on the social condition of the host community, are the main claims made for hosting mega-events.” Gratton and Henry (2001) are cited in Malfás et al. (2004: 211) as supporting the above argument by claiming that it is accepted by most studies that “cities’ motives behind the decision to stage a mega-event are its potential positive consequences, and predominantly its contribution to economic development and urban regeneration.”

Andranovich et al. (2001:113) claim that mega-events are viewed as “mechanisms to promote the consumption-based economic development of city centres.” In other words, events like the FIFA World Cup and the Olympic Games are considered to be major projects that have the power to stimulate the host city's economy. Therefore, as nations struggle to adapt to challenges posed by urban regeneration in the face of globalization, hosting of sports mega-events has been presented as having a positive impact on host
cities’ economies. In addition, some studies indicate a positive impact at the political and social level of the host nation.

To counter the positive economic impact arguments of the mega-event strategy, Ritzer (2007) argues that the economic justification of mega-events is risky because the economic benefits are hard to predict. He states that the 2006 FIFA World Cup produced €140 million, which was more than predicted; however, tourist spending was about €500 million, half of what was previously projected (Ritzer, 2007). Some of the reasons put forward for the low economic impact include the fact that many 2006 German World Cup visitors focused their spending on items such as food and drinks, and not so much on other retail items. In addition, despite an increase in employment figures during the event, the overall economic growth rate remained low.

At the national level, Florek, Breitbarth and Conejo (2007: 80) point to the fact that an increasing body of research questions the argument that mega-events have a positive impact on the image of the host nation (e.g. Chalip, Green, and Hill, 2003; Ritchie and Smith, 1991; Smith, 2005). Horne and Manzenreiter, (2006: 10) believe that some researchers “consistently, systematically and self-servingly mislead about the real impact of sports mega-events.” In fact, some studies have gone as far as suggesting that a relationship between mega-events and a country’s image cannot be proved to exist. Rivenburgh et al (2002) and Sola (1998) indicate that Australia and Sweden showed no image improvements from hosting the Sydney Olympics games and the 1995 IAAF World Championships in Gothenburg respectively. Another example to consider in relation to the negative impacts of mega-events on host nations is the 2010 South Africa World Cup. It could be argued that developed countries show no image improvement because their images are generally accepted as positive. However, the situation could different for developing countries because they have a more negative image at the start of the bidding process. The negative image that accompanied India’s organization of the 2010 Commonwealth Games is an example in that respect. The events surrounding the preparation of the main games confirmed for many doubts about India’s ability to organize. On the other hand the 2011 Cricket World Cup that followed went quite well.
The African host nation intended to use the global media interest in the 2010 FIFA World Cup to change the international perception about Africa. Most importantly, the organizers hoped that hosting the event would boost South Africa’s international image and help to challenge views that the country is an unsafe place to visit or do business. However, hosting the event led to South Africa witnessing intense media scrutiny and criticism. The media focus was mainly related to issues of poverty, health, crime and unemployment. Finally, hosting mega-events may be argued to result in massive job creation programs, but it should also be acknowledged that most of these jobs are temporary. This could be viewed as a negative impact because hosting the events may meet the state’s short-term objectives but not the long-term objectives. The latter are the most desired and targeted through the sports mega-event strategy.

*The economic impact: Identifying the long term and short-term benefits*

Dolles and Söderman (2008;154) state that many studies have made great efforts to develop methods and models to measure the economic impacts of mega-events (they cite Syme et al., 1989; Getz, 1991, 1997; Gratton et al., 2000; Ritchie, 2000; Solberg et al., 2002; Baade and Matheson, 2002; Matheson, 2006). Furthermore, Crompton & McKay (1994); Crompton (1995) and Porter (1999) have written at great length about issues regarding research methodology in measuring the impact of mega-events. However, scholars appear to agree that mega-events have both long term and short-term benefits for host nations.

Andranovich et al. (2001: 165) assert that the distinction between short-term events and ongoing urban development is almost non-existent during the preparation to host a sports mega-event. The authors assert that “hotels, stadiums, entertainment complexes, urban parks, and civic monuments” are developed not only for the purpose of hosting the event, but also as part of “a broader urban revitalization agenda.” Kitchen (1996) argues that mega-sports events are used as a trigger for large-scale urban improvement. As a result, mega-events are seen to have short and long term benefits for the host nation. These include “investment in infrastructure, telecommunications, and urban development and demand (increase in tourism, consumer confidence, local availability of jobs)”
(Sterken 2005: 2). Therefore, a combination of public and private financing is required to achieve the long term and short-term objectives of a sport mega-event. However, using such an approach would not necessarily guarantee an economic windfall for the event, and economic uncertainties still remain high.

Horne and Manzenreiter (2006: 1) argue that “modern competitive sport and large-scale sport events were developed in line with the logic of capitalist modernity” and therefore are central agents of that system. Factors such as the rapid advancement in media-technology, especially the development of satellite television, are key drivers for the transformation and commercialization of sport. Therefore, “world sports events are in themselves an expression of globalization and have developed in line with it. This applies not only to the economic sphere around the marketing of world sports events, but also to the media construction of these events as a form of ‘global village’” (Sterken 2005: 2). As Mule (1993) contends, the process of globalization has been a significant factor for the restructuring of the world economic system.

As a result, nations have taken advantage of the dynamism of globalization by using the mega-events strategy as a tool for economic growth. To analyze this view, let us consider Malfas’ (2004: 211) argument that “‘place-competition’ and ‘place-marketing’ are the effects of global competition and capital mobility in the contemporary borderless world.” Therefore, mega-events are a crucial element of globalization and the world economy. Examining them empirically, Black (2004) suggests mega-events have become an important tool for social, political and environmental campaigns for change. In addition, as Harvey (1989) suggests, mega-events could be approached as a platform for nations to highlight their standing in the global arena. These arguments highlight the long-term impact of mega-events and the influence of the globalization process in transforming the way these events are approached.

Moreover, hosting mega-events may help to push forward delicate reforms in some problematic areas in the city (Andranovich, et al, 2001). In other words, the events may allow the government to implement long-term projects that were not necessarily connected to the event. This statement highlights the immediate short-term benefits of
hosting a mega-event. However, the short-term benefits in terms of visiting fans, building of event infrastructure and sponsorship investments often turn out to be long-term benefits after the event is completed. The long-term benefits include leaving a lasting legacy for the local communities and national teams and the athletes. In preparation for the events, a host city witnesses unprecedented rates of construction activity as the city gears up for a massive influx of visitors and heightened international attention. In addition, at the short-term level, the host nation’s construction industry gains a great deal from contracts related to the production of the events. Yoo (1989: 59) describes the role played by the Seoul Olympics in “stimulating double-digit growth in South Korea’s construction sector in 1988.”

The political impact: Application of sport and mega-events as a political tool across the developed versus developing nation divide

Van der Merwe (2006: 2) states that hosting of mega-events is “wrapped up in global configurations of power, inequality and identity.” Meanwhile, Greene (2003:167) argues that research on mega-events hosted by developed nations often looks at the trend towards “revitalizing post-industrial urban centers through consumption-based economic development.” On the other hand, for the developing nations, mega-events appear to be also motivated by “a desire to demonstrate that the host county embraces international legal norms” (Greene, 2003:167). Therefore, based on these arguments, one may suggest that developing nations often pursue mega-events to signal their coming of age in terms of being recognized amongst the industrialized nations. In other words, developing nations may approach mega-events as a platform to display their political stability and legal maturity.

Judd and Parkinson (1990) claim that mega-events play a critical role in enabling local elites to offer “a coherent interpretation of a city’s ‘intentions’ and of its economic and political environment—in other words, its ‘image’” (see Greene 2003:166). Therefore, it could be argued that mega-events have developed to form an integral part of urban politics. Cochrane and Peck (1996) illustrate some of the key features of this new urban politics. According to the authors, Manchester’s Olympic bid in the 1980s was
driven by the business sector instead of the local government. Dyerson (2001) argues that engaging volunteers in the event process could be viewed as a mechanism to build civil society and social capital and thus, a key political component of hosting a mega-event. At the same time, hosting mega-events enables local politicians to use them to enhance their image and also legitimizes the government by claiming to have brought the events to the people.

Some authors have argued that mega-events can be used to enhance human rights and advance the host nation’s democratic process. At most, their assumption is formulated around the idea that mega-events can be used as a powerful tool to free or democratize the host nation’s political system. Black (2004) refers to three sets of arguments that are typically invoked by supporters of bids for sports mega-events: (a) identity building and signaling; (b) development; and (c) promoting political liberalization and human rights. These three arguments apply in the case of the 2010 South Africa World Cup event. As Van der Merwe (2006:3) notes, on the national level, the South African government rather “ingeniously, although sometimes with unintended consequences, looked to sport and sports mega-events to unite a divided society and provide a focus for national identity, and in particular, to pursue the much vaunted national agenda of racial reconciliation — a related goal being the consolidation of South Africa’s young democracy and the realization of human rights for all its citizens.”

In addition, apart from the media, human rights watch groups too have become increasingly interested in sports mega-events. Their common interest is around issues concerning the human rights record of nations bidding for or hosting sports mega-events. As a result, the so-called “undemocratic regimes” or “repressive political systems” (Keck and Sikkink: 1998), are most likely to face enormous pressure from the media and human rights organizations. For example, during the 2008 Beijing Olympics, the international media and human rights groups were critical of China’s human rights record and questioned the IOC’s decision to award the game to China in the first place. However, Lenskyj (1996) argues that bid organizations and organizing committees are often private-public “partnerships” that are shielded from normal processes of democratic accountability, compromising in their essence democratic processes. Moreover, world
sports organizations such as FIFA or the IOC are most likely to prioritize other requirements such as commercial returns and spreading the interests of football and other sports globally. Human rights standards criteria appear to fall in the middle of the list. Furthermore, the difficulty is also influenced by the notion that sport and politics are separate.

Manheim (1992) argues that nations view hosting of mega-events as an opportunity to engage in pursuit of public diplomacy. Both developed and developing nations have sought to use hosting of sports mega-events to enhance diplomacy and relations with other countries. In order to understand this view, it is important to consider that diplomacy forms a critical part of international relations and foreign policy of a majority of countries. Furthermore, it is equally important to acknowledge from the outset that diplomacy can take many shapes or forms. Based on this framework, Goldberg and Solomos (2002) argues that after the end of the cold war and the subsequent end of the ideological divide, sports and hosting of mega-events have emerged as a platform for advancing global integration and cooperation. In addition, it is also crucial to consider the way global sports organizations change their policies and the impact it has on the bidding process and the relations of eventual host nations with other countries. Despite traditional views about the concept of diplomacy, which often refer to signing of economic, political and cultural treaties between nations, sports have proved to be a significant player in global diplomacy, especially since sports form part of most countries’ diplomacy, whether used to unite people, extend friendship, or show their power.

Beacom (2000) indicates that previous scholars like Hoberman, Kanin, and Espy referred to sport as a “political tool” and to international sport organizations as “ideologically loaded.” Therefore, as Keech (2001:87) argues, to understand the broad application of sports diplomacy, it is important to use a “wide frame of reference” taking into account not only the political background of nation states, but also the economic and cultural levels. Therefore, Keech holds that, looking at South Africa from a sports diplomacy standpoint, the early 1960s were an important period for three main reasons: “first, although the IOC did not expel South Africa, the issue of apartheid became firmly lodged on the IOC agenda.” Secondly, the creation of local sport organizations such as
the South African Non-Racial Olympic Committee were significant for rallying international support and protest against the apartheid regime. Finally, the mounting international pressure forced the South African apartheid policy makers to reconsider their position.

On the other hand, Cha (nd: 4) argues that sports events have “become the means by which Asian countries grease the wheels of diplomacy and engagement.” According to Cha, sports engagements between South Korea and China in the early 1990’s paved the way for the normalization of relations in 1992. He states that sports competitions between the two countries in the 1980’s provided a way to express goodwill and economic ties. China’s decision to take part in the 1986 Asian Games and the subsequent 1988 Olympics in South Korea helped to improve relations between them. To reciprocate China’s support for the Korean sports events, Seoul attended the 1990 Asian Games held in Beijing. In addition, a total of $15 million in advertising revenue and other substantial donations were made to China by Korea in an attempt to facilitate the successful staging of the event. For China, the event was significant in helping create a climate of normality and stability following the international criticism of the state in the aftermath of the Tiananmen Square massacre.

Therefore, the race to host sports mega-events is also inspired by the need to signal key political developments or changes both nationally and internationally. Dolles and Söderman (2008:151) cite Harada’s (2005) argument that “the Tokyo Olympics (1964) were not held as a commercial event to generate enormous fees for sponsorship and broadcasting rights, but rather as a nation-wide project on which national prestige was staked. The event became a symbol of Japan’s post-war restoration.” Sugden and Tomlinson (1998:118) state that for the 2002 Korea Japan World Cup, “the Koreans aimed at introducing the finals as a ‘catalyst for peace’ on the Korean peninsula, and the Japanese focused their bid on its ability to promote political stability, high technology and the country’s infrastructure.”
The cultural impact: The Intangible benefits

In addition to tangible benefits such as economic growth and infrastructure development, hosting mega-events have been argued to produce intangible benefits such as national unity, pride, self-confidence and a sense of patriotism. Therefore, besides arguments accounting for tangible benefit of sports mega-events, there are some arguments proclaiming the intangible impacts of these events. Sturgess and Brady (2006) highlight the gap in research about this issue by stressing that many studies have “ignored” this subject. However, some studies have looked into the issue and interesting questions have been raised as a result. For example Heyne et al. (2007) examined the cultural impact of mega-events on the host nation and concluded that the local host residents experience a good feeling as result of hosting the mega-event.

Therefore, this argument could be said to amount to the intangible impact debate of mega-events prevalent in the literature. Black (2006) supports the intangible benefit argument by claiming that mega-events offer the host nations a chance to highlight to the world that they too have undergone a huge social transformation. To support his claim, Black refers to the 1998 France World Cup and argues that “France’s victory at home during the 1998 World Cup was widely interpreted as showcasing the reality and benefits of a multicultural France, versus the conservative, anti-immigrant appeal of the National Front and its sympathizers.” However, some authors like Marivoet (2006), Whitson and Horne (2006) warn that research about intangible impacts still needs to show their results clearly.

The analysis of this thesis thus far suggests that scholars are in agreement that hosting mega-events has become a significant aspect of the capitalist modern world system. The events are characterized by high level of economic investment from governments and the corporate sector, infrastructure development, global media interest, high tourism volumes and they command support from a global multicultural community. As a result, these factors are often raised as arguments in support of bids to host sports mega-events.
Furthermore, the historical connection between sports, society and politics has been crucial in the development of sports mega-events and the desire to host them. In addition, the political and economic imperatives of hosting sports mega-events exist in parallel in cultural elements of sports. In this respect, issues pertaining to nation building and identity formation as a result of hosting these events are critical. Therefore, the combination of political, economic and cultural impacts of hosting sports mega-events will continue to influence nations to bid to host them.

Conclusion

Based on the discussion thus far, it is clear that both the Marxist analysis of conflict and functionalist theory suggest complementary ideas with regard to the function of sport in society. As already noted, for the Marxist theorist, sport is viewed as a cultural domain that takes place under conditions of conflict as a result of the economic inequalities of the capitalist system. The conflict theorist recognizes the economic [capitalism], political [social inequalities] and cultural [physical and ritual] elements of sports in society. The same analysis is also relevant in functionalism, as has already been established: the critical issues in functionalism are cohesion and harmony in society through social consensus between the dominant and the dominated groups. The implication is that in order to achieve a sense of peace in society, different groups will have to reach consensus with regards to the distribution of resources in the realm of politics, economy and culture. This thesis considers capitalism to be a unifying element between conflict theory and functionalism, and that both schools of thought recognize capitalism as the driving force of conflict in society. Therefore, this thesis formulates a paradigm of understanding sports mega-events based on the union and fusion of conflict theory and functionalism frameworks. As figure 2 below indicates, politics, economics and cultural domains are linked organically in sports and there is overlap between them in the sociology of sports mega-events.
Therefore, framed in this fashion, this thesis asserts that sport has unique characteristics that encompass a range of social dimensions that affect social change. The interaction between the economic, political and cultural domains is critical for understanding the central function of sports in society. These factors are embedded in the sport experience and have profound implications for the socialization process. The relationship between these three levels in the context of sport is that of interdependency and shared interests. In fact, the political, economic and cultural imperatives in sports are intertwined and extremely difficult to separate. As a result, the conflict in sport reflects the structural conflict that exists in society due to the contradictions apparent in the capitalist system. For example, the power of sport in terms of identity formation is
something that occurs on the cultural level of society but also has significant political consequences. From a conflict theory perspective, the nation state may use sports to foster national identity by instilling its values, ideology and aspirations in society. In the same context, the state may apply economic factors in conjunction with other socio-political considerations in an attempt to reduce conflict in society and the likelihood of resistance or challenge against its dominance. As a result, it may embark on various economic strategies including infrastructure development and investment on social issues such education, health, sports facilities, service delivery and safety and security inefficiencies. On the domestic front, taking these types of steps may assist the state with the question of legitimacy. Meanwhile on the international level, issues of prestige and status are relevant in that regard.

Furthermore, funding for infrastructure development related to sports mega-events and the general organization of hosting these events is heavily dependent on public financing in terms of the taxation system. The question of the taxation system is both political and economic in that it reflects the state political ideology as expressed through legislation and party manifestos. Therefore, politically, the taxation system is used as a means to consolidate and reinforce the state's power. To achieve that end, state institutions such as the police, military and the judicial system are important for guaranteeing protection of capitalist interests and also for the demonstration of the state’s coercive power. On the economic level, the issue of taxation forms an integral part of the state’s revenue stream and is crucial for the stability and sustainability of state capitalism. Thus, through the hosting of sports mega-events, the state is able to fuse political and economic dynamics to push forward its policies and to exercise its power in various forms. Equally significant is the recognition that hosting sports mega-events has serious cultural overtones in society.

Hosting sports mega-events does not only serve the profit motives of the capitalist system and political ambitions of the state, but it also has important cultural ramifications. On the cultural level, hosting sports mega-events has integrative power and a symbolic dimension in society. As this thesis will later show, on certain occasions, sports mega-events may be appropriated to serve a cultural function in terms of
improving social cohesion, but the unity forged amongst social groups may end posing a threat to the continuing dominance of the core groups by challenging the status quo. In other words, sport may be appropriated to satisfy a cultural function, but may end up having a negative impact on the political and economic dimensions of society. This is also true if the situation is the other way around. Therefore, the economic, political and cultural dynamics in sports mega-events can be seen to be linked organically and to have a direct influence on each other. This line of thought is crucial for understanding the multiple impacts of sports events on the host nation in terms of political, economic and cultural dimensions. As this thesis will show, hosting sports mega-events is critical for the political aspirations of both the dominant and dominated groups in society, as much as it is imperative for achieving their economic and cultural goals under capitalism.

Lastly, the legacy projects as a result of hosting these events and the transformative effect thereof in terms of infrastructure development, environment, tourism, corporate governance and political power, could prolong the significance of these events for years to come. Although there is still a lot of uncertainty with regards to the benefits of hosting sports mega-events in relation to these issues, it is clear that a case-by-case assessment is necessary to determine the relevance and suitability of these developments to the host nation. This will take into account the developing versus developed nation scenario and the sport mega-event strategy as a solution designed to meet the needs and objectives of the host nation. Having said that, the global appeal of sports mega-events coupled with their power to foster social cohesion and their potential for stimulating economic growth, will continue to cause these events to expand in their influence in the political, economic and cultural dynamics of society.
Chapter 2.

Sports Diplomacy and the FIFA World Cup: A Global Peace-Building Initiative

Introduction

This chapter seeks to understand how sports and hosting of sports mega-events are often used to achieve a nation’s diplomatic objectives. Hosting global sports events like the FIFA World Cup or the Olympics has developed into the most sought after peace building commodity for many nations. To a certain extent, sports diplomacy appears to be succeeding where traditional diplomacy seems to be failing. This chapter will argue that the nexus between sports and politics necessitates the application of sports diplomacy to resolve national and international conflicts. Furthermore, the concept of “peace” as the fundamental value inherent in the FIFA World Cup, like that of the “Olympic Spirit,” is recognized as the driving force behind sports diplomacy. Systemic processes involved in issues of politics, economy, culture and society will be taken into consideration throughout the discussion. Therefore, the chapter begins from the hypothesis that FIFA’s decision to award the World Cup to Uruguay (1930), Japan-Korea (2002) and South Africa (2010), was influenced by the organization’s intention to use the competition as a tool for diplomacy and for the promotion of peace.

The chapter will adopt a historical approach highlighting political, economic and social factors surrounding these three World Cups events. The motive for choosing to focus on the above mentioned World Cups is summarized as follows: (a) all four countries were the first to host the FIFA World Cup event in their respective federations/continents; (b) conflict or violence was a recent prominent feature of politics in all these countries (the Uruguay civil war, the Japan Korea conflict, and apartheid South Africa); and (c) the event was, or was used as, a tool for sports diplomacy and peace building. The chapter will discuss the issues in the following order. The first section will contain a literature review of sports diplomacy and its implications for nations dealing with international relations and foreign policy issues. The second section
will look at sports diplomacy and the 1930 Uruguay World Cup. Specifically we will examine how sports diplomacy was used to start the World Cup event, and also highlight factors that led to Uruguay being nominated as host nation despite bids from European countries. In the third section we examine the issues surrounding the bidding process of the 2002 Korea Japan World Cup.

The fourth section will highlight how sports diplomacy could be used as a tool to deal with sensitive international relations and foreign policy issues. To achieve this end, the chapter will ask the question of whether the 2002 FIFA World Cup co-hosted by Japan and Korea helped to improve relations between two countries. Attempting to answer this question, the paper will examine two specific controversial issues that continue to have a negative impact in their foreign policy relations: the issues of the wartime “comfort woman” and history textbook debates in Japan. Moreover, this thesis will highlight the areas of cooperation (if any) that came about as a direct result of the co-hosting decision.

The fifth section will analyze the impact of sports diplomacy on national politics in South Africa. In this context, the chapter will discuss how sports, particularly football, were used as a political tool to mobilize South Africans against the apartheid system. For this purpose, we will consider the colonial and apartheid eras of white minority rule together, then move to discuss the post-apartheid era. In addition, the chapter will examine the controversy that surrounded the 2006 FIFA World Cup bidding process. The intention is to provide a background and show some of the motivations behind FIFA's decision to award the right to host the 2010 FIFA World Cup to South Africa.

*Sports Diplomacy and International Politics*

First and foremost, let’s consider Beacom’s (2000) assertion that there has been a significant transformation in the concept of diplomacy in terms of the way it is understood and practiced. Originally, the idea encompasses issues such as bilateral agreements, summits, pacts or treaties, trade agreements, and resolutions from international organizations such as the International Monetary Fund and the United Nations. Therefore, the “changing nature of diplomacy has, it is argued, presented a
challenge to the traditional role of the diplomat and his/her relationship with domestic political interests” (Beacom 2000: 14). In this respect, factors such as improvement in technology and world transportation network system have allowed agents of diplomacy and diplomats easy and faster access to the world than was the case before. Secondly, Houlihan (1994) refers to the intertwining of politics and sport at different levels to highlight the significance of one over the other. Moreover, Houlihan suggests that because sport is often used as an instrument for diplomacy, ideology, nation building, access into the international arena, and commercial gain, it should therefore form a central theme for discussion in that regard.

Therefore, the growing influence of international sports organizations and sports mega-events such as the Olympic Games and the FIFA World Cup has had a profound impact in broadening the notion of diplomacy. In most cases, rival states have used these events to improve relations between themselves by promoting aspects of friendship across the social, political and economic divide of global society. Houlihan (1994) argues that the nexus between politics and sport is a significant factor in sports diplomacy. In most cases, nation states have used sports and hosting sports mega-events to assert their national ideologies for nation building purposes and also as a symbolic entry point to the international arena.

To understand the wider implications of sports diplomacy, it is important to adopt a broad framework taking into account not only the political background of nation states, but also the economic and cultural levels. In this context, sports diplomacy is viewed as a form of “soft power.” Kingston (2009) defines soft power as “the ability of a nation to achieve its objectives by attracting or seducing other nations to do its bidding or emulate its policies without resorting to coercion.” In other words, the concept involves power derived through “intangible or indirect influences such as culture, values, and ideology” (Fukushima: 2006).

Keech (2001:71) defines sports diplomacy as “the whole range of international contacts and competitions that have implications for the overall relations between the nations concerned.” In sports diplomacy, the emphasis does not lie in the competitiveness
of the games (the Olympics or the FIFA World Cup) but rather rests on the mutually held ideals of dialogue, respect and leadership (Walters:2007). However, it does not necessarily mean that sports diplomacy is the answer to global conflicts: as Sparre (2008:10) argues, “sport does not start reconciliation but it can be a valuable part of broader initiatives.” Therefore, understood in this context, sports diplomacy is regarded as a “low-risk testing ground” for peace building initiatives (Goldberg et al; 2002: 67). In addition, unlike the application of diplomacy through hard power such as bilateral agreements or military engagements, sport does not suffer from fears of exposing state secrets and other confidential issues. Therefore, sports diplomacy is viewed as a safe and accessible approach in dealing with relations between nations or communities.

*Sports Diplomacy and the Ideological Conflicts of the Cold War*

According to Beacom (2000: 1) “the political and cultural dimensions of sport are widely recognized and international sport is generally accepted as contributing to the dynamics of international relations.” It follows that international sport is also reflective of approaches in international relations. Therefore, as Goldberg (2002:64) states, “not only do sports often have political purposes, but they also are affected by politics. Political conflict has long appeared in sports, whether it is communism vs. capitalism, amateurism vs. professionalism, nationalism vs. internationalism, or integration vs. segregation.” For Coakley and Dunning (2003:214) “the explicit examination of the relationship between politics and sport is comparatively recent.” However, the authors also acknowledge that there were some social science studies before the 1970's that dealt with the question of sport and society. However, “interest in sport (in terms of research) was a product of two major issues in international politics, namely the Cold War and the campaign against apartheid in South Africa” (Coakley and Dunning (2003:214). In other words, the intervention of international sport federations in politics as a result of these two events made them critical forces in world politics.

To illustrate this point, Body (1976) argues that after the end of World War II, the NATO and Warsaw Pact countries that had defeated the Nazi-Fascist axis became deadly enemies. The Olympic Games and sport in general became part of the Cold War.
Therefore in this sense, “sports assumed ideological dimensions as countries used athletics to validate political systems and beliefs” (Goldberg, 2000:64). According to Giatsis et al (2004), the 1980 and 1984 Olympic Games witnessed the lowest point in terms of relations between the Eastern bloc and the Western bloc. In this respect, the allied forces led by America abstained from the 1980 Olympic Games held in Moscow and subsequently the Soviet Union and its allies stayed away from the 1984 Olympic Games in America.

McLauchlan (2001) believes that the amount of cooperative efforts in sport by different sectors has been a critical driver for change in politics. To back up his claim, he refers to the sports diplomacy or the ping-pong diplomacy approach adopted by President Nixon of America in his attempt to improve relations with China. Goldberg (2000:67) agrees with McLauchlan's view by highlighting that the sports exchanges between China and America under Nixon's approach played a key role in challenging “stereotypes” about each other by opening a new dialogue for understanding, such as “encouraging further people-to-people contacts.” Hong and Yi (2000:492) stress the significant part played by other individuals including the players and officials of the respective table-tennis teams, the “low-ranking diplomats and journalists” in helping to bring about “a dramatic transformation” in the relationship between China and America. Xu (2006) notes that China protested in 1958 against the Olympic Movement’s decision to recognize Taiwan as a nation state and to allow it to take part in the Olympics under another name, that of Chinese Taipei.

In South Africa, the international sports boycotts against the Apartheid regime in the 1980’s played a huge role in the downfall of that oppressive system in favor of democracy. Therefore, given these examples, it clear that the political power or influence of sport is significant for the pursuit of diplomacy and peace around the world. In addition, through the development of mega-events and the global interests in them, international sports organizations such as FIFA or the IOC have thus emerged to be significant players on the global political stage. Another important aspect of sports diplomacy is that it enables informal talks between nations to take place. The meeting
between the Prime Minister of Pakistan and India respectively as a result of the 2011 Cricket World Cup semi-final serves as good example in that regard.

*Sports Diplomacy and Globalization*

Roche (2001) and Simson and Jennings, (1992) argue that sports mega-events have became a significant part of globalization and as a result are crucial for hosting nations in relation to both the socio-economic and political dimensions. Muller (2007:6) contends that “many contemporary authors” have adopted a “globalization perspective” on football. Weede (2004:167) defines globalization as “a process of market expansion and market integration, as the universalization of capitalism.” Yusof and Shah (2008:112) argue that “the economic characteristics of globalization include: (1) increase in international trade at a much faster rate than the growth in the world economy, (2) increase in international flow of capital including foreign direct investment, (3) creation of international agreements leading to organizations like the WTO and NAFTA, and (4) development of global financial systems.” On the other hand, Higham and Hinch (2009:18) suggest that characteristics of globalization include “the accelerated compression of time and space; (b) a growing interdependence that crosses traditional spatial and non-spatial boundaries (c) an uneven distribution of impacts; and (d) increasing flexibility of production.”

As Muller (2007:6) points out, the globalization approach views economic dimensions as paramount for international sport and football relations. This way, Muller argues, “the state-centric view on international relations is left thereby, and firms (especially multi-national corporations) are emphasized” (Muller 2007:6). Furthermore, it could be argued that commercial interests have partially replaced political patronage as the dominant power in football affairs. In addition, the process of globalization in terms of the interdependency of local, regional and global structures is considered to be a significant factor in that regard. Muller (2007:7) holds that football as represented by the FIFA World Cup is seen as an “industrial system” composed of stakeholders that seek to create “extraordinary surplus value.” Therefore, viewed in this manner, the commercial interests of the FIFA World Cup are herein stressed and FIFA as an organization is
considered as a corporation competing with other sport organizations to provide sport entertainment around the world. Sudgen and Tomlinson, (2003:195) view football as a “representation of economic and cultural ‘imperialism.’”

Muller (2007) has also suggested the application of world-system theory as a method to examine how football functions in international society. He states that the main thesis of this theory is that “the currently overarching system is a world-economy and that this system is capitalistic” (Muller 2007:8). Furthermore, he advocates that modern world-systems theory considers and explains social interactions in relation to global economic behavior. According to this theory, the global economy functions via a market where money exchange occurs in a public domain. Muller further argues that the concept of universalism embedded in the modern world-system concept is essential for the capitalist model to operate. Therefore, this chapter suggests that forces of capitalism and globalization, as represented by the universal FIFA World Cup, also drive the global football business. In addition, these forces are not only unavoidable, but they are also necessary. In other words, capitalism as an economic model for football is necessary for the survival and the continued dominance of football in the global sports industry.

Globalization or capitalism as represented by global football (the FIFA World Cup), inevitably promotes international trade. According to Weede (2004:173), “trade (because of its contribution to prosperity) underwrites democracy and thereby the democratic peace where it prevails.” Ratnapala (2003) raises an interesting question as noted by Weede (2004), namely how trade contributes to the prevention of war, or rather, to pose the question differently, why trade promotes peace. As a response, Ratnapala suggests that firstly “war is likely to disrupt trade” and secondly that “commerce might contribute to the establishment or maintenance of moral capital, which has a civilizing and pacifying effect on citizens and statesmen” (Weede (2004:169). Therefore, it could be argued that the geopolitical issues that appear to affect peace by democratic approaches seem to be absent in the concept of peace determined by means of trade. Friedman’s (2005) concept of “the Dell Theory of Conflict Prevention” supports the notion of peace attained through trade. He argues that partners in the same global supply chain do not usually go to war with each other as long as they are part of that supply chain. This has often been referred
to as a *capitalist-peace* perspective. Although this approach takes into consideration the link between politics, the market and peace, it also recognizes the necessity of maintaining a policy that prioritizes the market over politics. In other words, the success of the market is considered as more important than any political ideology or any form of discrimination. Therefore, applying this theory to the concept of mega-events as represented by the FIFA World Cup and Olympics, one may argue that trade, as dictated by the market, is an essential component of these events, whether exemplified by tourism, infrastructure development or the involvement of multinational corporations.

Based on this understanding, it could be argued that in pursuit of sports diplomacy, international sport organizations like FIFA or the IOC have positioned themselves to appear to be free from political influence. However, the issues surrounding the political nature of international sports organizations are a subject of debate in the modern world system. Nonetheless, Siebers (2006:93) argues that “trade now provides the preferred language of international relations.” According to this theory, the difference between nation states and the potential conflict between them will be harmonized by the leveling effect of the market. At the same time the author warns that although most people and organizations want to make a profit from the market, that on its own does not guarantee protection against exploitation and injustice. Moreover, the market motive should be treated with caution as it continues to divide the world into those with superior technology, and those with raw materials and/or a cheap labor force. Based on this assessment, it could be argued that the global business market would inevitably maintain the international business status quo by perpetuating the economic divisions between nations. Furthermore, the market system does not assist much in the production of long-term relations between nations based on the prospect of equal economic benefit for all parties involved. However, despite evidence of economic imbalance as result of mega-event strategy, different nation states continue to bid to host them hoping for either economic or other benefits.
The concept of globalization in sport has been characterized by developments in media technology such as broadcast media (television, radio), print media (newspapers and magazines) and digital media (the internet). According to Roche (1999:5) these developments represents “an historically significant and qualitative” shift from the experiences of the early 20th Century in terms of “aspiration to influence and control of mass populations on the part of the elite groups and the controllers of mass media systems and technologies.” Dolles and Söderman (2008) argue that a change of perspective has occurred in research, politics and business practice in terms of their approach towards hosting sports mega-events. Maguire (2005) argues that athletes compete in mega-events not only to exhibit their athletic excellence, but also to represent the dreams and aspirations of their respective nations. In other words, as Roche (2000) points out, mega-events provide nations and athletes with an opportunity to showcase their culture and assert their identities.

Tomlinson and Young (2006:1) argue that “the political exploitation of the global sports spectacle and the cultural and economic ramifications of its staging have been critical indices of the intensifying globalization of both media and sport.” Goldberg (2000:67) holds that sport receives more mass media coverage compared to other activities such as art or science because it “involves the broader public—a precondition to broader policy changes (i.e., engagement).” In addition, Goldberg offers some explanation as to why sport attracts such a huge media interest: business transactions may be overloaded with implications of economic reform; however, sport on the other hand is not seen as a threat to structural core of society. In addition, unlike in military exchanges, sport does not suffer from fears of exposing state secrets and other confidential issues. On the contrary, sport is regarded as a “low-risk testing ground for gauging the public’s reaction to another country and, ultimately, for moving toward rapprochement” (Goldberg, 2000:67). However, the rapid growth of technology and the increased media
interest in mega-events have had both a positive and negative impact on the way these events are approached and used. The following section considers a few examples.

The positive use of media in the promotion of sports diplomacy

On a positive note, the media can highlight the peace initiative side of football and thereby instill a sense of hope for the conflicting nations. For example, in 2009 Iraq and Palestine made headlines around the world when the two nations played a friendly game in the city of Irbil in Iraq. The match marked an end to a seven-year run without a national football team since the occupation by the US-led forces. The game allowed the Iraqi people to unite behind the national team despite the differences that resulted in military conflict. According to Neil Arun, the Iraq editor for the Institute for War and Peace Reporting (IWPR) who was at the game, the people of Iraq hoped that “the match will be a sign to countries around the world that if Palestinians can travel to Iraq to play football, so can they ” (BBC broadcast Report 2009/10/7). He was highlighting the state of security and the general public desire for peace in Iraq and in the Middle East. Therefore, as Goldberg, 2000:66) argue, sports “provide a healthy outlet to nationalism where, even in defeat, another country’s heroes are glorified (rather than its political leaders vilified); more than being just celebrated, athletes can replace dominant images that tend to demonize and stereotype the other side.”

The negative use of media and its impact on sports diplomacy

On the negative side, the way networks and newspapers dramatize international sports contests by focusing on global rivalries and using war-like commentary in order to attract viewers (Walters: 2007) could have a negative impact on peace-building and thus hurt diplomacy.

(a) A World Cup qualifying match between Honduras and El Salvador in 1969 ended up “with thousands dead and the future of two countries in the balance” (BBC News 2002/15/03). According to the report, a day after the final match between the two nations, which Honduras lost 3-0, an El Salvadoran plane flew over the Tegucigalpa and dropped a bomb on a city of 250,000 people, which had a tremendous impact. “The city and its
people ground to a halt; shops closed for business, restaurants never opened and many cars were left abandoned. A blackout swiftly ensued...Cross border gun fire and shelling developed through the night and soldiers and civilians alike were settling in for war – trenches were being dug on the border and people were hoarding in the cities.”

(b) The IOC has argued that the 1936 Olympics in Germany were used by Hitler as a platform for propaganda in order to “prove his theories of Aryan racial superiority” (IOC website). Some authors have noted the notion that Hitler used the Olympics to harden the German spirit and instill unity among German youth. Gray and Barney (1990: 214) have argued that Hitler viewed sport as way to “maintain the purity of German blood” by sifting out the weak and the Jews from the German population.

(c) Winstanley (2009:1) argues that “the sectarian nature of football in Glasgow mirrors the ethnic conflict of Northern Ireland, and therefore analysis of football in Scotland demonstrates that sports is a method through which Northern Irish identity conflicts are manifested.” Moreover, the author argues that even though the institutionalized conflict appeared to be fading due to the peace agreement in Northern Ireland, sports have become a platform for discontents to express their views. Therefore it could be argued that sports not only act as a powerful tool in the maintenance of identity, but are also significant in the perpetuation of conflict. In the Irish case, identity is also maintained through the distinctive Gaelic sports – hurling and Gaelic football.

(d) Again during the 1968 Olympics in Mexico City, two American athletes used the media attention surrounding the games to highlight to the world the plight of the African American struggle during the civil rights movement. According to the BBC (2008/17/10), “Tommie Smith and John Carlos, gold and bronze medalists in the 200m, stood with their heads bowed and a black-gloved hand raised as the American National Anthem played during the victory ceremony.... Thirty years after their protest, the two men ...were honoured for their part in furthering the civil rights movement in America.”
Sports Diplomacy and the 1930 Uruguay World Cup

Rimet’s dream of international football tournament dedicated to world peace and prosperity

According to the FIFA website (FIFA.com/history), when the organization’s first president, Jules Rimet, took over, the organization “which had been shaken by the First World War, counted 20 members.” Lowery and Williams (2002: 6) confirms that Rimet was FIFA president from 1 March 1921 and until 1954 (excluding the Second World War) and “oversaw five World Cups from 1930 onwards.” The first World Cup was hosted by Uruguay in 1930 after a vote at the FIFA meeting known as the “Barcelona Congress” (FIFA.com/World Cups). According to reports, there were thirteen nations participating in the tournament. The European zone was represented by eight countries, while South America had four and the United States of America made up the numbers. There were no teams from Africa, Asia, the Caribbean Islands and the Middle East.

As is still the practice today, different nations presented bids to FIFA for the right to host the FIFA World Cup. Krotee (1979) argues that when nations were invited to tender their bids to host the first ever FIFA World Cup event, Uruguay’s political and economic achievements at the time had positioned the country as a frontrunner to host the tournament. European nations in the form of Sweden, Italy, Spain, Hungary and the Netherlands were the other nations bidding to host the event. Several reasons have been put forward to explain why FIFA chose Uruguay to host the first World Cup in 1930. According to FIFA the motive was to “honour” Uruguay’s “achievements” and “to encourage a regime of international peace” (FIFA.com/previous World Cups).

According to Krotee (1979:145) Uruguay saw its “last civil upheaval for almost 70 years when the Colorados defeated the Blanco or nationalist rebels at the battle of Masoller in 1904.” Therefore, the country was internationally recognized as an open society and as Latin America’s “most politically conscious and articulate nation” (Krotee 1979). In addition, the political regime in Uruguay under the leadership of Jose Batlley
Ordenez, introduced new reforms, such as making public education free, taking ownership of banks, improving social security and announcing an eight-hour workday. The political transformation included a clear separation of state and religion. Therefore, as Riordan and Kruger (1999:34) note, from a political perspective, hosting the 1930 World Cup was important for Uruguay as it was planned to form “part of the celebrations for the centenary of its constitution,” and to commemorate the event.

