



**CORRUPTION IN GOVERNMENT ORGANS OF
THE KYRGYZ REPUBLIC AND WAYS OF
DECREASING ITS LEVEL BY USING
INTERNATIONAL EXPERIENCES**

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List of Abbreviations

ADB	Asian Development Bank
CC	Control of Corruption
CE	Council of Europe
CIS	Commonwealth of Independent States
CPI	Corruption Perceptions Index
CPIB	Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GE	Government Effectiveness
ICAC	Independent Commission against Corruption
ICT	Information Communication Technologies
KGZ	The Kyrgyz Republic
NGOs	Non-government Organizations
NSC	National Statistic Committee
OECD	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
OGP	Open Government Partnership
PV	Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism
RL	Rule of Law
RQ	Regulatory Quality
TI	Transparency International
UN	The United Nations Organization
UNCAC	UN Convention Against Corruption
VA	Voice and Accountability
WB	World Bank
WBG	World Bank Group
WGI	Worldwide Governance Indicators

Abstract

The report explores corruption in the government offices of the Kyrgyz Republic. It has two objectives, firstly, to determine the real situation of corruption in the government offices by finding their causes; secondly, to find suitable ways to decrease the level of corruption in the government offices by using international experiences. Qualitative explanatory research methodology was used in the form of a case study for the first objective and comparative study for the second objective.

The causes of corruption were found not only inside the government offices but also outside the government offices that are very closely interrelated and complement each other. A set of measures are recommended to eliminate causes of corruption in the government offices. These measures are based on successful international experiences of several countries (Hong Kong, Singapore, Georgia, Japan and India).

Chapter 1: Introduction

“A Central Asian country of incredible natural beauty...”, these are the first words which are introducing The Kyrgyz Republic in the World Factbook (2012). This statement is really the essential part of the country, which has many beauties of the nature. And this feature is the Kyrgyz Republic’s pride. However this peculiarity does not reflect actual picture of what happening in the Republic and its society.

The Kyrgyz Republic is landlocked country with total area 199,951 sq km. It has borders with China, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kazakhstan. “The Natural resources are abundant hydropower; significant deposits of gold and rare earth metals; locally exploitable coal, oil, and natural gas; other deposits of nepheline, mercury, bismuth, lead, and zinc” (Factbook, 2012). Main ethnic groups are Kyrgyz 64.9%, Uzbek 13.8%, Russian 12.5%, Dungan 1.1%, Ukrainian 1%, Uighur 1%, other 5.7%. Religions are Muslim 75%, Russian Orthodox 20%, other 5%. The population is 5,496,737 as to 2012 est. (Factbook, 2012). According to Article 1 of the Constitution of the Kyrgyz Republic (2010) “The Kyrgyz Republic (Kyrgyzstan) is a sovereign, democratic, legal, secular, unitary, welfare state”.

After the collapse of the USSR the Kyrgyz Republic gained its independence in 1991. Its first steps aimed to build democratic modern country with market economy. Nevertheless during the period of transition, it has been becoming in worse situation than it was during soviet period. Conducted reforms could not reach the desired

goals. It happened because of the huge number of faced obstacles in all spheres of life activities. After 21 years of independence, it is possible to name some of them with confidence. Unprofessional reforms in the state structure, poor governance, and high level of corruption are some of the main obstacles, troubles and issues of the country's failures. Two so-called revolutions, in March 2005 and in April 2010, are evidences of it. Corruption, poor governance and high prices were primary reasons of the revolutions. According to analysis of administrative reforms made by Baimyrzaeva (2011, p. 22) those factors were one of the main causes of the revolutions; she states that "image of reforms has been tarnished by several governance challenges including entrenched corruption and a host of political and economic problems". She mentions that 2005 turnover, when first president of the Kyrgyz Republic Akaev escaped, was the "first major sign of the tension" (Baimyrzaeva, 2011). After Akaev left, Bakiev came with his promises to solve all problems, especially corruption, however, he failed and in April 2010 people revolt against him and his regime. The most dramatic part of April 2010's event is that 86 people lost their lives (Baimyrzaeva, 2011). Another research indicates that people and opposition were tired from "the greed of the ruling families and endemic government corruption" and those factors forced them to go out to the streets (Temirkulov, 2010). Also Johan Engvall (2011) concludes that "when corruption reaches the level it has in Kyrgyzstan, the state is doomed to fail". Actually corruption and poor governance by parity of reasoning are complementary and generating each other. Also during demonstrations in two revolutions people were

blaming rulers for high level of corruption not only among them and their confidants but also in the government offices. They were shouting that all government officials became totally corrupt and uncontrolled.

Therefore the main purposes of this report are to explore corruption in the government organs of the Kyrgyz Republic and possible ways of decreasing its level by clarifying real situation in the country and successful international experiences. First objective is to detect real situation of the corruption in the government offices, and find out what types, shapes and forms it has. The government organs in the report mean the Government of the Kyrgyz Republic, in other words executive branch of the country, according to Article 83 of the Constitution of the Kyrgyz Republic (2010), which states that “The executive power in the Kyrgyz Republic is exercised by Government, subordinated to it ministries, state committees, administrative offices and local state (municipal) administrations.” Next objective is to explore ways of decreasing level of corruption in the state organs by using international experiences. It means to find out practical tools, methods, mechanisms, in other words, how, by what, who and what kind of actions can be done in the Kyrgyz Republic and what experiences of other countries in fighting corruption can be applicable in the case of the Kyrgyz Republic in order to reduce corruption level.