Secondly on the economic level, hosting the World Cup was a symbol of Uruguay’s economic supremacy in Latin America. As host of the World Cup tournament, Uruguay promised to cover all the costs relating to staging of the games including travel and accommodation costs for all participating teams. Uruguay’s announcement that it was prepared to take responsibility for the total fiscal costs for the event was a significant factor in convincing FIFA to award the games in its favor. Furthermore, the country further strengthened its reputation in world sport having previously won the soccer championship during the 1924 Olympics held in Paris. After having been chosen to host the 1930 FIFA World Cup, the host government ordered the construction of the Estadio Centenario to mark the event and also as a “testimonial to the integral meaning of sport in Uruguayan society” Krotee (1979:144).

Foer (2004:32) argues that “while statesman Robert Schuman was daydreaming about a common European market and government [later the European Union], soccer clubs [had already] moved toward union … and started competing against one another in regular transnational tournaments, such as the events now known as the Champions League and the Union of European Football Association (UEFA) Cup.” Therefore, football had long defied separation of nations by borders since the end of the First World War. The power of football in terms of its ability to unite people, players and governments across borders has been the most significant factor in sports diplomacy, as a means of promoting world peace. This phenomenon of movement of people and governments as a result of globalization has been a prevalent argument in today’s rhetoric about sports diplomacy and the significance of FIFA and the World Cup events.
Boniface (2002:2) highlights two important issues, First, “while the UN has 186 members, the FIFA can boast 198, including Northern Ireland, Scotland, England and Wales. These four are present in the UN as one United Kingdom, but exist independently in the world football.” Second, FIFA membership include nations which are not affiliated with the UN such as “Anguilla, the Dutch Antilles, Aruba, Bermuda, the Cayman Islands, the Virgin Islands, the Faeroes, the Cook Islands, Tahiti, Montserrat, Puerto Rico, Macedonia, Switzerland, Palestine, Taipei, Hong Kong and Guam.” Therefore based on these two assertions, it could be argued that football represent the most universal and inclusive phenomenon of modern times.

Boniface assertions indicate that FIFA has succeeded where the UN, the IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency) and others have failed, that is, to bring the Peoples Republic of China and Taiwan together within the same international organization. Although many things have changed in the world since Uruguay hosted the first FIFA World Cup back in 1930, it could be argued that the role of the FIFA World Cup as a stage for diplomacy and dialogue for the purpose of peace building has remained unchanged. According to the current FIFA president, Sepp Blatter, the organization’s mission extends well beyond managing the world’s football affairs and also includes promoting peace and development around the world. In his mission document, Sepp Blatter states that in building a better future “football is no longer considered merely a global sport, but also as unifying force whose virtues can make an important contribution to society. We use the power of football as a tool for social and human development, by strengthening the work of dozens of initiatives around the globe to support local communities in the areas of peace building, health, social integration, education and more” (FIFA.com/aboutfifa).

**Sports Diplomacy and the 2002 Korea-Japan World Cup**

_The co-hosting decision and Japan-Korea relations_

The road to the 2002 FIFA World Cup co-hosted by Japan and Korea was full of controversies and accusations and almost brought FIFA into disrepute. Japan and Korea
had been enemies for a long time, and their hostilities came to the fore during the bidding process. The fight to host the first FIFA World Cup in Asia exposed the deep animosity between the two nations. Their conflict stems from a brutal history of war and colonialism of Korea by Japan between 1910 and 1945. Although Japan’s occupation did help to industrialize Korea and developed its infrastructure, it was also merciless and bloody. Weiner (1989) asserts that many Koreans were forced take Japanese names, learn Japanese and forced to provide cheap labor for Japanese companies. Therefore, relations between Japan and Korea are informed by that history.

The South Koreans believed that Japan’s occupation was unjust and that therefore it should at least apologize for the atrocities committed. In addition, as Lind (2005) has noted, the Koreans claimed that the Japanese Ministry of Education’s textbook screening and approval system tended to whitewash and distort the history of Japan’s violent colonial role in Asia. Furthermore, the issue of the so-called “comfort women” stands as an obstacle to improving relations between the two countries. Many Korean women were forced to act as sex slaves for Japanese soldiers during the Second World War (Yangmo, 2002). The survivors of that ordeal lodged appeals with the courts and the United Nations to force Japan to account for its history and pay economic retributions to the victims.

In her report to the UN Human Rights Commission, Radhika Coomaraswamy, the U.N. special investigator into violence against women, concluded that Japan must “admit its legal responsibility, identify and punish those responsible for the sex slavery during the war, compensate the victims, apologize to the survivors in writing, and teach its students this hidden chapter in Japanese history” (Soh 1996:1226). However, Japan did not oblige and refused to give in to the Koreans’ demands. The authorities in Japan maintained that they had provided substantial reparations and that the matter was settled. Therefore, the two countries remain deadlocked on this matter and that has created a vacuum for suspicion and mistrust in their future relations.

As a result, the hostilities between the two neighbors came to the fore during the bidding process for the 2002 FIFA World Cup. Their campaigns were marred with war-like talk as they lobbied support from the FIFA delegates and the various regional soccer
federations. In fact, the circumstances that surrounded the bids of the two rivals involved not only an intertwining of government politics and sport but also politics within FIFA. Initially, Japan started its bid in 1986 after Joao Havelange, the previous FIFA President from Brazil, encouraged it to bid for the 2002 World Cup and promised to back it. Havelange, as a Brazilian, made the promise to Japan in an effort to strengthen relations between Japan and Brazil. This argument takes into account the fact that Japan and Brazil share historical links that have seen many Brazilians coming to work and live in Japan. At the same time, many Japanese have also migrated to Brazil over the years. Tsuda (1999:1) notes that “since the beginning of the return migrant flow in the 1980's, the number of Japanese-Brazilians in Japan rose to 220,000 by the late 1990’s.”

On the other hand, South Korea’s bid to host the 2002 FIFA World Cup was not mounted until 1994. If Japan did not feel threatened immediately, they certainly began to when the Korean Football Association President, Chung Mong-joon, a charismatic figure, started winning the all-important political battle by being voted President of the Asian Football Federation. He openly challenged Havelange by demanding a more accountable and open FIFA. The Korean and Asian president soon won the hearts and minds of the African and European football federations who backed him in his country’s bid to host the 2002 FIFA World Cup. The issue as to who supported Japan’s bid and who favored the Korean bid exposed two important issues, (a) a rift and power struggle within FIFA; and (b) alliances between the core states and the peripheral states. The split was both between individual members and between various federations representing their regions. To a large extent, power struggles within FIFA often involve a contest between Europe and South America as the two regions are considered to be the world soccer powerhouses. However, the notion that smaller federations are always caught in the crossfire when the time for electing a new FIFA president draws closer cannot be overlooked. Nonetheless, the bidding process for the right to host the 2002 FIFA World Cup was intense and hostile.

Both Japan and Korea leveled accusations and counter-accusations against each other in their quest to win votes. FIFA delegates were showered with gifts and generosity amounting to something close to bribery. Now FIFA delegates had the serious problem of
not knowing who to vote for. Their confusion stemmed from the fact that two close neighbors were attacking each other with serious claims that appeared to be straining their already fragile relations. Therefore, choosing one instead of the other could have had a negative impact on relations between the countries. As for arguments or motivation for wanting to host the event, Korea advanced its claims by pointing to its outstanding football record, boasting of having previously appeared in five FIFA World Cups. In addition, Korea referred to its long-established professional football league with a huge fan base, much larger than that of Japan.

In addition, each Korean promotional statement inevitably included a reminder that Japan had never qualified for a World Cup Final and that over 85% of all Koreans actively wanted to host the 2002 tournament compared to just 29% of all Japanese (McLaughlan 2001). On the one hand, professional football had only recently been started in Japan, and the J-League was very young. Therefore, Japan pointed to the establishment of the J-League as one of the reasons for its desire to host the 2002 World Cup (Horne and Manzenreiter 2004). The Japanese federation reasoned that the 2002 World Cup could serve as a catalyst to spark interest in Japan in the J-League and at the same time raise the level of their association.

To complicate matters, South Korea raised the issue of their forgotten neighbor, North Korea. South Korea reasoned that bringing the 2002 World Cup to Korea would help in healing old wounds between the two Koreas, and that the event might actively engage all the stakeholders to move in the right direction in terms of reunification talks with the North. They argued that a unified Korea would bring stability to the region. In response, their opponents raised the issue of the 1987 terror attacks during the run-up to the 1988 Olympics in Seoul. According to Fischer (2007) Pyongyang terrorists bombed a Korean Air jet flying over the sea off Burma in 1988 and Japan raised that issue drawing attention to the unstable situation on the Korean Peninsula. The issue soon became petty, with Korea claiming that the weather in Japan would not be suitable for the games, unlike Korea. Japan raised the issue of the superiority of its technology and finances to justify the claim that it would have fewer problems financing the World Cup. As the claims and counter claims were continuing, so were the gifts to FIFA delegates.
The situation illustrated how federations and individuals with their own agendas other than that of promoting World Cup football could manipulate FIFA. The race to host the 2002 World Cup was heating up and both sides showed no sign of backing down. FIFA was faced with a serious dilemma of not wanting to further damage the relations between the two nations by choosing one against the other. So the President of FIFA decided to award co-hosting right to the two rivals. FIFA’s rationale was that co-hosting would force the two nations to work together on a range of issues in preparation for the World Cup.

The most significant thing about the 2002 World Cup besides the games was that it was the first time the event was held on the Asian continent. Secondly it was the first time in the history of the World Cup that two nations had co-hosted the event. Thirdly it was the first time that FIFA decided on who would host the next World Cup without a vote, because the normal procedure is that a vote is taken and a winner is selected on the basis of that.

FIFA’s initial idea in deciding to award the co-hosting rights to Korea and Japan was for the competition to act as a vehicle in which dialogue and corporation could take place between the two rivals. But instead, the two nations virtually hosted two separate World Cups with minimal cooperation between the organizing committees from each side. The rivalry went on into the final preparatory stages of the event. The next hurdle had to do with naming rights, in other words, which country’s name would come first in the naming of the event. This has serious ramification in national branding. Japan lobbied FIFA to decide that the event should be called the “2002 Japan-Korea World Cup” because in the English language “J” for Japan comes before “K” for Korea. However, Korea objected, arguing that FIFA refers to South Korea as Corée in French, the official language of the organization. Eventually FIFA declared that the event should be called the “2002 Korea-Japan World Cup.” Japan was furious to have lost two battles with Korea, while Korea was celebrating both victories.

The next problematic issue had to do with setting ticket prices at a level agreeable to both parties. Initially FIFA had ruled that the number of tickets would be shared equally between the co-hosts so that both would stand a fair chance of benefitting from the ticket sales, even though Japan has a larger population than Korea. However, Japan accused
Korea of setting low-ticket prices aimed at attracting international football fans to Korea for the World Cup, a claim denied by the Korean authorities. In addition, the Korean government and the World Cup Organizing Committee had initially invited the Japanese Emperor to attend the opening ceremony in Korea, but the Japanese government quickly responded by saying they would send Prime Minister Koizumi instead. The political tension between the two nations appeared to be threatening the success of the event. Just less than eight months before the kick-off of the first match in Seoul, the two countries appeared not to have resolved many of their differences. Despite FIFA’s call for closer cooperation and better partnership between the co-hosts, the tension appeared to be escalating.

Often politicians from both governments were guilty of derailing the positive steps towards peace and reconciliation by taking actions or making statements that provoked a negative reaction from the other. As Cho (2010:13) argues, the politicians in Korea often “drew on anti-Japanese symbols to solidify the legitimacy of the government.” The same argument applied in the case of Japan. For example, in 2001 the Japanese Prime Minister made a state visit to Korea but was denied entrance to the Korean Parliament by some MP’s, pointing to the fact that Japan had yet to offer a satisfactory apology about its war history. The cold reception given to the Japanese Prime Minister by the Koreans caused the Japanese authorities to refuse an invitation by the Korean Local Organizing Committee to have the Japanese Emperor attend the opening ceremony of the 2002 World Cup in Korea. As a matter of protocol, FIFA requires a head of state to attend the opening and the final match of the World Cup. The Japanese were afraid that the same treatment given to their Prime Minister a year before would be given to the Emperor, a highly respected symbol of the nation.

However, despite the tension between Japan and Korea and the competition to outclass each other in terms of organizing a better World Cup, FIFA still required the two parties to cooperate in many respect of the preparation process. Therefore, from a structural functionalist perspective, FIFA forced the two rival nations to reach consensus and work together for the benefit of the 2002 World Cup. Moreover, FIFA proved that as an organization, it has a vital role to play in international relations and peace building.
missions. The world football organization changed its rules and allowed two countries to co-host the World Cup, an unprecedented decision in World Cup history. Through that bold decision, FIFA gave the two enemies a real chance for peace and for future cooperation. Since then, co-hosting has proved a good way to involve smaller countries in major sporting competitions, e.g. Euro 2012 co-hosted by Poland and Ukraine; and the 2011 Cricket World Cup games played in India, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh.

Although Japan and Korea had separate local organizing committees, FIFA was a bridge between them. The two committees were obliged to follow the rules and regulations as stated by FIFA. These coordinated efforts ensured that they hosted a spectacular and successful 2002 World Cup. The two organizing committees released a joint statement in Yokohama, Japan in 2002 acknowledging that the co-hosting of the World Cup had paved the way for better future relations. Therefore, despite the major differences that existed between Japan and Korea before and during the 2002 FIFA World Cup event, the co-hosting decision had forced the two nations to cooperate and work together for a common goal.

On the political level, co-hosting the FIFA World Cup helped to accelerate bilateral reconciliation between the two nations. As some authors have observed, co-hosting the World Cup encouraged cooperation and mutual understanding between the two rival states. The President of Korea had publicly announced in 1998 as part of his election manifesto that his main foreign policy goal was to improve bilateral relations with Japan. He followed up his rhetoric by an official state visit to Japan in 1998 where he met Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi (1998-2000) and the both men signed the “Joint Declaration on A New Republic of Korea-Japan Partnership towards the Twenty First Century.” In their joint statement, the two leaders declared that they “shared the view that in order for Japan and the Republic of Korea to build solid, good-neighborly and friendly relations in the twenty-first century, it was important that both countries squarely face the past and develop relations based on mutual understanding and trust” (MOFA:1998). As a result, the two countries reached a new fishery agreement later in 1998-99 and that action temporarily brought an end to the Dokdo/Takeshima dispute. According to Van Dyke (u/a:p23) “the treaty established a compromise joint-use zone around the Tok-
Do/Takeshima islets, and carefully regulated how much fish of each species could be caught within the zone, and in the adjacent national-jurisdiction zones.”

Sakaedani (2005) asserts that the 2002 FIFA World Cup was instrumental in reinforcing the momentum of friendship and reconciliation between the co-host nations at government and civil society level. In 2001 Prime Minister Koizumi of Japan and President Kim Dae Jung of South Korea made a joint statement at a press conference in Seoul where they announced that in the spirit of co-hosting the World Cup, their respective countries had agreed to work towards improving relations between them and had also discussed policy in dealing with North Korea (Kantei.gov.jp/foreign). As a result, they designated the year 2005 as the “Japan-Korea Friendship Year” aimed at promoting mutual understanding and cooperation in relation to addressing problematic issues in their relations, especially the history textbook issue. Therefore, as Seongho (2003:4) notes, in 2002 the governments of Japan and Korea took a positive step in addressing the history textbook issues by launching a joint committee comprising of experts from both countries tasked with formulating an “objective understanding of the past and to bring closure to the controversy surrounding Japanese textbooks.” More importantly, both parties emphasized that the committee's efforts would have serious implications for improving future relations between the two states. These efforts were followed up again in 2004 when the Hanal Yondae 21(Korea-Japan Solidarity 21) was formed by scholars from both nations with the aim of promoting dialogue and “mutual understanding of regional history” (Ku;2008:28).The mandate of these academics was to establish regional solidarity and to advance self-criticism and reflection of their respective nations for the twenty-first century (ibid).

In addition, on the security level, the co-hosting decision had serious implications for the military relations between Japan and Korea. The two states agreed to resume joint military drills and share intelligence and also agreed a criminal extradition treaty in 2002 (Cho, 2010) in an effort to safeguard the first Asian World Cup. Furthermore, co-hosting the World Cup served as perfect platform for a royal visit by a member of the Japanese Imperial house, the first visit of its kind since the Second World War. As a matter of protocol, FIFA requires a head of state to attend the opening and the final match of the
World Cup. Chung Mong Joon, chairman of the Korean Local Organizing Committee, had highlighted the importance of the Emperor of Japan’s visit to South Korea for the opening ceremony of the games. He was quoted as saying “I understand a visit to Korea by the Japan’s Emperor is difficult for the Japanese people to accept .... However the Korean people are very much looking forward to seeing the Emperor” (Japan Times: 2001/7/11). However, his request was rejected by the Japanese law-makers, but instead, Prince Takamado, the Emperor’s cousin, and his wife Princess Hisako attended the event and represented the royal family. The Japanese Prime Minister was also present and represented the political establishment of Japan. Therefore, the co-hosting decision helped move the relations between Japan and Korea in a more positive direction. As the Consul-General of Japan in Denver, Colorado, USA, Mr Kubo, noted, during the 2002 Korea Japan World Cup period, “the tension [he] felt 15 years ago” between the two nations “was mostly gone and the atmosphere had become much smoother” (Kubo 2008/10/5).

On the cultural level, the 2002 Korea Japan World Cup in terms of its integrative power and as a catalyst for peace had serious implications for the communities of both countries. The co-hosted event helped to bridge the gap between the peoples of Japan and Korea at the grass-roots level. Seongho (2003:2) notes that when Korea proceeded to the semi-final, there was celebration and cheering by the peoples of both Japan and Korea, especially in Shin-Okubo, a part of Tokyo with many Korean residents (Huat and Iwabuchi, 2008). More significantly, the scenes on the streets were reflected in some surveys which showed that there was a “drastic improvement of people's mutual perceptions and positive view about the future relationship between Japan and Korea” (Huat and Iwabuchi, 2008:251). Furthermore, Korea reversed its previous prohibition of Japanese music and other cultural influences such as manga and anime in Korean society. Home and Manzenreiter (2004) assert that co-hosting the 2002 Korea-Japan World was critical in transforming the relationship between the two neighbors into economic and cultural partnership rather than hostile opponents.

Leading up to the 2002 World Cup, the co-hosts organized various cultural exchange activities in an effort to promote peace and understanding between them. The Korean
government website (visit korea.or.kr) confirm that musicians and other artists from both countries collaborated on cultural projects and the well known names included the famous Korean percussion quartet Samul Nori who performed at a concert in Korea with a Japanese percussionists and other Western classical musicians. These cultural exchange activities were also influenced by the growing Japanese interest in Korean cultural products since the late 1980’s, which became known as the “kankoku boomu” (Korea boom) (Hoffman;1992:489). In 2003 the Japanese public broadcaster NHK started airing a South Korean drama called Winter Sonata which became popular amongst Japanese audiences. Cho (2010) stresses that these cultural dynamics helped to educate both the Japanese and the Korean public about each other and served as bridge for friendship and understanding. Her study shows that “public opinion polls from 1996 to 2003, conducted by Donga Daily and Asahi Shimbun in South Korea and Japan respectively, indicated that Korean and Japanese belief in prospective positive relations increased from 42% and 47% in 1996 to 59% and 65% in 2003” (Cho 2010:42). In addition, “37.2% of Koreans polled by Gallup in 2007—aged 20-29—are primarily interested in Japanese trends and fashions while 40.6% of that same age group are predominantly interested in Japanese films, television dramas, and video games” (ibid:42).

Therefore, the 2002 Korea Japan World Cup served as the most significant instance of cultural cooperation between Japan and Korea. The co-hosted event provided both nations with an opportunity to improve understanding and dialogue between their people. However, the suspicion shown by the two countries towards each other during the bidding process showed that considerable diplomacy would be necessary if FIFA’s courageous, if not desperate, choice of two countries to co-host the coveted World Cup competition in 2002 was to succeed. In addition, the decision to have Korea and Japan co-hosting the 2002 World Cup not only signaled FIFA’s intention to rotate the event to all continents, but also it finally showed the power vested in FIFA as the most significant player in both world soccer and a major influence in international relations. On the other hand, the decision also proved to be a catalyst for peace and harmony within a FIFA family divided by regions, federations and personalities. For the co-hosts, the 2002 FIFA World Cup represented a symbol of peace between the two nations. As Macquarrie
(1973) suggests, “Healing of fractures” is paramount in the process towards peace building. Therefore, based on this notion, this thesis maintains that co-hosting the 2002 FIFA World Cup became a catalyst for stimulating dialogue and accelerating cooperation between Japan and Korea. In so doing, the event presented the two nations with a unique opportunity to begin the process of healing the fractures of the past. However, the paradoxical nature of Japan-Korea relations in terms of their economic interdependence (they are the third largest trading partner of each other after America and China), and despite their political history of antagonism and conflict, means that there is still much to be done before a permanent peace between them can be established. Having said that, co-hosting the 2002 FIFA World Cup marked a critical point in the development of better relations between Japan and Korea. History will remember the co-hosted event not only in terms of the conflict it generated, but also in terms of the scope and nature of consensus and agreement the two nations managed to reach as a result of co-hosting the event.

**Sports Diplomacy and the 2010 South Africa World Cup**

*An appeal for national reconciliation and economic growth*

In order to understand the impact of sports diplomacy in South Africa, it is important to consider the historical nature of the political process in the country from the colonial-apartheid era to the post-apartheid era. In addition, it is equally significant to recognize the soft power of football as source of racial integration and unity in the country during the same periods. Secondly, in order to examine FIFA's decision to award the 2010 World Cup to South Africa within the framework of sports diplomacy, it is critical to take into account issues surrounding South Africa's lost bid to host the 2006 FIFA World Cup and the subsequent bid to host the competition in 2010.

Therefore, in an attempt to address these issues, the discussion will begin by highlighting the history of South African football, taking into consideration the interplay between social, political and economic issues involved during the colonial-apartheid era and in the post-apartheid era. This approach will help to show the impact of apartheid
policies on the social and economic dimensions of society. Furthermore, the method will help to highlight the relationship between sports and society in the country within the framework of culture capital as a method of exclusion and social control. More significantly, the discussion will show how football had been used as soft power to mobilize, integrate and unite communities in the country. The second part of the discussion will look at circumstances surrounding the lost 2006 FIFA World Cup bid and the reconciliatory nature of the 2010 South Africa World Cup bid. The thesis will argue that the 2010 South Africa World Cup was approached as a vehicle to address the structural violence inherited from the apartheid system.

*The Colonial and Apartheid Eras*

The roots of soccer in South Africa reach as far back as the mid-1800’s when the organization of the game reflected the separate ways in which South Africans lived their lives. Holt (1986) asserts that football was introduced into South Africa during the 1870s and was particularly introduced to Africans because of its association with the working classes in Britain. According to Anderson et al. (2004:49) “only the few Westernized affluent Black Africans played cricket or rugby, but soccer was played by all Black Africans, both rural and urban, of all language groups, as well as by English-speaking working-class Whites, by recent European immigrants, by mix race coloureds, and by Indians.”

However, as Lapchick (1976:155) argues, until 1956, there were “no laws” or “major Government policy statements” banning mixed sports participation in South Africa. Anderson et al.’s (2004:48) anthropological analysis of sports and race in South Africa from the colonial period asserts that the country's racial ideology of separation was based on three factors, “language, religion and location.” Therefore, “Whites” were classified as either English or Afrikaner, “Indians” was applied to anyone who looked as if they originated from the Indian subcontinent, irrespective of their religion. “Coloured [meant] a person of mixed race, but especially of Dutch and Indonesian or Khoisan origin. Both
categories were often included with indigenous Bantu-speaking ‘Africans’ under the label ‘Blacks’” (Anderson et al., 2004:48).

Despite the divisive and oppressive British colonial rule, football remained the only sphere of society free from political influence. Couzens (1981) asserts that immigrants from Britain often went against apartheid laws prohibiting racial mixing in sport by joining racially integrated teams. When football supporters or players gathered at a football game to watch or play against each other, the only concern they had at that time was winning the game. “White players who joined multiracial teams throughout the apartheid decades, at considerable risk to themselves, [stated] that they were motivated primarily by the desire to win” (Anderson et al., 2004:49). Therefore, for fans and players alike, football was a means of escaping the harsh political and daily realities of their lives. It then became a significant symbol of non-racialism and unity in the country.

Compared to other sports in the country at the time, football enjoyed a great deal of interaction with the international community. According to some newspaper reports, “various British teams came to South Africa to play friendly games with many local teams” (Dispatch 2004/15/05). The situation created a trend in which both British players and coaching staff got involved in developing the local game at all levels. The first game is recorded to have taken place in 1897, with the arrival of the Corinthians, and it said that the English FA sent squads in 1910, 1920, 1929, 1939 and 1956 (Dispatch 2004/15/05).

Soccer formed the basis of friendships, equality and leisure. Moreover, in football, those sporting exchange programs laid the foundations on which South African football would grow later. The majority of South Africans from the Black and Indian communities played their football matches in open and dusty spaces around the townships. Even high profile games took place in poorly equipped stadia that posed a serious threat to the players and spectators alike. The lack of infrastructure in non-white communities reflected the general social neglect of the government of those communities. These included lack of health care, poor education systems and lack of basic necessities such as food, clean water and shelter.
However, according to Alegi (2003:6) rugby and cricket, the so-called “White sports,” received the fullest government backing, both economic and political. He further notes that the local government in Natal granted “loans of £257,300 and approved ‘non-recoverable works’ totaling about £227,980 for the construction of the rugby, cricket, and soccer stadiums.” Also, there is evidence suggesting that public land was generously donated to improve the level of the white-affiliated sports in the province. Reference is made to Pietermaritzburg [Natal] where the government provided public land and various aid schemes to whites without consideration of the development of facilities in non-white locations.

These economic disparities between different racial groups fueled the political tension in the country and militated against peace and unity. Although the nation was divided by race and economic background, football proved to be a platform for multiracialism and unity. Anderson et al. (2004:52) argue that “the discourse of celebration of national unity and reconciliation through sport exceeds the exhortations of church and political leaders...Soccer thus [provided] ‘Whites’ with a unique entree into Black urban life.” The introduction of the Apartheid system codified racial divisions in all aspect of society, including sports. As a result, the political will to improve the conditions and development of football, both as a business model and as a sport, was neglected.

There is evidence that in the 1940s and 1950s many studies indicated that a shift in government policy that would prioritize investment in sporting facilities for Africans was required. Alegi (2003:5) argues that in the Cape Province, “Africans had access to only 30 acres of playing fields instead of a recommended 220 acres.” The discriminatory laws of the Apartheid system eventually forced FIFA to ban South Africa from membership first in 1963 and again in 1976. According to historical reports (History of SA Soccer: government website), after FIFA suspended South Africa from its ranks in 1963, South Africa appealed to FIFA by announcing that it intended to “send an all-White team to the 1966 World Cup, and an all-Black team to the 1970 World Cup.” However it was not until the brutal killing in 1976 of the Soweto students who were protesting against apartheid education that FIFA finally expelled South Africa from its ranks. According to Bale and Cronin (2003:47) “participation in international football and membership in
FIFA were important political statements” and therefore FIFA’s message was a clear condemnation of apartheid South Africa.

The post-Apartheid era

Anderson et al (2004) argue that football administrators and players from the white communities exerted continued pressure on the apartheid regime to change the country’s sport policy. Therefore, faced with the same reality, football administrators from different associations, united by the struggle to end segregation in sport and society, slowly came together to work for a better tomorrow. As a result, the South African Football Association was established in 1992 and that marked a turning point in the development of football in the country. However, this was already after Mandela had been freed: until then, the South African government refused to make any concessions to international pressure. After, FIFA rewarded South Africa for their political achievements by readmitting the country to its organization. To introduce their arrival on the football international stage, South Africa invited one of the leading African soccer nations to test its national team’s capabilities.

The July 7 1992 match between the South African national team and Cameroon was the first-ever international soccer match to be hosted in the country in more than three decades and the first test of the newly formed SAFA’s capability in organizing international soccer events. The home side rose to the occasion by beating the Cameroonian side 1-0, much to the delight of the thousands in the crowd that had filled the Durban Kings Park Stadium to full capacity. Both the game and the stadium would be remembered for three reasons: first, South Africa’s victory against the favored Cameroon side and the national team’s first ever international goal; second, the racial integration of the team and the supporters; and third, most importantly, the fact that a new football era had begun.

When the last South African president under the apartheid regime, F W DeKlerk, “unbanned his political opponents and committed the National Party to removing the legislative pillars of apartheid... [his] moves had an immediate effect on South Africa’s
international relations” (Booth 1998:7). After the abolition of the apartheid policy, South Africa began to form part of the international community with readmission to sports organizations such as FIFA and the Olympic Movement. In 1994 South Africa went to the polls for the first time as a nation and elected former Robben Island prisoner and freedom fighter Nelson Mandela as the country’s first African President of the Republic.

To mark the occasion, SAFA organized a friendly match between the new national team called “Bafabafana” and the Zambian national team. Alegi (2004) confirm that South Africa won the match 2-1 at a packed Ellis Park Stadium. However, what brought more joy to the crowd than seeing their national team beat the opposition, was the sight of the newly elected president of the people when “on the very day of his inauguration as President, Nelson Mandela significantly broke away from official celebrations to join an 80,000 crowd…he was ecstatically introduced to both teams during a 35-minute half-time interval” (ibid). On that day, the capacity crowd that filled the Ellis Park Stadium celebrated in style, not only because they were excited that their team had defeated Zambia, a brother during the liberation struggle. They were even happier because that day would go down in history as the day South Africa took the first steps to majority rule.

By that time two things became clear: one was that SAFA was bringing to the football enthusiasts of the country the international games they had been longing for a long time. Secondly, what also became apparent was the strong relationship between SAFA and the African National Congress-led government, a relationship between football and politics in terms of the liberation movement that had been the cornerstone of civil mobilization against apartheid throughout the years. This became apparent when Mandela broke away from the presidential inauguration ceremonial and went to pay homage to the soccer fans. By wearing the national team jersey, he showed his support for SAFA and the national team. The underlying fact was that once again, as argued throughout this thesis, politics and sport, especially the magic of football, have always been intertwined in South Africa.

In fact sports, particularly football, were and still are approached as vehicles to galvanize unity and instill a sense of patriotism in the country. Anderson et al. (2004:51)
state that “soccer in South Africa was highly valued and served as a safe platform to
demonstrate Black resistance to apartheid, partly because at least [a] few White players
[had] always resisted the regulations prohibiting mixed teams, mixed matches, and mixed
spectators.” Nonetheless, the newly formed SAFA had a mission to put South African
soccer on the world map and their first step was to conquer Africa. Amazed at the fast
pace with which South African football was progressing, many nations around the
African continent started to take note of the new kid on the block.

In 1996 South Africa hosted the African Nations Cup, the biggest soccer showpiece
in Africa next to the FIFA World Cup. By this time, SAFA had grown from strength to
strength and confidence within the nation had been building, not only for the
organization, but also for the national team. The 1996 African Nations Cup became the
first major international tournament to be organized and staged by the South African
Football Association in the sense that it included more that 10 teams, it was played in
more than one city, and it attracted international media and huge sponsorship deals. The
event saw South Africa defeating Tunisia 2-0 in front of a full capacity stadium. The
event could be viewed as a yardstick that SAFA would later use to measure its capability
and knowhow of hosting soccer mega-events. It was also its first test to see if football
support in South Africa in terms of the previously divided racial groups had developed to
a stage where it could host a mega-event. Although less complicated and extravagant than
the World Cup, it was equally significant and symbolic within the African continent.

Furthermore, the South African Football Association got a chance to familiarize itself
with the strict FIFA rules pertaining to the staging of international events under its
banner. Moreover, through the 1996 African Nations Cup, the South African Football
Association got a chance to make important friends with delegates from the
Confederation of African Football and FIFA alike, friends that would prove crucial in the
future. The South African soccer momentum went on to inspire the local soccer players
and instilled a sense of pride in the nation. After the 1996 Africa Cup of Nations
experience, European teams scouted many local players and that in the long run proved to
be a crucial factor in raising the level of the game within South Africa. The results soon
became clear when South Africa qualified to play in the FIFA World Cup in France 1998
South Africa's lost bid to host 2006 FIFA World Cup and the subsequent 2010 South Africa World Cup decision

On 7 July 2000, South Africa lost the bid to host the 2006 soccer World Cup games to Germany in controversial circumstances. The result shocked many people around the world and particular South Africans, who were left crying foul play. A FIFA Executive representative from the Oceania Association, Charles Dempsey, was given a mandate by his association to cast his vote in favor of South Africa during the FIFA final voting process. But instead, he decided to abstain from voting which resulted in Germany winning the bid by 12-11 votes. Had Dempsey voted as instructed by his association, Germany and South Africa would have been tied on 12-12 votes, a situation that would have allowed FIFA President Sepp Blatter to cast the deciding vote. The FIFA President had made public his support for South Africa before and was also prepared to cast his vote in favor of South Africa had the need arose, but he was denied that opportunity by Charles Dempsey’s decision.

The South African delegation was left wondering what happened and felt that they were victims of a FIFA conspiracy to deny Africa its rightful place in the soccer world. The President of South Africa, Thabo Mbeki, believed that according to a FIFA preparatory report on the 2006 World Cup controversy, a “political decision” was taken by FIFA to award the bid to Germany (ANC Today 2004) because both South Africa and Germany matched each other in their capability to host the event. According to Trecker (2007) the desire of South Africa and Germany to host the event was influenced by the same motivations. For example, both had gone through a political reunification process in their nation's history. Trecker further mentions a book by Andrew Jennings called Foul! that argues that “FIFA schemed to appear to support the South African bid while ensuring the tournament went to the far-richer Germany.” FIFA went to court to block the book’s publication, “but failed in its attempt” (Trecker, 2007:81). Dempsey was “forced to
resign from his Oceania post, still intimating that European soccer bigs were pressurizing him, even threatening his family, to withhold his vote.” According to Trecker, “it had been made clear to (him) by influential European interests that if (he cast his vote) in favor of South Africa, there would be adverse effects for (his) confederation” (Trecker, 2007:81)

Dempsey’s decision had other implications in respect of deciding the location for the 2010 World Cup. It prompted FIFA to declare that the 2010 World Cup would be contested by African countries only with the aim of bringing the game to the people of Africa. Secondly, the Dempsey decision cancelled Brazil’s aspirations to host the 2010 World Cup. Initially, Brazil and the Confederation of African Football Association had an agreement in which the latter would give up its 2006 bid to support South Africa in exchange for African support for Brazil’s 2010 bid (Associated Press:2010/11/03). The 2006 World Cup decision clearly revealed the politics that go on behind the voting and the lobbying process between FIFA and the countries that wish to host a mega-event. The Dempsey decision also turned the African and Asian Federations, which had been long time friends, against each other.

The President of the Confederation of African Football, Mr Ismael Bhamjee, said that they “were stabbed in the back by (their) Asian friends” when the latter cast their four votes for Germany (CBS; 2000/7/9). However, in an effort to promote peace and sportsmanship following the vote, “Jordaan (the South African Bid committee Chairperson) addressed the crowd at a ballroom at the Baur au Lac Hotel in Zurich. Never mentioning the politics of division that led to the South Africa’s loss, Jordaan praised everyone for their effort and ended his speech by leading his audience in a rendition of the new South African national anthem, ‘Nkosi Sikelela iAfrica.’” (Trecker, 2007:85). The national anthem was a symbol of resistance against the apartheid regime during the liberation struggle and the White government outlawed it. Perhaps singing the national anthem at that time also symbolized Africa’s call for fairness and equality within FIFA. It could have been a call to FIFA to observe principles of best business practice. But at the same time it could have been a song for peace, freedom, justice and prosperity, the basic fundamental principles that form the core of FIFA and football in general.
Despite the controversy that surrounded the July 2006 FIFA decision, South Africa and Germany remained close friends. The friendship was highlighted when the South African 2010 bid delegation to FIFA was also joined by Franz Beckenbauer, a legendary German footballer and the head of 2006 German World Cup Organizing Committee (Ford: 2004). Once again, the football spirit of “Fair Play,” peace and brotherhood played a significant role by reminding politicians and football authorities alike that all were united by the spirit and passion of football and therefore should work towards advancing the interest of the game. In addition, the peace element entrenched in football was even more visible during the 2010 FIFA World Cup bidding process.

For example, 14 May 2004 would go down in FIFA’s history as a day of remarkable importance because never before had the FIFA Executive Committee had the honor of having three Nobel Prize winners talking to them about matters of football and society. These distinguished gentlemen were the two former South African leaders, F.W. DeKlerk and Nelson Mandela, and Archbishop Desmond Tutu. They accompanied the 2010 bid committee to the FIFA headquarters to lobby the executive to vote in favor of South Africa when a final decision was to be made about which of the four countries (South Africa, Morocco, Tunisia and Libya) would host the 2010 soccer World Cup.

Their task was to indicate to FIFA the significance of the World Cup to the unification of the South African communities and their quest for total reconciliation. As Siebers (2006) argues, understanding, tolerance or consensus between different political organizations is tantamount to peace. This was what the senior South African statesmen were called on achieve: their primary mission was to show a unified front representing the various communities in South Africa. The South African Bid Committee had also included amongst its delegates three of Africa’s greatest players namely, Kalushi Bwalya (Zambia), Abedi Pele (Ghana) and Roger Miller (Cameroon), all former African Players of the Year. Looked at from Weede’s (2004) “capitalist-peace” approach, the players gave a vote of confidence to South Africa as a lucrative market space to launch aggressive legacy projects. Their rhetoric to FIFA was not based on political debates, but rather was focused on the commercial aspect of football in terms of players’ development, administration and infrastructure.
The Nobel Prize winners and the former Africa Players of the Year provided the first wave of support in the attempt to convince the FIFA Executive that Africa as a continent would benefit from a World Cup in South Africa as compared to other countries bidding for the same honor. The second wave of delegates included representatives from the South African government, the media sector and corporate South Africa. Together they carried the country’s hope to host the biggest mega-sporting event in 2010. In addition, government backing and corporate involvement in the World Cup process has serious implication for the success of the event. For example, the government of a state that wins the World Cup is expected to pass legislation designed to protect the financial interests of FIFA and its commercial partners from ambush marketers. In addition, the government is also expected to provide infrastructure and security for the event. Having said that, the local business sector is also expected to take advantage of the commercial opportunities that arise as a result of hosting the World Cup. This will in turn assist in creating jobs for the majority of the unemployed and at the same time help to internationalize their businesses. Bearing in mind Weede’s (2004:181) argument that “there is an indirect link running from free trade or economic openness to prosperity and democracy and ultimately to the democratic peace,” it could be argued that both state and commercial sector involvement in the World Cup process is a significant aspect of sports diplomacy towards nation building, prosperity and peace.

Therefore, it could be argued that the delegation that accompanied the 2010 South Africa bid committee was strategically selected to represent political, moral and financial arguments to the FIFA executive. In other words, the past and present state presidents, Mandela and DeKlerk, represented a break away from the political past and therefore reconciliation in the divided nation at the political level. On the other hand, Archbishop Tutu represented unity and the healing process in a nation divided by its history. Therefore, as a champion of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission that took place during Mandela’s presidency, the Archbishop represented the moral level.

The former Africa Players of the Year represented the voice of the African continent from the point of view of the fans and the development of African football. Lastly, the second wave of delegations (government, corporations and media), represented the
capitalist elements in the bid. Their inclusion in the final delegation to visit the FIFA Executive was to provide it with the assurance that the 2010 bid had financial backing from the highest financial authorities in the country and that they were ready and willing to cough up whatever was required to make the 2010 World Cup a success story. As a requirement, prospective host governments are expected to provide FIFA with financial guarantees and moreover certain clauses within the bidding document have to reflect such government intentions.

Nonetheless, despite the rivalry between the African nations competing to bring the FIFA World Cup to Africa for the first time in history, their rhetoric appeared similar in many respect. In particular, the idea of hosting an “African World Cup” designed to benefit the whole of Africa appeared to be at the heart of all the bidding nations arguments. To this end, the concept of “Pan Africanism” comes to mind. Walters (1986) defines the term/concept as “a philosophy that is based on the belief that African people share common bonds and objectives and that advocates unity to achieve these objectives.” The then South African and African Union President, Thabo Mbeki, argued that “FIFA’s decision to bring the World Cup to Africa in 2010 sends a strong signal to all Africans, both on the continent and the African Diaspora, that you [FIFA] are ready and willing to accompany us [Africans] on our journey of hope, and give [Africans] the strength and stamina [they] need to traverse the difficult terrain that separates [them] from Africa’s renaissance” (Ford 2004). This statement shows that the 2010 World Cup meant more to many African leaders than just a game. It became a symbol of peace, hope and unity.

Therefore, FIFA considered political; social and economic factors when it awarded South Africa the right to host the 2010 FIFA World Cup. In addition to recognizing the political freedom guaranteed by the new South Africa, FIFA also considered the need for economic development in Africa. Therefore, bringing the FIFA World Cup to Africa, it was hoped, would help to attract foreign investments in the continent. Moreover, recognizing the role played by football in the fight against apartheid policies, FIFA hoped that the 2010 South Africa World Cup would serve as an impetus for unity and social cohesion in the country and the continent at large. Furthermore, factors such as creating
jobs, upgrading infrastructure and participation in the global village, had a profound influence in bringing the World Cup to Africa.

“Just bringing boys and girls together, organizing schooling and health education, providing the tools to fight poverty and disease – that is the legacy we want to leave.”

Sepp Blatter :(Wilson K, Homewood B, Moses T; The Observer, Sunday 18 July 2010)

Therefore based on this assertion, the sports diplomacy paradigm cannot be ignored as a crucial element behind the decision to host the 2010 FIFA World Cup in South Africa. Certainly when the FIFA President Sepp Blatter proposed to have the World Cup event rotate around the world, the idea was not only based on economic considerations, but also political and social issues too. The political considerations refer to the promotion of universal co-values such as equality, justice and freedom. The social issues include eradication of violence, poverty and under-development. Both these political and social considerations form the core components of the sports diplomacy and peace building concepts.

Therefore, the 2010 South Africa World Cup was approached as a vehicle to address the structural violence inherited from apartheid. The development of infrastructure, improvement of the public transportation network, job creation, and addressing safety and securities problems in South Africa represent the core objectives of the 2010 South Africa World Cup. The fundamental idea was to use the event to provide the impetus for a massive government investment in public work projects in terms of upgrading the roads, the airports, the railway system and the creation of new rail and bus systems. These infrastructure developments have the potential to impact the lives of all South Africans and may stimulate economic growth. Therefore, the 2010 South Africa World Cup represented a new stage in the political evolution of the country’s fight to address the political, economic and social imbalances of the past. Finally, the 2010 South Africa World Cup served as a significant symbol of unity and hope in Africa.
Conclusion

The issues surrounding the bid processes and the subsequent hosting of the Uruguay World Cup, 2002 Korea Japan World Cup and the 2010 South Africa World Cup, clearly illustrate the intertwining of politics, economics and culture within the sport mega event context. With regards to the co-hosted 2002 Korea-Japan World Cup, the event provided a climate for dialogue over historical disputes between the host nations. The conflict of words between Japan and Korea during the organization of the event suggested that the two nations needed more diplomacy in order to fully normalize relations between them. Having said that, the co-hosting decision assisted in accelerating dialogue between the two rival states and a combination of political, economic and cultural concessions were reached as a result. On the political level, bilateral relations were improved, as marked by state visits and rhetoric emphasizing the importance of co-operation and peace between Japan and Korea. On the economic level, various trade agreements were reached recognizing the interdependency of the economies of the two nations. In that respect, fishing agreements, cultural trade and export-import issues were put on the table and addressed for the mutual benefit of the two states.

On the cultural level, the significance of the unbanning of cultural imports from Japan to Korea was critical. This step increased the opportunity for better understanding and appreciation of each other’s culture. More important, co-hosting the World Cup allowed more people to people contacts between Japan and Korea and that helped to bridge the communication gap between the people of the two countries. The joint discussions by the academics and civil society of the two countries concerning sensitive issues such as the history textbook problem and the comfort women issue are relevant in that regard. Judging from the evidence provided by various studies coming from both countries, the common conclusion is that co-hosting the 2002 FIFA World Cup was critical for bringing the two nations closer together in an attempt to address obstacles that hampered improved relations between them.
In the case of South Africa, hosting the 2010 World Cup proved to be an important symbol of post-apartheid South Africa and development of the African region. As the discussion has highlighted, as in Japan, hosting the 2010 South Africa had profound implications on political, economic and cultural levels of society. Politically, hosting the event was approached as a catalyst for uniting the racially divided nation and to instill a sense of national pride among the population. This was important for the legitimacy of the state in terms of being seen to represent the aspirations of all the citizens of the country, irrespective of race. Therefore, the reconciliatory power of sports in regard was emphasized to achieve political objectives. On the cultural level, inclusive nature of sports mega-events in terms identity formations was critical. As South Africa has in the past looked to sports to unite its people, it was hoped that hosting the 2010 South Africa World Cup would reinforce the notion of a rainbow and help thus help to heal the wounds of the past caused by the apartheid regime. However, in order for the country to achieve real peace and reconciliation, it is important that the state move quickly to address the growing economic inequalities between the various groups in the country. Solving this problem is regarded as a key to a prosperous, peaceful and united future South Africa.
Chapter 3.

States and Mega-Events: Impact on Host Nations’ Economic Competitive Advantage

This chapter will analyze how sports mega-events act as inputs for robust economic activity that has a direct impact on the economic competitive advantage of the host nation. The discussion will focus on the political economy of the 2002 Korea Japan World Cup and the 2010 South Africa World Cup. More specifically, the study will examine comparatively issues relating to infrastructure development, job creation, skill development, safety and security, imaging and the development of the football industries in the two cases. As a starting point, Porter’s (1985) work will be highlighted in an attempt to identify the critical factors influencing a nation's economic competitive advantage in a capitalist system. Furthermore, the discussion will consider Lakshman’s (2008) analytical framework within the context of sport mega-events. His study examined comparatively the differential impacts of the 1996 India Cricket World Cup and the 2002 Korea Japan World Cup on the two host nations. He concluded that there are huge differences between developed and developing countries in terms of the potential benefits that could arise as a result of hosting a sport mega-event. Lakshman’s analysis indicates that infrastructure development is a critical factor in that effect.

He asserts that developed nations approach sports mega-events with an advantage of already possessing an advanced level of infrastructure development, compared to developing countries that bid to host these events against a background of poor economic conditions. Therefore, as Lakshman notes, based on the disparities in infrastructure development between the core states and the peripheral nations, hosting sports mega-events may produce different impacts for each group. Although Lakshman’s study highlights some interesting issues, I have found it to be limited in that it concentrates most on physical infrastructure and does not deal with issues of social infrastructure. The
two factors are deemed critical for the purpose of hosting sports mega-events. Therefore, this chapter will attempt to expand his model and add other factors to the paradigm.

The second part of this chapter will consist of a discussion of Japan’s conditions in terms of infrastructure development as shown by the nations’ competitive advantages. In this respect, Japan’s infrastructure development will be examined within the context of (a) the construction state concept, highlighting the relationship between the state and the capitalist corporations; and (b) the use of sports mega-events for signaling and imaging purposes. Furthermore, the discussion will also consider the impact of the 2002 FIFA World Cup related infrastructure on Japan’s professional football league.

The third part of the chapter will look at the impact of 2010 South Africa World Cup on the country’s competitive advantage. Porter’s (2007) analysis of South Africa’s state of competitiveness will be reviewed in an effort to understand the nation's strengths and weakness regarding factors for economic growth. Having done that, this chapter will examine the impact of the 2010 South Africa World Cup on the nation’s competitive advantage in relation to issues concerning infrastructure development such as public transportation systems, safety and security, job creation, skills development and investment in the country's football industry. In relation to conflict theory, these factors are crucial for the production of capital in the capitalist system. In addition, they also have significant consequences on the social and political level of society, in terms of improving social conditions and the legitimacy of the state.

**Theoretical framework**

*Porter's Nations' Competitive Advantage Diamond Model*

In 1985 Michael Porter, a professor at Harvard University, introduced a model designed to help researchers understand how nations establish conditions to improve their competitive advantage and economic growth. Esfahani et al (2002: 447) define economic growth as “the consequence of an accumulation of factors that permit an economy to take advantages of opportunities for increasing its income.” Grant (1991:537) notes that the main idea behind Porter's “Competitive Advantage of Nations” concept is “to show the
nature and scope of factors of production, the processes by which they are created and their relationship to [an] organization's competitiveness.” The traditional perception in economic theory holds that factors such as land, natural resources, labor force and the size of the population are the most significant for development and economic growth.

However, Porter (1999) argues this approach has some limitations that may undermine the nation's competitive advantage. He views it as passive when considered in relation to national development. Instead, Porter insists that a nation's competitive advantage is as a result of four interconnected factors, namely firm strategy, structure and rivalry; demand conditions, related supporting industry and factor conditions. To illustrate the connection and inter-dependence between these factors, Porter envisaged them forming a diamond as shown in Figure 3 below.

**Figure 3:** Porter’s Nation’s Competitive Advantage Diamond

![Porter's Diamond Diagram](image)


According to Porter (1998) the term “factor conditions” “refers to inputs used as factors of production – such as labor, land, natural resources, capital and infrastructure.” He further states that issues such as infrastructure, skilled labor force and capital are considered *specialized factors* of production. Furthermore, he emphasizes that these
specialized factors need to be created because they cannot be inherited. In other words, Porter considers these as key factors that involve heavy and sustained investment. Therefore, they are considered to be hard to duplicate and crucial for a nation’s competitive advantage.

Lakshman adopted Porter’s competitive advantage diamond framework to analyze comparatively the differential impacts of mega-sporting events in two countries, namely Japan and India. His research specifically focused on the impact of the 2002 Korea Japan World Cup and the 1996 ICC Cricket World Cup in India. Lakshman’s intention was to highlight the differences between developed and developing nations in terms of their capacity to host a sport mega-event and also the differences in the impact of such events on their host nations. He argues that the ideas to host the 2002 FIFA World Cup in Japan and the 1996 Cricket World Cup in India were influenced by the common desire to bring the events to Asia. Lakshman emphasizes that Japan and India hosted their respective events for two strategic reasons, (a) to expand the international appeal and base of Japanese football and Indian cricket respectively, and (b) as a vehicle to open new markets locally and in Asia.

However, Lakshman makes an interesting argument by suggesting that at the time when the decision to host the respective events were made, Japan stood a better chance of reaping positive economic benefits from hosting its event compared to India. The determining factor in this regard is said to lie in Porter’s concept of “factor condition” requirements as outlined in his competitive advantage diamond framework. Therefore, compared to India, Japan had a lot of “favorable conditions” prior to hosting the 2002 FIFA World Cup event, while, on the other hand, India had to dedicate a huge portion of its resources to upgrade basic infrastructure and develop new facilities for the purpose of hosting the Cricket World Cup (Lakshman ;2008). These included building roads, building the stadiums and improving the transportation system.

Lakshman’s study contains propositions suggesting that the impact of Japanese and Indian mega-events would produce different ex-ante and ex-post results when compared to each other. According to his study, the two countries possessed different social and
economic development factors that influenced the overall results or benefits from hosting their respective events. He further argues that in terms of the capacity to host mega-events, there are great disparities in Asia between first world economies and emerging markets. He argues that infrastructure and economic development are the two most visible differences. Based on this assertion, Lakshman formulates two main arguments, Firstly, he asserts that one of the most significant factors in determining the kind of impact hosting a mega-event would yield is to consider the maturity and the nature of the host nation’s economy. This argument is informed by the notion that the level of success that might be obtained from hosting a sport mega-event depends mostly on the availability and sophistication of infrastructure required to host the event. Secondly, he maintains that the success of the event is also heavily dependent on the availability and strength of supporting industries in the host nation. In this case, Lakshman's emphasis is focused on sports-media industries and not so much on the construction sector as key players in the economy of infrastructure development related to sports mega-events.

In the case of a developed vs. developing nation scenario, it follows that compared to the developing nations, developed nations would most probably have acquired the necessary infrastructure requirements necessary to host the event long before bidding to host the event in question. In particular, the sport-media business nexus in developed nations is at an advanced stage and most of the media corporations are key players in the extensive global sports market. In fact, a large portion of the revenues for sports mega-events is generated from broadcasting and other media rights. Therefore, selling the event to a global market can be achieved without any serious difficulties. As Lakshman notes, Japan relied on the high level of its media technology, the sophistication of its sports industry and the organizational capacity of the nation. In view of this argument, Japan’s multinational corporations such as Sony, Toshiba and Dentsu, which have been among FIFA’s official partners, come to mind. Therefore, the fact that the developed host nation boasts of a corporate sector that is entrenched in the capitalist system of global sports, is viewed as contributing factor in ensuring that the developed host nation experiences greater benefits from hosting an event.
Matheson and Baade (2004) agree with Lakshman’s conclusion that the impact of sports mega-events in developing nations is most likely to be far less in terms of economic benefits compared to a developed nation. Owen (2005) also concurs by claiming that developed nations approach sports mega-events focusing resources primarily in alignment with the overall national economic strategy. This implies that developed nations approach sports mega-events for purely capitalist motives of profit and dominance. On the contrary, for developing nations, allocations of resources for organizing the event have to be balanced against addressing other pressing social challenges. Lakshman (2008) asserts that the 2002 FIFA World Cup in Japan produced a positive economic impact at the post-event level compared to the pre-event period, while on the other hand, the Indian Cricket World Cup did not produce a positive post-event economic impact. Therefore, there are great disparities between developed and developing nations in relation to the level of infrastructure development and the potential for economic benefit from hosting sports mega-event. In other words, infrastructure development is regarded as key factor condition for positioning a host nation to maximize benefits from hosting a sport mega-event. Below, Figure 4 presents Porter’s diamond for a nation’s competitive advantage as adapted by Lakshman (2008) for Japan.
Figure 4; Competitive Advantage Diamond for Japan

Critique of Lakshman’s (2008) Methodology: Expanding the study by including sub-factor conditions in the diamond

Lakshman has raised interesting questions regarding the broader impact of sports mega-events on host nations. However, his approach is too broad and fails to look at specific issues related to the relationship between infrastructure development, economic growth and a nation’s competitive advantage. For example, although his research identifies the significance of infrastructure as a crucial “factor condition” requirement for hosting a mega-event, it does not contain a discussion about economic drivers for infrastructure development in either Japan or India, before and after hosting their respective events. A discussion of these issues is critical for understanding the
relationship between government and business in terms of economic development and
growth, especially in the case of Japan.

This point is also crucial for highlighting which sector benefited the most from
infrastructure development during the 2002 FIFA World Cup in Japan. Secondly, his
study could be criticized for discussing only the physical infrastructure requirement and
not including a discussion about social and political infrastructure requirements. The
issues relating to improving the public transportation system, safety and security,
unemployment and job creation, and the government’s political will to support bids for
sports mega-events come to mind at this stage. These issues are believed to be important
sub-factors in the reproduction of capital and entrenching the political legitimacy of the
state. Therefore, a discussion of these issues is critical for understanding the interplay
between governments, business and society within the context of mega-events.

Moreover, highlighting issues relating to the maturity of the social and political
infrastructure of a host nation is important for understanding what the economic drivers
are for infrastructure development in that country. Fisher (1997:54) notes that “in many
studies, government spending, public capital, or public services are estimated to exert a
positive and statistically significant effect on economic development.” Various
publications show that improvement in key infrastructural sectors can have a positive
impact on the nation’s economic growth and can improve the nation’s overall competitive
advantage. Vanderschuren (2006) draws a link between improvement in the
transportation system and economic growth. He argues that investment directed to
improving transportation would stimulate economic growth by increasing mobility and
creating easy access to resources and markets.

Mohammad (2009:2) asserts that “there has been an ongoing debate about the role of
public infrastructure in economic growth since Aschauer (1989) published an influential
series of papers about the effects of public infrastructure investment on the long-run
growth and productivity of the United States.” According to Aschauer’s (1989) theory,
positive economic growth is influenced by investment in public projects or government
public capital geared towards the development of core infrastructure such as roads and
Ahmed and Miller (2000:9) argue that there are two distinct opinions on the impact of heightened government expenditure on investment. The traditional view holds that “government expenditure crowds out private investment”. In other words, it is suggested that any extensive expenditure by the state, irrespective of whether it is financed through debts or taxes, would result in an increased demand for goods and services, and would hike the price of capital, and that would in turn have a negative impact on attracting private investment. On the other hand, he asserts that the nontraditional view considers government expenditure as “a means to stimulate investment” (ibid). This chapter asserts that the nontraditional view applies to hosting sports mega-events in the sense that hosting the event encourages foreign investment. Looking at differently, it suggests that government investment in infrastructure development as a result of hosting the sport mega-event may lead to greater private sector participation in the economy, and thus stimulate economic growth.

Perhaps this argument may be more applicable in the case of developing countries (semi-peripheral and peripheral states) than would be the case in developed nations (core states). One reason is that developing nations require extensive investment in basic infrastructure development and upgrade. Therefore for that purpose, there is an opportunity for greater private sector participation in the economy through the contracts that would be awarded for building the needed infrastructure or providing services where applicable. Devarajan et.al (1996) examined the link between government expenditure and economic growth in developing countries and their study concluded that state investment in public infrastructure development produces a climate of economic growth.

In the case of the developed nations or core states, Japan’s hosting of the 2002 FIFA World Cup serves as an ideal model to illustrate the significance of infrastructure development and its relationship to economic growth. Riew (2007) looked at Japan’s competitive advantage relative to other developed nations (the G7) and concluded that Japan achieved much of its success by investing in infrastructure development such as railroads, the public transportation network system, communications technology and expansion of harbors and airports. Moreover, the author particularly commends the investment in the country’s rapid train system known as the “shinkansen” and believes it
to be the most significant development towards establishing the nation’s competitive advantage. The main contribution of the shinkansen is argued to be its ability to connect the three main economic regions of Japan, namely Tokyo, Osaka and Nagoya, cities which are geographically close to each other and which are also linked by a web of commerce. Riew (2007:18) hold the view that “the efficient rail system cuts down on logistics costs, expediting economic interaction among firms and promoting exchange among scientists and engineers in industry and academia.” Therefore, Japan’s advanced transportation network system proved critical for ensuring that hosting the 2002 Japan Korea World Cup delivered the much anticipated short term and long-term benefits.

Porter (1995:63) argue that “transportation infrastructure planning which today focuses primarily on the mobility of residents for shopping and commuting, should consider equally the mobility of goods and the ease of commercial transactions.” Therefore, it follows that the location of the inner city is central for the new economic model as highlighted by Porter. In fact, the linkage between central city business and regional clusters, alongside the development of export-oriented businesses, requires the presence of strong logistical connections between the core business sites within the city and the surrounding economy. Therefore, against this background, this chapter maintains that the investment in infrastructure projects related to the 2010 South Africa World Cup aimed to achieve two main objectives: (a) the short term goal; to meet the infrastructure requirements necessary to stage the FIFA World Cup as set by FIFA and (b) the long term goal; to address the nation's structural problems in terms of replacing the ailing infrastructure which was the legacy of apartheid. In the case of the latter, the benefit depends on whether or not the new or improved infrastructure remains in use after the completion of the mega-event. Having said that, figure 5 below is an attempt to extend the area of enquiry based on Lakshman’s discussion.
Figure 5: Competitive Advantage Diamond for South Africa

Source: Own illustration based on Porter’s diamond framework

To add to Lakshman’s analytical framework, this model includes the following sub-factors in the new diamond: (a) road and transportation network system conditions, (b) safety and security conditions (the context being the host nation’s capacity to provide an incident-free event), and (c) unemployment and job creation. These sub-factor conditions are regarded as crucial, especially in the case of South Africa, for stimulating economic growth and also improving the overall competitive advantage. This approach will assist in highlighting the multiple impact of hosting sports mega-events by focusing on the link between socio-political and economic factors. The discussion will show that
infrastructure development related to sports mega events is critical for stimulating economic growth and social infrastructure of the host nation.

**The case of Japan and hosting the 2002 FIFA World Cup: Impact on economic growth and competitive advantage**

*Factor Conditions: Infrastructure Development*

Before being overtaken by the Chinese economy, Japan was the second largest economy in the world after the US. As a result, the country boasts several favorable factor conditions required for successfully hosting a sport mega-event. This was evident when Japan hosted the 2002 FIFA World Cup. For example, in addition to the road and sea transport network, the country also has a sophisticated public transportation system in the form of high-speed shinkansen trains, well managed subway and railway networks in major cities, world-class airlines, highway buses, and a lucrative taxi industry. These factors were crucial in ensuring that the country hosted a successful FIFA World Cup event and at the same time contributed to diverting expenditure to other infrastructure developments aimed at improving the country’s competitiveness in the global arena.

For example, while South Africa had to devote resources to improving roads and public transportation by virtue of hosting the 2010 FIFA World Cup, Japan could spend most of its resources on introducing new technology at its airports, on stadium development, and on marketing initiatives. To a large extent, Japan’s transportation infrastructure, combined with a highly skilled and dedicated labor force, has contributed to the country’s economic growth and its overall competitive advantage. This development should be understood within the context of two scenarios, the 1964 Tokyo Olympics and the “construction state” concept.

*The 1964 Tokyo Olympic Games: Japan signals recovery from WWII and re-admission to the international stage*

Firstly, Japan’s hosting of the 1964 Tokyo Olympic games had serious implications for the region. Some authors believed that hosting that event signaled the readmission of
Japan to the international community having recovered from the ruins of the Second World War. According to Horne (2004), the 1964 Tokyo Olympics awarded Japan an opportunity to showcase its new infrastructure and also to reclaim its status as an Asian superpower. Furthermore, as Horne (2004:1233) notes, “the event gave the Japanese the opportunity to impress the numerous visitors with their friendliness, impressive organization and technology.” Dolles and Söderman (2008) make an interesting argument by claiming that when Japan hosted the 1964 Tokyo Olympic Games, the national rhetoric surrounding the games was based on intangible matters such as pride and prestige. Although Japan had commercial interests in staging the games, the core message that emerged from hosting the event was Japan’s recovery from WWII and readmission to the international arena.

Based on this argument, this chapter suggests that Japan had moved to re-claim its position as Asia’s leading economic power and also to signal to the Western powers that it had emerged from the horrors of World War II. At the same time, Japan took a giant step towards enhancing its competitive advantage by setting new Olympics trends and introducing innovations that shaped the course of future mega-events. For example, Dolles and Söderman (2008:151) argue that the “Tokyo Olympics were the first to use computers to record results and to be televised in color.” In addition, the launch of the first geostationary satellite in 1963 allowed the event to be televised globally (Dolles and Söderman; 2008).

The challenges posed by the bursting of the bubble economy in the 1970’s and 1980’s forced Japan to invest in rapid infrastructure development. The main idea was to revive the economy and bring back the glory days of the bubble era. Sakoh (1984:522) notes that the economic growth and expansion policies that were implemented in Japan between the 1960’s and 1990’s such as keeping “spending for social welfare, quality-of life, and national defense programs minimal” assisted in moving the economy forward. More importantly, the policies helped the state to “emphasized spending on the nation’s infrastructure in the form of roads, flood-control projects, harbors, airports, and basic industries such as hydroelectric power.”
Nonetheless, Horne (2004:1234) argues that although issues concerned with economic development of sport in Japan have been advanced since the 1970’s, “over-confidence, fanaticism, a shrill sense of inferiority, and a sometimes obsessive preoccupation with national status... [are] still reflected in Japanese policy towards sports and especially the hosting of major events.”

*Japan as a “Construction State”: The reason behind Japan’s rapid infrastructure development*

Secondly- understanding Japan as a *construction state* is crucial for understanding the state’s rapid infrastructure development and economic growth. Feldhoff (2002:34) argues that the term “construction state” (*doken kokka*) in Japanese has been used to refer to “a system of vested interests in construction activities that embraced Japan at different geographical levels of scale. A system of collusion between politicians, bureaucrats, and businessmen evolved and led to massive government spending on public works projects.” Broadbent (2002) asserts that in cases where more government resources are dedicated to public works than are required by the needs of the public, then that state could be said to be a “construction state.”

Some reports claim that Japan’s government has always had close working relations with the construction sector and that relationship had formed part of the country’s economic policy since World War II, when the Japanese government viewed this sector as crucial for the reconstruction of the state. Ronald et.al (1994) state that the “objective of industrial policy … was to shift resources to specific industries in order to gain international competitive advantage.” Horne (2004:1241) notes that, “Japan’s public works [sector] is three times the size of that in the UK, the USA or Germany. It currently employs seven million people, or 10% of the Japanese workforce, spending JPY 40–50 trillion ($350 million) per year. It amounts to 8% of the Japanese GDP.”

In relation to the organization of the 2002 FIFA World Cup in Japan, a local government staff was recruited to work with the World Cup Organizing Committee in the
host cities and thus the huge spending on the preparations for the event went ahead without much resistance from the taxpayers. Horne and Manzenreiter (2004:191) argue that the significance of Japan’s big construction corporations is highlighted by their influence “in political parties, lobbying groups and nongovernmental organizations.” A good example of a leading figure amongst this group of rich corporations was Tsutsumi Yoshiaki, a board member of numerous sports committees and a man recognized for transforming the Japan Ski Association into a professional organization. He was also influential in bringing the Nagano Winter Olympics to Japan.

Two years after Japan hosted the FIFA World Cup, a South African government website reported that the country’s Deputy Minister of Public Works, Ntopile Kganyago, noted that the Japanese “construction industry is the second largest in the world and contributes approximately 15% of Japan’s GDP [compared to South Africa’s] construction sector [which] contributes less than 5% to GDP.” Therefore, from this observation, it could be said that hosting the 2002 Korea-Japan World Cup benefited the construction companies and to a certain extent, benefited the politicians too. The situation appeared to have been the same for Korea. According to Manzenreiter (2004: 191), “the Korean construction sector stood to pocket a ‘22 percent share’ of the projected industrial output of US$8.82 billion” from hosting their event. Against this backdrop, it could be argued that Japan and Korea boosted their global competitive advantage in the construction sector by awarding the 2002 FIFA World Cup related projects to local construction businesses.

Japan’s approach to the 2002 FIFA World Cup could be placed within the national strategy to develop smaller cities. For example, as a result of the World Cup, local communities gained new and upgraded infrastructure and recognition for hosting the various national teams competing in the event. In addition, the participation of smaller cities as hosts assisted in opening up new markets and revitalizing local economies. Vanderschuren (2006:1) supports this argument by claiming that infrastructure development such as transportation undoubtedly promoted economic growth and social development. However, Japan did not invest so much in transportation as it did in stadium development.
Japan’s 2002 FIFA World Cup Stadium Development: Increasing Japan’s competitive advantage in architectural design and technology

Some authors argue that additional expenditure as result of host sports mega-events could have a positive economic impact on the host nation. As Sturgess and Brady (2007:28) note, expenditures generated by an event are of two types: consumer and investment spending. “Investment spending includes money spent on upgrading or building new sports stadia to hold spectators and provide them with the necessary comfort and security for a successful event”. Looking at the costs for stadia development from the 1998 France World Cup to the event hosted by Germany in 2006, the trend is that the sums allocated for building stadia have been increasing and the numbers are expected to rise for future World Cups. For example, as Sturgess and Brady (2007:28) noted, “the investment for (the France ‘98 World Cup) tournament has been estimated at no more than US$500 million” and that included the construction of one new stadium.

In the following event co-hosted by Japan and Korea in 2002, “a combined sum of US$ 4.5 billion on stadia alone” was spent while a total of “US$ 1.92 billion” was invested on developing stadia for the 2006 German World Cup (Sturgess and Brady 2007:18). Manzenreiter (2008) confirms that Japan invested huge amounts in 2002 FIFA World Cup stadia development, perhaps more that Korea. One of the most important requirements set by FIFA for host nations is that they should provide safety and security in respect of the event. Against the backdrop of the September 2001 terror attack in the United States, FIFA and the 2002 World Cup co-hosts were concerned that the event might be a target for another attack, given the high volume of tourists and football fans from around the world. As a result, both Japan and Korea beefed up their security and frequently engaged in unprecedented joint security drills in preparation for the games.

On the other hand, issues relating to safety are not only limited to situations outside the venues and around the host cities, but also include instances inside the stadiums. In
In this regard, the host nation is expected to ensure that players, organizers, administrators, VIP’s and fans inside the stadiums are as safe as those watching the games in their homes on television. For Japan, the safety concerns afforded the country an opportunity to bring to light the fact that the country is generally safe and has one of the lowest crime rates in the world. Secondly, it was also an opportunity to highlight the country’s achievements in architectural design and technology for major projects, putting the emphasis on safety and innovation.

For example, in order to meet the safety and security requirements set by FIFA for the 2002 World Cup stadiums, the Japanese considered Asia’s volatile earthquake conditions and thus aligned their stadium design to guard against such a natural disaster. As a result, stadium features included earthquake proofing, winged roofs, retractable roofs, and grand designs. For example, the stadium in Sapporo is said to be a “marvel” with artificial turf, “but a grass soccer field sits just outside the east wall.... [and] on soccer game days, the wall slides open, a bank of seats retracts, and the turf field—floating on an air cushion—is rolled indoors, then the wall closes, the turf field is rotated 90 degrees, and—voilà—an indoor, grass soccer stadium. This insanity cost $400 million, plus $15,000 every time they move the field” (Plotz 2002/31/5). Furthermore, the design also took into account Hokkaido’s heavy snowy conditions in winter and thus the roof is covered to ensure that attendance remains unhindered. To prevent the stadium from becoming a white elephant past 2002, the organizers had to ensure that the stadium design would cater for both baseball and football. Therefore, overall the stadium design had the potential to increase the post-event benefits of the infrastructure development.

In total, Japan had 10 stadiums for the 2002 FIFA World Cup: Kashima Soccer Stadium in Ibaraki Prefecture, Nagai Stadium and the International Stadium in Yokohama were existing stadiums that were refurbished. The remaining seven stadiums were built from scratch in strategic locations, away from the major cities to foster the rejuvenation of smaller cities and to urbanize semi-rural areas. According to the Taiyo Kogyo Corporation (2005) website, “six of the 10 Japanese stadiums have membrane structures, and Taiyo Kogyo constructed the membrane roof for five of those stadiums.” The most interesting feature of Japan’s stadium development is the label “made in Japan”
that was attached to the building process. In other words, to boost its competitive advantage, Japan opted to use Japanese designs, engineers and other resources at its disposal to ensure that it instilled a sense of pride across the nation. For example, the “air float/wheel drive system [used in Sapporo Dome was] developed with Kawasaki heavy Industries [and ] was the first of its kind in the world” (Nakai et al 2003:54).

According to a British newspaper (*The Guardian*, May 27, 2002) “the speed and efficiency of this building programme make English efforts to rebuild Wembley Stadium look farcical, but the quality and ingenuity of their collective design is one of the great international architectural and engineering achievements of recent decades.” Equally impressive was the way in which Japan incorporated the talent of young designers in the development of the 2002 World Cup stadiums. As a result, Japan stadium development had a positive impact on its competitive advantage and certainly set a new benchmark in using mega-events venues to add a unique spin in utilizing urban space for development. Belanger (2002:360) believes that “in the current context of global and more flexible modes of capitalist accumulation, along with an increasing commercialization of culture worldwide, sport is at the core of the pressing debates around the spectacularization of urban space” for generating an economic windfall. Figure 6 below presents a list of 2002 Japan World Cup stadium and investment costs.
Figure 6; List of 2002 Japan World Cup stadiums

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>REF #</th>
<th>STADIUM</th>
<th>DATE BUILT</th>
<th>COST (US$ Million)</th>
<th>CAPACITY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>SAPPORO DOME</td>
<td>2001</td>
<td>356.1</td>
<td>42,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>MIYAGI</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>225</td>
<td>49,133</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>NIIGATA</td>
<td>2001</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>42,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>IBARAKI PREFECTURE KASHIMA</td>
<td>1993</td>
<td>240</td>
<td>41,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>SAITAMA</td>
<td>2001</td>
<td>304.1</td>
<td>63,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>INTL STADIUM YOKOHAMA</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>502.5</td>
<td>72,370</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>SHIZUOKA</td>
<td>2001</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>51,349</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>NAGAI</td>
<td>1996</td>
<td>351.6</td>
<td>50,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>KOBE WING</td>
<td>2001</td>
<td>193</td>
<td>42,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>OITA BIG EYE</td>
<td>2001</td>
<td>209.1</td>
<td>43,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source www.World Cup-info.com

The 2002 FIFA World Cup and Football in Japan: Advancing the J-League’s Competitive Advantage

Hosting the 2002 FIFA World Cup was significant for Japan in terms of advancing the structure and nature of organization of the local football industry. The games were also vital in changing the balance of power in terms of the global football periphery, previously characterized by the dominance of Europe and Latin America over their Asian and African counterparts. Some studies suggest that in respect of football status Asia is peripheral. Horne (2004:1235) argues that “contrary to the Western experience, sports did not evolve gradually out of familiar folk traditions. Lumped together in the cultural backpack of Western foreigners, modern sports were imported during the latter half of the 19th century, at a time when the geopolitics of imperialism had a rather downgrading impact on national consciousness in the Far East.”

The development of Japanese sports is believed to owe much credit to the role played by the business sector. Ericsson (2008) state that corporations sponsored company teams
that competed against each other on a regular basis. Furthermore, a league consisting of amateur teams made up clubs from companies was established in 1965. However, the Japan Football Association (JFA) was formed long before that, in 1921. Uchiumi and Ozaki (1993:11) argue that one of the reasons companies invested in football was “the enhancement of worker’s physical fitness and health and the integration of young worker’s that had been influenced by socialism.” Horne (2004) argues that the European club sports model and the business principles found in the American system influenced the structural design of the Japanese professional football league (J-League). For example, “J-League teams were to have a balanced ownership, representing hometowns (or cities) and regional prefectures as well as sponsors” (Horne (2004:1239). In this way, clubs would function as autonomous and economically viable entities and were not dependent on government subsidies for their economic survival. Moreover, the system forced the teams to promote social ethical issues including advancing football, and thus installing a sense of pride and unity among residents.

_The Economist_ (1995:10/28) claim’s that “Japan’s football model is based on a reverse engineering technique that proved successful during the industrial era.” The article argues that Japanese industries used to study technologies and models from foreign countries and improve them to suit the Japanese context. According to that report, “a technique that worked for industry [has been] applied to sport”. As a result, after the US World Cup in 1994, the Japanese football authorities offered foreign players huge salaries to come and play football in Japan. The strategy sought to improve the quality of play among the local players and at the same time increase business confidence in the commercial value of the newly formed Japan professional league.

As a result, renowned soccer players like Dunga who captained Brazil for many years and later became the Brazilian national coach, ended his playing career in Japan playing for Jubilo Iwata. _The Economist_ (1994/10/22) reported that “within few years of its establishment, the J-League had attracted 54 foreign players from 14 countries, including five who took part in this year’s World Cup; Latin America provides 31 (26 from Brazil alone, including two of this year’s World Cup winners), and Europe 22.” However, Japan’s football strategy attracted a lot of criticism and was seen as causing the league to
be of suspect standard internationally because foreign imports were generally confined to aging players at the end of their careers. Despite such criticism, Japan professional football league continued on the path of economic growth and managed to increase public interest in the game.

Currently Japan is regarded as one of the strongest teams in Asia together with South Korea, and this less than 20 years since the launch of the J-League. To date, Japan has participated in four FIFA World Cup tournaments, taking part for the first time in the 1998 France World Cup, then as co-host in the 2002 Korea Japan World Cup. They also made it to the World Cup finals in 2006 and 2010. During the FIFA World Cup in France, Japan lost all its games and also failed to score a single goal in the tournament. Therefore, prior to co-hosting the World Cup in 2002, Asians teams were regarded as the weaker teams in the tournament. After the dismal showing during France ‘98, Japan football administrators moved swiftly to strengthen the national team’s competitive advantage. The strategy deployed was to recruit the experience of foreign coaches, an approached that proved positive in the long run. In 2000 under the leadership of French coach Philippe Troussier, Japan was crowned champion of Asia by winning the Asian Confederation Cup and soon after that the national team won second prize during the 2001 FIFA Confederations Cup played in Japan in front of home supporters.

Japan’s efforts at building a competitive national team capable of challenging the dominance of Europe and Latin American teams was strengthened by co-hosting the World Cup in 2002. Therefore in Japan, the rhetoric about hosting the World Cup included ideas about improving the development of football in the country to the level of Europe or the Americas. As a result, when Japan co-hosted the 2002 FIFA World Cup, it passed a huge milestone by registering its first World Cup win and moreover it was a victory against a European team on home soil when Russia lost 1-0 to the hosts. The team went passed to the knockout stage and was eventually eliminated from the tournament when it lost 1-0 to Turkey in the last sixteen. Horne (2004) argues that success of the national team on the field of play served as a significant outlet for expressions of pride and national excellence. Two years after hosting the World Cup, Japan won the Asian Confederation Cup for the second time in 2004 having won the championship back in
1994. From a football perspective, Japan’s triumphs indicated an increase in its global competitive advantage, an important post-event benefit of hosting the event.

As an indication of Japan’s football growing influence in the affairs of the Asian Football Confederation, “in 2008 the former Japan Football Association President, Saburo Kawabuchi, established a new tournament similar to [the] European Champions League for Asian football clubs” (The Asian Football Confederation, 2008/12/13). According to the report, in 2005 the “AFC President Mohamed Bin Hammam requested Japan to lead the Ad Hoc Committee for the AFC Professional League Project.” In addition, as an indication of the local football dominance in Asia, Japanese teams have been winning continental championships including the 2008 Asian Football Confederation awards, where Gamba Osaka FC won the “team of the year and the team coach won the coach of the of the year award” (FoxSport 2008/26/11). The national team won the 'Gong Award' as result of their impressive performance during the 2010 World Cup qualifying campaign. After an impressive last sixteen finish during the South Africa World Cup, Japan won the Asian Cup in 2011, becoming champions for the fourth time.

Therefore before Japan hosted the 2002 FIFA World Cup, it had an adequate infrastructure for bidding and eventually co-hosting the event. Moreover, building additional infrastructure as a result of hosting the event appears to have produced a positive impact on the country’s global competitive advantage, especially in football. Based on our discussion thus far, two propositions can be suggested: (1) that for developed nations, the benefits of mega-events most likely far exceed those for developing nations; and (2) that judging from the experiences of Japan’s co-hosting of the 2002 FIFA World Cup and its long-term impact, it could be suggested that hosting the 2010 South Africa World Cup may have a positive impact in the long term on the country’s economic development and also it may improve the country’s football competitive advantage.
The Case of 2010 South Africa World Cup and Competitive Advantage

South Africa's state of competitiveness

Porter (2007) analyzed South Africa’s competitive advantage and his report indicates that according to the Business Competitiveness Index, the country ranked 33rd. In addition, the report states that South Africa had a moderate competitiveness improvement, just a little over the global average. However, he criticizes the country for failing to exploit its full potential. Despite South Africa's competitiveness, its prosperity level is still low compared to developed countries like Japan. There country still has high levels of unemployment and there is widespread poverty across the nation. On the other hand, the country has seen steady economic growth since the end of apartheid. The introduction of the democratic system helped to develop the political and the economic systems of the country. As a result, South Africa has positioned itself as a critical player in the modern capitalist world system.

Regarding South Africa's competitiveness profile, Porter mentions areas of strengths and weaknesses, paying attention to factors of economic growth and increased comparativeness. He asserts that strengths are present in “company sophistication, financial markets, and some aspects of context for rivalry.” (Porter, 2007:14). With regards to weaknesses, he emphasizes the lack of infrastructure and skills, “especially basic skills” (ibid). The former includes both physical and social infrastructure in terms of roads, public transportation system, technology, safety and security, education, health and housing. Compared with the Accelerated and Shared Growth Initiative (ASGISA), an economic policy adopted by South African in 2004, Porter's assessment concurs with the findings of the study about factors with a negative impact on economic growth in the country. Some of the constraints on economic growth included the following: (a) inefficient and costly transport infrastructure, (b) skill shortages, (c) barriers to entry and competition, (d) burdensome regulations for small companies, and (e) weaknesses in administrative capacity. Taking into account the significant contribution of tourism in sports mega-events, it is important to think about safety and security problems in South Africa within that context. The 2010 host nation was aiming for a tourism windfall from
hosting the World Cup. Pre-event estimates put the number at about 350,000 tourists coming for the World Cup.

According to South Africa’s *State of the Cities Report 2006*, three key cities, namely Cape Town, Johannesburg and Durban, are fundamentally important for the overall economic growth of the country. They are seen as the main points of interchange in the transport web across the globe. “They embody the agglomeration benefits of proximity, increasing the possibility of interactions, and speed, increasing the efficiency of moving people and goods” (State of the Cities Report 2006:2). In other words, these cities have developed to become significant actors in the world capitalist system. However, on the domestic level, the three cities are also considered to be central points for social conflict in terms of high crime rates and unemployment problems. Therefore, the 2010 South Africa World Cup placed special emphasis on social interaction, skill development, technology, art and cultural symbols.

Hosting the 2010 South Africa World Cup allowed the regional governments to step up urban development projects in order to stage the events, and also for the purpose of addressing wider social issues. Post-apartheid South Africa has positioned itself as key player in the global market. Thus, hosting the 2010 FIFA World Cup was approached in line with the broader national agenda on economic growth and social development. For the state, the issue of legacy as a result of hosting the event informed the strategy in organizing the games, while on the other hand the private sector was motivated by economic principles and the processes of globalization. In that respect, the relationship between the political and the economic imperatives was crucial for two reasons: Firstly, the state used public financing to organize the event, and therefore, public support in favor of hosting the event was important for the legitimacy of the state. In the case of developing nations like South Africa, poor service delivery, low social development and unemployment are the main causes of poverty. Therefore, the notion of using the World Cup for development purposes resonated with the public expectations in terms of development in key areas of society. Secondly; for the private sector, hosting the 2010 South Africa World Cup presented an opportunity to get a share in the global market and thus increase productivity and profits. Therefore, the core of the 2010 South Africa
World Cup objectives were influenced by a combination of economic, political and social factors.

*Factor Condition: Transportation Infrastructure development: Enhancing connection between labor and industry*

Prior to South Africa hosting the 2010 World Cup, there was a lot of criticism and skepticism about the host nation’s ability to host the event. The host nation’s lack of infrastructure in terms of an efficient public transportation system, accommodation and safety and security were among the major issues. Jerome Valcke, FIFA’s secretary general, told reporters in 2008 that his organization had been assured by Jeff Radebe, South Africa’s Transport Minister, that there would be sufficient transportation to cater for all the fans, both national and local. According to Valcke, about 1,400 taxis and buses were made available by the host nation and FIFA had organized more than 3,000 vehicles for its own staff (SAPA 2008: 26/11). In an attempt to address the insufficient transportation system, South Africa had invested “US$15.96 billion in transport”(BBC: 2008/23/11).

According to Minister Radebe, the investment included upgrading roads, airports, and the creation of new railway and bus systems (BBC: 2008/23/11). Therefore, as part of organizing the 2010 FIFA World Cup, the South African Department of Transport had formulated a blueprint called the “2010 Transport Action Plan” with the sole purpose of addressing the serious challenges facing the country’s transportation network system. The publication proclaimed that “transport services and infrastructure provided in 2010 must meet the efficiency, safety, quality and cost-effective requirements of the modern era, and must be accessible to all, visitors and residents alike” (2010 Transportation Action Plan, 2006:1). Therefore, this approach could have considerable long-term benefits for South Africa.

Since hosting mega-events requires extensive guarantees from the national government, the 2010 Transportation Action Plan served as a form of guarantee to FIFA of the government’s commitment to the event. The plan guaranteed smooth mobility for
the World Cup fans during the games and also for the general public after the end of the games. For that purpose, a high quality and efficient transport system had to be developed to a standard satisfactory both to FIFA and the state. Although prioritizing quality transportation for the 2010 World Cup was the main goal for the major part of the action plan, the plan was also designed to fall in line with the nation’s general agenda on social equity goals. Therefore, sustainability and legacy objectives had to be key concepts behind the 2010 Transport Action Plan. Politically, the government actions in this respect were critical for its legitimacy and popularity. It is important for the state to be seen to be addressing serious social concerns such as the poor state of the country's public transportation system.

Moreover, the development of infrastructure had the underlying intention of creating jobs for thousands of people. However, despite government actions, not everyone in the country was happy about the developments as they were unfolding. For example, before the start of the World Cup, resistance and outright rejection by the local taxi drivers met the new Rapid Bus Transit system that had been introduced for the city of Johannesburg. The system aimed at providing dedicated lanes for buses around the city, ending a transportation monopoly long held by taxis. According to a BBC report (2009/11/6) “an astonishing 50% of workers in Johannesburg currently commute by taxi – which are often more like mini-buses, capable of holding up to 15 people – with only 4% using the public bus system.” Therefore, against this background, the taxi drivers did not receive the idea of rapid bus transit very kindly and held demonstrations against it. Their main concern was that the new bus system would affect their industry and cause many job losses. However, the 2010 South Africa World Cup Local Organizing Committee remained optimistic that a solution would be found in time for the World Cup. These events helped highlight the nature of the conflicts between the workers and the state that appeared as a result of hosting the 2010 South Africa World Cup.

One of the most significant impacts of hosting sports mega-events is its ability to unlock and fast-track government projects that were previously planned but had never materialized. In this situation, the early implementation of these projects may have been prevented by government red tape and the bureaucratic system. For example, in the case
of South Africa, the state introduced the Gautrain, a high-speed commuter train linking the City of Johannesburg with O.R. Tambo International Airport and Pretoria City. Initially, the project was planned long before the 2010 South Africa World Cup bid and was earmarked to be operational after the 2010 FIFA World Cup had taken place. However, the government moved the project forward to include it in its overall 2010 Transportation Action Plan. Ian Riley, head of logistics for the South African bid committee, stated that “for the construction industry, which has been in decline in South Africa since the 1980s, much of the real value of the 2010 World Cup appears to have been the stimulation of projects already in the pipeline” (Chalmers2004/01/7). With reference to the Gautrain, Riley confirmed that the project had little to do with the World Cup and in fact the World Cup bid book did not even emphasize the ‘significance’ of the Gautrain project because it was not ‘critical’.

According to a government website, the R25bn Gautrain project is “one of the most significant engineering projects undertaken in Africa to date” (Project 2010 2008/5/8). Ray Betler, President of Bombardier Transportation, Total Transit Systems, a German company that had been contracted to build the rapid train, said that Bombardier was “very proud to be part of the Government’s vision to build a modern and effective rail system that will alleviate traffic congestion while harmonizing with the region’s pristine natural environment” (Bombardier 2005/2/7). The Gautrain, it was believed, would help to stimulate job creation and would further contribute to the economic development of Gauteng Province.

Therefore, the Gautrain project may have a long-term positive impact on Gauteng Province. The Sunday Times (2010/9/22) noted that, “within days of opening and in time for the World Cup, the Gautrain was carrying about 80,000 passengers per week.” The report further noted the post-World Cup train service figures, which were said to have stabilized at about 50,000 passengers a week while the new rapid bus service carries about 4,000 passengers per week. Therefore, the projects will go a long way in assisting the business sector from the province to connect better with the markets in the region. Furthermore, construction of phase two of the Gautrain project, which constitutes two-
thirds of the remaining project, continued after the end of the World Cup, up until the middle of 2011.

Other major public works projects geared towards improving economic growth included upgrading of airports across the major cities in the country, particularly in the host cities of Johannesburg, Cape Town and Durban. Gabara (2008/14/8) noted that the Aviation Council of South Africa had committed R22 billion for the upgrading of aviation infrastructure spread over a five-year period that started in 2007 and is planned to end in 2012. The plan was designed to fall in line with the national economic growth expectations and also form an integral part of the country’s preparations for the World Cup. For that purpose, a total of “R1.7 billion [was spent] on O.R. Tambo International Airport; R603 million on Cape Town International; R1.925 billion at the new green field airport development at La Mercy and Durban International; and R298 million at domestic airports countrywide (Gabara, 2008/14/8).

Pillay and Bass (2008: 329) argue that the idea of legacy should go beyond the “exclusively pro-poor language” to include the wider national economic goals. Considering the scope, nature and scale of the infrastructure development surrounding the 2010 South Africa World Cup, Pillay and Bass’s argument appears justified. This chapter has emphasized that the major transportation projects in South Africa due to the World Cup were intended to meet the country's long-term infrastructural needs, in addition to serving the relatively short-term demands of the 2010 World Cup. However, there is a need for a continued vigorous debate about the nature and scope of the legacy derived from hosting the 2010 South Africa World Cup in order to understand the extent of the impact of the event.

*Factor Condition: Safety and Security Infrastructure and Competitive advantage*

Porter (2007:2) asserts that “improving competitiveness is increasingly essential to South Africa’s prosperity.” However, at the same time, he is quick to point out that issues concerning safety and security are some of the factors impeding the opportunities to improve the country’s overall competitive advantage. According to Porter, the South
African government, civil society and the private sector need to establish a co-operative approach to improve public safety. This approach is considered to be critical for instilling confidence from the investors’ perspective, but it is also equally important for stimulating economic growth. Fisher (1997: 56) argues that, “results from many studies indicate a significant positive effect of public safety spending on economic development, as measured by changes in employment or new investment.”

Compared to the 2002 Korea Japan World Cup event, there were serious fears on the part of the media, FIFA and the local people that the 2010 South Africa World Cup would not be a safe affair. Japan in 2002, for its part, was counted as one of the safest and most secure nations in the world. Media reports indicate that there was virtually no crime or violence reported during the 2002 Korea Japan World Cup. Poulton (2005:28) confirms this assertion by noting, “there was a notable absence of any disorder at the 2002 World Cup [and] England supporters demonstrated an exemplary behavior that has seldom been acknowledged before.” The Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2002/1/7) confirmed that the 2002 co-hosts left aside their political differences and conducted joint security drills to ensure that they produced a safe 2002 FIFA World Cup.

Meanwhile, for the 2010 South Africa World Cup, the issue of safety and security in the country resulted in the attention of the international media being firmly focused on the host nation. There were fears that the event would be marked with wholesale robberies and murders of visiting fans by the local criminal elements. In some ways, their fears could have been justifiable since South Africa has one of the highest crime rates in the world. “The 2010 Tourism Organizing Plan,” a document that outlined the country's state of readiness in terms of development of tourism related infrastructure related to the 2010 World Cup, emphasized that safety and security concerns remained a top priority issue before, during and after the games.

According to South Africa Tourism, many foreigners are discouraged by the country's high crime from visiting South Africa. A study by South Africa Tourism revealed that several million potential travelers had not considered South Africa between 2000 and 2005 because of safety concerns. Therefore, safety and security concerns have a negative
effect on tourism sales for the country's core target markets. According to Dr Johann Burger, a senior researcher at the Institute for Security Studies based in South Africa, the issue of crime in the country is considered as “a serious problem” and the crime ratios are “still significantly higher than almost every other country in the world” (BBC:2009/11/6). Looking at the crime statics in South Africa, it is clear that that the problem is worse in major cities like Johannesburg, Pretoria, Durban and Cape Town. These cities were also the main venues for both the 2009 FIFA Confederations Cup and the 2010 South Africa World Cup respectively. As a result, most of the safety and security investment for hosting the 2010 World Cup was concentrated on these cities. Figure 8 shows social contact crime ratios per province between 1 April and 31 March 2011.

**Figure 7;** Social contact crime ratios per province 1 April - 31 March 2011

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>RSA</td>
<td>34.1</td>
<td>31.9</td>
<td>-6.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mpumalanga</td>
<td>24.3</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>-17.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Limpopo</td>
<td>14.6</td>
<td>12.2</td>
<td>-16.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KwaZulu Natal</td>
<td>40.4</td>
<td>35.2</td>
<td>-12.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gauteng</td>
<td>32.7</td>
<td>29.1</td>
<td>-11.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern Cape</td>
<td>33.2</td>
<td>31.0</td>
<td>-6.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Cape</td>
<td>48.4</td>
<td>47.3</td>
<td>-2.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Cape</td>
<td>42.4</td>
<td>44.2</td>
<td>4.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North West</td>
<td>21.5</td>
<td>23.2</td>
<td>7.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Free State</td>
<td>31.4</td>
<td>34.1</td>
<td>8.6%</td>
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Figure 7 shows that the Eastern Cape, Western Cape, KwaZulu-Natal and the Free State recorded the highest proportions of reported murder for the 2010/2011 period. On
the other hand, the figures also show slight reductions in murder rates for Mpumalanga, Limpopo, KwaZulu-Natal and Gauteng, of 8.5% reduction. The Northern Cape recorded a 6.6% reduction rate while the Eastern Cape had a 2.3% reduction. The most troubling provinces in terms of recording increases in murder rates are Western Cape with a 4.2% increase, North West with 7.9% and the Free State with 8.6%. However, although South Africa has high crime statistics, crimes against tourists remain at a minimum. Most of the crime committed is against property and violent crime usually involves a victim and perpetrator who know each other. According to Gareth Newham of the Institute for Security Studies in South Africa, “80 percent of the murders (in South Africa) are between people who know each other, and more than 50 percent of those are committed under the influence of alcohol in a dispute that becomes more and more violent ” (BBC 2009/11/6). His assessment is not without merit as confirmed by the South African Police Service (SAPS) report on crime figures and trends in country.

The study conducted by the Crime Research and Statistics unit of SAPS Crime Intelligence (Crime Report 2010/2011:p6), asserts that over the past ten years, “approximately 70,0% - 80,0% of murders, 60,0% of attempted murders, 75,0% of rapes and 90,0% of all assaults (whether GBH, common or indecent assault) involve victims and perpetrators who know one another (whether as family members, friends, acquaintances or colleagues).” The report stresses that in most cases alcohol and to a lesser extent drug abuse play a significant role in these crimes. It is against this context that the South African authorities based their confidence that the international tourists would be safe in South Africa ahead of the World Cup. However, what these statistics also reveal is that the level of crime in the country is still very high and that the state has a difficult task in addressing this complex problem and other serious social issues such as health and education.

*The safety and security legacy of the 2010 South Africa World Cup*

South Africa has hosted “close to 150 major sporting events” including the 1995 Africa Cup of Nations, the 1996 Rugby World Cup, the 2003 Cricket World Cup, and the 2009 Indian Premier League, without major crime incidence reported (Southafrica.info,
2010/02/24). However, the 2009 FIFA Confederations Cup, hosted in South Africa in June, cast serious doubts on the country’s state of security readiness ahead of the 2010 FIFA World Cup. Moreover, the tournament was regarded as a dress rehearsal in terms of the host nation’s organization and preparations a year before the kickoff of the FIFA World Cup. During the 2009 Confederations Cup, there were several cases of crime involving the visiting national teams. Not only did the incidents cause embarrassment for the Local Organizing Committee, but the situation also led the international media to forecast a bloody and crime-ridden 2010 South Africa World Cup. Nonetheless, the experiences of the 2009 Confederations Cup reminded everyone about the seriousness of the crime problem in South Africa. These are some of the crime incidents that transpired during the Confederations Cup and which resulted in negative global media publicity.

According to media reports, the Egyptian national team returned to their hotel rooms following their win against Italy during the Confederations Cup only to find some of their property stolen from their rooms. The news made international headlines amid persistent concerns over high crime rates in South Africa in the run-up to the World Cup. But two South African Sunday newspapers gave a different version of events. The *Sunday Independent* and *City Press* both quoted police sources as alleging that “the players had fallen foul of light-fingered female consorts at an impromptu victory party” (Supersport.com 2009/21/6). However, the incident caused a war of words between the South African and the Egyptian authorities.

A second incident involved the Brazilian national team that also claimed to have fallen victim to theft during the tournament. Finally some of the international media personnel from Reuters also announced that criminals in a parking lot of one of the venues robbed them at gunpoint during the games (*Kickoff Magazine* 2009/22/6). The Local Organizing Committee CEO, Mr Danny Jordaan, responded by asking the media not to sensationalize the issue. In a press conference held in Sandton city, Johannesburg, Mr Jordaan argued that the LOC had been “aware” of reports of crime “here and there,” “but these could happen anywhere and at any time” (*Kickoff Magazine* 2009/22/6). However, the organizers of the first African World Cup remained optimistic that a solution would be found in time before the start of the 2010 South Africa World Cup.
At the same time, from a tourism perspective, the South African government was faced with a huge uphill task to address the reality of safety and security issues in the country. Already there were concerns that the high level of crime might deter the international tourists from traveling to the 2010 South Africa World Cup. In addition, the global economic crisis of 2007 had serious implications for the tourism sector. It negatively affected the aviation sector, hotels, travelers, travel agents and tourism products. As a result, prices for flights and hotels were inflated and at the same time there was a massive job loss on a global scale as companies closed down under the economic pressure. Therefore, the 2010 South African World Cup organizers had to adopt a proactive approach to soften the impact of the crisis. The authorities had to ensure that the first African World Cup remained an attractive spectacle for the international audience. According to South Africa Tourism, the international fans remained a key category of supporters for the overall economic success of the 2010 South Africa World Cup. Compared to the local fans, the international supporters spent more money throughout their visit and stayed longer in the country in support of their national teams.

As a result, Dr Danny Jordaan, the CEO of the 2010 Local Organizing Committee, stressed that his organization was taking the issues of safety seriously and had invested R1.3 billion in security for World Cup. The security investment included increasing the number of police officers and providing training, and some police officers “underwent intensive training in Europe” (Southafrica.info, 2010/02/24). Pruis (2010) indicate that the South African Police Service department made a further R640 million available for human resources and that contributed to “44 000 police officials and an additional 10 000 metro police officials” being dedicated to the 2010 South Africa World Cup. “The ratio of police to people in the country during the World Cup was estimated at 3:1 000” (Pruis 2010:1). Furthermore, the South African Police Department announced that it had spent an estimated R665 million on new equipment which included “six new helicopters, 10 mobile command vehicles, 100 high-performance vehicles, unmanned aerial vehicles, body armour and water cannons” (Southafrica.info, 2010/02/24). In addition, specialized units were created such as the Public Order Police, which was tasked with crowd control management, and the Tactical Response Team, which was developed to handle security
issues of serious nature. Pruis (2010:14) notes that on the first day of the 2010 South Africa World Cup, a total of 30,173 members of the police force had been deployed, and on the last day of the event about 34,446 members were on duty.

In addition, each 2010 host city had the responsibility to plan and implement their own security measures aimed at producing a safe 2010 World Cup for both the visitors and the local residents. Let’s consider Cape Town for example: according to the Cape Argus (2009/08/01), the government intensified efforts to secure safety and security for the 2010 World Cup by embarking on a massive national recruitment drive. “More than 5,000 public emergency call centre staff, including some of last year’s [2008] matriculants, [had] been recruited as call centre agents.” Furthermore, “70 traffic officers, 124 fire fighters, 180 law enforcement officers and 21 disaster operation centre staff” were appointed and provided training (Cape Argus; 2009/08/01). Therefore, in this context, hosting the 2010 South Africa World Cup served a dual purpose of acting as a catalyst for job creation and at the same time the event was used as a crime prevention strategy. The investment in safety and security development had an immediate impact on the fight against crime. As shown in Figure 8 below, there was a decline in crime rates in South Africa since 2004 when the country won the right to host the World Cup, to the post World Cup period.
Figure 8; Crime rates in South Africa 2004 – 2010

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Murder</td>
<td>19,824</td>
<td>18,793</td>
<td>18,528</td>
<td>19,202</td>
<td>18,487</td>
<td>18,148</td>
<td>16,834</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total sexual offences</td>
<td>16,079</td>
<td>69,117</td>
<td>68,076</td>
<td>65,201</td>
<td>63,818</td>
<td>70,514</td>
<td>68,332</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attempted murder</td>
<td>30,076</td>
<td>24,516</td>
<td>20,571</td>
<td>20,142</td>
<td>18,795</td>
<td>18,268</td>
<td>17,410</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assault with the intent to inflict grievous bodily harm</td>
<td>260,082</td>
<td>249,369</td>
<td>226,942</td>
<td>218,030</td>
<td>210,104</td>
<td>203,777</td>
<td>205,293</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Common assault</td>
<td>280,942</td>
<td>267,857</td>
<td>227,553</td>
<td>210,057</td>
<td>198,049</td>
<td>192,838</td>
<td>197,284</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robbery with aggravating circumstances</td>
<td>133,658</td>
<td>126,789</td>
<td>119,726</td>
<td>126,558</td>
<td>118,312</td>
<td>121,392</td>
<td>113,715</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Common robbery</td>
<td>95,551</td>
<td>90,825</td>
<td>74,721</td>
<td>71,156</td>
<td>64,985</td>
<td>59,232</td>
<td>57,537</td>
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Figure 8 suggests that South Africa experienced a decline of about 6.5% in the murder rate between the 2009/2010 and 2010/2011. There were 16,834 murders recorded in the 2009/2010 period but that figure decreased to 15,940 for the 2010/2011 period. This means that South Africa experienced a decrease of 894 in numbers of murders between those periods. This is significant for three main reasons: Firstly, it was the first time in the post-apartheid era that the murder figure fell below the 16,000 mark (South African Police Service 2010-2011:7) Secondly, the decrease in crime rates occurred despite the rapid population growth and heightened urbanization process due to the migration of labor from rural areas, and also of other African foreign nationals. The most notable problem is the influx of illegal immigrants from Zimbabwe as a result of the
political turmoil and poverty in that country. Thirdly, considering the fact that the majority of the population in South Africa is poor and unemployed, and thus prone to resort to crime to address their immediate needs for survival, the decrease in crime rates came as a huge boost to the government. The issue of civil obedience and social order amid widespread poverty and unemployment amongst the majority of the population, is critical for the state and its ability to maintain social control.

More importantly, the post World Cup crime statistics gives a positive indication that police intervention against crime has been sustained in terms of strategy, planning, equipment and cohesive force, as a result of the safety and security measures introduced before and after the 2010 South Africa World Cup. This view is shared in light of the fact that due to the Confederations Cup and the 2010 South Africa World Cup hosted in the country, the period between 2009-2010 experienced high levels of police visibility. Thus, hosting the 2010 South Africa World Cup is viewed as having produced a positive impact when in relation to policing and deterring widespread criminal activity.

In addition, there were other independent factors that increased the number of police officers deployed across the country. On the political level, the national elections of 2007 and the subsequent inauguration of President Zuma as the third president of post-apartheid South Africa was significant in that regard. Other issues included the international cricket match played in Cape Town and the decision to stage some rugby games in Soweto township, the most densely-populated and crime-ridden area in the country. Having said, there was also a growing civil unrest around the country, especially in the Soweto township, due to agitation for better living conditions and improved service delivery by the state. All these factors contributed to the decision by the state to deploy more police in order to safeguard the lives of the communities and also to portray a safe state of affairs ahead of the 2010 South Africa World Cup.

Furthermore, the increased police activities in the country contributed to a reduction of the number of robberies nationally. It is clear from looking at the figures provided in Figure 9 that there is a causal link between robberies and murder rate in the country. This takes into account that a significant number of people are murdered during the
commission of robberies. The perpetrator or the victim may commit the murder as an act of self-defense. This would automatically cause an increase in the total number of murders committed nationally. Therefore, by reducing robberies, the state may be in a position to curb the number of people being killed during the process of committing a crime. Therefore, viewed in this context, the safety and security investment as a result of hosting the 2010 South Africa World Cup may have long-term consequences in the country. However, it depends on whether the state tackles the issue of crime in conjunction with other problems such as unemployment and poverty. In other words, it is critical to recognize that any strategy to fight crime in South African has to take into account the socio-political and economic history of the country.

The state’s view on this issue as highlighted by Mr Nathi Mthethwa, Minister of Safety and Security, is that a “more targeted and systematic approach” as contained in the South Africa's National Crime Prevention Strategy,” is required to address the problem of crime in South Africa (Gabara; 2008/12/5). The government strategy in this regard encompasses the integration of national security issues and law enforcement issues. During the World Cup period, the South Africa National Crime Prevention Strategy was based on specific safety plans that were in turn based on FIFA safety guidelines. For example, FIFA required detailed strategic, operational and tactical planning for every scenario: for instance, the safety plans had to include a detailed analysis of every port of entry into the country, the mapping of all possible routes that could be taken, and identifying the venues where the main participants were to be accommodated (Pruis;2010:13). More importantly, the safety and security operational plans related to the World Cup necessitated regional and international cooperation with other countries. In this regard, the SAPS cooperated with the South African Regional Police Chiefs Cooperation Organisation (SARPCCO). Other agencies within the safety and security cooperation framework included the South African National Defence Force (SANDF), the metro police, provincial traffic police, the intelligence community, the Department of Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs (COGTA), the LOC, the hotel industry, the transport sector and the intelligence services (Pruis;2010)
In addition, the security demands of the 2010 South Africa World Cup enabled the state to introduce reforms in the criminal justice system. Appel (2009/02/10) stated that the South African government strategy involved improving integration and coordination of the country’s criminal justice system “along the whole value chain, including the functioning of the police, the judiciary and correctional services.” As a result, a collaborative approach between the South African Police Department, the Department of Justice and Constitutional Development and the Department of Correctional Services, provided a platform for the introduction of special World Cup courts designed to process World Cup matters.

Rikhotso (2008) emphasized that the idea behind the strategy was to build efficiency in the criminal justice system in terms of “possible arrest, court appearance and brief detention of offenders during match days.” A total of 56 special World Cup courts were opened across the nine host cities and operated seven days a week from morning to 23:00pm. According to The Independent (2010/06/19), the courts were assigned “110 magistrates, 260 prosecutors, 93 foreign language interpreters, 1140 court officials and 327 court orderlies.” Although the main objective of the plan was to provide better access to justice for the 2010 fans, the initiative also helped to increase employment opportunities for the country’s unemployed graduates.

In the event, “the 56 courts attended to 205 cases, of which 122 resulted in convictions” (Dube 2010). Most of the cases brought before the courts involved petty crime such as theft and the perpetrators were local citizens and foreigners alike. The Independent (2010/6/19) reported a high profile case which involved the sentencing of two Zimbabwean nationals to a period of 15 years in prison in connection with an armed robbery of Spanish and Portuguese journalists at a Magaliesburg lodge a day before the kickoff of the 2010 South Africa World Cup. The South African government has described the courts as a great success and has expressed an intention to incorporate them into the country’s justice system. The Government Communications and Information System (2010/7/13) reported that the state intended to maintain and improve the courts in an attempt to continue to deliver swift justice beyond the World Cup. Therefore, based on these developments, it is clear that one of the most positive legacies from the 2010 South
Africa World Cup is the improvement of the safety and security infrastructure in terms of providing more highly trained police officers, coupled with state of the art technological capability to fight crime in the country. The systems established for the World Cup will be judged based on their application within the national social context and their geographical spread in terms of access and inclusion.

*The 2010 South Africa World Cup Stadia Development: An impetus for a job creation and skill development strategy*

The organization of the 2010 South Africa World Cup generated a lot of economic activity. Apart from investing in public projects such as building new roads and upgrading the public transportation system, the 2010 FIFA World Cup hosts built new stadiums in host cities around the country for the World Cup games. The stadiums could be argued to represent the most obvious symbols of the 2010 South Africa World Cup project. The central, provincial and local governments cooperated in the construction of four brand new stadiums and the refurbishment of five more in nine South African cities. According to Craig Allen (n.d.), a senior U.S. Commercial Service Officer, “South Africa’s Treasury Ministry had allocated USD 2.5 billion for the stadiums and associated infrastructure. In addition, provincial and municipal governments had contributed a further USD 1.2 billion for the same purpose.

According to Gleeson (2009/17/7), the initial estimate of World Cup stadium costs made by South Africa at the time of winning the bid, “was set at some R2-3 billion.” However, costs escalated beyond the budget, imposing a huge strain on local authorities already struggling with other social issues such as housing, HIV/AIDS, education and poverty alleviation. AFP (2008/14/8) put the figures for the construction of stadiums at “a staggering 9.2 billion Rand” and issues such as the “economic recession, the price of steel, the volatile South African currency” were cited as reasons for the cost overruns in the stadiums construction process. Cohen and Seria (2008/21/10) stated that the additional allocation brought the total direct cost of hosting the tournament to R28 billion.
Beside the cost overruns, progress in the construction process was continuously hindered by labor disputes between the union workers and construction companies. The results were devastating strikes and other down-tool demonstrations that crippled progress as the deadline for completion of the projects drew even closer. For example workers at the 46,000-seat Mbombela stadium in Nelspruit were the first ones to stage strikes in February 2008 and demand a near doubling of their wages. Similar disputes broke out at stadiums in Durban and Cape Town. However, the World Cup organizers remained confident that the stadium projects would be completed on time (Supersport 2009/19/2). Figure 10 below consists of a list of the 2010 South Africa World Cup venues and relevant data relating to costs, capacity and year of completion.

The most significant impact of preparing to host the 2010 South Africa World Cup had been the number of jobs opportunities created in the process. A BBC News article (2006/7/7) stated that the LOC was hoping that the tournament would create “160,000 jobs and [would] contribute more than 20 billion rand (about $3.6 billion) to the country’s gross domestic product.” As FIFA.com (2009/7/1) notes, a special report prepared for Cape Town Council showed that about “2,143 on-site jobs [were] created to construct the Green Point stadium, and 1,179 artisans received training from the contractors” to help in the future. Of these, “99% [were] local residents, 88% [were] black, and 35% [were] under 35 years of age. Four per cent [were] women” (FIFA.com 2009/7/1).”
Other examples of job creation programs and projects include the upgrading of industrial rail lines and port capacity expansion in several cities. Mdletshe (2008:27/10) states that South Africa’s transport MEC for Kwazulu-Natal Province, Mr Bheki Cele, confirmed that “the King Shaka Airport project had created more than 3,000 jobs.” For the Gautrain project, “approximately 57,000 jobs” were created in the process (Beushausen 2005: Sep/Oct). Although most of the jobs created were temporary and most of them expired after the 2010 South Africa World Cup, the authorities hoped that the programs provided would develop the workers’ capacity and provide them with the necessary skills to assist them in the future. Therefore viewed in that light, it could be argued that job creation as a result of hosting the 2010 World Cup could enable the country to improve its economic growth and competitive advantage.

Porter (2007:18) argues that, “South Africa continues to suffer from a ‘two-economy phenomena’ A formal economy with relatively solid productivity close to global
standards. An informal economy with low productivity that provides jobs for a large share of the population, especially the poor.” Therefore, the 2010 South Africa World Cup was approached as a strategy to merge the two economies (formal and informal) into a single stream. This strategy is thought to have the capacity to assist not only in creating employment for the poor but also in providing opportunities for training and skill development for the majority of people. As part of the program, the employees received skills development training to assist them in advancing their careers long after the World Cup.

For that purpose, various on-site training centers were developed to offer qualification/certificates for “steelfixers, shutterhands, scaffold erectors, concrete hands, bricklayers, plasterers, crane operators and health and safety officers.” Also on offer were “Adult Basic Education Training: computer skills training; construction supervisor training and management development and training for workers on site: Undergraduates and Graduates: civil engineering and building.” The training provided accreditation by the relevant education boards and agencies. It could be argued that such initiatives will have a positive impact on the economy in the long run.

Seria and Cohen (2009/5/5) assert that hosting the World Cup formed an integral part of the government’s strategic policy initiative to address the problem of creating “Black Economic Empowerment” opportunities. For example, about “57% of procurement on the stadium [was] sourced from BEE companies, and 65% from SMMEs. Ninety per cent of the procurement [was] from suppliers within the municipal area” (Supersport.com 2009/7/1). However, there were also a lot of sub-contracting opportunities for overseas companies in lighting, security equipment, broadcasting, information management and catering. Overall, the 2010 South Africa World Cup stadium construction was a joint initiative that involved labor unions, private sector management and the state. This kind of cooperation is critical if South Africa hopes to build on the success of the World Cup. Moreover, such participation is essential for economic growth.
As previously mentioned, the 2002 Korea Japan World Cup was used to advance the objectives of the Japanese Professional Football League (J-League). The event was used as a marketing strategy for the J-League. The 2010 South Africa World Cup model appears to have been established to achieve similar objectives. The South African organizers used the event to boost the local Premier Soccer League (PSL). The fact that 2010 World Cup was positioned to host the first FIFA World in Africa triggered huge economic investment in the development of the county's football industry. For example, in 2007 two of South Africa’s big businesses, South African Breweries (SAB) and Absa (in the banking sector), jointly pledged a sponsorship deal worth R500million to the South African Football Association over a period of five years. The contract came soon after the Premier Soccer League announced that it had reached a broadcasting agreement worth R1.6-billion with Supersport International (Morgan 2007/28/8). The deal serves as a reflection of the positive spin-offs from hosting the 2010 South Africa World Cup.

Amato (1020/9/19) argues that the Supersport deal has had a positive impact on the contracts of PSL players. According to the latest figures, some PSL players earn about R5 million a year (ibid). The South African football authorities hope that awarding salaries competitive with those in the European leagues would assist in bringing down the exodus of talented local players to overseas leagues. Furthermore, due to the global economic crisis of 2007, many football clubs in Europe were left with huge financial losses and heavy debts. The impact appears to have trickled down to the players, affecting their contracts and the transfer market. For example, Sowetan (2010/9/19) notes that in the Norwegian league, “footballers accepted a 15% pay cut” and there were reports that in Italy Seria A players threatened to strike at the beginning of the 2010-2011 season demanding more power during contract negotiations during the transfer process. However, hosting the 2010 South African Africa World Cup helped to soften the impact of the economic crisis in the local football industry. Therefore, this could have a positive impact in the future of South Africa football.
Apart from the PSL and the players, the 2010 South Africa World Cup legacy may also benefit the local fans. As indicated earlier, Japan stadium design set a new benchmark in stadium innovation and landscaping. This has been viewed as a significant factor for not only improving the structure and the economic base of the J-League, but also for increasing the number of fans attending the games at the stadiums. For the 2010 South Africa World Cup, the host nation sought the experience of leading foreign companies to build the 2010 World Cup stadiums and help shape the “African experience.” For example, according to Architecture (2006/01/08), two German architects, Meinhard von Gerkan and Volkwin Marg, “were commissioned to build three of the five new stadiums” for the 2010 World Cup. The same architects had also rebuilt stadiums in Frankfurt, Cologne and Berlin during the 2006 German World Cup.

Following the end of the 2010 World Cup, the South Africa fans could begin to enjoy watching their favorite teams playing on beautiful surfaces in the high-tech stadiums built around the country. The new stadiums will assist the atmosphere of the games. Furthermore, the 2010 South Africa World Cup was approached as a strategy to improve the administrative structure of football in the country. During the 2010 South Africa World Cup, the host nation was knocked out of the tournament in the first round group stage. It was for the first time in the history of the World Cup that a host nation failed to progress past the first round. In fact, with six teams from Africa participating in the World Cup, Ghana became the only African team to go through to the knockout stages. Several factors could be responsible for the poor performance by the African teams. These include the lack of football development at the grass-roots level, poor football administration by the authorities, and perhaps the pressure created by people’s expectations that since the World Cup was hosted in Africa, maybe an African team could win. Therefore, the legacy of the 2010 South Africa World Cup in this respect is the restructuring and professionalization of football in the country from grass roots levels to the Premier League in terms of management capacity, player salaries and contract issues, sponsorship deals and media rights issues. These developments could prove to be significant factors in the future moving forward towards the 2014 Brazil World Cup.
Conclusion

Porter's notion of factor condition as a prerequisite for improving a nation's economic competitive advantage is critical for understanding how sports mega-events can be critical as a catalyst for infrastructure development, job creation and show-casing a country. Having said that, hosting sports mega-events predominantly serves the interests of the capitalist system. Important actors in that regard are the state and the corporations: these two groups make up the real beneficiaries of sports mega-events. As the discussion has demonstrated, in the case of Japan, the relationship between the state and the construction sector has been important for the country’s rapid development in terms of roads and rail infrastructure, accommodation facilities and state of the art sports facilities. These infrastructure developments underpin the strong connection between the state and the capitalist corporations in Japan. In this context, the concept of a construction state highlights the accumulation of capital in Japan in terms of technology, level of education and the sophistication of the infrastructure, as compared with the rest of Asia and other developing nations like South Africa. Japan is still regarded as one of the leading global powers when it comes to its economic standing after America and China, but other nations such as India and Brazil are catching up fast and unless Japan address weaknesses in its economy and the problem of population decline, it will loose its status in the international community.

As a developed nation, Japan is recognized as a core state, thus possessing the necessary basic infrastructure to host a sports mega-event on the scale of a FIFA World Cup. However, on the football side, Japan’s position is semi-peripheral. When compared to the football leagues in Europe, the Japanese football league is less developed, but it is recognized as a dominant force in the Asian region. In fact, if the results of the past three World Cups (2002, 2006 and 2010) are anything to go by, where Japan finished in the last sixteen and eight respectively, then Japanese football is certainly in the ascendency and can be expected to mount a real challenge to the dominance of Europe and South America. Hosting the 2002 Korea Japan World Cup helped to improve the level of the game in Japan by concentrating efforts in the development of infrastructure and other
related issues. The long-term impacts are certainly visible in that regard and are most likely going to be felt for a long time to come.

With regards to the 2010 South Africa World Cup and the development of the factors required to host the event, this chapter has argued that the investment in infrastructure development was critical for economic political, and social reasons. On the economic level, hosting the event acted as a catalyst and provided the state with an opportunity to upgrade the ailing infrastructure of the country. Porter (2007) identified the poor level of infrastructure as one of the main stumbling blocks preventing the country from reaching its full economic potential. As noted in this thesis, various scholars acknowledge the link between economic infrastructure development and economic development. In terms of our diamond analysis, infrastructure development is crucial for improving a nation’s competitive advantage. The underlying implications of infrastructure development related to sports mega-events are felt in the form of job creation and empowerment programs that are stimulated by the event. Although South Africa is regarded as the major economic engine of Africa, the country has had the problem of high rates of unemployment for a long time. The issue has its roots in the apartheid system. Hosting the 2010 South Africa World Cup was seen as a strategy to address the question of unemployment in the country.

However, as post-event studies show, there were fewer jobs created by the event compared to the pre-event employment estimates. As this thesis has noted, previous studies show that that jobs created from sports mega-events are mostly part-time and concentrated in the construction, tourism and leisure sectors. According to Grant Thornton’s report (2003), hosting the 2010 South Africa World Cup was expected to create an estimated 695,000 jobs during the pre-event and post-event periods, and of these, 280,000 would be maintained in 2010. However, only 111000 jobs were created in the construction industry and many quickly disappeared after the completion of the 2010 World Cup projects (Cottle, 2010:5). Equally important, the high crime rates in the country are part of a broader social framework in which widespread joblessness leads to crime. Porter (2007) notes that safety and security issues in South Africa were a serious weakness, inhibiting economic growth and competitiveness. As a result, this thesis has
adopted a diamond framework that examined the development of safety and security infrastructure in South Africa as sub-factors within the factor condition requirement necessary for improving a nation's competitive advantage.

On the political level, the infrastructure development surrounding the World Cup served two objectives, (a) it served as a symbolic break from the apartheid legacy of poor infrastructure, and (b) it provided the state with added legitimacy and authority in the political arena. Internationally, hosting the event allowed the state to showcase its image and soft power on a global scale. Nationally, the event served to increase government support amongst the population in terms of public trust and authority. Figure 10 below presents the results from a survey conducted by the Human Sciences Research Council in South Africa, that examined the public attitudes towards hosting the 2010 World Cup. The issues covered ranged from the readiness of the country to host the event to the impact on infrastructure development in the country.

**Figure 10:** Attitudes to the 2010 World Cup

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Response</th>
<th>Percentage point</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Respondents indicated that they “strongly agreed” or “agreed” with the statement that South Africa would be ready to host the World Cup;</td>
<td>82%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Respondents “strongly agreed” or “agreed” that local government in the area in which they lived would be able to meet the needs of the FIFA World Cup;</td>
<td>62%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Respondents “strongly agreed” or “agreed” with the proposition that the World Cup would delay the provision of basic services to poor areas in the country;</td>
<td>47%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Respondents “strongly agreed” or “agreed” with the proposition that small businesses would benefit;</td>
<td>81%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Respondents “strongly agreed” or “agreed” that hosting the event would improve black economic empowerment (a South African government policy designed to change inherited racial ownership of wealth in the country);</td>
<td>78%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Even though hosting the 2010 South Africa World Cup enabled the country to experience robust economic activity during the organization and the subsequent hosting of event, the economic legacy is still yet to be felt by the majority of population. In fact, as this thesis notes, hosting the 2010 South Africa World Cup served as a clear demonstration that the state can deliver on its pledges. The infrastructure development helped to boost public confidence in the state, and the general belief that it has the capacity to address the broader challenges of service delivery. The Human Sciences Research Council (2006) study looked at the pre- and post-event trends in public perceptions of whether the government use of funds for infrastructure development related to the event was well spent or not. In the case of the host cities of Durban and Cape Town, the results show that the public perception that funds had been well spent declined after the World Cup was over.

The statement the respondents addressed was; “I feel that the use of public funds in support of this event was acceptable” (The Human Sciences Research Council 2006:51). As the study indicates, (67.8%) agreed or strongly agreed with this statement in Cape Town before the event, compared with 62.5% after the event. In Durban 61.5% agreed or strongly agreed before the World Cup compared with 53% after the World Cup” (ibid:51). These figures suggest that the hosting the World Cup increased public expectations that the state, when put under enormous pressure, could deliver on its promises. Therefore, the decline in expectations after the event may be an indication of public disappointment with the African National Congress-led government.

Therefore, unless host nations from developing nations employ event strategies that aim to strike a balance between economic imperatives on the one hand and meeting the social expectations of society on the other hand, then, like South Africa, they will run the risk of loosing public support and legitimacy in the post event era. For South Africa, how the state deals with the challenge of addressing growing mistrust and civil discontent as a result of false promises made during the bidding and subsequent hosting of the 2010
World Cup will be a significant factor in measuring the legacy of hosting the event. Therefore, unless the state accelerates programs intended to create more jobs, and improves service delivery, hosting the 2010 South Africa World Cup may have a negative impact on the state, while increasing demands from civil society for accountability by the state.
Chapter 4.

Capitalism and Sports Mega-events: Sponsorship and broadcasting rights; Marketing and Ambush Marketing

Literature review

Meenaghan (1998) asserts that in the last thirty years, the sponsorship industry has developed as a major global force with the increase in the scope and scale of sponsorship activities. Sports is considered as the most sponsored activity compared with the fields of the arts, culture and the environment. Cliffe and Motion (2005) note that the notion of sport as the most popular medium for sponsorship has been addressed in many studies, such as those by Witcher, Craigen, Culligan and Harvey (1991), Shanklin and Kuzma (1992), Suchard and Scott (1992), Sunshine, Backman and Backman (1995), and Thwaites, Aguilar-Manjarrez and Kidd (1998).

According to Westerbeek et al (2003), the figure for the global economic value of the sports industry was said to be around US$80 billion. However, the authors add that the method used to calculate the economic value of the global sports industry does not include important aspects of the economic chain such as tickets sales, broadcasting rights, and sponsorship fees. Moreover, the calculation is also believed to have excluded the aspect of merchandising. Therefore, this means that the figure could be higher than the one stated. Nonetheless, even this figure certainly amounts to a significant contribution to the overall income from global trade.

Some authors point to the economic value of the US sports industry to highlight the contribution of sport to the national economy. For example, Harverson (1997/14/03) states that in 1995 the US sports industry was the 11th largest industry in the country, worth US$93.8 billion. Others point to the United Kingdom as an example of the sports industry’s contribution to the national economy. The United Nations Environment Programme (2003) noted that estimations regarding “sport-related turnover in the United Kingdom equals that of the automotive and food industries.” Everyone from the fittest athlete to the fattest couch potato can be seen wearing running shoes and tracksuits. As
Wolfea et.al (2002) note, globally, sports-related turnover amounts to three per cent of total world economic activity, and the International Olympic Commission alone earns almost $2 billion from sponsorship and TV rights.

In most cases, industries with global reach dominate the sponsorship market. As a result, sports like football are the most attractive for the multinational corporations. O’Malley (2002/9/4) argues that “Nike’s thirteen-year $429 million dollars investment in Manchester United” concluded in 2002 was “the largest deal in sponsorship history.” Moreover, since the UK and Europe constitute the most lucrative football markets, Nike saw an opportunity to heighten its dominance in football via its Manchester United sponsorship deal. Farrelly et al (2005:56) explain that sports is most attractive to sponsors because it has a “substantial nonverbal component involving universal images of hope, pain, and victory, which can transcend language and cultural boundaries in order to provide companies with a persuasive platform on which to build awareness in international markets”.

Therefore, sponsorship spending in international football appears to be outpacing traditional marketing activities. This notion has fueled a debate about which is the biggest sporting event: the FIFA World Cup, or the Olympics? So far the FIFA World Cup is seen as being larger than the Olympics. For example, as Sterken (2005:2) notes, the FIFA World Cup “attracts about 2 to 3 million spectators in its current form (the German 2006 committee sold 2.2 million tickets in February 2005), while the Summer Olympic Games in Athens 2004 attracted about 2.5 million interested people to its venues.” However, supporters of this notion often based their claims not on ticket sales but mainly on two other issues, (a) the size of the global television audience and (b) the amount of sponsorship investment involved.

James et al. (2006) indicate that the global audience for the 2002 Korea Japan World Cup was considered to be about 28·8 billion. The calculation is based on a Chinese model based on the number of times a TV set was switched on for the games and not the number of people who watched the games on television. A report published by Telegraph UK (2006/6/9) projected that “the 2006 World Cup in Germany would generate huge profits
surpassing the £636m generated in the 2002 Korea Japan World Cup.” The article further projected that the event would attract a “global television audience of 30 billion, around seven times that of the Olympics.” Sterken (2005: 2) examined the role of broadcasting and sponsorship in financing a FIFA World Cup and noted that “it has increased over the years covering about 70 per cent of the current operational costs.” Dolles and Söderman (2008) argue that the economic power of sports sponsorship has come about as a result of increased development in media technology.

According to Amis and Cornwell (2005), the 2006 German World Cup sponsorship fees cost each of the 15 sponsors that were awarded the contracts US$40 million. The Telegraph (2006/9/6) recorded the total sponsorship figures at about “€600m” and “thought [the amount] to be higher than the sponsorship fees for the last World Cup [2002 Korea-Japan] and Euro 2004 put together.” Transnational corporations regard sports events like the FIFA World as a perfect occasion for launching genuine global marketing campaigns. As a result FIFA has established a win-win economic relationship with multinational-corporations and the media industry. What this relationship really entails is that FIFA is responsible for the organization of the World Cup (i.e. the teams, the rules of the game, the spectators and the business side), and sponsorship investment provides FIFA with the financial muscle to organize and market the event in different parts of the world. The official sponsors of the World Cup are made up from an impressive group of international companies, which includes some of the world’s best-known brand names.

The 2006 German World Cup had 15 official sponsors and six national sponsors. However, FIFA was heavily criticized for having too many sponsors and for over-commercializing the event. For sponsors, advertising clutter was the main concern during the 2006 World Cup. As a result, FIFA announced that it would introduce measures in the future to correct the situation. According to a BBC report (2004/20/11) in an effort to protect the interest of its partners, FIFA moved swiftly to re-organize the sponsorship portfolio so as to reduce clutter and optimize the value for its sponsors.
As a result, the changes took effect during the 2010 South Africa World Cup and they included reducing the number of official partners (global corporations) from 15 to 6. In addition, the official sponsors were guaranteed exclusive rights to all FIFA events up to the 2014 Brazil World Cup. Furthermore, the World Cup in South Africa had four national partners. Wilson (2004/30/11) confirms that six new sponsorship categories were created in the form of “apparel and sports equipment, digital life, financial services, automotive, soft drinks and alcoholic drinks.” In addition, after the 2002 Korea Japan World Cup, FIFA decided to abandon the static advertising boards at the games in favor of the electronic rotating advertising boards. The move was designed to guarantee television exposure across the globe for sponsors participating in future World Cup.
events. Therefore, as official FIFA sponsors, brands would share the premium perimeter advertising positions at all the World Cup venues.

However the changes introduced by FIFA came at a huge price for sponsors. This is clear considering the fact that, with the reduction of number of sponsors, FIFA raised the sponsorship fee. For example, given FIFA’s decision to abandon its partnership agreement with MasterCard in favor of its rival, Visa, it can be deduced that sponsorship deals are influenced by variety of factors such as the competitiveness of companies within a category, the size of a category, and the duration of the sponsorship agreement. In other words, a company willing to spend more than its competitors to be a FIFA commercial partner would most likely win the sponsorship race.

According to the FIFA website (www.FIFA.com/marketing), the sponsorship package for the commercial partners includes “comprehensive rights for all FIFA competitions, including the FIFA Women’s World Cup, the FIFA U-20 and U-17 World Cups for both female and male players, the FIFA Beach Soccer World Cup, the FIFA Interactive World Cup, the FIFA Futsal World Cup, the FIFA Confederations Cup, the FIFA Club World Cup (2011-2014) as well as two editions of the FIFA World Cup in 2010 South Africa and Brazil 2014.” In addition, the sponsors are also considered as active partners in the sense that they support the World Cup organization by supplying it with other technical material necessary for the game. These include footballs, referees’ equipment, office and audiovisual equipment, cars, stadium installations and other products and services.

For example, during the 2006 German World Cup, Phillips supported the event “through a broad range of activities, including the creation of giant public viewing screens in all 12 host cities, the provision of 10,000 Flat TVs for use in media, broadcasting and the official hospitality villages located in each host city, and the supply of Heart Start, Philips’ innovative, easy to use defibrillator, at selected match venues. This is in addition to the provision of stadium lighting in eight of the 12 sites, the deployment of a Philips RFID solution in all 3.2 million 2006 FIFA World Cup tickets to
significantly enhance security and the provision of Philips Vidi-walls inside selected stadia” (United Arab Emirates 2006/8/6).

In addition, Toshiba’s sponsorship agreement included “the provision of IT-related products such as computers, PC servers, and so forth, as well as semiconductors [and also included] consulting on modification of the official FIFA World Cup™ web site” (ibid).

On the other hand, Hyundai, the Korean based car manufacturer, was awarded the sponsorship to supply a “fleet of approximately 1,000 VIP vehicles and numerous buses... reserved for the 32 participating teams” (Stein 2006/6/2). On the field of play, Adidas soccer balls were used “at every match” as it returned as the game’s “official match ball supplier (a position it has held since 1970). In addition, on July 6, the Adidas Golden Ball, the official tournament trophy, was awarded to the competition’s most valuable player” (Scott 2006/10/9).

Mutual respect and non-interference in each other’s affairs are two main principles that bind relations between FIFA and its commercial partners together. In this regard, corporations are barred from interfering in the administration of the game or in the rules by which it is played. On the other hand, FIFA has an obligation to expand the media and consumer interest in game. Tropido (2001) argues that through FIFA sponsorship, companies are able to communicate their message to a global audience. Therefore, FIFA is responsible for ensuring that corporations are exposed to a wider and diverse audience.

According to Polonsky et al (1996) corporations consider the FIFA World Cup to be a significant platform for sponsorship, mainly because the event strategically exposes them to two crucial markets, “the participants” and “the spectators.” Cliffe and Motion (2005) add a third market dimension, referred to as the “external audience,” only accessible through the media.

Wolfea et al (2002:12) argue that “parallel symbiotic relationships of sport and sponsorship, and sport and the media” form the cornerstone of relations between FIFA and its partners. Thus, during the 2006 German World Cup, FIFA managed to raise “€1.9bn (£1.3bn) in marketing revenues” (Telegraph 2006/9/6). This includes €1.08bn for the sale of TV rights and €120m to cover new media rights, an overall 34 percent
increase on the sums paid to broadcast the 2002 tournament” (ibid). On the other hand, the Olympics are no different either, as corporations also invest a lot of money through sponsorship. A report by CBS (2008/08/08) prior to the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games, noted that official sponsorship revenue estimations were set in the range of “US$281.49 million.” According to the Star Publication (2007/8/9) the “revenue from local sponsorship [was] expected to be at least double that of the Sydney or Athens Olympics, reported to reach US$1.5 billion, due to bidding competitions and with billions more spent on advertising and promotional campaigns.”

*Sponsorship benefits*

Irwin and Sutton, (1994) and Cornwell (1995) view brand awareness and brand image as two primary reasons behind sponsorship. Cliffe and Motion (2005) confirm that sponsorship is used as a strategy for imaging and raising brand equity. Some studies assert that motive for the strategy is to position the sponsoring company as more important or above its competitors (Aaker and Joachimsthaler 2000; Huang et al. 2008; Cornwell et al. 2001). The idea is based on the notion that sponsorship offers companies an economic advantage in terms of brand awareness, imaging, product marketing and customer loyalty. Therefore, it could be argued that by linking the event experience to the brand using sponsorship as the medium, corporations could leverage brand experiences that would not otherwise be possible. Keller (1993) has coined the concept of “brand knowledge” to explain how companies utilize sponsorship as a medium to increase brand awareness and enhance their brand’s image.

This means that companies like Emirates Airlines or Hyundai motors, for example, which generally deal with aviation and transportation respectively in their daily business activities, are also involved in the football business through the sponsorship medium. They use football’s popularity to promote and familiarize consumers with their brands. Abrahamsson et al (2003: 3) argues that sponsorship seeks to “achieve favorable publicity for a company,” while Bennet (1999) considers sponsorship as a strategy designed to assist companies promote their brands within a certain target audience by taking part or supporting an activity not directly related to their normal business.
Walliser (2003: 4) examines public opinion about sponsorship and argues that, although different methods of analysis are used depending on the sponsorship area (e.g. sport vs. art, environment), the activity sponsored (e.g. athletics vs. football) and the industry/ products of the sponsor company, the popular view is that “generally sponsors are more easily accepted in association with sporting events than with arts or social causes.” Fan and Pfitzenmaier (2002: 2) conducted an internet-based survey about event sponsorship in China and their study showed that a large number of respondents believe that sponsorship gives international brands a “viable alternative” to the current cluttered mass media. Furthermore, they regard it as a good corporate strategy for branding and marketing communication. Most significantly, their research highlighted that fact that sponsoring sports events was found to be particularly “effective in reaching the opinion leaders and innovators, and establishing favorable links between an audience and a sponsor’s brand image.”

Fareelly et al. (2006) argue that sponsorship value can be derived from a variety of sources. These include the naming rights, official suppliers, and sponsoring of athletes through endorsements. At the same time, external factors such as the event’s geographical reach influence the benefits of sponsorship. It could be argued that sponsors are critical about the issue of audience size when deciding on sponsorship deals. This argument is based on the notion that audience size reflects the market size and the potential value or benefit to the sponsor. Therefore, the strength and duration of the sponsorship alliance depends on the ability to extract benefit from the partnership. For FIFA, revenue or value comes in the form of sponsorship fees and television rights for its events.

However, determining value or benefit for sponsors in the sponsorship relationship is often a complex process. Thompson and Speed (2000) argue that the process of building a strong and sustainable relationship between the brand and the customer is a long and expensive one. In other words, it may take a long time for customers to identify with a certain brand and therefore an activation effort on the part of companies is essential for any success. Moreover, the problem of determining the exact amount of sponsorship value is compounded by the fact that value in this regard is both tangible and intangible.
Calderon-Martinez et al. (2005) view the former as referring to the points of target audience rates (see also Miyazaki and Morgan 2001; Farrell and Frame, 1997) and the latter includes consumer goodwill. Walter et al (2001) have used the terms “indirect” and “generative” to describe the tangible and intangible nature of sponsorship value. Cornwell (1995) and Meenaghan (1991) have suggested that sponsorship value or benefit can be quantified through the event signage in terms of exposure or brand awareness.

This view appears to form the basis behind sponsorship deals, especially mega-events sponsorships. However, Koschler and Merz (1995) appear to disagree with that notion and have claimed that the use of sponsorship is not effective in increasing brand awareness if it is applied on its own. In order to intensify the impact, Crimmins and Horn (1996) have suggested that sponsorship should be used with other traditional advertising techniques. This, it is thought, will begin to assist the audience to formulate an association between the brand and the event (Lardinoit 1998; 1999; Eilander 1992; Du Plessis 1997; Quester & Thompson 2001). Therefore, a broader approach to sponsorship should be adopted in order to maximize the benefit.

Farrelly et al. (2006) assert the idea that exposure as the main criteria for determining sponsorship value has been replaced by the concept of strategic branding. Their study shows that sponsors who used to put the emphasis on exposure and awareness are now realizing that that exposure constitutes a relatively small and less important part of sponsorship value. Moreover, some other sponsors they interviewed argued that too much exposure might cause them to be side-tracked and lose focus in relation to the value they desired from the sponsorship. For example, as one sponsor noted, with regards to the issue of exposure emanating from naming rights, sponsors want less “logo ubiquity” and more “brand meaning.” Sponsors believe that they are “substituting presence with purpose and this means logo only where it really adds something to the brand, where we can use it and other sponsorship marketing activity to resonate with consumers on a meaningful level” (Farrelly et al. 2006: 1022).
The Ambush Marketing Strategy

Sandler and Shani (1989) assert that the economic input geared towards sports mega-events has witnessed huge growth. In fact, sports properties have come to rely heavily on sponsorship resources. At the same time, mega sports events are in turn significant for the marketing position of multinational corporations. The main motive is to gain access to a diverse global audience. However, not all corporations can be sponsors of the same event. Sports organizations control who joins and who does not. The main criterion or requirement is the economic value of the sponsorship, sold to the highest bidder. Therefore, the situation has caused the reduction of the number of sponsors per event. However, that has subsequently caused an escalation in sponsorship fees. Now the question is, what happens to non-sponsors who wish to benefit from the event? This section suggests that “ambush marketing” is increasingly growing as an alternative to legitimate sponsorship.

Sandler and Shani (1989) and Meenaghan (1996) consider the increase in sponsorship costs as having an impact on the rise of ambush marketing. The authors argue that non-event sponsors adopt creative ways to market their brands in the absence of sponsorship deals. Hoek and Gendall (2002:2191) state that “ambush marketing has emerged as an unintended consequence of the emphasis on clearer financial returns.” Corporations that have been excluded in the sponsorship deal have sought to cause confusion about the identity of the true event sponsor (Bean, 1995). In fact, as some studies suggest, cases of ambush marketing are well thought out before the event (Meenaghan 1994; 1996; Sandler and Shani 1989, 1998). The intention is to limit the event sponsor’s ability to fully benefit from its sponsorship. However, legitimate event sponsors and sports organizations still go to great lengths to protect their sponsorship partnerships by introducing measures to curb the escalation of ambushing marketing in their events.
Defining Ambush Marketing: The Distinction between the 'Narrow' and the 'Broader' approach

There is a lot of ambiguity surrounding the definition of ambush marketing. Meenaghan (1996) suggest that a lot has changed regarding our understanding of ambush marketing because what was once considered ambush marketing is now often regarded as normal marketing practice. Moreover, the problem is also compounded by the fact that in most cases ambush marketing and guerrilla marketing are believed to mean the same thing. However, the latter is mostly recognized as a legitimate form of marketing in a business climate. Medcalf (2005:24) views guerrilla marketing as “the practice of using public spaces and unsponsored events to build brand awareness or encourage trial,” in other words, targeting situations where crowds gather for an activity and introducing a product or service to them. On the other hand, as Meenaghan (1998:306) asserts, ambush marketing occurs when “another company, often a competitor of the official sponsor, attempts to deflect the audience’s attention to itself and away from the sponsor.” Medcalf (2005:24) define ambush marketing as a strategy “to reach the consumer with a brand, by leveraging another brand’s event or opportunity without approval.”

The Australian Government (Ambush Marketing Legislation Review: 2007:13) defines ambush marketing as a term “used to describe a wide range of marketing activities by which a business seeks to associate its name, logos, products or services with an event for which it is not a sponsor.” Schmitz (2005:205) argues that the definition of ambush marketing has both a “narrow and broader application.” Therefore, it is important to make a distinction between the narrow and broader application of ambush marketing. Kendall and Metz (2003) explain that “the narrow approach to ambush marketing places emphasis on the aim or intention of the ambusher.” The primary criterion in this regard is the deliberate intention to confuse the public by associating the non-sponsor's brand or product with a particular event. In other words, the test is whether the association (ambusher) has the ability to weaken the marketing opportunity of the official sponsors. The narrow application of ambush marketing usually gives rise to a legal course of action on the grounds of infringement of intellectual property and/or trade rights against the perpetrator.
Business-line (2008/8/5), a specialized marketing publication, concurs that ambush marketing “in the sports events context, is the ‘intentional’ effort by a company or brand to weaken or ambush its competitor’s official sponsorship of the event through a ‘planned’ campaign to suggest (but not explicitly state) a commercial association with the event.” Also in the same context, Sandler and Shani (1989) describes ambush marketing as an action carrying the intention to directly align or associate the non-sponsor with an event organized by others. The emphasis is placed on the intention to cause confusion amongst customers by directly associating with the event sponsored by other companies. Moreover, the action must have the potential to cause economic loss for the official sponsor and profit to the ambusher. McKelvey (1994:18) refers to it as “an ‘intentional effort’ to weaken or ambush the promotional campaign of a competitor.”

Some suggestions have been presented to explain the broader application of ambush marketing. Skildum-Reid (2006: 12) considers “activities that capture, or leverage off, the goodwill surrounding an event” as part of ambush marketing. In a broader context, the concept may even include conduct that expressly denies or revokes association with a particular sponsor. In other words, activities that do not have any express or implied misrepresentation may also be classified as ambush marketing. Ambushing in this instance incorporates “efforts that are not aimed specifically at a competitor, but whose end result does, in fact, impact official sponsorships” (McKelvey 1994:18). Payne (1998) argues that ambush marketing instances are not only unfair to the official sponsors, but are also unfair to the event organizers, mainly because the fruits of the organized event do not benefit those who should benefit, but are unfairly and unlawfully enjoyed by a third party.

On the other hand, Sebel and Gyngell (1999:691) argue that ambush marketing, in the broader context, “includes many activities that do not infringe any intellectual property rights or make any misrepresentation as to sponsorship.” Moreover, the activities may have come about as a result of rights that arose out of a legitimate and binding commercial contract such as a television program sponsorship deal. Nonetheless, Shani and Sandler (1998) argue that realistically, it is not expected that non-event sponsors will consider sponsorship different from other forms of marketing and promotion within a
competitive business environment. This view is also shared by Hoek and Gendall (2002:72) who suggest that “considerable vagueness surrounds the concept of ambush marketing” and that “most discussions around ambush marketing include what are arguably known as normal competitive practices.”

Farrelly et al (2005) argues that there is still a lot of uncertainty regarding what constitutes ambush marketing and what does not. In fact, the term as is applied, covers a wide range of “sins.” The authors believe that the complex nature of sponsorship agreements and the layering of sport-related assets are some of the factors contributing the confusion surrounding ambush marketing. For example, beside the main event, some brands may sponsor athletes, teams, a particular sport, events within the main event, and broadcast programs. This complexity makes the sponsor's task of “extracting value decidedly more difficult” (Farrelly et al. 2005: 1). In addition, as McKelvey (1994: 18) argues, the ambush marketing concept may include tactics that are “wholly legal within the parameters of current advertising law, but have the effect of weakening a sport branded name or concept through the advertising message” Therefore, the ambiguity surrounding what really constitutes ambush marketing and what doesn’t, illustrates two things, (a) that ambushers employ creative tactics, and (b) that the sponsorship landscape may be cluttered. In the end, the situation results in a great deal of difficulty in predicting ambush marketing tactics and also in guarding against them.

Effects of Ambush Marketing: Creating confusion about the identity of the event official sponsor.

Seguin et al (2005:1) state that “ambush marketing diminishes the value of sports properties and increases the clutter surrounding sports events.” In fact, in the long run, ambush marketing practices can cause serious harm to the sports industry. Meenaghan (1998:306) asserts that one of the effects of ambush marketing is that it can “simultaneously reduce the effectiveness of the sponsor’s communications while undermining the quality and value of sponsorship opportunity being sold by the event owner.” Tripoldi and Sutherland (2000) suggest that ambush marketing may cause customers to have a change of heart in terms of their purchasing intentions and attitude.
However, Shani and Sandler (1998), like Bean (1995), have argued to the contrary. They maintain that ambush marketing does not have a significant impact on the behavior of consumers. Despite these contradictory views, the issue of ambush marketing continues to be a cause of concern for sports properties and sponsors alike.

According to FIFA.com (2009/5/5) about “258 ambush marketing cases across 39 countries were reported” during the 1994 World Cup. However, it was not until the 1998 France World Cup that the problem first became a major concern. As stated on FIFA’s website, about “773 infringements of registered marks were discovered in 47 countries.” The problem escalated during the 2002 Korea Japan World Cup where 1,884 cases were recorded across 94 countries. The numbers continued to rise as 3,300 rights infringements were recorded in 84 countries during the 2006 German World Cup. It will be interesting to see how many ambush marketing incidences were recorded for the 2010 South Africa World Cup as the report dealing with this issue has not been made public yet.

Hoek et al (2001:1) confirms Townley et al’s (1998) assertion that victims of ambush marketing have “limited legal remedies available” to them. The Australian Government (2007: 18) states that “given the perceived limitations and inadequacies of existing trade practices and intellectual property laws, one strategy has been to deal with ambush marketing through specific legislation, including existing and proposed legislation internationally.” Regarding the same question, Hoek et al (2001: 1) considers O’Sullivan and Murphy’s (1998) recommendation that “instead of relying on legal protection, sponsors need to develop an ethical framework that they, event owners, and eventually the public can use to evaluate the behavior of competing organizations.”

In other words, if ambush marketing is seen as a problem with little legal recourse available for victims, ambushers need to be exposed and held commercially accountable through other means. As a result, there has been an increase in co-operation by all stakeholders (sponsors, event organizers and government) to combat the problem. For example, Hoek and Gendall (2002:2192) hold that sport properties have to “implement stricter contracts that ensure official sponsors have first right of refusal to media opportunities.” Although this action only relates to conflict involving the media, it also
reflects the seriousness attached to ambush marketing by both FIFA and IOC. In addition, these sports organizations often compel host nations to introduce legislation making ambush marketing unlawful.

For example, for the 2006 German World Cup, FIFA used contract law to protect its interests and those of its partners. However, as Dentlinger (2008/5/11) notes, during the 2010 South Africa World Cup, host cities introduced a bylaw prohibiting public advertising from the period starting right after the final draw of the World Cup in December 2009 up to the final of the 2010 World Cup. The bylaw stated that public advertising would be outlawed “within a 1km radius from the stadium, 100m from a fan park or any place visible from a public road within a 2km perimeter of the stadium or the venue of the draw.” Breaking the bylaw was declared a criminal offence punishable by jail.

The Economist (2006:72) revealed that for the 2006 German World Cup, tickets were considered as a “revocable licenses between the event venue and the spectator – and the terms and conditions (which no fan ever reads) ban such things as ticket give-aways or attending en masse in clothing emblazoned with unauthorized logos.” As a result, “On February 8th [FIFA] trumpeted that it had won an injunction against Burger King Israel, barring it from holding a contest to give away tickets and travel packages to the World Cup in Germany.” In this case, McDonald was the official sponsor with exclusive rights to run promotions with tickets and other World Cup trademarks. Hargrave-Silk et al. (2004: 5) recall that during the 2002 Korea Japan World Cup, Adidas took issue with its rival sports brand Nike Inc. The conflict arose when Nike appeared to have copied the Adidas 2002 World Cup advertising campaign that showed a giant ball sitting on top of a crushed car. The story made international headlines “and saw Tokyo’s police file charges with the prosecutor’s office against Saatchi & Saatchi Co. PLC, which developed the campaign [for Nike]” Hargrave-Silk et al (2004:5).
Categories of Ambush Marketing: Summary of the most recognized instances of ambush marketing

(a) Purchase and use of television coverage sponsorship

Payne (1998) has found many studies suggesting that the issue of broadcasting rights could be viewed as a sub-category of ambush marketing. In this case, the ambusher purchases the sponsorship of sporting event broadcasts rather than the sponsorship of the actual event. This is done as a means to undermine the sporting contest sponsor that paid huge amounts to be associated with the event. Therefore ambushers in this regard, spend far less to be broadcast compared to the amount paid for sponsoring the event. On the other hand, concerned about high production costs, broadcasters start to offer broadcasting rights packages that includes advertising and brand recognition throughout the program. For example, during the 2008 Beijing Olympics, a Chinese company called “Li Ning [had] a deal to provide clothing and shoes to the sportscasters of Chinese Central Television, which had exclusive rights to the Games in the mainland” (Balfour 2008: 54). However, the official sponsor for the apparel products related to the games was Nike.

(b) Airing of television commercials during the sponsored events

This type of ambush marketing could be perceived as less devastating than the broadcast sponsorship technique described above. However, it carries enough weight to cause a negative impact on the official sponsor. Like most cases of ambush marketing, the consumer watching the event on television is exposed to conflicting messages to the detriment of the official sponsors. Hoek (1997) and Meenaghan (1998) assert that airing of logos and images of a non-event sponsor on television when the event in question is in progress suggests an association between the ambush advertiser and the event.

In other words, the basis for criticism lies in the nature of content in terms of similarities to the images of the contracted sponsor. Sandler and Shani, (1989) and O’Sullivan and Murphy (1998) confirm that “companies that advertise or run promotions during a competitor’s sponsorship are considered ambushers, particularly if they use
media spots during broadcasts of the sponsored event.” For example, according to Marketing Week (2005: 28), during the World Cup in Japan and Korea, Nike “worked hard to undermine Adidas’s 20m pound sponsorship of the event with its high-profile Secret Tournament advertising campaign. An OMD Snapshots poll showed that 22 per cent of UK consumers thought Nike was the official sponsor, compared with the 19 per cent who knew it was Adidas.”

(c) Sponsorship of individual teams or athletes

Meenaghan (1996) argues that aspects of ambush marketing include sponsoring a team or an individual athlete taking part in an event sponsored by competitors. The idea is to avoid paying inflated event sponsorship fees but yet maintain a significant association with the event. In this regard, world champions have become a sought after commodity. Athletes and national teams provide a commercial passage into the event. In this particular case, teams or individuals with international or popular appeal are used by non-event sponsors to overshadow the sponsorship of competitors. Therefore, consumers are led to believe falsely that the sponsor of their favorite or person is also the sponsor of the event. This is by far the most popular form of ambush marketing. At the same time, it is also the most problematic to control. This is most apparent in football where successful teams and athletes have long-term contracts with non-official partners of the FIFA World Cup.

(d) Promotional advertising or activities at the event

Meenaghan (1998) states that the “technique of ambush marketing involves the use of promotional advertising or marketing collateral at an event by non-sponsors.” For example, non-official sponsors may give tickets as give-aways or run competitions involving winning of tickets. Other techniques include flying of company banners or flags or passing out flyers outside the event venue within a reasonable distance. The Financial Times (2002/3/4) wrote that “a state run Korean tobacco [company], scared by falling domestic market share, produced 10m packs of special edition "World Cup" cigarettes to be sold at tourist hotspots and [2002 Korea Japan World Cup] venues.”
Subsequently FIFA took legal action against the company in order to protect the interests of its commercial partners.

(e) ‘Congratulatory and salutatory messages’

The ambusher in this regard concerns itself more with affiliation of a team or the host nation rather than sponsorship per se. In other words, this type of ambushing marketing involves companies that opportunistically capitalize on what they deem as favorable timing for nationalistic advertising surrounding the national expressions of the event. They purport to create congratulatory messages that seem to associate themselves with a particular event. Particularly their messages relate to wishing a particular team or the host nation good luck on its performance or success in hosting that particular event.

The ambiguity of the ambush marketing concept has led to a situation whereby non-event sponsors employ sophisticated techniques to gain access in the sponsorship market. One example that comes to mind is the strategy used by bigger brands where they would buy other smaller brands that holds a competitive edge over their (bigger brands) main rivals. For example, as Pfannere (2010/6/6) has noted, in 2007 Nike acquired Umbro and signed a €34 million a year deal with the England national team. The acquisition of Umbro by Nike was seen as part of the corporation's strategic plan to break Adidas dominance in Europe. In addition to sponsoring England, Pfannere confirms, Nike went further by pushing Adidas out of its sponsorship of the national team of France when it concluded a seven year deal worth €40 million per year with the French soccer federation commencing with the 2014 Brazil World Cup. The deal is believed to have more than four times greater than the value of France’s previous sponsorship by Adidas.

However, the big spending by major brands had not deterred other smaller sports brands from marketing in the World Cup extravaganza. During the 2006 German World Cup, Puma sponsored all five participating African teams and Italy, the eventual 2006 World Cup champions. Moreover, other less known brands were left to sponsor national teams with a lesser football pedigree such as was the case with a Spanish company called Joma, which acquired the sponsorship right for the Honduras national team, and an
American company called Brooks, which sponsored the Chilean national team. However, the greatest surprise was the sponsorship of the North Korea team by the Italian sports equipment provider, Legea. The deal was announced few months before the start of the 2010 South Africa World Cup and the brand hoped to market its product on a global scale. Therefore, what these examples really indicate is that brands with less financial capabilities will continue to avoid paying huge sums to sports organizations for participating in their events by employing ambush tactics. In the end, the more global sports events like the FIFA World Cup and the Olympics become an exclusive affair only reserved for a few selected high spending multinationals, the more complicated the issue of ambush marketing could become.

Conclusion

Sports mega-events generate a global media audience that guarantees sponsors marketing opportunities on a wider scale. Corporate sponsors consider events like the FIFA World Cup as a perfect platform to launch new products and to increase sales volumes. As this thesis has highlighted, image and brand awareness are two main driving factors behind sponsorship for mega-events. However, the popularity of these events among sports fans and the market in general has caused the fees required to be a sponsor to escalate. This has resulted in bidding wars between corporations that are interested in associating their brands with these events. As noted through this thesis, sports mega-events exist within a context of capitalism where multinational brands dominate the sports sponsorship market. Therefore the profit motives of international sports organizations and sponsors alike influence the hike in sponsorship fees. This trend in turn is designed to exclude non-sponsors from the marketing opportunities linked to sports mega-events. As a result, corporations that cannot afford sponsorship fees have frequently resorted to ambush marketing to achieve their marketing objectives.

However, there is uncertainty about what constitutes ambush marketing and what does not. This loophole has caused a surge in ambush marketing cases as non-sponsors employ creative means to bypass the sanctions against the technique. Therefore, unless stakeholders and law markers establish strict rules or reach consensus about ambush
marketing, the more the problem will persist, especially since more nations from developing countries are bidding to host these events. Their economies consist of large numbers informal traders and street vendors that are also a prominent feature of sports events. Their activities are unregulated and the states lack the organizational capacity to ensure that they remain within the legal frameworks designed to protect the interests of the official sponsors. Therefore, how sports organization in future deal with informal traders and street vendors is crucial for limiting the scope of ambush marketing.
Chapter 5

Impact of Mega-events on Tourism: A collaboration and network system approach

Introduction

First and foremost, it is imperative to appreciate the fact that hosting the 2002 Japan-Korea World Cup helped a great deal to raise the level of interest in the game of football in Japan in terms of business, the media and the public. Secondly, we need to admit that the enthusiasm for football inherited from the 2002 Korea-Japan World Cup had been increased by the huge interest in the progress of the national teams in international competitions and the increase in the number of players from other countries playing their football in the European leagues. Thirdly, we recognize from the onset that South Africa learned great lessons from the experience of the 2002 Japan-Korea World Cup and the 2006 German World Cup in terms of organizing and marketing the 2010 South Africa World Cup. Before the start of the 2010 South Africa World Cup, the host nation invested heavily in infrastructure development and marketing for the event. From the beginning of the organization process, projections for the 2010 World Cup were looking healthy with officials predicting that 500,000 people would visit South Africa for the World Cup and would stay an average of 15 days.

This Chapter begins from the hypothesis that collaboration and network systems between the South African Tourism office in Japan and the Japan Association of Travel Agents was a critical factor in marketing South Africa as a destination and also for promoting the 2010 South Africa World Cup in Japan. The research questions for this chapter focus on three specific issues: (a) What obstacles or conflicts were identified as having a negative impact on increasing tourism volumes from Japan to South Africa and what steps were taken to address those problems? (b) What were the promotion and marketing initiatives that South African Tourism developed to promote tourism in Japan? (c) Did the measures introduced produce any positive results?

In an attempt to answer some of these questions, the first part of this chapter consists of a review of the literature on the impact of sports mega-events on tourism. The
second part is an overview of the concepts of collaboration and networks prominent in tourism for mega-events. The third part is a case study of the South African Tourism branch office in Japan, and how it used collaboration and networks to attract potential tourism for the 2010 World Cup event and beyond. The discussion will conclude by summarizing the findings of the investigation.

**Sports Tourism; Destination Marketing and Imaging**

According to Daniels (2006: 333), sports tourism “has received increasing attention in recent years as an economic development strategy” (citing Crompton 1999; Daniels, Norman and Henry 2004; Delpy 1998; Gelan, 2003; Higham and Hinch 2002; and Lee and Taylor, 2005).” According to Higham and Hinch (2001), a host of publications on tourism and events have addressed the issues of sports mega-events’ capacity to generate tourism (Getz, 1991; Hall, 1992; Williams, Hainsworth, and Dossa, 1995). On the other hand, Getz (2008) points to Deery, Jago, and Fredline (2004), who have posed the question of whether sport tourism and event tourism are the same thing. Their conceptualization considers sport tourism and event tourism as sub-categories of tourism. However, they also indicate that sports tourism lies within the nexus of event tourism and sports. Getz (2008:406) argues that, from a tourism industry perspective, events “are highly valued as attractions, catalysts, animators, place marketers, and image-makers.” Further, “conventions are considered business travel and participation [in] sport events or festivals are part of leisure travel.” Burbank (2002:180) states that cities in particular “have come to emphasize policies that promote urban tourism [and] these policies typically include the development of convention centers, large hotels, restaurants, entertainment facilities, and shopping malls.”

Thus, international tourism has witness the rise of international events as an important sector for global tourism. Horne and Menzereiter (2004) note that many countries are influenced by national branding and marketing as key factors pushing them towards hosting sports mega-events. The authors refer to Gibson (1998) who asserts that tourism destinations have strategically positioned hosting mega-events for marketing development strategies. Accordingly, potential tourism volumes, huge sponsorship
investment, global media coverage and the showcase effect influence this growing pattern of mega-events strategies. As Lee and Taylor (2005) argue, mega-events are also seen as a useful means to market products globally, create business opportunities, and instill a sense of pride and dignity among the local people. Daniels (2006:332) adds that, “public and private stakeholders are interested in adding the brand element of sport to their destination marketing profile as they view it as a means of enhancing their local economies.”

Sports mega-events provide the host nation with an opportunity to showcase its cultural dynamism, economic capability, political will and tourism brand. They appear to have developed into an “important element in the orientation of nations to international or global society” (Horne and Manzenreiter, 2006:1). Yuen (2008:29) remarks that leisure, tourism, entertainment and the arts have become a prominent feature of globalization as cities “compete to get noticed.” This notion is compounded by that fact that mega-events attract a lot of media attention, and that has become a significant feature of the events. Black and Westhuizen (2004:1208) assert that host nations hope to attract tourists and investors through media by showcasing their distinctive culture, technical and managerial sophistication, growing modernity and quality of life” in a highly stylized and commoditized form.

The recent trends in organization of sports mega-events are also highlighted by the special emphasis placed on the opening and closing ceremonies by event planners. These two particular kinds of events have developed into the most important stages of the entire process. The global media attention on the two ceremonies has resulted in organizers spending huge resources on improving the artistic and the audio-visual production value of the events. For example, during the 2008 Beijing Olympics, China hired the Oscar-winning Hollywood director and producer, Steven Speilberg, as the “artistic advisor” to the event ‘ to assist in audio-visual production. However, their relationship soon came to an end following Spielberg’s withdrawal from his position, citing China’s poor foreign policy and human right record. A BBC report (2008/13/2) reported that Spielberg had “accused China of not doing enough to pressure Sudan to end the ‘continuing human
suffering’ in the troubled western Darfur region.” However, the trend of adding a bit of Hollywood to sports mega-events planning is expected to increase.

Some authors’ studies have suggested that mega-events are employed by cities or bidding nations as a new strategy to rejuvenate their economy and stimulate urban growth. According to Yuen (2008:29), with the impact of “globalization, sports development is increasingly being regarded as a part of the city’s cultural and leisure capital to reinforce place promotion and consumption-based economic development.” Chalkley and Essex (2004: 201) argue that recently “in a period of deindustrialization, economic restructuring and globalization, the promotion of urban spectacle or mega-events has become a key strategy by which urban areas justify significant projects of renewal and regeneration, advertise their status and personality and thus, attract new inward investment and modernize their economies.” This way, host nations are able to expand and diversify their tourism product while at the same time breaking into new tourism markets.

Coccosis and Tsartas (2001:172), argues that the global trend towards the growth of these events is “mainly due to the sharp increase in demand for specialized tourist products.” A Korean tourism website (Korea.net 2006/15/6) wrote that after staging the 2002 FIFA World Cup, the country appears to have established a niche market related to the World Cup tourism in terms of fan parks and public cheering organized during the games. The street-cheering phenomenon has been successfully converted into a popular tourism attraction. A report by the Korean government website said that during the 2006 German World Cup, the Korean Tourism Organization successfully “sold an outdoor cheering tour program to visitors from Malaysia, Canada and the United States” (Korea.net 2006/15/6).

According to the report, many of the clients were young Koreans residing in those countries who wanted to experience the atmosphere of street cheering “in their parents’ homeland.” The cheering locations included public and open places such as the city streets, parks and shopping malls. In this way, the Red Devils (the official national football fan club) was used as a tourism symbol of Korea. The 2010 South Africa World
Cup emulated the 2002 Korea Japan World Cup and the 2006 German World by creating public viewing experiences through fan parks across all the host cities. Maennig (2007:15) notes that the “value of an improved perception [of the nation] as well as the feel-good effects experienced by the people” when the events takes place is huge.

**Collaboration and Network Theory**

Muzaffer and Fesenmaier (1993:217) refers to Selin’s (1993) argument that “interest in collaborative alliance as a management strategy and as an object of scientific inquiry is on the rise in the tourism field.” Bhat and Smilne (2008: 1132) echo the same view, maintaining that issues of “collaboration and partnership have come to the forefront of tourism research.” According to March and Wilkinson (2008:1), “the benefits of collaboration in tourism have been investigated for two decades.” Bhat and Smilne (2008:1131) argue that state interest in collaboration and network systems appears to be inspired by the view that they serve as a “useful conceptual framework for understanding the collaborative phenomenon in the tourism domain.” Selin (1993: 222) asserts that “several recent journal issues and conference have been devoted to this theme.”

But the question is how can these terms be understood in relation to tourism without getting trapped in a web of definitions? Jamal and Getz (1995) offer some suggestions to overcome this problem by pointing out that, “the terms ‘co-operation’ and ‘collaboration’ are typically used synonymously.” Co-operation, which literally means “working together towards some end” does not “sufficiently capture several major dimensions that are felt to be critical to ‘collaboration.’” In particular, “the nature of collaboration as a necessary response to the complexity of the problem domains is felt to be underemphasized by the term ‘co-operation’” (Fyall and Garrod 2005:136). One may suggest that in this case, the complexity of the problem lies in the network systems within the collaboration framework. Bhat and Smiles (2008:1132) suggest that “network” is different from “networking.” As per their argument, “networking is about people making connections,” and therefore something which is “probably very much a part of what goes on in a network.”
This chapter adopts an approach of combining collaboration and network concepts under the same umbrella. The motive is to recognize the significance of “working together” as a core element in the shared interests within the relation. Therefore I apply Gray’s (1989:227) definition of collaboration in tourism terms as “a process of joint decision-making among key stakeholders of a problem domain about the future of that domain.” Similarly, I use Ndou’s (2005:1) definition of networks as a “complex systems of enterprises where each single enterprise realizes a small part of the total service or product, and contributes in increasing the total value delivered.” Öztürk (2009:589) argues that from a tourism perspective, stakeholders aim to reap some positive economic benefits accruing as a result of networking and collaboration (cf. Bramwell and Sharman, 1999; Selin and Chavez, 1995). In addition, Öztürk says that the need to create a competitive destination is the core common goal for tourism organizations, which encourages them to join together.

Salin (1993) asserts that the tourism sector applies the collaboration concept to adjust to the ever-changing tourism environment and to benefit from their linkage through making decisions collectively. March (2009:455) maintains that “attracting more tourists through collaborative effort” can benefit “not only the narrow financial objectives of tourism operators, but also the more diverse social objectives of the public sector.” Öztürk (2009: 589) argues that a lot of authors believe that tourism stakeholders are motivated by the notion that “collaboration results in a richer understanding and learning of issues, leading to more innovative activities” (cf. Camagni, 1991; Roberts and Bradley, 1991; Roome, 2001; and Kaufmann, 1999).

Collaboration and Network Systems in promoting South African Tourism

Trends in Japanese travel to South Africa: Background and Figures

The 2010 South African World Cup attracted a lot of overseas visitors traveling to watch the games and also enjoy the country’s tourism products. Although tourists from Europe and the United States of America make a huge contribution to the total number of visitors to South Africa, Japan has emerged as a significant and highly lucrative tourism
market for South Africa. In an interview, Bradley Brouwer, country manager for South African Tourism in Japan, said that in 2006 South Africa welcomed an “18 percent year-on-year increase in arrivals from Japan, making it the fastest growing source market in the Australasia region.” Corroborating Brouwer’s claim, figures released by Statistics South Africa for April 2006 showed that “arrivals from Japan grew by 24 percent year-on-year and in the first quarter of 2006, 14 percent over the first quarter of 2005” (Mlangeni 2006/16/11).

However, various factors around the world have had a negative impact on tourism volumes from Japan to South Africa. These factors include the global economic crisis of 2008 that resulted in massive job losses, companies filing for bankruptcies, and less tourists traveling. In addition, the crisis sparked concerns, mostly from the media, that many people would be unable to travel to South Africa for the 2010 FIFA World Cup games amid job losses and uncertainty surrounding the crisis. To highlight the impact of the crisis, figures released in 2008 indicated that the steady increase in tourism volumes from Japan encountered in the previous year had been declining.

Statistics South Africa (Stats SA) reported that the total number of travelers who visited South Africa during August 2008 “was down 6.2% year-on-year (y/y) to 2.084 million from the 2.221 million recorded in August 2007” (Business Times 2008/4/11). The report further said that the number of travelers from overseas showed a steady growth from 2004 to 2007, but dropped between 2007 and 2008. Data indicated that the UK, US, Germany, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Australia and Spain were the eight leading overseas markets for South African tourism (ibid). Regarding Asia, the Gauteng government report indicated that China and Japan had both dropped out of the top 10 markets in July. China showed a 23.8% drop, while Japan showed a 7.3% drop. Other Asian markets seem to have fared well with India showing an impressive 10.9% increase (http://www.gauteng.net/ 2008/27/11).

The Japan football market is believed to be expanding and the general interest in the game of football is also said to be on the rise. Some reports have gone further to claim that during the 2006 German World Cup, “a total of 70,000 Japanese traveled all the way
to Germany to support the Japanese national team” (*Japan Forum* 2009/16/8). Nonetheless, these figures are believed to have been exaggerated and thus unreliable. During the 2008 RCAPS symposium at Ritsumeikan Asia Pacific University, an event I organized as part of my action research project, Mr Toru Furusawa, the JATA representative, stated that about 30,000 Japanese traveled to Germany for the World Cup in 2006. He also went on record asserting that his organization (JATA) had planned to reach a target of 50,000 tourists from Japan to travel to South Africa for the 2010 FIFA World Cup event. He also revealed that South Africa had emerged to be one of the most interesting destinations for their market. Furthermore, he indicated that the number of tourists from Japan between 2005 and 2007 had grown steadily from 27,285 to 31,855 and therefore JATA had intended to increase that number as a result of South Africa hosting the 2010 World Cup. Figure 12 shows general trends in Japanese international departures and change in the travel patterns. This information is crucial in understanding the Japanese travel patterns to South Africa.

**Figure 12.** *Graph showing Japanese International Departures in general 1990-2006, (units in millions)*

The graph in figure 12 shows interesting changes in Japanese travel trends. In 1997 more than 16,000,000 Japanese traveled outside the country to various destinations matching the number of travelers in the previous year. However, in 1998 the number dropped significantly to 15,806,000 almost the same number as 1995 when only 15,298,000 departures were recorded. One of the main reasons cited for the change was the effect of the Asian financial crisis in 1997 that had a negative impact on tourism. Although the trend soon recovered with 17,819,000 departures recorded in 2000, the number could not be sustained the following year due to the effect of the 9/11 terror attack on the United States. The events in the USA proved to be significant independent variables that had a negative impact on outbound tourism in Japan with a total of 16,216,000 departures recorded in 2001, down from over 17,000,000 registered in 2000.

**Figure 13; Total Japanese Arrivals to South Africa, (units in thousands)**


The figures remained the same for 2002 and any hopes of recovery were dashed when the United States and its allies invaded Iraq in 2003. As a result, many Japanese were cautious about traveling abroad and that caused the number of departures to drop to a long time low of 13.296.000 about the same number as in 1994 (13.579.000). However, the figures increased drastically in 2004, reaching 16.831.000 and continued to rise in the subsequent years, reaching 17.535.000 departures in 2006.

Figure 13 shows the pattern of Japanese travelers to South Africa between 1998 and 2007. The trend of Japanese travel to South Africa appears to be consistent with the general trend in international departures witnessed by the country over past years. For example, the slump in the Japanese travel figures recorded in 2001 was also reflected by a decline in Japanese arrivals to South Africa during the same period. A total of 5.872 arrivals from Japan were reported for the year 2000, but in 2001 the figure dropped slightly to 5.787. The decline is attributed to the 9/11 terror attacks in the USA. However, the number increased in the following years with a total of 6.430 in 2002, climbing to 6.505 in 2003 and reaching 6.678 in 2004. Despite the slowdown in total tourism travel or departures by Japanese recorded in 2003 as a result of the Iraq war, the trend of Japanese travel to South Africa continued to rise without any deterrent. In 2007 the number reached 9.091, the highest ever achieved by South African Tourism.

**JATA South Africa working group focus on the 2010 South Africa World Cup event:**

**Building a tourism strategy for the Japanese market**

According to the Japanese Association of Travel Agents (JATA), business is the most common motive for travel to South Africa, followed by leisure and “other.” As a result of South Africa’s hosting of the 2010 FIFA World Cup event, the South African Tourism office in Japan and JATA formed a partnership in 2007. The main idea was to examine ways in which the two parties could share information about the 2010 World Cup and at the same time promote South Africa to become a popular tourist destination for the Japanese market. Several factors had been proposed to explain the rise in the number of Japanese traveling to South Africa and these included the “interest in the wild
animals, natural scene, culture, high quality of the ground operation as a result of experience in handling many visitors from Europe and America, access from Japan (many routes from Japan to Johannesburg) and the general interest in the 2010 South Africa World Cup” (Toru Forusawa 2008).

JATA claim that there are still some obstacles that continue to stand in the way of improving the tourism numbers to South Africa. Therefore, the organization believes that their partnership with the South African Tourism will go a long way in trying to address some of the problematic issues. Major areas that require immediate attention include issues of general safety and security in South Africa, particularly at the airports where baggage loss and theft is a major problem for aviation security. In 2005, Kentaro Kaneko of JATA, visited Kenya with other JATA officials. In his address to Kenya Tourism officials, he stressed the issue of safety and security and argued that “Japanese are far more sensitive about these matters than other people globally. We have an old saying in Japan that says ‘Safety and water are free.’” Japanese people see these as a given. It is part of their nature to expect them.”

Second on the list of problems is the issue of the negative media coverage that South Africa continues to receive internationally. The Japanese authorities are worried that the negative image of Africa in the media may hurt figures for Japanese tourists who rely on international media sources for information about African affairs. Lastly, the problem of planning and itinerary has been identified as another area requiring serious attention. The issue of classic tours or stereo-typical tours has been criticized and identified as part of the reason for the decline in tourists’ interest in traveling to South Africa. In 2005, JATA president Mr Kaneko suggested that Africa should look into campaigns such as tree planting tours to entice the Japanese traveler and at the same time diversify the tourism products on offer by the host nation. He argued that “the importance of tree planting on the ground of the African Continent has been more and more understood by Japanese.” Mr Kaneko believed that “the very occasional event like tree planting will make the tourists happier than before. They recognize that their activity will contribute slowly but firmly to the future of the entire planet.”
In addition, as part of the co-operation between Japan and South Africa, the JATA-South African Working Group developed an aggressive marketing and promotional campaign known as “Japan-Africa Exchange Year 2008.” The campaign was designed to expand the number of Japanese tourist arrivals in South Africa by developing familiarity with South Africa as a destination. The collaboration between JATA and the South African Tourism (Japan) appeared to be positive and strong. For example, JATA took a decision in September 2009 to extend its relationship with its South African counterpart until the end of 2010. Mr Brouwer, the South African Tourism Japan Country Manager, noted that the developments were viewed as “a huge achievement” considering that “JATA has never extended a relationship in the past regarding marketing initiatives with a destination.” Moreover, the JATA Working Group logo, which was developed by the Working Group Trade, would “continue to show JATA’s support in selling South Africa in the trade,” and was to be used by JATA-affiliated agents on their brochures “in support of South Africa as a ‘must visit’ destination.”

South African Tourism (Tokyo office): Adopting a fusion of re-active and pro-active media strategies to set up tourism agenda

According to Business-Report (02/26/2004) “Japanese visitors spend about $4,500 on average [in South Africa] against $2,000 to $2,600 by other visitors.” The report also revealed that factors such as (1) a low awareness of the country, (2) the distance and high travel costs, and (3) weak overall product appeal needed to be addressed in order to attract more visitors from Japan and other East Asian countries. However despite these weaknesses, South African still attracts some tourists from Japan, therefore, it was hoped that through the World Cup these numbers could be greatly improved. According to a SA Tourism survey of Japanese tourist behavior and its economic impact on South African, the Japanese tourists are high spenders, contributing R28.2 million of total Foreign Direct Spending for the second quarter of 2004, as shown in Figure 14 below. Although these figures are based on old reports, it is believed that the Japanese are still considered as high spenders in South Africa compared to tourist from other countries. The latest reports on this issue could not be obtained at the time of writing this thesis. Perhaps this was a one-off study done by the South African tourism in that respect.
Figure 14: Economic Impact of visitors to South Africa 2003 - 2004

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Q2 2003</th>
<th>Q2 2004</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total Foreign Direct Spend in SA</td>
<td>R 28.3 million</td>
<td>R 28.2 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Spend in SA</td>
<td>R7,188</td>
<td>R6,128</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Spend in SA per day</td>
<td>R1,019</td>
<td>R893</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average Length of Stay</td>
<td>18 nights</td>
<td>10 nights</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: South Africa Tourism.net

In addition, during the 2006 German World Cup, Japan had the fourth highest number of supporters among the countries represented. Therefore, questions about safety and security surrounding the 2010 South Africa World Cup continued to trouble the South African tourism authorities. The country’s high crime rate and the general perception that it is an unsafe destination were seen as deterrents to improving tourism volumes from this region. Therefore, the South African Tourism office in Tokyo saw a need to step up marketing and publicity initiatives in order to capitalize on the Japanese 2010 South Africa World Cup market. According to Mr Brouwer, his office was aware that in Japan “newspapers and magazines are in the top three information sources for travelers seeking information about South Africa and therefore getting South Africa covered by respected publications is of major importance.”

As a result, in response to the mounting international media pressure regarding safety issues in the country, his office invited senior journalists from leading travel industries and mainstream publications in Japan on a 10-day tour of South Africa. The trip was part of the JATA South Africa Working Group’s action plan which covered four core themes: (a) “to improve South Africa’s image”, (b) “tour products”, (c) “security and safety”, and (d) “airports.” Throughout the trip, the Group intended “to cultivate new tourism offerings, and create new itineraries,” explained Brouwer. Furthermore, JATA
had an extensive meeting with the Airport Company South Africa (ACSA) in an effort to address the issues of theft and loss of travelers’ luggage in the main airport of the country.

Using the benefits of internet technology, the South Africa Tourism launched a proactive and interactive marketing campaign in 2008 called 'Picture Perfect Contest'. Its basic idea was to invite the Japanese public to explore South Africa’s rich tourism offering through photographs supplied by other Japanese people who had visited South Africa before. According to Brouwer, the campaign was the biggest and most visible online campaign ever launched by South African Tourism in Japan. The campaign objective was to profile South Africa as a friendly, easy and affordable destination. In an attempt to legitimize the notion of South Africa as a safe place to visit, the campaign included a “word-of-mouth” element. The strategy involved inviting the Japanese people who had visited South Africa before to provide their own stories along with the images submitted. Mr Brouwer pointed out that the campaign was designed to ensure that “South Africa’s unspoiled beauty and wildlife as well as [its] welcoming spirit will be conveyed to Japanese audiences by Japanese people who have experienced the country first hand.”

In an effort to maintain a physical presence and open dialogue in Japan, the South African Tourism (Japan) adopted a strategy of hosting workshops and seminars. These forums targeted tourism practitioners, the media and travelers alike. The main purpose of the strategy was to try and effectively deal with the market's concerns about South Africa's safety. In 2009 the Southern Africa Trade Workshops were held in Osaka and Tokyo on June 11 and 12. The event attracted a record number of visitors and had a total of 29 exhibitors, including FIFA partners. Mr Brouwer said the objective of the workshops was “to improve the perception of South Africa as 2010 hosts as well as being an attractive travel destination.” He further commented that the same workshops were held the previous year and they proved successful.

Innovation is the key to unlocking the potential of a tourism destination. Noting JATA's suggestion mentioned earlier in the discussion about tree planting as an alternative to “classic tours,” the South African Tourism (Japan) responded to the idea by
inviting a group of 120 Japanese tree planters in 2009 to travel to South Africa and plant trees on African soil. Mr Brouwer said that the aim was “to improve the quality of life of disadvantaged communities while promoting an awareness of climate change, food security and sustainable natural resource management.” While in South Africa, the group was treated to a traditional South African *braai* (local grill), enjoyed South African music, experienced a real safari, and visited Sun City in the North West Province. According to Brouwer, “Apart from making a contribution to greening and feeding South Africa, the visit also serve[ed] to highlight South Africa’s development challenges, wonderful people, incredible landscape and cultural offerings to the visitors and to others back home in Japan.” Therefore, through innovation and response to new ideas, the South African Tourism (Japan) appeared to have opened a tourism market attracted to what the country can offer.

However, central to the success of the South African tourism strategy in this region was the role-played by the Japanese partners within the collaboration and network system. Their joint approach towards travel planning and organization for the Japanese market was key for ensuring that the 2010 South Africa World Cup remained an attractive destination for the Japanese market. Against the backdrop of conflict in terms of the financial crisis of 2008, the crime problem of the host nation, the fear factor instigated by capitalist media, and the general negative perceptions that accompanied developing nations, the collaboration was critical as a mechanism to defusing the level of anxiety amongst tourists. As noted earlier, tourists from Japan are regarded as high spenders in South Africa and therefore they formed an important market for the 2010 South Africa World Cup. The official figures published by the South Africa Tourism after the completion of the 2010 South Africa World Cup indicate that the event produced a total of 309,554 foreign tourists. Below is figure 15 showing the total number of the 2010 South Africa World Cup tourists per source region.
Figure 15: Total number of the 2010 South Africa World Cup tourists per region

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>North America</th>
<th>Central and South America</th>
<th>Europe</th>
<th>Africa Land</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>US: 30175</td>
<td>Brazil: 14,815</td>
<td>UK: 22,802</td>
<td>Mozambique: 24,483</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada: 3,654</td>
<td>Mexico: 9,680</td>
<td>Netherlands: 8,741</td>
<td>Swaziland: 19,593</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Argentina: 8,757</td>
<td>Germany: 8,596</td>
<td>Botswana: 16,385</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Chile: 4,175</td>
<td>France: 6,747</td>
<td>Lesotho: 12,733</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Uruguay: 1,357</td>
<td>Portugal: 5,348</td>
<td>Zimbabwe: 10,351</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Africa Air</th>
<th>Asia</th>
<th>Australia</th>
<th>Middle East</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria: 4,325</td>
<td>China: 6,760</td>
<td>Australia: 12,210</td>
<td>Israel: 2,977</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghana: 3,578</td>
<td>Japan: 4,614</td>
<td>New Zealand: 1,636</td>
<td>Saudi Arabia: 311</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya: 2,089</td>
<td>India: 3,086</td>
<td></td>
<td>Lebanon: 261</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algeria: 1,948</td>
<td>Phillipines: 2,102</td>
<td></td>
<td>Kuwait: 198</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mauritius: 1,410</td>
<td>Korea Republic: 2,040</td>
<td></td>
<td>Cyprus: 156</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: South Africa Tourism: World Cup Study report, December 2010

In terms of the total numbers of international fans that traveled to the games per country, Japan registered 4,614 tourists. Although the number is significantly lower than the figures registered in the Europe region, the tourists from the Asian region spent an average of R15,700 (1.900US$) compared with R12,600 (1.500US$) spent by those from Europe (South Africa Tourism, 12/2010:p13). As indicated earlier, the Japanese tourist is well established as a high spender in South African tourism. Therefore, although the Japanese market produced fewer tourists compared to other regions, the financial contribution to the total amount of tourism benefit from hosting the 2010 South Africa World Cup was significant. On the other hand, the numbers could not have pleased JATA since the organization was targeting to send 50,000 Japanese tourists to South Africa for the 2010 World Cup. The next chapter highlights some possible answers to the question as to what factors might have caused a low turnout of Japanese tourists for the event in South Africa. However, the collaboration between JATA and South Africa Tourism has established a solid foundation for improving South African tourism in Japan for the long-term period. Figure 16 gives a brief summary of the tourism impacts of the 2010 South Africa World Cup.
Figure 16: Tourism Impact of the 2010 South Africa World Cup

Source: Own illustration and figures derived from South Africa Tourism, 2010

The diagram in Figure 16 shows that the tourists spend an average of 10.3 nights and contributed a total of R3.64 billion to the economy through direct expenditure. The numbers show a shortfall from the 500,000 projections made prior the event. In addition, the report also indicates that the pre-event projections of tourists staying an average of 15 nights were never realized. These shortfalls in figures attest to the notion that in most cases, organizers of sports mega-events inflate pre-event projections to justify public spending to host these events. In the case of South Africa, the pre-event projections were proclaimed in the bid documents, and formed part of the host nation’s rhetoric throughout the preparation stages for the event. Having said that, the tourism benefits of the 2010 South Africa World Cup are recognized in the infrastructure development and tourism capacity building programs that remains as a legacy from hosting the event. In addition, the leisure and hotel industries, including small business enterprises, were also beneficiaries from hosting the World Cup. The real impact for these sectors will surely be
felt most in the long-term. Overall, hosting the 2010 South Africa World Cup provided the host nation with an opportunity to clean up the tourism sector and to brand the country as an attractive destination to visit.

Conclusion

Collaboration in sports mega-events tourism is crucial for positioning the host nation to showcase its tourism brands and unique culture to international clients. As this discussion has highlighted, South Africa has serious weaknesses in terms of its image as an unsafe place and also suffers from lack of tourism diversity with regards to brands. As a result, forming collaborative networks with influential organizations such as JATA will have a long-term impact on its tourism image in Japan. More significantly, the partnership that South Africa Tourism and JATA formed in before and after the 2010 South Africa World Cup will go a long way in helping the tourism industry in South Africa in future. This is based on the assumption that the two organizations work together to identify problem areas and formulate possible solutions to deal with those problems for their mutual benefit. Whether or not the Japanese tourists realize the changes made to improve their tourism experience in South Africa also depends on how South Africa Tourism markets its brand in Japan in the aftermath of the 2010 South Africa World Cup. The image legacy from hosting the event is critical for future marketing strategies in terms of leveraging and awareness.
Chapter 6.

The 'Gambatte' Project; An Action Research Application

The 2010 South Africa World Cup media and publicity initiative project conducted in Japan between 2007-2010

Introduction

This thesis asserts that in terms of sports mega-events, the media, multinational corporations and international sports organizations have formed a mutually beneficial relationship based on economic principles driven by profit motives. In this context, the media system is the driving force behind that relationship. It is responsible for selling and distributing the commercial products of stakeholders to the global market. In turn, the medium of sports and particularly sports mega-events, serves as the single most lucrative area for the global media industry. In the case of broadcast, print and web media, hosting sports mega-events assists with issues relating to programming, content, packaging and product differentiation. In this respect, media organizations purchase exclusive rights for live broadcasting or publishing of sports mega-events. The implications are that the media rights holders will offer the advertisers a chance to market their brands to a global audience.

Looking at this issue within the tourism perspective, this thesis suggest that through advertising and other marketing channels, the media assist host nations to communicate and ultimately convince international sports fans that the chosen host city or country is the best place to host the sports mega-event and is also a great place to visit. In other words, the media are a vehicle for selling the tourism products of the host nation to the media audiences, who in turn constitute the buyers of the media product.

However, this thesis asserts that in the case where the host nation of a sports mega-event is a developing country, the nature of the relationship between that host nation and the media appears to be paradoxical in nature. On the one hand, the host nation (or its tourism sector) does not have the power to control what the media cover. Equally, the
media do not have the power to control how host nations express themselves through images and other forms of narratives, although the media may shape or actually create these narratives themselves. Therefore, depending on circumstances, the media may have a positive or negative impact on the image of the host nation.

On the positive side, the media may portray the host nation as a democratic country with a stable political climate and cultural dynamism. On the negative side, the media may expose the host nation's social problems or political instability. In most cases, a high profile event or a dramatic or catastrophic situation arising from a natural disaster can serve as an occasion for heightened media publicity. In the case of South Africa within the context of the 2010 South Africa World Cup, the conditions in the country in terms of social inequalities, economic disparities, high crime rates, high level of poverty, the large unemployed population, political infighting within the ruling party (the African National Congress), and the growing public discontent with the state since the establishment of democratic rule after the fall of the apartheid system in 1994 provided the impetus for conflict, and therefore heightened the media coverage of the country leading up to the 2010 World Cup event.

It is equally significant to consider that in terms of location, the FIFA World Cup is spread across different host cities and therefore activities are decentralized to local governments and other stakeholders. However, for the media, any critical breakdown in the systems in one host city has a negative effect in the way the whole event is perceived. Clearly given the range and number of stories being broadcast and the number of people they are being broadcast to, the effect on the host nation’s branding and tourism marketing can be significant indeed.

South Africa approached the 2010 FIFA World Cup as a mechanism to strengthen and assert its political standing, boost its economy and showcase its culture to a global audience. The media play a key role in transmitting those messages both on the national and international level. However, when the media emphasize the fear factor or issues related to crime and poverty in their editorial content, rather than highlighting the many positive attributes of the host nation, the results may have a negative impact on inbound
tourism in the short and the long term. The driving factor behind media behavior is the profit motive, where conflict sells news.

This chapter examines how the media and host nation, in the case of a developing country, approach sports mega-events to promote their own interests, even where, in certain cases, the interests of the media may result in a loss for the host nation. To highlight this conflict of interests, a case study approach is used to investigate the link between the media issues related to the 2010 South Africa World Cup and the host nation's efforts to use the event to market a positive image of South Africa to a Japanese audience. To achieve these goals, a participatory or insider perspective is used to reveal some of the strategies used by the South African authorities in marketing the 2010 South Africa World Cup to the Japanese media audience. Central to the discussion is role that the researcher plays as an active participant in the research project, as a facilitator in these strategies, as a broker of consensus between different actors, and also as an agent of social change. In the context of the 2010 South Africa World Cup landscape and the media publicity it generated in Japan, this approach was used to answer three basic research questions; (1) What was the nature of the conflict between the media in Japan and South Africa in respect of coverage of the 2010 South Africa World Cup? (2) What mechanisms or strategies were adopted by the South African authorities in their desire to market the 2010 host to a Japanese media audience? (3) Can an action research methodology be applied as a useful tool for making a positive contribution towards bringing about social consensus and thus social change?

The first section of this chapter provides the theoretical foundation for a discussion highlighting the main concepts of conflict theory regarding the media. In addition, the existing literature on the intersection between international sports events, tourism and the media is presented. The second section contains an analysis of the conflict between the media and the host nation, focusing specifically on the international media coverage of the 2010 South Africa World Cup. The third section deals with issues of methodology highlighting the role and purpose of the Gambatte Project as an example of action research. The discussion will consider the theoretical implications of action research as a tool for academic inquiry in the field of sports and society. The fourth section presents a
critical discussion of the Gambatte Project’s stakeholders and their various motives for participating in the project. The fifth section highlights some of the failures and successes of the Gambatte Project before, during and after the 2010 South Africa World Cup. Finally, this chapter will show how South Africa applied political, economic and cultural pressure to deal with the conflicts that manifested themselves as a result of the negative international media coverage during the preparation stage of the 2010 South Africa World Cup.

Theoretical framework

The concept of hegemony is commonly used in critical social research on the media. It was coined by Antonio Gramsci (1971) in his famous *Prison Notebooks*. Lears (1985:568) defines cultural hegemony as “the ‘spontaneous’ consent given by the great masses of the population to the general direction imposed on social life by the dominant fundamental group; this consent is ‘historically’ caused by the prestige (and consequent confidence) which the dominant group enjoys because of its position and function in the world of production.” The media are regarded as a cultural product or “mental production” (Curran et al, 1982: 22) in the capitalist system, and thus conform to this definition. Lears’ definition raises some interesting points: first it implies that hegemony is a process, secondly it implies that social life is directed and imposed on others by the dominant groups, and lastly it views the subordinate groups as being manipulated to accept the social reality as dictated to them by the dominant groups.

However, the notion of hegemony does not necessarily suggest that the subordinate groups are passive recipients of domination by the dominant group, but rather they exist in a constant state of opposition to the status quo. However, despite their efforts, the dominant group will continue to protect its advantages and maintain a disproportionate share of society's resources. Therefore, this thesis views society as bound together, not by shared values, but rather by shared coercion at the hands of the dominant group. The coercion is both tacit and explicit, supported by political and economic institutions in terms of the police, military, judiciary and the financial systems. In other words, consent is key for the acceptance of components of the dominant culture in terms of values,
beliefs, norms and social institutions. The media play a critical role in spreading these attributes within society. As Anastasio et al (1999:152) assert, the media are “part entertainer, part educator, part purveyor of social norms.” Therefore, the media are the most important instruments at the disposal of twentieth century capitalism for maintaining ideological hegemony in that they provide the framework for perceiving reality (Hall, 1977). In other words, the media are responsible for helping perpetuate existing norms, conventions, and sociopolitical relationships.

Looking at the question of media hegemony in the context of sports mega-events, this chapter applies the media theory of agenda setting. The motive for choosing this approach is to highlight the close connection between the media, public opinion and perception. Wanta, Golan and Lee (2004:367) consider agenda setting as “the choice of (agenda) attributes” that the media chooses to portray to the public. In other words, the agenda the media sets has a direct impact on the larger public agenda by deciding which news makes headlines and which does not, which in turn influences public discourse and perceptions. This issue is relevant in tourism for sports mega-events in relation to destination marketing and nation branding strategies. The media serve as an important source of information about potential tourist destinations for the public. The communication system may be in the form of still images, video, news coverage, the printed word and internet communication.

This chapter asserts that in relation to sports mega-events, media agenda setting can have devastating consequences for the tourism objectives of the host nation when it is exposed to extensive negative media coverage. Furusawa (2008) confirms this notion by noting that the media coverage of international events such the Asian financial crisis of 1998; the 9/11 attacks in America in 2001 and the invasion of Iraq in 2003 all had a negative impact on outbound travel patterns for Japanese heading to the affected areas. The portrayal of a given global event by the media to a mass audience that causes panic or at least uncertainty amongst potential tourists regarding safety and security at the destination affects tourism negatively. Hall and O’Sullivan (1996) maintain that macro-events like these are critical factors that influence the tourist decision-making process. Therefore, when reporting on a potential destination, the media content may focus or
comment on the level of infrastructure development (or underdevelopment); safety and security issues; the state of transportation; the political climate; or any number of different issues relating to a destination.

Given the number of potential stories that could be covered by the media, it is clear that the issue of news selection in the editing rooms of media outlets is the core of the agenda setting process. As a result, this chapter considers the media’s editorial rooms to be the first line of gatekeepers that sort out which news stories are deemed worthy of coverage and public consumption (usually few), and which stories are left out of the media domain. This line of reasoning puts the question of the culture and social background of the media practitioner in the spotlight. Benson (1999) proposes media field theory as a theoretical framework with which to examine the influence of the socio-cultural background of the journalist in the news process. Anastasio et al (1999) and Tajfel (1978) have applied social identity theory in an attempt to address the same question. The two theoretical approaches are similar in that they highlight the close connection between the media, public opinion and perception. The implication is that the media reflect the views or prejudices of both journalists and their audience.

Dimeo and Kay (2004:1268) examined the international media coverage of the 1996 India Cricket World Cup and concluded that “Western cultures continue to construct ‘others’ in oppositional, dichotomous terms, often as inferior.” Boyd-Barrett and Rantanen (1998) confirm that the social context in developing nations is often represented negatively by the international media compared to that of the developed nations. This kind of representation or misrepresentation has a profound influence on the opinions of the media audience about the situation in developing nations. Therefore, the question of media hegemony poses serious challenges regarding the role of the media in global capitalist society. Furthermore, debates surrounding media hegemony highlight the complex nature of news production and the struggle between different social groups for cultural influence and power.
The conflict between the international media’s coverage and the host nation’s self-image campaign; the case of the 2010 South Africa World Cup

The development of the mass media and the concept of global marketing are significant drivers of economic investment in sports mega-events. Host nations often spend significant amounts of financial resources in advertising through global media networks such as CNN, BBC, ESPN etc. In the case of the 2010 FIFA World Cup, the host nation embarked on global media campaigns and in 2008 South Africa Tourism entered into a three year partnership deal with CNN International in which the network produced the “first ever user generated content driven advertising solution, geared towards raising the profile of South Africa to CNN’s elite audience of business and leisure travellers” (Singh, 2008:22). Furthermore, South Africa Tourism organized media tours for “10 key foreign journalists from the world’s major media agencies” in an attempt to familiarize them with conditions in South Africa (Singh, 2008:22).

However despite these global marketing efforts, South Africa continued to receive negative media publicity ahead of the 2010 FIFA World Cup. As illustrated below in Figure 18, media research conducted before South Africa hosted the 2010 South Africa World Cup indicates that the issue of safety and security was the topic most often discussed by the global online media audience. This had serious implications for tourism and the international image of the host nation.
Based on the results as presented in Figure 17, it is clear that the theme of safety and security in South Africa dominated discussions and coverage ahead of the 2010 South Africa World Cup. As the results from 2009 and 2010 indicate, the majority of articles suggested that concerns surrounding safety and security and infrastructure development were most likely to have a negative impact on tourism related to the 2010 South Africa World Cup. Although there were many news stories about crime in South Africa published prior to the 2010 South Africa World Cup, this chapter highlights three particular stories that made international headlines.

The First Story: ‘The 2007 African National Congress (ANC) elections in South Africa’

South Africa’s political transition as a result of the 2007 ANC elections, which split the ruling African National Party (ANC) into two factions and eventually two parties, generated considerable domestic friction, and this was picked up on by the international media. More significantly, the elections resulted in the ousting of Mandela’s chosen
successor, President Thabo Mbeki, in favor of Jacob Zuma, who subsequently became
the third president of the democratic South Africa in 2009. The change in the political
leadership had direct implications for the planning and preparations for the 2010 South
Africa World Cup. The results of the election saw cabinet ministers and other
government officials, who had been responsible for organizing the World Cup under the
previous administration since 2004, replaced by new officials serving under President
Zuma. Practically, this meant that the new administration would require some time to be
briefed on the progress made previously to formulate a strategy for moving forward.

The Second Story: The so-called ‘xenophobia attacks’ of 2008

In 2008, some sections of the South African population began attacking immigrants
from other African countries in the townships throughout the country. These riots and the
nature of the violence were embarrassingly reminiscent of the apartheid era and left many
people dead and many more homeless.

The Third Story: Labor disputes on 2010 World Cup construction sites

The progress of construction on the various 2010 World Cup infrastructure projects
was slowed down as result of labor disputes as workers organized strikes and go-slow
actions as tactics in negotiating for higher wages and bonuses. These actions caused
many projects to fall behind their deadlines. Perhaps the most affected of all the 2010
projects was the Mbombela Stadium in the host city of Mpumalanga. The construction of
the stadium was severely disrupted, to the extent that FIFA decided to remove it from the
list of venues initially earmarked to host the 2009 FIFA Confederations Cup.

Based on these three stories in their coverage of the 2010 South Africa World Cup,
the international media seemed justified in questioning whether South Africa was capable
of hosting the games. However, there were other positive developments taking place that
did not receive prominence in the international media. Therefore, the tendency of the
media to prioritize conflict in their news selection meant that other news themes such as
local culture or the development of technology and telecommunication systems as a result
of hosting the World Cup were overlooked. In other words, news about developmental
issues and other legacy implications of the World Cup were left out of the media agenda. It is critical to consider the media as the primary source of information about the host nation. According to a report by South Africa Tourism, more than one third of tourists that came to the 2010 South Africa World Cup said they relied on the media as their first source of information about the event (South Africa Tourism, 2010 South Africa World Cup impact study, December 2010).

Therefore, the link between the amplified media coverage of the theme of safety and security in the host nation and the tendency of sports mega-event tourists to use the media as a primary source, restricted South Africa's ability to communicate its 2010 World Cup tourism message to the Japanese audience. As a result, media communication from the host nation’s government focused on assuring the international media and potential visitors that the 2010 South Africa World Cup would be a safe affair. Moreover, the message often emphasized assurances that the state had taken critical steps to deal with the problem of crime. Therefore the organizers of the 2010 South African World Cup had to employ crisis and risk management in an effort to salvage the reputation of the host nation.

As the events above occurred, the Japanese national team was progressing well in the qualifying stages of the 2010 World Cup. The prospect of the Japanese team taking part in the finals of the World Cup in South Africa had created a lot of excitement and enthusiasm in the country. The local media gave considerable attention to the national team, especially after the coach announced that his team’s mission was to reach at least the semifinals (Japan Times, 2009: 20 Nov). Therefore, a combination of all these circumstances helped to (1) heighten the media's attention to conditions in the host nation, and (2) create public interest over the climate of uncertainty and conflict surrounding the 2010 South Africa World Cup. Moreover, the issues revived speculation that the games may need to be hosted in a “Plan B” developed country and the countries mentioned in the news included Japan, Britain, the US and Germany (Gray, 2008). Based on the discussion thus far, it is clear that the international media coverage surrounding the
2010 South Africa World Cup had the potential to harm the tourism objectives and nation branding intentions of the host nation.

*Introducing the Gambatte Project; methodological processes and application*

The word *Gambatte* in Japanese is used to encourage another person or group to do their best or to try harder in what they are doing. As Rapoport (1970:499) notes, action research aims to deal with “practical concerns of people in an immediate problematic situation.” It is against this background that the overarching goal of the project was to increase the media opportunities and awareness regarding 2010 South Africa World Cup related events leading up to and during the 2010 World Cup. Furthermore, the Gambatte Project was also influenced by theoretical research by several scholars on group facilitation. Etang (2006) emphasizes the role of public relations in social development in protecting the nation's reputation against media coverage that might appear harmful to the nation's image. Chibnall (1997) argues that the public relations industry reduces the media to the position of secondary sources because the industry generates stories and interprets events for the media. Hall (1982) shares the same view by suggesting that the industry serves as frame of reference for the media in an attempt to promote a particular idea. The Gambatte Project applied some of the same techniques of public relations as part of its methodology.

The main goal was to increase the likelihood of achieving positive results in terms of attracting the media and ensuring that the media coverage concerning the project’s activities was positive. By so doing, the project aimed to provide alternative information for the Japanese media with regards to issues related to the 2010 South Africa World Cup. The overarching goals were (a) to keep the public informed and educated about the development of the 2010 South Africa World Cup; (b) to provide exposure and marketing opportunities for the stakeholders of the project; and most importantly, (c) to provide the media with alternative narratives of the preparations of the 2010 South Africa World Cup. Therefore, connecting with the Japanese media throughout the 2010 South Africa World Cup process formed the core of the Gambatte Project.
In terms of methodology, the role of the project facilitator is critical in the research process. Central to the function of the facilitator is the notion of building relations with the media and establishing collaborative networks with other stakeholders. Because the Gambatte Project targeted a variety of actors, issues of conflict of interest among actors were certain to challenge the collaborative process. In this case, the role of facilitator is important for identifying areas of conflicts of interests between stakeholders and finding solutions that are satisfactory for each stakeholder. Thus, part of the duties of the facilitator as a researcher here was to seek consensus where conflict existed, and establish a basis for the pursuit of common interests. This process is important for building trust and cooperation with the different actors in the project. Gummesson (1998) asserts building relationships based on consensus leads to a win–win situation for the actors involved in a project.

On the other hand, Benson (1975) makes a distinction between domain and ideological consensus. He states that domain consensus refers to an “agreement among participants regarding the appropriate role and scope of an agency” and ideological consensus covers “the agreement among participants regarding the nature of the tasks confronted and the appropriate approaches to those tasks” (Benson 1975;235). With regards to the Gambatte Project, both types of consensus were established.

Based on this understanding, it is clear that, as action research, the Gambatte Project focused on inter-organizational relationships in the organization of sports mega-events. Under such an arrangement, my goal as the Gambatte Project's facilitator was to reconcile the conflicts of interest between the various actors involved in the project and broker negotiations and trade-offs that would allow for greater participation in the process of publicizing the event. This approach allowed me to become involved as an active participant in the flow of information by striving to create synergy between the other actors. By acting as a bridge between the actors, it was possible to co-ordinate activities between them for the benefit of all stakeholders. This included ensuring that all the actors were familiar with the strategies and activities of other actors in the network and how they could benefit from the activities of others.
Establishing the collaborative network of the Gambatte Project

This section discusses which stakeholders were interested in participating in this project activity and why. The issues of incentive and motive are key factors for stakeholder participation. The stakeholders were divided into three categories, which could be labeled as political, economic and cultural, with different incentives and motives.

The Gambatte Project built fruitful relationships with other stakeholders in Japan and South Africa who had an interest in the successful organization of the 2010 South Africa World Cup. The core stakeholders of the Gambatte Projected were the South Africa Tourism office in Tokyo, the Embassy of South Africa in Japan and Ritsumeikan Asia Pacific University. Their interests were political, in the case of the South African Embassy in Japan, economic in the case of South Africa Tourism, and academic in the case of the Ritsumeikan Asia Pacific University. The stakeholders are outlined in the 'Participation Matrix' diagram as shown in Figure 18 below.

Figure 18: Stakeholder Participation Matrix

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stakeholder</th>
<th>Purpose/Role</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Political level:</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South African Embassy in Japan</td>
<td>Assist in campaign events. Liaison with national government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Diplomacy/foreign policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Prestige</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Influence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Legitimacy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Economic Level:</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa Tourism</td>
<td>Assist in campaign events. Liaison with LOC African Student recruitment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Act as bridge between the coordinator, Media publicity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>the Japanese government and South Africa Cultural exchange</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Tourism marketing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Increase level of awareness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Create a positive image of Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Increase Tourism competitive advantage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Cultural level:</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ritsumeikan Asia Pacific University</td>
<td>Act as bridge between the coordinator, the Japanese government and the coordinator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- African Student recruitment drive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Media marketing and public relations</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
However, the discussion also highlights the incentive and motives of other stakeholders that were not critical to the collaborative network of the Gambatte Project, but who had an interest in the project’s activities based on their links with the FIFA World Cup. In this regard, the Gambatte Project further collaborated with Emirates Airlines and the South African Government’s Communication and Information Services. In an effort to learn from the experiences of the 2002 Korean Japan World Cup hosted in Oita City, the project managed to receive support from the ex-governor of Oita City, Mr Hiramatsu. Therefore, through collaboration and networking, the project managed to make use of political, economic and academic contacts to organize stakeholders from different sectors in a single framework.

(a) The South African Tourism office in Japan

As it was shown earlier, tourism is a significant component of sports mega-events. Moreover, by hosting the 2010 South Africa World Cup, the country's tourism industry saw massive investments in efforts dedicated to marketing and advertising for the games and for the country in general. Therefore, it was crucial for the Gambatte Project to align its objectives and activities with those of South Africa Tourism in Japan. Collaborating with the office in Tokyo was also important for gaining strategic access to its marketing and advertising operations established as a result of the 2010 South Africa World Cup. The Gambatte Project established a direct association with South Africa Tourism and could also use their letterhead and other promotional material of South Africa Tourism in its activities. The fundamental questions addressed by that alliance were concerned with issues of legitimacy and authority. Through the agreement, the Gambatte Project had established the necessary connections to operate on behalf of the host nation.

Rather than direct profits, the Gambatte Project offered South Africa Tourism more intangible benefits. The value that the project gave South African Tourism came in the form of help in branding and marketing. As stated earlier, brand image and destination marketing are important concepts in sports mega-events. The activities of the project were focused more directly on the public at the micro-level compared to those of South African Tourism. This meant that South African tourism was presented with a rare
chance to maintain visibility on the ground. In terms of the marketing strategy, collaboration with the Gamabatte Project was significant as it served as a vehicle to distribute South Africa's tourism message to a wider audience. On the technical side, South Africa Tourism was given access to the project’s extensive media database that included media organizations in Japan and South Africa. This was critical for the tourism authorities in terms of establishing new media contacts and strengthening relations with established ones. Therefore, the key to fulfilling the tourism objectives of the 2010 South Africa World Cup depended heavily on the level of communication the host nation maintained with the international media, in this instance the Japanese media.

(b) The South African Embassy in Japan

The next stakeholder that was needed was the South African embassy in Japan to secure political support for the project. It was important to have support from the Ambassador of South Africa as the highest political officer representing the interests of the country in Japan. In addition, the idea to collaborate with the embassy was seen as strategic in terms of legitimacy relating to permission to participate in 2010 South Africa World Cup related projects. Furthermore, the partnership with the ambassador's office was significant for ensuring greater interest from Japanese counterparts.

In terms of incentives, the embassy stood to gain from the political presence that the Gamabatte Project’s public relations and cultural exchange activities could potentially provide. Through participation in the project, the embassy was assured of continuing interaction with different Japanese organizations, including the local and regional government in Oita. In short the Gamabatte Project offered the embassy an inexpensive and useful opportunity to expand its outreach activities to a wider social audience.

(c) Ritsumeikan Asia Pacific University

During the negotiations between the Gamabatte Project and APU we reached an agreement whereby the admissions office of APU agreed to take part in the Gamabatte Project in exchange for coverage of APU in the local and international media. By associating itself with the activities connected to the 2010 South Africa World Cup, APU
stood in a position to generate significant media attention to its campus and enhance its international appeal, especially since the Gambatte Project considered APU as the basis of its legitimacy.

In addition, from APU’s perspective, there was the benefit of hosting visits from high-ranking officials, including multinationals affiliated with the football industry. During my presentation at the South African embassy, I asked if it was possible for the ambassador to visit APU with the intention of establishing relations with the university. In 2008, the South African ambassador, Dr Ngubane, a former Premier of Kwazulu-Natal Province, and the mayor of Petermaritzburg in Kwazulu-Natal Province visited Ritsumeikan APU. They had discussions with the Vice President, Professor Malcolm Cooper, the Dean of International Cooperation Studies, Professor Kazadi Sanga-Ngoie, and the Director of the Research Center for Asia Pacific Studies, Professor J.S. Eades. I had the opportunity to be present at the meeting and contributed towards the discussions. Therefore, viewed in this light, the Gambatte Project served as a bridge between APU and the South African mission in Japan. According to cultural conflict theory, sport serves as a powerful tool to foster cooperation and cultural exchange between different groups. In addition, sport is also prominent in the distribution of cultural capital. APU, as an institution of higher learning, possesses a great amount of cultural capital which the university had a chance to showcase using the 2010 World Cup.

(d) The South African Government Communication and Information System (GCIS)

The South African Government Communication and Information System (GCIS) facilitated government communication efforts in relation to the 2010 South Africa World Cup event. More importantly, this office was the driving force behind the National Communication Partnership Forum (NCPF) that itself was formed to as a result of hosting the 2010 South Africa World Cup. The initiative was a collaborative effort comprising communicators from both the public and private sectors. The key actors included editors from media organizations in Africa, FIFA, the 2010 Local Organizing Committee (LOC), South African Tourism, the South African International Marketing Council (IMC) and the GCIS. The Forum’s primary role was to facilitate the marketing
and communication campaigns related to the 2010 South Africa World Cup. More importantly, the NCPF was established to offer alternative media narratives to the international audience and thus challenge the existing media coverage that tended to contribute to the negative perceptions of the African continent. Therefore, the GCIS was a significant actor insofar as it brought all the major players related to marketing the 2010 South Africa World Cup under the same umbrella. My plan was to use the GCIS as a reference point in terms of understanding the national and regional objectives set out for the 2010 South Africa World Cup.

For the GCIS, the incentive for wanting to participate in the project to advance the interest of the South African state in Japan. The foreign policy issue was at the heart of the cooperation agreement between the project and the GCIS. In addition, the Gambatte Project offered the office an opportunity to disseminate the state's position and perspective in relation to the World Cup to a wider and potentially influential audience. The prospect of communicating more directly with Japanese society through the local media itself had great appeal for the GCIS.

(e) Former Governor of Oita City: Mr Hiramatsu

The South African delegation also met separately with the former governor of Oita Prefecture, Hiramatsu Morihiko. He was the vice president of the 2002 Korea Japan World Cup Local Organizing Committee and he currently held the title of 'Honorary President' of the Japan Football Association. The delegation from South African was interested in Oita City's agricultural development concept of “One Village One Product” which had been successfully championed by Governor Hiramatsu. In addition, APU has a research and development program dedicated to the concept and hosts workshops and seminars on the topic for various organizations and government officials from different regions, including Africa. Therefore, on the political level, the Gambatte Project was able to connect the South African embassy in Japan, APU, the Japanese local government in Oita City, and the organization of the Japan Korea games personified by Mr Hiramatsu.
Emirates Airline was identified as a key stakeholder for the Gambatte Project because of its position as one of FIFA’s official partners. In 2007, the airline signed a sponsorship deal worth $195 million with FIFA for the 2010 South Africa World Cup and the 2014 Brazil World Cup (www.fifa.com). Therefore, based on the sponsorship agreement, the corporation had the right to associate with or support local initiatives such as the Gambatte Project.

Several reasons explain why the airline chose to participate in the project. Firstly, as a business enterprise, the question of profit remained the central concern as it does for any corporation. As a result, the Gambatte Project offered the airline marketing and public relations opportunities in terms of communicating its product to a selected audience including the international students at APU. Most of the student population and staff at APU use airlines to travel to their homelands. By associating itself with the Gambatte Project, Emirates was in a good position to market its products among the students and staff for future travel.

In addition, the presence of the tourism industry represented by JATA and South Africa Tourism at the symposium provided Emirates with a good opportunity to gain the attention of the trade. However, more importantly, the airline saw the symposium as a platform to connect with the Japanese media for the purpose of marketing its products and services to a potentially lucrative local audience. In other words, from a business perspective, the Gambatte Project offered the airline an opportunity to engage in public relations. Therefore, more than any other participating organization, the interaction of Emirates with the project was most clearly based on tapping the market. The common factor between all the stakeholders with regards to their willingness to participate in the Gambatte Project was their desire to achieve short-term goals.
The Gambatte Project initiated several projects based on the research goals outlined above. This chapter describes three of them, and examines the reasons why only one should be considered successful. The first involved organizing APU’s students to work as volunteers in activities organized by the Gambatte Project. As a result, a volunteer pool that included students from Africa, Japan, Korea, America, China, Canada, Bulgaria and France, was recruited to assist in the project. Furthermore, many APU students had been volunteers during the 2002 Korea Japan World Cup and therefore the university had the experience of being involved in volunteer work of this nature and had an organizational model that could be followed.

The volunteer group took part in small-scale activities organized by the Gambatte Project including attending community and cultural festivals around Oita prefecture and Fukuoka prefecture in Japan, and attending football matches played in Oita city that involved the Japanese national team. The strategy was to maintain a visible and distinctly international presence of volunteers, reminding the Japanese fans that South Africa was ready to welcome them with open arms should they choose to make the trip to the 2010 World Cup. In addition, the volunteers assisted with their language skills, helping with translations and other issues with the media or other Japanese organizations.

With regards to the 2010 South Africa World Cup, over 15,000 volunteers were needed to attend to the needs of the event, especially for issues related to language support. Because there was such a need, the project engaged the 2010 South African Local Organizing Committee to consider absorbing the volunteers from the Gambatte Project in the broader 2010 volunteer program. In addition, a further request was made to South Africa Tourism (Tokyo) and the Embassy of South Africa in Japan to make use of Gambatte's Project's volunteers in their campaigns so to create an international atmosphere similar to the World Cup. For the volunteers, this step was seen as an ideal opportunity to learn and develop their skills in areas of translation, media and public relations. However, the offer made by the Gambatte Project in that regard was never
taken up by the South Africa authorities and thus the project failed to materialize on that level.

The second project involved taking a television crew from Fukuoka Broadcasting Station to three 2010 host cities in Durban, Cape Town, and Johannesburg during the preparation stages in 2009 in order to present the Japanese media with an opportunity to cover the host nation's state of readiness at that time for themselves and not through the lens of other media outlets. The idea was motivated by the intention to afford the Japanese media firsthand knowledge so it could act as a primary source of information regarding the preparations of the games. Although there were news stories in Japan surrounding the World Cup – in addition to print and radio media – there were no TV programs, and in particular there was no programming to showcase other aspects of South Africa. As highlighted earlier in the discussion, evidence from the various research studies that looked at the global media coverage of South Africa leading up to the staging of the 2010 South Africa World Cup event indicated that the main theme covered by the international media in relation to the World Cup event was safety and security in view of the host nation’s high levels of crime. Therefore this project was designed to fill that void.

Initially the idea was pitched to a former colleague from CTB Media (a local cable television station in Beppu City, Japan) who at that time served as a producer at Nippon Television Network System in Fukuoka prefecture. He was keen to participate in the project as it offered his network better programming related to the upcoming 2010 World Cup and more importantly access to higher level organizers and the events sites. As a result, I went to South Africa to propose the idea to the three cities and there I spoke with the relevant 2010 marketing officers. Despite the initial interest shown by the host cities during the negotiations, they never backed up their verbal agreement in writing, and as a result, the process stalled and eventually collapsed.

The most successful project was the international symposium on the South African World Cup hosted at APU in 2008 October 22nd and 23rd. The title of the symposium was “Fulfilling the 2010 South African World Cup Promise: Learning from the Experiences
of the Korea Japan World Cup 2002.” The symposium was organized as a joint venture between the Ritsumeikan Center for Asia Pacific Studies and South African Tourism (Japan). The idea was to examine the extent to which the experiences of Japan and Korea in hosting the Soccer World Cup in 2002 could help in the planning of the event in South Africa in 2010. In addition, the symposium aimed at promoting dialogue, cooperation, cultural exchange and partnership between Japan and South Africa. More significantly, the goal of this project was to attract the Japanese media’s attention and to offer them alternative themes other than safety and security issues in terms of news coverage surrounding the 2010 South Africa World Cup.

It is important to recognize that the symposium was not an activity happening in a vacuum, but rather it was tied to, and capitalized on, activities already underway in terms of public forums, workshops and seminars related to the 2010 World Cup taking place around the world. For example, in 2008 February, the University of Ohio in the United States held the Fifth Annual Sports in Africa Symposium, entitled “Communication, Media and Sport in Africa.” The idea was to promote dialogue about Africa using sports as a medium to connect people and stimulate debate about the issues. On the 5th of February 2008, a conference entitled “2010 World Cup- Sponsorship Risks and CSR Chances” was held in Berlin. The theme of the conference “was a comparison of the sponsorship targets of companies with the social framework conditions existing regarding the World Cup event in the African threshold country” (www.sf.com/reputation/press).

Two deductions could be made from the above-mentioned examples: firstly, that hosting sports mega-events generates considerable local and international debate about the connection between sports, business and society; and secondly, that mega-events have multiple impacts on the international community.

In relation to the two unsuccessful projects, two reasons can be suggested as critical factors that led to the negative results. Firstly, the Gambatte Project was first and foremost an academic research initiative, while the stakeholders and principle actors represented capital. Framed in this context, the exploitation of the agent by the principal actor is inevitable in a relationship based on profit within a capitalist system. Therefore, as key players in the capitalist system of global tourism and international sports events,
the stakeholders prioritized the economic and profit incentives as the primary reason for wanting to participate in the Gambatte Project. Secondly, on the economic level, as business entities, they stood to save financially because of the marketing potential presented by the Gambatte Project.

In hindsight, perhaps the main reasons that caused the first two projects to fail were that (a) they were perceived to have long-term implications without immediate tangible short-term benefits, and (b) they cost money. In addition, the projects also called for a significant amount of preparation on the part of the South African authorities, who at that time, were already under a lot of pressure from their heavy workload.

**Attracting the Media**

The symposium as a media strategy was based on the concepts of collaboration and networking. The goal was to encourage interaction between the media, government officials, the tourism sector, academia, 2010 FIFA World Cup organizers and FIFA commercial partners. Therefore it was important to foster cooperation with these stakeholders and use their already established media connections to provide publicity for the symposium itself. The strategy had the potential to secure publicity from newspapers, government websites, and specialized media such as tourism, television and radio broadcasting networks, as well as drawing media attention from both Japan and South Africa.

For that purpose, the Gambatte Project collaborated with the Network Office of APU, an office that has an extensive regional and national media network, including the influential Japanese Press Co. The Network Office further assisted with human resources and provided infrastructural support. In an effort to secure media coverage about APU in South Africa, the project also collaborated with the marketing and recruitment division of APU’s admission's office. We worked towards inviting a journalist from South Africa to the symposium, courtesy of the office. The admissions office would cover costs relating to the flight and accommodation for the journalist in exchange for coverage not only about the symposium, but also about APU as a dynamic international university. I then
contacted my former editor in South Africa at The Star, the country's largest national daily newspaper. I managed to pitch the symposium to the newspaper and highlighted the newsworthiness of the event in terms of (a) what the Japanese were saying about the 2010 South Africa World Cup; and (b) as a way to begin to prepare for the influx of Japanese World Cup fans to South Africa for the 2010 event.

I also worked closely with Planet Marketing Communications Inc, a public relations company responsible for handling media issues for the South Africa Tourism branch office in Tokyo. The idea was to tap into its media database in terms of tourism publications, and also to guarantee that the symposium would be publicized on the South African Tourism official website. In an effort to reach a wider global audience, I relied on relations established with the GCIS to ensure that the news about the symposium was posted on government websites dedicated to the 2010 South Africa World Cup. Besides the FIFA website, statements about activities related to the 2010 South Africa World Cup coming from the host government websites were regarded as official. A press conference was scheduled for the morning before the start of the symposium. The aim was to hold a formal press briefing as a preview of the symposium and to allow a question and answer session. Information on the program and some of the presentations during the symposium, eventually entitled, “RCAPS Symposium: Fulfilling the 2010 South African World Cup Promise,” are included in the Appendices at the end of this thesis.

The Symposium's Media Outcomes

The subsequent news coverage about the symposium came from five different levels of media sources: (a) international, (b) national, (c) regional, (d) specialized and (e) online media. It included the media coverage from Japan and South Africa and concerning activities related to the symposium.

(b) National

The Japanese national broadcaster (NHK) aired an interview featuring myself and their journalist, talking about my intentions regarding the symposium. The story made primetime evening news and the coverage was extensive. Secondly, Mainichi Shinbun
(27/10/2008), a national newspaper, featured an article focusing on my profile and ideas about the legacy of the 2010 South Africa World Cup. Thirdly, in South Africa, *The Star* (30/10/2008) carried a story about the symposium highlighting the Japanese concerns about safety and security issues in South Africa. In addition, the article had a brief description of APU in the introductory section and mentioned that the university had hosted the symposium.

*(c) Regional*

As part of the build up towards the symposium and in an effort to maximize marketing opportunities for the event, I sent a pitch about the symposium to a regional radio station, the Oita Broadcasting Station (OBS). As a result, I received an invitation to appear as a guest on a talk radio show entitle ‘fun!fan!time’ (12/10/2008) and the show was also featured on the OBS website. In addition, a regional newspaper called *Nishi Nihon Shimbun* (24/10/2008) which operates in Oita prefecture and has a circulation of around 120,000, published an article about the symposium. The story was about passing on Oita’s experience of the 2002 FIFA World Cup to South Africa for the 2010 event.

*(d) Specialized*

The symposium received coverage from two online tourism magazines catering for Japanese audiences. The story appeared on *Travel Vision* (30/10/2008) which has a circulation of about 27,000 readers. The second source was *Travel Vision Weekly* which boasts of a circulation of around 10,000 readers and it carried the story for three weeks from the 25th October to the 13th November 2008. In addition, an article about the symposium was also featured on Ritsumeikan Asia Pacific University's website (www.apu.ac.jp).

*(e) Government*

The South African Tourism website and the other state websites that receive news from the GCIS featured the symposium as part of their global marketing campaign for the 2010 South Africa World Cup (http://www.sa2010.gov.za)
Post-Symposium Media Outcomes

The Gambatte Project continued to engage other parties in the network system with the aim of accelerating media coverage the 2010 South Africa World Cup in Japan. As a result, during the 2009 FIFA Confederations Cup held in South Africa, which served as test run for the World Cup in 2010, I got an invitation to work with NHK (16/6/2009) in Tokyo through a recommendation by a source within my networks. I joined the documentary section on a short-term basis and assisted on the production of a documentary about the World Cup, unemployment and poverty in South Africa. The documentary was fashioned as a human-interest story and my responsibilities included providing translation, context and background. All the while, my aim was to offer the Japanese media an alternative way of looking at Africa and the issues affecting the continent.

During the 2010 South Africa World Cup, I continued to liaise with the Japanese media giving interviews and answering questions regarding the organization of the event in South Africa. These included two interviews with Nishi Nihon Shinbun, published on 10 June and 14 July 2010 respectively. The first interview covered issues related to crime incidents that took place a few days before the start of the 2010 South Africa World Cup. Again questions of safety and security in South Africa were central for the Japanese media and the audience alike before, during and after the World Cup. The second interview came at the end of the World Cup and it was about my assessment and overall impressions of the event, including my thoughts on the legacy that the 2010 South Africa was most likely to leave behind.

Contribution of the Gambatte Project to the 2010 South Africa World Cup

According to the post-impact study of the 2010 South Africa World Cup published by South Africa Tourism, the majority of the tourists indicated that the media were crucial as a source of information about the host nation prior to their departure to the 2010 South Africa World Cup (Figure 19). Therefore, based on the results of this study, I
would argue that the Gambatte Project was at least successful in providing alternative information on the host nation in the media and potentially raising awareness for some.

**Figure 19:** 2010 South Africa World Cup sources of awareness

![Sources of Awareness](image)

Source: South Africa Tourism, 2010 South Africa World Cup impact study, December 2010, pp 30

Figure 19 indicates that many tourists relied on television, magazines and websites for information regarding the 2010 South Africa World Cup. In fact, more than one third of tourists mentioned “World Cup associated media/channels” as their first source of awareness about the host nation. Interestingly, the report does not mention the percentage of the tourists that relied on newspapers articles as a source of awareness. As the Gambatte Project has demonstrated, host nations can use newspapers to distribute information and highlight their destinations to a wide audience. Therefore, the contribution of the Gambatte Project as a model for media marketing in sports mega-events tourism relates to the use of newspaper articles as means to strategically position a destination for improving its image and in shaping audience perceptions. In addition, the report is silent about the impact of radio shows in creating awareness. As highlighted in the discussion, the Gambatte Project media strategy included a combination of print,
online and broadcasting media to spread the 2010 South Africa World Cup message in Japan. Although, the Gambatte Project was a small project, it managed to keep the media and the audience informed about the host nation and further contributed towards building a South Africa brand.

Conclusion

This chapter has used the concept of media hegemony as theoretical framework to examine the role of the media in the capitalist system within the context of sports mega-events. The discussion asserts that the media are critical for the reproduction of social inequalities in the realms of culture, politics and economy, and are keen on news content that emphasizes conflict. Stemming from this, the chapter has applied agenda setting theory to analyze the media coverage surrounding the 2010 South Africa World Cup. The discussion showed that the issues of safety and security in South Africa received the most attention from the international media. Issues of crime, labor strikes and political instability were some of the factors that delayed the preparations for the 2010 South Africa World Cup. More importantly, the combination of these factors helped to heighten the media spotlight on the 2010 South Africa World Cup and the social, political and economic situation in the host nation. However, despite the many challenges, hosting the 2010 South Africa World Cup was critical for branding and the country, and the media played a crucial role in that regard.

In an effort to examine these issues more closely, the chapter looked at the media challenges that faced the host nation in spreading its message in Japan. In the case of a developing country as the host nation, the interests of the media and the host nation will often tend to clash. Several factors are responsible for the inevitable conflict between the two groups. Firstly, developing nations are often faced with serious economic and social problems, and naturally the media are attracted to such issues. Secondly, developing nations are viewed as peripheral in the modern world system. This means that their status of being dependent will tend to remain unchanged, despite hosting sports mega-events. In this context, the media and the host nation are often deadlocked. On the one hand, the host nation will continue to invest money in the media in the hope of receiving more
positive coverage, while the media will continue to publish stories of conflict that sell on the market, but which might end up harming the interests of the host nation.

Therefore, as this chapter suggests, an action research approach as exemplified by the Gambatte Project may be used both to ensure that the media and the host nation benefit from the relationship emanating as a result of sports mega-events, and to investigate the interests and motivations of stakeholders. The Gambatte Project demonstrated that different organizations involved in sports mega-event are driven by diverse interests. Although the issue of incentives is generally measured in terms of real or tangible benefits, the global appeal of sports mega-events allow organizations to invest in intangible benefits in relation to matters regarding imaging and brand identity. As the project shows, in the case of a developing nation, collaborative networks can be created which allow a variety of organizations to pursue their various objectives and market their brands via the media in relation to a sport mega-event. However, such a collaborative framework is most likely going to be short term in nature. In addition, stakeholders are most likely to resist the temptation of diverting substantial resources in support of a project from which continued returns are uncertain. In the case of the Gambatte Project, the stakeholders’ participation turned out to be minimal after the symposium was held.

Despite these limitations, the Gambatte Project managed to achieve some of its objectives. Firstly, the project assisted in creating a platform for dialogue between South African and Japanese organizations and interests. Secondly, the project played a small role in ensuring that the Japanese media spotlight on the 2010 South Africa World Cup continued. Furthermore, the project served to generate an alternative, less conflict-driven narrative of the issues affecting South Africa ahead of hosting the 2010 FIFA World Cup, providing the media with an opportunity for diversifying their content. Therefore, to conclude on a positive note, the Gambatte Project did manage to provide and disseminate positive information on the South African brand and the 2010 South Africa World Cup.
Thesis Summary and Conclusion

The thesis has defined sports mega-events as large-scale events held on a short-term basis, characterized by huge media interest, global supporters, imaging strategies, massive infrastructure development and tourism. In addition, the thesis has maintained that despite the interest in hosting sports mega-events, the costs involved to stage them are substantial. Moreover, the idea of an economic windfall from hosting these events is difficult to predict. Nonetheless, mega-events are often approached by host nations with an intention to achieve long-term and short-term objectives.

At the same time, the discussion shows that besides the arguments for tangible benefits from sport mega-events, there are also arguments for intangible benefits. In relation to this, issues relating to building a sense of national unity, pride, self-confidence and patriotism, were discussed.

This thesis has further argued that the concept of sports diplomacy forms an integral part of sports mega-events. International sports events such as the FIFA World Cup or the Olympics have developed into significant forces used to unite people, extend friendship, or show power. To illustrate this view, the thesis looked at FIFA’s decision to award the 1930 World Cup to Uruguay, the 2002 Korea Japan World Cup and the 2010 World Cup to South Africa. It has argued that FIFA’s decision to stage these events was influenced by the political, social and economic factors in these countries. Although there are obvious differences between Uruguay, Japan, Korea and South Africa in terms of their geo-political, socio-cultural and economic dimensions, there are also some similarities. First, all had emerged from conflicts, either internal or international. Second, they all approached the World Cup with the intention to boost their economies, to signal their arrival on the world stage, and also to foster peace and reconciliation. With regards to the 2002 Korea Japan World Cup, the thesis has demonstrated how co-hosting the event was crucial for accelerating cultural cooperation between the co-hosts. The event served as a platform for improving understanding and dialogue at the micro-level of social interaction. However, the fact that Japan was the first amongst the Asian nations to industrialize and was recognized as an economic superpower in the region by the
Western powers was used to extend its cultural capital in the rest of Asia. Though imperialism before the Second World War, and reparations and transfer of technology after, Japan historically played a key role in the development of Korea's economy. The ambiguity of Japan-Korea relations lies in the fact that, though their economies have been historically linked, the two nations have still found themselves locked in conflict over history, and have been faced with the challenge of how to create a degree of understanding between them.

The 2002 Korea Japan World Cup bidding process served as an arena where these historical disputes were revived. The events surrounding the bidding process that led to the co-hosting decision suggested that more diplomacy was needed between Japan and Korea if the two nations were to reach the stage of full normalization of relations between them. As this thesis has shown, it was the cultural domain of society that benefited the most from the co-hosting of the 2002 Korea Japan World Cup. Most of the cooperation between Japan and Korea was related to cultural exchange issues, cultural trade deals, and visits by politicians and members of the Japanese imperial family. It is at this level that the significant impact of co-hosting the event can be identified. It is often concluded in the sociology of sports that the peace or improved relations between social groups that result from sports mega-events are short term in nature. However, co-hosting the 2002 World Cup offered Japan and Korea an opportunity to interact and work together. Even though the political relations between the states continued to remain fragile, it was on the cultural level that the co-hosted event produced a positive impact. Co-hosting the 2002 World Cup helped to re-establish and accelerate cultural diplomacy between Japan and Korea. In that sense, co-hosting the 2002 Korea Japan World Cup will have long-term consequences for the two nations.

For South Africa, the event became a symbol of African development, post-apartheid South Africa and national pride. At the cultural level, hosting sports mega-events helps enhance national identity and social cohesion. In this case, the role of national symbols such as national sports, flags and other cultural symbols are crucial for instilling a sense of national pride. In the case of South Africa, this thesis has argued that under the apartheid regime, and even in the post-Mandela era, national symbols such as
rugby, cricket and football have continued to play a paradoxical role. On the one hand, they are seen as a potentially powerful force in uniting society, but at the same time, they are also seen as helping to perpetuate social inequalities. Sports in South Africa reflect challenges that the South African society has still yet to resolve. The field of sport was very much part of the apartheid system and reflected deep seated ideological and cultural differences between the social groups. Rugby and cricket historically represented the culture of the dominant group, while football represented the aspirations and the struggles of the dominated. At the heart of the apartheid system was an ideology of domination based on race. The divisions apparent in sport are also apparent in society; however, these divisions are no longer based solely on racial categorizations, but class has also emerged as a critical factor. This new class dimension in South Africa may represent a shift from apartheid classification based on race. Under the apartheid system, issues of identity and race underpinned the political economy of South Africa. Racial classification was applied as the basis of the allocation of economic, political and cultural capital. Therefore, although the soft power of sports diplomacy is crucial for bridging conflict and divisions between communities in South Africa, the success of the strategy also depends on the political and economic dimensions of society. Strong political will accompanied by economic progress are imperative in that regard. These would help ensure that the momentum of social cohesion resulting from hosting the 2010 South Africa World Cup is sustained in the long term.

The apartheid system was as much political and economic as it was cultural. It was based on basic principles of capitalism such as expropriation, accumulation and exploitation, with the intention of maximizing profits for the dominant racial group. Although race is still a factor in the country, issues of economic inequalities now dominate the political and social discourse. As a result, it is not surprising that most of the feasibility studies of the 2010 World Cup raised pro-poor arguments in relation to the potential benefits from hosting the event. However, this thesis has argued that an assessment of the nature and direction of the investment related to the organization of the event suggests that the results were largely positive in terms of the infrastructural legacy. This suggests that South Africa approached hosting the 2010 South Africa World Cup
seeking a balance between helping the poor and developing the economy and infrastructure. In developing nations, the infrastructural development surrounding sports mega-events follows a strong developmental agenda. This is consistent with Lakshman's findings that the significant contribution of hosting the 1996 Cricket World Cup was the infrastructural development. This statement is also true for South Africa and the legacy of the 2010 FIFA World Cup. The South African governments spent an estimated total of about R40 billion to finance the World Cup projects around the country.

The idea of using sports mega-events as a catalyst for improving basic infrastructure informs the decisions of many states to compete for these events. This is clearest in the case of developing nations, but can even be seen in the case of the developed nations, as shown by the present preparations for the Olympics in London. In the case of Japan, the country is internationally recognized for its advanced public transportation system in the form of urban subways, commuter trains, and express trains and highway buses linking major cities, in addition to a technologically advanced airport management system. From the point of view of capitalism, they provide better connections between market networks. An efficient transportation system, coupled with a highly skilled labor force, is a good basis for capitalist accumulation. A high level of infrastructural development on a scale similar to that in Japan is critical for the capitalist system in allowing opportunities for opening new markets and diversifying the economy. In addition, Japan used the World Cup to re-establish its place in the global hierarchy of nations by showcasing its level of development and the strength of its economy. Therefore, for developed nations, sports mega-events can be seen as addressing broader issues, including transforming the landscape, urbanization policies, testing new sophisticated technologies, boosting a growing sport industry, and improving tourism. In the case of developing nations, or developed nations redeveloping declining regions for an event, the sports mega-event agenda focuses on legacy projects such as improving basic infrastructure in the form of road networks and public transportation, and addressing safety and security problems. Therefore, the distinction between developing and developed nations in terms of their approach to sports mega-events lies in the nature and scope of infrastructure development related to the event.
As this thesis has demonstrated, infrastructure development is critical for a nation's competitive advantage on the political, economic and cultural levels. The questions of economic growth and competitive are interdisciplinary, and require research which adopts approaches from different fields. As a result, this thesis has used Porter’s model of national competitive advantage to show how mega-events can be used to stimulate economic growth and the host nation’s competitiveness, within the overarching framework of conflict theory, in order to understand how the economic processes entailed in sports mega-events affect society, in terms of benefits and loss. The questions highlighted here have dealt with issues of power, capital and inequality in the social order at both the national and international levels.

This thesis argues that developing nations and developed nations approach sports mega-events with different agendas in mind. Although the intention of both remains earning a profit from hosting a sports mega-event, there are great differences between them with regards to strategy and approach towards these events. In developing nations, hosting sports mega-events is often seen as the means to achieve a combination of economic and social objectives. The development of infrastructure is a critical factor, including the upgrading of roads, stadia development, developing technology, and strengthening supporting industries. Detailed analysis of the infrastructure development surrounding the 2010 South Africa World Cup supports the view that developing nations often approach infrastructure development linked to sports mega-events as a way to address broader social issues.

In relation to the 2010 South Africa World Cup, was the R40 billion infrastructural development price tag worth the benefits from hosting the event? From a national competitive advantage perspective, the benefits were widespread across the political, economic and social domains. On the political level, hosting the even helped the state improve its international standing. Unequal power relations between developed and developing nations characterize the modern world system. From this perspective, sports mega-events can be viewed as mechanisms that enable the states in the periphery and semi-periphery to compensate for their relative lack of economic power and influence in the international sphere that is dominated by the developed states of the core. Not long
after the end of the 2010 World Cup, South Africa began to be seen as the only African member of the “BRIC” nations, the emerging economies of Brazil, Russia, India and China. Through the 2010 World Cup, South Africa increased its power and influence within the African Union and other regional structure such as SADEC.

Simultaneously, hosting sports mega-events plays a significant role in the domestic affairs of the host nation. For the South African government, hosting the World Cup was used as a mechanism to consolidate power in the political sphere. It helped to bring certain critical issues to the fore and generate public debate about the state of the nation. One of the more positive impacts of hosting the 2010 South Africa World Cup was that it helped to expose the gap between the upper and the lower echelons of society. The gap between the rich and the poor is ever widening, and to compound the problem, there is a growing black middle class that has been emerging since the end of the apartheid system. Class in South Africa should be viewed as a pyramid: there is a small wealthy group at the top and a very large number of poor at the bottom. Although people from both groups have benefited from the processes of capitalism such as industrialization, globalization and the market economy, many more have still been excluded from participating fully in the economy despite the end of apartheid. The xenophobic attacks on migrants from other parts of Africa and the service delivery protests symbolize the growing social discontent in the country. However, despite this, a majority of the population believed that the state would deliver the infrastructure requirements of the World Cup on time. This acknowledgement suggests two things: (1) the population believes in the capacity of the state to deliver services; and (b) that the state is viewed as having enough capital to address the social needs of society. In other words, hosting the 2010 South Africa World Cup has helped to raise the expectations of the public, and thus put pressure on the government to address social problems with more vigor and urgency.

On the economic level, the 2010 South Africa World Cup infrastructure development in terms of the upgrade in the transportation network system and improvements in the realm of safety and security will have a positive impact in the long term. The improvement of public transportation will have an impact on development in urban areas and the regional economy. More importantly, it might contribute to the quality of life of
millions of people who depend on public transport to commute from their homes to centers of economic activity located in cities and suburban areas.

However, despite the positive social legacy of safety and security as a result of hosting the World Cup, there are also parallel political implications. Conflict theory views the police, the military and judicial system as instruments of the state established in order to protect the interests of the capitalist system. In its capacity as the protector and the key driver of the capitalist system, the state will rely on the upgraded police force, the military and the improved criminal justice system in its attempts to deal with the social conflict that arises as a result of the contradictions inherent in the capitalist system. This takes into account the historical context of South Africa characterized by conflict between different racial groups, classes and other divisions in society. These problems are still prevalent in post-apartheid South Africa and therefore the 2010 South Africa World Cup was critical as a strategy in addressing some of these challenges.

Equally significant is the long-term positive impact of the skill development initiatives that became a key feature of the 2010 South Africa World Cup. The program left the country with a more highly equipped and technically aware labor force. A cheap and skilled labor force is critical for the capitalist system in a post-apartheid South Africa that suffers from a severe skills shortage. The long-term implication of a highly skilled labor force is that it increases the chances for future economic growth. At the same time, the skill development programs make up for the short-term nature of the employment creation directly related to sports mega-events.

In terms of the improvements in the transportation system, this thesis maintains that the advance in this sector will help to connect the labor and the business centers much better that before 2010. More importantly, it is in tourism that many of the positive impacts from the infrastructure will be felt in the longer term. Issues relating to investment in the development of safety and security in the country are relevant for tourism in that improvements may have a positive impact on the image of the country. The issue of high crime rates in South Africa remains one of the most significant factors preventing tourism growth. As this thesis has demonstrated, a majority of the World Cup
tourists mentioned good infrastructure and the level of safety and security in the country during the event as a reason why they would return or recommend others to visit the country in the future. The results of the various 2010 South Africa World Cup impact studies clearly demonstrate that increased national pride and an improved image of the country were among the benefits from hosting the event. As seen above, a majority of the population thought both before and after the event that hosting the 2010 South Africa World Cup would mostly likely benefit a few people, but the social and infrastructural legacy left behind by the event was considered worth the investment. Therefore, although the 2010 South Africa World Cup may have cost the host nation a significant amount of money, the benefits that accrued are considered to be real, whether tangible or intangible. Tangible benefits refer to the infrastructure legacy, while the intangible benefits are in terms of cultural capital, greater national pride and unity, an improved image of the country, and the enhanced legitimacy and credibility of the state.

In addition, this thesis has discussed sponsorship of sports mega-events within the framework of the capitalist system and corporate investment in sports. Motivated by profits and with an eye on the global mass media, multinationals compete using their economic might to outbid each other in their pursuit for the expensive right to be an exclusive sponsor of the event. Issues of image and brand marketing are critical factors influencing the growth of sports sponsorship. As noted in this thesis, sports boast a large share of the sponsorship market. Sports events such as the Olympics and the FIFA World Cup attract huge investments from commercial brands that wish to derive value from associating themselves with these events. Sport’s ability to heighten consumer emotions and sports mega-events’ power to attract global audiences through satellite television and the internet are two significant factors behind the increased interest in sports sponsorship. As this thesis has highlighted, broadcasting fees are the fuel of the sports media rights business and form an integral part of the system of sponsorship for sports mega-events. The fees are paid by consumers to national broadcasters through licenses and taxation, or through subscription fees in the case of satellite and cable television. They are then paid to the networks, then to the international sports governing bodies, and finally that money is shared by those who own the rights.
The bidding wars witnessed in sports sponsorship are a reflection of the conflict between the dominant corporations and the smaller ones in peripheral positions in business hierarchies. As this thesis has pointed out, the increasing number of corporations bidding for sponsorship rights has resulted in a systematic increase in the sponsorship fees they have to pay to sports organizations like FIFA and the International Olympic Committee. Apart from the sports organizations wanting to limit the number of sponsors per event, the increase in sponsorship fees is consistent with the basic principles of capitalism in terms of creating economic monopolies and eliminating competitors.

Consequently, the situation has gave rise to a growing number of non-event sponsors employing alternative methods like ambush marketing to link their brands with an event they are officially not part of. As discussed earlier, this may include sponsoring national teams and/or individual athletes, or taking part in a global sport event organized by others. The thesis has argued that there is great ambiguity surrounding what constitutes ambush marketing and what does not. Furthermore, given the fact that there is no universal legal framework governing issues of ambush marketing, it is left to the international sports organizations, corporations and host nations to introduce legal frameworks to protect the economic interests of stakeholders. This may take the form of contracts or bylaws enforceable in the courts in the host nation and internationally. Looking ahead to the 2014 Brazil World Cup, it would be interesting to see what kind of marketing strategies are employed by official sponsors and ambushers alike. More specifically, the tussle between Nike and Adidas will be the one to watch. The former is not an official sponsor for the 2014 Brazil World Cup but rather is an official sponsor of the Brazil national team and other famous football organizations. On the other hand, Adidas is the official sponsor of the World Cup and may want to use that advantage to strengthen its brand identity and maximize its sponsorship value. Having said that, the commercial value of sports mega-events depends on the financial contributions of multinational corporations. The marriage between the two is considered to be the driving force behind the success of sports mega-events.

The thesis has further argued that sports mega-events have two distinct features: (a) their importance in terms of their broad tourism impact on host nations and their regions;
and (b) their power to draw the global media. From a tourism perspective, it was argued that branding, marketing and strategy development are some of the drivers behind sports mega-event tourism. Motivated by the prospect of attracting a global television audience, nations bid intensely for the right to host these events. The interaction between sports mega-events, the media and tourism has been described as the media-tourism complex. This notion holds that the three sectors exist in a mutually beneficial relation based on economic principles. However, as this thesis has demonstrated, the relationship between the media and tourism in the context of sports mega-event is paradoxical in nature and it is driven by conflict. On the one hand, the media have the power to influence opinion and perceptions about a destination. In terms of conflict theory, the media reflect the ideas of the dominant group, in this case, the views of the core states and large capitalist enterprises. This is problematic for nations in the periphery in their struggle to disseminate knowledge about their destinations and also in terms of spreading their cultural capital. On the other hand, the host nations drawn from the peripheral states still invest extensive amounts in the media with the hope for better coverage aimed at improving the public perceptions of the host nation. Therefore, despite the unequal relationship, the media still maintain their editorial freedom to report on any issue they deem fit while host nations can choose what they publish or present in the media.

Furthermore, the discussion noted that the dilemma inherent in the relationship between tourism and the media within the context of sports events could yield positive or negative results for either party, depending on the circumstances. On the positive side, the media could portray positive attributes of the host nation in terms of the level of infrastructure development, technology and democratic values. This was certainly the case in Japan during the 2002 World Cup, as the media coverage helped to reaffirm the host nation's level of safety and the sophistication of its infrastructure. On the negative side, the media may cover events that have the potential to expose the host nation's social ills, or weaknesses in the political and economic systems. This was certainly the case in relation to the media coverage of the 2010 South Africa World Cup. The discussion highlighted the fact that the event was being held in a country marred by international
concerns surrounding issues of crime, political transition and high levels of poverty amongst the majority of the population.

Therefore, this thesis has suggested that host nations from the developing countries ought to engage the media proactively by opening lines of communications through dialogue and access to information. This may have a positive impact on channeling the media to cover more stories that have the potential to advance the host nations’ marketing and branding agendas. For that purpose, the discussion examined the question of collaboration and network systems in tourism. This thesis maintains that the application of this model provides an easy understanding of collaborative efforts within sports mega-events tourism. The most critical factor is the notion that interested parties in the tourism domain make joint decisions about what measures to take in an effort to improve mutual growth. As a result, the discussion looked at a case study of collaboration and network systems between the South African Tourism office in Japan and the Japan Association of Travel Agents, highlighting issues pertaining to the nature and form of their joint tourism marketing initiatives. The discussion asserted that the two parties’ main aim in their collaboration and networking was to assist with branding issues and also attract tourists from Japan to attend the 2010 South Africa World Cup event.

Having said that, obstacles that prevented tourism growth and the attainment of the collaboration objectives were identified. Issues relating to South Africa’s lack of safety and security, the negative perception in Japan of Africa, and the reliance on so-called classic tours were singled out as major challenges in that regard. As a result, South African Tourism and JATA increased the level of cooperation through organizing visits to South Africa by leading industry journalists and tour operators, hosting workshops, attending tourism fairs organized by Japan, organizing visits by government officials, providing information to tourists via websites, and publication by their respective organizations. However, despite these efforts, a smaller number of Japanese supporters went to see the World Cup compared with those that went to the 1998 France World Cup and the 2006 German World Cup. This thesis has suggested that the significance of the 2010 South Africa World Cup should be viewed not in terms of how many tourists attended the event relative to other countries, but rather the emphasis should be placed on
the Japanese contribution to the total figure of tourist spending in the country during the event, given that tourists from Asia, and especially Japan and China, were among the highest spenders at the event. Therefore, although Japan does not yet fall within the core markets for South Africa tourism, the spending power of the Japanese market has the potential to change the South African tourism marketing strategy in Asia, which has thus far prioritized the Chinese market, to include special measures to attract more Japanese tourists to South Africa.

For future research, it would be interesting to examine the factors that caused such a low turnout for the 2010 South Africa World Cup. Furthermore, during the 2010 South Africa World Cup, each participating nation chose a city, town or village as their base for the duration of the event. Japan chose the city of George in the Northern Cape. A study looking at the question as to why Japan avoided larger cities for their training camp might be interesting to examine. The underlying questions may relate to how the Japanese authorities perceived the level of safety and security issues in George versus the suitability of the town as an ideal place to prepare the national team for the World Cup.

Finally, the discussion offered a model for studying how organizations and the media related to sports mega-events make use of small projects at the micro-level to generate coverage and reach new audiences. An organization’s motive for considering this type of method is often influenced by the need for marketing and public relations opportunities. This thesis applied an action research approach and the discussion referred to the Gambatte Project as an example of local initiatives involved in the marketing of sports mega-events. The project had at its core a collaborative framework that involved multiple stakeholders with different functions at different stages of the process. The project was established with the intention to assist the South African authorities in Japan with marketing and promotion of the 2010 South Africa World Cup in Japan. More specifically, the intention was to generate alternative and more balanced media coverage in Japan of news related to the 2010 South Africa World Cup.

The project was initiated against the background of negative media coverage in Japan about the preparations surrounding the 2010 South Africa World Cup. The analysis
showed that hosting sports mega-events in the case of developing countries allows the media and the host nation to enter into a reciprocal but yet conflict ridden relationship. On the one hand, conflict is perceived as the selling point for the media and conditions in developing countries are a breeding ground for conflict driven media content. In addition, the public appetite for conflict drives the commercial strategy of media organizations. On the other hand, host nations among the developing countries may want to avoid or play down news content that emphasizes conflict or the inadequacies of their political system and social structure. This was certainly the case with regards to the media coverage of South Africa in Japan. Therefore, based on this understanding, it clear that the media and the host nations often have conflicting motives in their relationship, and that the profit motive of the one may result in a loss for the other. In keeping with conflict theory, the analysis viewed the role of the media in society as an instrument of the dominant group and thus reflecting the views, values and aspirations of that group. Developing nations like South Africa are often viewed from the perspective of the core states that often characterize them as possessing problem economies and ineffective political systems. Therefore, it was against that backdrop that the Gambatte Project was established.

The main goal of the project was to act as a vehicle to link the Japanese media, South Africa and Japanese tourism policy makers and the political leadership of both countries. As a result, several stakeholders were identified and approached to form a collaborative framework for the purposes of sharing resources and expertise. The list included the South African embassy in Japan, South Africa Tourism (Japan), the ex-governor of Oita prefecture (Mr Hiramatsu), Emirate Airlines and Ritsumeikan Asia Pacific University. Having evaluated the potential benefits and risks that might accrue as result of participating in the project, these stakeholders decided in favor of taking part. The main incentives for the stakeholders were intangible in nature in that they included issues of marketing and publicity. As the discussion has shown, the Gambatte Project only managed to draw the attention of the media to the activities of the stakeholders in relation to the World Cup in South Africa but the project did not deliver any economic benefits to the participants in terms of increased sales. Therefore, their participation was based on
short-term motives and their goal was to gain as much media publicity as possible, and then move on to other activities once their objectives had been achieved.

Nonetheless, drawing on evidence about the impact of the 2010 South Africa, a World Cup report published by the South Africa tourism authority in December 2010 stated that the tourists who came for the World Cup cited newspaper articles, magazines, television broadcasts and promotional campaigns staged in their countries as the main sources of information concerning the event. Based on this assessment, it is possible that the Gambatte Project managed to contribute to an enhanced awareness of the image of South Africa. In addition, the project assisted the stakeholders in meeting their marketing and promotional goals. It also served as a platform for their campaigns and more importantly it served as a link to the media. Therefore, evidence from the Gambatte Project suggested that action research can be applied to the promotion and marketing of sports mega-events. However, in order to ensure effective participation and a broader impact, it is critical that stakeholders demonstrate their support for the project not only in terms of moral support, but also material support.

Suggestions for future research

As for future research, it would be interesting to see how the Gambatte Project model could be applied using a mixture of quantitative and qualitative methodologies in an attempt to refine some of the key concepts established in this thesis. Sports mega-events are by their nature complex and therefore require sophisticated methods of inquiry encompassing a wide range of theories from multiple disciplines.

With regards to the concept of sports diplomacy as applied in the case of Japan-Korea relations, it would be interesting to examine the content of Japan-Korea relations in terms of agreements and promises reached during the period of the 2002 FIFA World Cup and their development since. In the case of South Africa, it would be interesting to see how many jobs remained after the World Cup and what alternative employment the state managed to provide for the thousands of people that saw their jobs end together with the event. What are the other implications for the creation of South African identity and
national pride? How did the South African government deal with the high expectations from the public in terms of its capacity to deliver services as demonstrated by the delivery of the World Cup related infrastructure on time? On the regional level, it would also be interesting to examine how far the 2010 South African World Cup was an African World Cup, besides simply being staged on the continent. Answering some of these questions may help to expand the discussion of the concept of sports diplomacy and its role in providing solutions regarding complex global issues.

Equally interesting is the question relating to the social investment and the subsequent legacy of the 2010 South Africa World Cup with regards to issues of safety and security in the country. In this respect, an enquiry could be made into the question of what kind of impact did the increased size of the South African police force and the reformed criminal justice system have on helping the state to fight crime related to poverty such as theft. The study may have relevance in measuring the extent of the improvement or decline of the quality of life in South Africa and whether the state's efforts to narrow the gap between the rich and the poor are beginning to produce any real positive results.

In addition, looking ahead at the next FIFA World Cup to be held in Brazil in 2014, it would be interesting to see if Brazil adopts some aspects of the 2010 South Africa World Cup model in terms of transportation systems and safety and security planning. The two countries share some common social challenges in terms of the inadequate public transportation system, extreme poverty, high crime rates and high unemployment figures. Therefore, how Brazil deals with some of these issues in preparation for the 2014 World Cup will have serious implications for the success of the event. From a legal perspective, it can suggested that a legal system that is seen as independent, effective, and able to deliver timely and swift justice, has the potential to instill respect for the rule of law, encourage foreign investment, boost public morale, and create an opportunity for a productive and hard-working labor force. These issues informed the establishment and subsequent assimilation of the 2010 World Cup courts into the South African criminal justice system. It would be interesting to note if Brazil will adopt the same model to deal with crime during and after hosting the 2014 World Cup and the 2016 Olympics.
Nonetheless, the reputation of Brazil as the home of football, combined with its scenic beauty, may be crucial factors in attracting fans and thereby optimizing the potential for success of the two events.

**Recommendations regarding Action Research Methodology**

In terms of methodological approaches used to examine the impact of sports mega-events on the host nation, this thesis suggests that perhaps research in this regard should go beyond cost-benefit analysis to include other intangible factors such as public benefit and service delivery. In other words, the research in this respect should focus less on the questions of how much money was spent on the development of infrastructure and how much profit did the event generate. Rather, as this thesis maintains, the economic success of the event should be measured based on the nature of the projects the money was spent on and their implications in terms of contribution to society. This line of questioning will assist us to look deeper into the impact of the event by asking further questions, such as what facilities were developed as a result of hosting the events, and their geographical spread in terms of location and accessibility for the local communities. In this respect, the research would be able to begin to expose other sub-factors related to the development of the political, economic and social infrastructure of the host nation. In the case of the impact of the 2010 South Africa World Cup, relevant sub-factors relate to the number of police officers recruited, the quality of their training and development, equipment and other logistical necessities, where they are deployed in the post-event period, and the level of their involvement in the communities they serve.

With regards to the investment in upgrading the public transportation system, the questions must focus on the number of buses, trains and taxis introduced; the number of new roads built and their proximity to residences; whether the locations have a sufficient active labor force to utilize the new transportation systems; the number of public servants recruited to drive the system; and issues of access and availability of transportation. These questions may have significant consequences for the overall success of the event. This kind of approach may be useful in highlighting the distinction between event projects and non-event related projects that were fast-tracked as a result of hosting the
event. In addition, this model would allow us to assess the combined impact of the infrastructure development on economic growth and also on society in terms of contributing to the daily lives of the public.

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Appendix 1. The Gambatte Symposium

The following is a program of a symposium led by the Gambatte project in October 2008.

Venue: Ritsumeikan Asia Pacific University, Beppu, Japan.

Title: Fulfilling the African Promise in 2010: Learning from the Experiences of the Korea Japan World Cup 2002.

Spekears;

(a) Mr Monte Cassim (APU President) - Welcome and Opening Addresses

(b) Mr M Hiramatsu (ex Oita Prefecture Governor & 2002KJLOC Vice President)

Topic; 2002 Korea Japan World Cup: Challenges and victories.

(c) Ms (Global Marketing Manager; South Africa Tourism)

Topic; Preparations for the 2010 South Africa World Cup and its potential for the global promotion of South African tourism.

(d) Mr Dawood (Political Division; South African Embassy in Japan.

Topic; Legacy of apartheid and fast-tracking social and economic development in a multicultural society.

(e) Mr Sekgobela (Mpumalanga Tourism and Parks Agency; MTPA)

Topic; “Progress and Achievements of Host Cities in Preparing for the 2010 South Africa World Cup”.

(f) Japan Association of Travel Agents

Topic; Impact of 2002 Japan-Korea World Cup on tourism in Japan: Tourism services, experiences and opportunities.

(g) Emirates Airlines
Topic; The dynamics of sports sponsorship in relation to the FIFA World Cup and dangers of ambush marketing

*Theoretical Implications of the presentation lead at the symposium*

What do some of the presentations led at the symposium tell us about the concept of hosting sports mega-events?

(a) *Host City perspectives*

Through the Gambatte Project, the research managed to examine issues concerning the hosting of the 2002 Korea Japan World Cup from the perspective of one of the host cities, namely Oita City located in Island of Kyushu, Japan. The findings of the study showed that Oita City approached hosting the 2002 World Cup event as a strategy for urban rejuvenation and internationalization of the city. In that regard, the urbanization process was also influenced by the sports-mega event strategy. In most cases, constructions of new infrastructure related to mega-events are often in line with host city's broader economic strategy. For Oita City, the main ethos of the strategy was to establish the city among the major cities in Japan in terms of technology, commerce, foreign investment and also as a prominent venue for sports events. As a result, government resources were spent on upgrading roads, the airport, public transportation network systems, increasing accommodation, tourism development.

The analysis of the infrastructure development in Oita city is approached within the context of Mr Hiramatsu’s strategy introduced after 1979 whose goal was (1) to reform the industrial base of the city and; (2) to raise the standard of living of the population. As Castells and Hall (1994:112) note, Hiramatsu’s strategy was part of Japan’s Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (MITI) “technopolis program” in which power to generate new commercial technologies was transferred from big cities like Tokyo and Osaka to the peripheral regions in the country. According to Castells and Hall, Oita’s technopolis program was regarded one of the more successful in Japan and Mr Hiramatsu is credited with the success.
When framed under conflict theory, Castells and Hall's assertion exhibit the political economy of sports in Japan and the conflict between regional governments in the country for economic expansion and profit. The dominated regions exploit the contradictions in the capitalist system to demand for greater participation in the economy. Hosting sports events by cities in the core group has proved to accelerate development and had been a key factor for their rapid urbanization. Therefore, issues of struggle and domination are evident in the competition between different municipalities for right to host sports mega-events. The promise of profit and the prospect or and illusion of power, are the two driving force behind the conflict. According to Castells and Hall's suggestion, this was certainly the case in Oita.

As a result of hosting the World Cup, Oita city commissioned the construction of a new high-tech stadium to cater for the games. During his presentation at the symposium, Mr Hiramatsu pointed out that the development of the stadium was originally planned to cater for the national athletics meeting that was schedule to take place at a later date, but the project was brought forward when the possibility of hosting the World Cup games became more definite. His statement appeared to be consistent with the notion that hosting sports mega-events allows governments to fast track projects that would have otherwise taken more time to be completed. In addition, the conflict theory of sport considers questions of image and prestige to be critical. The application of sports events for improving the host cities image has been well documented (Horne, 2004). The construction of the stadium in Oita that hosted the World Cup games in 2002 is approached within the notion of “starchitects” as suggested by Ren (2009). The term refers to the growing trend amongst nations to hire in the technical expertise of highly skilled and internationally renowned architects or “starchitects” for the purpose of branding and marketing their cities. The underlying intention behind this kind of branding strategy is to increasing the economic value of the city or location where these structures are constructed. This thesis view the development of the stadium in Oita City as influenced by similar ideas.

Mr Hiramatsu mentioned that the city approached the 2002 World Cup as a means to mobilize the community and for instilling a sense of pride in the city. However, the
issue of branding remained the primary purpose throughout the strategy. He said the
discourse of community identity was used to brand the city. He referred to the strategy of
hosting national teams participating in the World Cup in small villages such as Nakatsue
as an example of the city's intention towards internationalization and building a social
community. Therefore, from a cultural viewpoint, Oita City approached the 2002 Korea
Japan World Cup to serve three main purposes: (a) it served as a ploy to increase the
support base for Oita Trinita Football Club; (b) it was also used as a strategy to attract
media attention to the city and (c) for instilling a sense of local pride in the city. On the
economic level, hosting the event formed part of a long-term economic strategy,
motivated by the goal to rejuvenate Oita Prefecture as a whole. From a football business
perspective, the new stadium was earmarked to benefit the Japanese professional football
league in the long term. Mr Hiramatsu pointed out that he had foreseen the need to
maintain the use of the stadium after the World Cup had ended and thus he became a
prominent figure in the formation of a local football team called Oita Trinita to compete
in the J-League and use the stadium as its home ground. To prevent the stadium from
becoming a white elephant, the formation of the local team to utilize the venue was
significant in that regard.

As this thesis has stressed through the discussions, there are significant differences
and shared similarities between developing and developed nations in terms of their
approach to sports mega-events. Looking at the experience of Mpumalanga as one of the
host cities for the 2010 South Africa World Cup, this thesis argues that developing
nations turn to emphasizing an extensive developmental agenda in their approach to
hosting sports mega-events. The World Cup held in South Africa had placed special
emphasis on improving basic infrastructure, job creation, skill development and pro-poor
tourism strategies. The goal was to improve the country's economy, renovate the ailing
Apartheid infrastructure and, more importantly, bring economic relief to the majority of
South Africans facing high unemployment rates and extreme conditions of poverty.
Therefore in that sense, hosting the 2010 South Africa World Cup appeared to have been
influenced by the government’s need to address the issue of social justice in the country.
Underneath that strategy, lies a critical political consideration on the part of the state in
terms consolidation of political power and legitimacy. The infrastructure development and the jobs created as a result of hosting the 2010 South Africa are two key factors in the legitimation process of the state. Moreover, hosting the World Cup was significant as symbol of power and instrument of continued domination of the national political arena by the Africa National Congress.

Speaking at the symposium organized by the Gambatte Project, a representative from the host city of Mpumalanga, Mr Sekgobela (2008) stressed that the development of infrastructural projects in Mpumalanga between the period 2004 and 2010 was carried out for two main reasons, firstly to meet the short term World Cup requirements as specified by FIFA, and secondly as part of the broader national agenda on economic growth. For example, during the preparations for the World Cup, the city needed to improve its roads and the public transportation system in order to increase mobility for the thousands of football fans traveling to support their national teams. In their effort to address the problem, the local government adopted a regional approach, taking into account the economic development of the local communities. More specifically, the city constructed road-interchanges from the main 2010 World Cup attractions at the confluence of various roads that could be used for feeder services to the surrounding townships. In addition, the interchanges were planned with a long-term view of establishing growing nodes of economic activity in Mpumalanga.

In terms of similarities between Oita City and Mpumalanga in relation to hosting their respective World Cups, the question of regional development strategy was the most obvious. As earlier explained, the local government of Oita City employed a strategy of incorporating small villages in the World Cup planning by using them as hosts for the participating national teams. The idea was to ensure that the benefits of hosting the event were spread across the Oita Prefecture. Although the national team of Cameroon was the only one that had a base in the prefecture, three other national teams came with their supporters and spend few days in the city due to the games during the group stages. On the other hand, Mpumalanga host city's regional strategy focused on benefiting neighboring countries such as Mozambique and Swaziland. The goal was to spread the tourism opportunities that accrued from the 2010 South Africa World Cup. In that
respect, the two countries assisted the host city by providing extra accommodation in terms of hotels and other related facilities. In return, South Africa offered their tourism industries a chance to share the tourism benefits that might accrue from hosting the World Cup. Since the World Cup exist within a capitalist modern world system, issues of economic inclusion versus exclusion factors are considered to be relevant. Both in the case of Japan and South Africa's World Cups, the patterns were consistent with capitalist tendencies of encouraging social inequalities in the name of opening new markets and maximizing on profits. In the end, new social divisions are created and the old once are perpetuated.

(b) Sponsorship perspective:

*Sports sponsorship as an integrated marketing strategy: Emirates Airline's and the FIFA World Cup*

Numerous studies agree that brand image and brand awareness are two main reasons behind why corporations enter into sponsorship deals (Walliser; 2003, Tripodi;2001, Irwin and Sutton;1994, Cornwell;1995). In terms of sponsorships related to sports mega-events, issues of global brand marketing are important. As Mr Kazuhisa Tanaka (2008), the Emirates Airline Sales Manager (Western Japan District), explained, his company viewed the FIFA World Cup sponsorship agreement as a perfect medium for achieving an integrated communication strategy. Supported by a global television audience, sports mega-events guarantees exceptional presence for sponsors across the world. The global nature of sports mega-events serves as a vehicle to generate new sales and distribution channels. The relationship between corporations and international sports organizations is applied in accordance with principles of global capitalism and commodification of sports events. The profit motives influence the alliance and the media-technology provides the platform for reaching a global audience.

On the other hand, an onsite sponsorship activity at the games’ venues allows sponsors to build customer relations by physically demonstrating their corporate values directly to the market. Therefore, sponsorship of sports mega-events provides
corporations with an opportunity to reach their target market in an environment of their choice. For Emirates Airline, the sponsorship of the FIFA World Cup is intended to position the airline as a global player along with other FIFA partners. The airline's association with the World Cup event is viewed as a strategy to gain an advantage over competitors. Especially when considering the congestion of the market and the similarities between the products, the question of exclusivity then becomes important. In most cases, sponsorship of sports mega-events offers corporations the exclusive right to market, advertise and publish any material related to the sports event. This allows sponsors to be able to differentiate themselves from others in terms their products and prices. More importantly, that also assists to entrench the domination of certain corporations in the sports market.

For its sponsorship of the FIFA World Cup, Emirates Airline marketing strategy put special emphasis on the fact that it is the first airline company to be a FIFA World Cup sponsor. The objective of Emirates sponsorship is to boost brand awareness and to educate the public that the airline is one of the leading international airlines. This thesis asserts that sponsorship allows corporations to engage in activities that fall outside their daily practice or line of businesses. This is regarded as a critical factor for adding value to the brand. For example, associating the Emirates brand with the FIFA World Cup allows the airline to have direct contact with sports fans and thus have an opportunity to attract new customers and to build loyalty and trust amongst old ones.

As previously discussed, a sponsorship contracts often runs for a specific time period and usually give rise to legal obligations and rights. In this respect, corporations are obliged to pay a certain sum of money in return for rights to associate their products with the sponsored event. In terms of sponsorship for the FIFA World Cup, the amount involved is usually substantial and the rights awarded in return cover a wide range of issues. With regards to Emirates Airline sponsorship of the FIFA World Cup, the company invested 195 million (USD) and the agreement covers three World Cup events from the 2006 German World Cup, 2010 South Africa World Cup and the 2014 Brazil World Cup. The rights that emanates from the sponsorship deal includes advertisement on stadium perimeter boards, merchandising, use of official marks including emblems.
and mascot, global integrated marketing activities which included worldwide ad campaign, commercial displays (viewing experience at 16 airports around the world), hospitality programme (tickets give away and exclusive travel package), global PR support system, media (internet, tv and radio broadcasts). Therefore, it clear that Emirate Airline aims to reap marketing benefits from its association with the FIFA World Cup and in turn position itself as closer to its target market. Finally, the Emirates interest in sports sponsorship highlights the growing economic value of the industry and the importance corporations’ places on this lucrative market.

Applying conflict theory in this context, this thesis asserts that the sponsorship trend demonstrate interesting structural conflict between various corporations as a result of the growing economic disparities between them and the economic exclusion element inherent in sports sponsorship deals. Sponsorship agreements give rise to legal rights that are protected by international legal frameworks. In addition, sports organizations also require host nations to introduce national legislations intended to protect the economic interest of their sponsors. The legal system and the police institution act as guardian of the exclusive rights. In conflict theory, this analysis illustrate how other social institutions like the police and the judiciary, are use by the state and the dominant group to protect their interests. The underlying implication is the maintenance of the existing social order under capitalism. Therefore, sports mega-events are relevant for the orientation and navigation of the state, corporations and the international sports organizations, in capitalist modern world system.
Appendix 2. The 2010 GAMBATTE PROJECT

Executive Summary

The 2010 Gambatte Project is a joint venture between Bheki Hlabane (facilitator and coordinator), the South African Embassies in Japan and Ritsumeikan Asia Pacific University (APU). The project has two main objectives:

To increase the level of understanding and cooperation between Japan, Korea and South Africa in the realms of government, business and society;

To increase the tourism volumes from Japan and Korea to South Africa for the upcoming 2010 South Africa FIFA World Cup and beyond;

The project plan is to host a series of 2010 South Africa World Cup awareness and promotional campaigns in the major cities of Japan and Korea for a period of two years (2007-2009). The ideal period to launch the project is the end of February 2008, just before the 2010 World Cup qualifying rounds involving Japan and Korea begins;

A market survey which will be conducted jointly by Bheki Hlabane,Phd (facilitator), Ritsumeikain Asia Pacific University and Dentsu (Japan leading marketing and advertising company and FIFA 2010 World Cup official broadcaster for Asia) will form an integral part of the campaign. The data collected will be used to measure the project’s success and at the same time to inform decisions about Japan-Korean market leading up to the 2010 World Cup. Also in recognizing the importance of learning from the experience of the 2002 Japan-Korea World Cup in terms of hosting marketing and promotional campaigns, Presence Co Ltd, a small event management company based in Fukuoka, that hosted several events before, during and after the 2002 Japan-Korea World Cup, will assist in promotional events for the survey;

Through the contribution of APU, Presence Co Ltd, and the government-business-media network both in South Africa and Japan-Korea, the 2010 Gambatte Project will
be able to host campaign events in strategic places including bilateral functions and business conferences (Japan-Korea-South Africa), football stadiums, hotels, shopping malls, JR stations, national land-marks, national music and cultural festivals. The main idea is to use the exchange of culture between South Africa, Japan and Korea as a means to convey our message about South African tourism opportunities, culture and the 2010 FIFA World Cup;

To minimize costs and at the same time maintain quality and efficiency, it is proposed that the official sponsors of FIFA and the 2010 World Cup should share the financial burden of this project by aligning it with their Corporate Social Responsibility functions. The idea is to group sponsorship with specific themes or concepts in all three levels of the project. I strongly believe that Corporate Social Responsibility can be a very powerful marketing tool if applied strategically. Strategic application of Corporate Social Responsibility in this instance imply we look into (1) ethical/moral issues; (2) legal right to operate; (3) brand image and brand loyalty. Therefore, the 2010 Gambatte Project is potentially a win-win situation for all stakeholders and should help ensure that the first FIFA World Cup to be held on the African continent will leave a lasting impression on the world.

**The Name of the Project**

The project will be known as The 2010 Gambatte Project. “Gambatte” is a Japanese phrase which is used to express good wishes or good-luck to another person or group. The term is also used to encourage a person or group to do their best or try harder in an activity they are doing.

Therefore, for the purpose of this project the phrase “Gambatte” is used to encourage the following:

- The South African World Cup Local Organizing Committee to organize a world class tournament;
- The South African Tourism industry to prepare a wonderful reception for 2010 World Cup visitors;
The Blue Samurai and the Red Devils in their quest to qualify for the 2010 South Africa World Cup;

The Japanese and Korean business sectors in their quest to take advantage of the opportunities Africa has to offer;

The respective governments on their road to mutual cooperation and understanding;

FIFA in their social responsibility projects in Africa;

The thousands of World Cup Fans in Japan and Korea in their preparation to travel to South Africa in 2010.

**Objectives**

To undertake research which will assist in improving the development and delivery of South African tourism;

To develop and implement effective marketing and publicity initiatives to increase the Japanese and Korean markets for South African tourism, and contribute to the overall success of the 2010 South African World Cup event;

To improve Japanese and Korean perceptions of Africa;

To develop creative concepts targeting market segments with the highest growth potential;

To increase the opportunities for and awareness of other FIFA events leading up to and during the 2010 World Cup event;

To deliver a high quality 2010 awareness campaign in Japan and Korea that meets target market needs, wants and expectations, as outlined below
To enhance communication between all stakeholders, including sponsors, government, and sports federations, and increase awareness of co-operation and development initiatives;

**Enabling Objectives**

To co-ordinate and collect data (research-survey) in a consistent manner so that the result can be analyzed and used for the benefit of all stakeholders;

To introduce world-class campaign concepts that are flexible in order to target groups that have the potential to develop the South African Tourism market;

To develop and implement benchmarking of tourist satisfaction for all 2010 South Africa World Cup visitors from Asia region;

To help promote ethics of best practice during the 2010 South Africa World Cup and FIFA Fair-Play policies for quality and assurance about Gambatte 2010;

To develop and implement a communication strategy ensuring that all stakeholders are aware of all the activities of Gambatte 2010;

To work with all stakeholders in building a partnership for Gambatte 2010 based on confidence and trust.

**The Stakeholder Participation Matrix**

Figure 1 outlines the different levels of cooperation that should be reached with all stakeholders in different stages in the development of the process. The illustration table also shows what activity or role each stakeholder will play and for what purpose.
Figure: 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level of Involvement</th>
<th>Stakeholder</th>
<th>Activity/Role</th>
<th>Results/Purpose / Overall objectives</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Leadership</td>
<td>Coordinator</td>
<td>Coordinate all activities of the project between all stakeholders.</td>
<td>Produce a quality PhD thesis.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Design campaign concepts and themes.</td>
<td>Assist preparations for the 2010 South Africa World Cup.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Use media network to maximize campaign coverage.</td>
<td>Ensure that the 2010 World Cup is truly an African event by involving African students in Japan and Korea as volunteers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Work closely with Presenters to create a world class campaign.</td>
<td>Assist in projecting a positive image of South Africa and the African continent.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Advise/Consult</td>
<td>APU</td>
<td>Advise/supervise APU PhD program.</td>
<td>Produce a quality PhD thesis.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Provide volunteers for the project.</td>
<td>Prepare for hosting a 2009 World Summit on Football World Cup and social development.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Assist in securing government owned venues/locations such as JR Stations/Airports etc for activities.</td>
<td>Strengthen corporation with the Japanese/ Korean Ministry of Education and Ministry of Sport.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partnership and Financial Support</td>
<td>Embassy</td>
<td>Assist in campaign events.</td>
<td>Increase level of awareness and education about South Africa.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Liaison with LOC and SA Tourism Ministry.</td>
<td>Create a positive image of Africa.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Provide financial resources for the Gambatte 2010 South Africa World Cup project.</td>
<td>Increase South Africa’s Tourism advantage looking forward to 2010 World Cup.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Prepare for 2010 South Africa World Cup by establishing new partnerships with Fan clubs and Foreign Embassies.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**The 2010 Gambatte Project Plan**

The next two-and-a-half years are the time to raise public awareness about South Africa and 2010 World Cup. The aim of the 2010 Gambatte project is to use the local media’s interest in the project to improve public awareness of preparations for the 2010 South African World Cup. As a result, the project proposes to host event campaigns around Japan and Korea at three levels:

1. **The Cultural level:** at Dept Stores/JR Stations/Airports/ Five Star Hotels/ Celebrity Functions/National Annual Music Festivals/ Cultural festivals.

   Target Market: Non- Ticket Holders

   Concept: Promote South African culture through music, games, art and other activities as a mechanism to achieve our 2010 South Africa World Cup objectives.
2. Second level- Japan /Korea - National Football Team Qualifying Matches: 2010 South Africa World Cup (Home-ground matches only).

   Target Market: World Cup Ticket Holders

   Concept: To set the mood of the 2010 South Africa World Cup. To support and wish the Blue Samurai and the “Red Devils” good-luck in their qualifying matches and to let them know that they are welcome in South Africa for the FIFA World Cup tournament.

3. Third level- collaboration on campaigns/events with South Africa Tourism and the South African Embassy in Japan and Korea

   Target Market: Business and Government. Marthinus van Schalkwyk, the SA Tourism Minister, recently told a business conference in Cape Town that there is a “significant crossover [between the business market and] … the leisure market, with 18 percent of business travelers going on tours prior to their business activities while 22 percent do the same afterwards (and) on average each spent three times more than those who came here on holiday." With regards to inter-governmental relations, the strategy is to enhance cooperation for the purpose of the 2010 World Cup. For example “the Korean Embassy in Germany set up a promotion hall in downtown Cologne June 9th to feature various displays and events promoting the image of Korea as a nation.”

   Concept: To use the experience of the Japanese in terms of the way they marketed their 2002 World Cup to assist the 2010 marketing efforts of the South African tourism in Japan and the office of the embassy. In this respect, the Gambatte project would organize, produce and host promotional campaigns related to the 2010 South Africa World Cup. According to Themba Maseko (CEO-GCIS) “the experience of other countries that have hosted major events like this has important lessons for us if married with our own perspective and character”. Therefore working with Presence Co Ltd (a Japanese company) and the Beppu Project (a Non-Profit-Organization) will draw on experience and a network that will ensure that we produce a cost effective, creative and professional campaign. Drawing on their contacts and experience in terms media, musicians, producers, event organizers, commercial brands and other role players, will ensure that we organize a high-quality campaign
The Research Survey

During the 2006 German World Cup, the Local Organizing Committee (LOC) and the German National Tourist Board introduced a similar campaign in the Middle East with the aim of promoting a better image of Germany as a travel destination before, during and long lasting after the FIFA World Cup 2006 (Travel-video TV). However, the Gambatte project is more dynamic in that it involves different stakeholders playing different roles at different stages of the process. In addition, the research survey will be conducted in parallel with the project with the aim of collecting and analyzing data for marketing decision-making and feedback on the campaign. More importantly, the data will be used to measure the success of the campaign and to update the 2010 World Cup planning for the Japanese and Koreans market. The survey will attempt to address questions related to the following issues:

1. Public knowledge about South Africa and its culture;

2. Public awareness about the 2010 World Cup;

The dynamics of the Japanese/Korean soccer fan market.

The survey is also part of my work in the Ritsumeikan Asia Pacific University PhD program and therefore the question design and analysis will be the responsibility of APU. However, suggestions and recommendations with regards to the survey design will be welcomed from all interested parties.

The 2010 Gambatte 2010 Project weaknesses

The project is starting up on zero capital;

The project may have too many stakeholders playing different roles and feedback might be limited, making room for leaving out important details;

Setting the agenda for the 2010 South Africa World Cup and at the same ensuring that the 2010 World Cup objectives and the project objectives are met will result in an expensive campaign;

The campaign will be running against the background of negative international media coverage about the preparations for the 2010 South Africa World Cup;
The project also relies on the participation of the FIFA Official sponsors in their Corporate Social Responsibility capacity; however there is a danger that these corporations might solely use the campaign for their commercial and marketing interests.

The 2010 Gambatte Project strengths

The coordinator’s previous research, a comparative study (APU Masters Thesis: Sociology of Sports Mega-Events: 2002 Japan-Korean World Cup experiences, 2006 German World Cup and 2010 South Africa World Cup) provides a solid theoretical and practical foundation for the Gambatte project;

Team cooperation will ensure diversity and division of duties/functions covering a range of issues in achieving our common objectives;

The office of the Embassy does not have a project of this kind running at the moment; therefore there will be no duplication of projects. Also the Gambatte project offers the Embassy a solution to their problem of a lack of personnel/staff to run such a project effectively themselves;

The results of the research survey will assist the South African Tourism Department to prepare better for the Japanese and Korean 2010 World Cup visitors;

The involvement of stakeholders will ensure access to information and locations normally only granted to in case of special need;

The Coordinator and Presents Co have already started negotiating and communicating with other interested parties such as television stations (CTB Media, OBS, Digital TV (Oita), Yahoo JP, Fukuoka- fm (Radio), Oita –fm (Radio), Cross-fm (Radio), shopping malls, hotels, national annual music event organizers, national community projects and J-league football clubs. These activities have been going on since 2006 October and some verbal agreements have been reached already. This is a significant achievement in that it shows that the project is one step ahead
in the implementation process; although verbal agreements are not very secure, however they may form a basis for future concrete agreements;

The FIFA Corporate Social Responsibility Office and its director, Mr. Federico Addiechi, have been contacted and discussions with regards to defining the extent and how FIFA can get involved in the project together with 2010 World Cup Official Sponsors are still ongoing;

Teaming up with Presents Co confers advantages because the company has experience in running campaigns of this nature leading up to and during the 2002 Korea Japan World Cup. A network of business, media, musicians, and football fans has been established over the years and that will prove to be a big plus to the project.

**Conclusion**

To ensure the success of the 2010 South-African World Cup, it is important for South Africa Tourism (Japan/Korea) to expand current tourism marketing strategies by slowly introducing new initiatives designed to assist meeting the 2010 South Africa World Cup objectives. In that regard, it is equally important that the South African Embassies in Japan and Korea fulfill their obligations to the FIFA World Cup event by taking advantage of the opportunities to market South African tourism in their respective countries. The 2010 Gambatte 2010 Project is designed to assist in promoting South Africa, creating a new image of Africa and at the same time creating awareness about the first FIFA World Cup to be held on African soil. In that light, the Gambatte project will recruit 12 African volunteers from 12 African countries to work with other Japanese and Korean volunteers as guides during the campaign. Education and Training will be provided for the all the volunteers by 2002 World Cup trainers and by Ritsumeikan Asia Pacific University. The idea is to ensure that development and training for African students is encouraged in order to fulfill the African Legacy program. More over, the 2010 Gambatte Project aim to use to promote both unity and development in the continent using the 2010 soccer tournament as a catalyst for change in Africa.

On January 2007 African ambassadors in Korea met in a workshop organized by the United Nations World Tourism Organization to promote effective tourism projects to fight poverty and promote development. It is against this background that the 2010 Gambatte Project is proposed to assist in communicating the 2010 World Cup message to
the Japanese and Korean public. The aim of the project is to host a series of 2010 World Cup awareness campaigns with cutting edge themes in major cities in these two countries. The idea is to run the campaigns for a period of two years (September 2007-September 2009) targeting both football fans and non-football fans alike. The aim is to increase the volume of tourism for the 2010 World Cup tournament and beyond. In addition, the campaign will showcase South Africa’s beauty, culture and scenery through special 2010 South Africa World Cup video footage designed for promotional purposes. Furthermore, through collaborating with the Japanese and Koreans event and projects organizers, the Gambatte 2010 project plans to invite South African artists (musicians/artists/dancers, etc), business and government to form new partnerships through music concerts and business seminars that fall within the local events calendar.

Of course, running such a campaign has financial implications. Funding of the project will involve outsourcing of services and collaboration with many organizations and people. However, the high costs involved in successfully running the project should not deter us from fulfilling our objectives and achieving our goals. In an effort to minimize costs and at the same time produce a world-class campaign befitting FIFA World Cup status, the Gambatte project proposes to synergize the activities and efforts of all FIFA World Cup Official sponsors in their quest to fulfill their Corporate Social Responsibility obligations. In other words, these corporations will be invited to host joint ventures and thereby share the financial responsibility of the project by offering certain services or sponsorship.

It is imperative that we recognize from the onset that this approach is not new nor is it unique because it has been a common practice or strategy applied in previous World Cup promotional campaigns. However the 2010 Gambatte project stands apart from previous World Cup promotional projects by virtue of its aims and objectives and the fact that the 2010 World Cup is indeed a FIFA social responsibility project. The President of FIFA Mr Sepp Blatter has said in many occasions that the 2010 World Cup will be approached as a social responsibility project for the development of Africa and African football. This view has also been expressed by Ferdi Cilio, the FIFA CSR Director, in his many addresses to the 2010 Official sponsors, urging them to get more involved with that kind of approach in mind. These developments have prompted the Gambatte 2010 South Africa Project team to begin to communicate with all FIFA World Cup stakeholders with the aim of sharing the financial burden involved in the project.
To ensure the success of the project, the co-coordinator, Bheki Hlabane, has assembled a team that has a lot of experience in event management and tourism in the Asia Pacific region. In addition, members of the team ran similar campaigns during the 2002 Korea Japan World Cup or have vast knowledge of the target market. It is proposed that the team should include Presence Co Ltd, the South African Embassies in Japan and Korea, and Ritsumeikan Asia Pacific University. The Project is the next step to building friendship and cooperation based on mutual trust and respect between Japan and Korea on the one hand and South Africa on the other, looking ahead to the 2010 South Africa World Cup.

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264


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