It is a well-known fact that each country in the world, no matter developed or developing, has corruption issues. Corruption issues have always been present during the history, but in different times it has its own peculiarity. In the contemporary history of the world, so-called globalization period, people, countries, international

organizations started to pay a huge attention to this problem. And it is an expected attitude, because everyone realizes that corruption is one of the main destructive obstacles to the all spheres of life, processes of development and prosperity of the country. It also makes real obstacles against rule of law, democracy and human rights, economic, political and social development of any society. In present world nobody can say that their country has no corruption at all, rather the level of corruption in a country can be high or low, how efficient a country is conducting policy against corruption, how it is able to control it. That's why international organizations, dealing with corruption issues, usually rank countries as low level of corruption or high level of corruption.

Today there is a huge number of researches which were made on corruption, and many findings show us that corruption became one of the leading problems everywhere. Its consequences are harmful and sometimes destroying. Great efforts in researching corruption are made by different international organizations. It is necessary to see some of their official stances and statements. As stated by the United Nations (UN) corruption is a crime against development, prosperity, justice, democracy, environment, health and education (2011). According to International Monetary Fund's researchers Tanzi and Davoodi (1998): "corruption can reduce growth by increasing public investment while reducing its productivity; can reduce growth by increasing public investment that is not adequately supported by nonwage expenditure on operation and maintenance; can reduce growth by reducing the quality of the existing infrastructure; can reduce growth by decreasing the government

revenue needed to finance productive spending.” Also President of the Asian Development Bank (ADB) Haruhiko Kuroda during his speech on International Anticorruption Day stressed that “corruption is a disproportionate tax on the poor and a deterrent to inclusive growth” (Report to the President: Office of anticorruption and integrity. Annual report 2011, 2012).

By viewing on the World Bank Group’s (WBG) Updated Strategy and Implementation Plan it is seen that corruption is a symptom of weak, ineffective or bad governance (WBG, 2012, p. 7). Poor governance and corruption in procurement invariably reduce development outcomes and are likely to discourage foreign direct investment (WBG, 2012, p. 31). Corruption increases the cost of doing business, especially for micro- and small firms that pay larger shares of their sales in bribes, and it may lead firms to exit. (WBG, 2012, p. 36). Poor, weak, or ineffective governance and corruption undermine efforts to reduce poverty (WBG, 2012, p. 70). Also the 2011 World Development Report demonstrates, where corruption is considered as one of the global threats, the impact of corruption on governance and development across the developing world (WBG, 2012, p. 48).

In addition to the international organizations, many other scholars underline the negative outcomes of corruption. According to Roberta Ann Johnson (2004), “corruption demoralizes the human spirit and it wastes opportunity, energy and resources”. Rose-Ackerman (1999) underlines that corruption is a worldwide phenomenon, limits investment and growth, leads to ineffective government and creates economic inefficiencies and inequities. It is necessary to mention that it is

very difficult to promote democratic values parallel with corruption, as Bowen (2003) after exploring corruption in Japan mentions that “corruption hurts democracy; voters stop voting; they sever their ties with political parties, and generally avoid involvement in civic affairs”. Also, corruption influences politics by short-circuiting the connection between the electorate and its representatives, corruption can cause civil unrest (e.g., China, the Ukraine, Kyrgyzstan) and is associated with poor government performance (S.Brown, Touchton, & Whitford, 2011, p. 1516). Another scholar Karklins (2002, p. 32) shows that “corruption undermines good governance and democracy”, and citizens start not to “trust state and political institutions” and suffer from weak governance.

What to say, if corruption nowadays has its impact on people’s happiness, according to the World Happiness Report 2012 the levels of perceived corruption in government has the powerful effect on the happiness of nations (Helliwell, Layard, & Sachs, 2012, p. 69). For example, “comparing the top four happiest to the bottom four countries, people are less likely to perceive widespread corruption in business and government (33% vs. 85%)” (Helliwell, Layard, & Sachs, 2012, p. 13). Also according to the World Happiness Report’s analysis (2012, p. 92) “corruption in government is a major cause of unhappiness in many countries, and needs to be rooted out”. Actually the Kyrgyz Republic is on the 102nd place among 156 countries in this report. But this report does not see the corruption as the major indicator for happiness.

To see the real picture, it is necessary to look at the data provided by several organizations, which purposefully exploring corruption issues in the world. One of those is Transparency International (TI), it annually provides report Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI), which ranks 183 countries based on how corrupt their public sector is perceived to be (TI, 2011). Scores range from 0 - highly corrupt to 10 - very clean (TI, 2011).

According to Transparency International Corruption perceptions index 2011, the Kyrgyz Republic is ranked (Table 1) as 164th among 183 countries with the score 2,1, and 18th in the region among 20 countries. That means that the country is highly corrupted, and this virus has already spread in all spheres of the country's life.

Table 1. The rank of the Kyrgyz Republic in the Corruption Perceptions Index 2011 (TI, 2011).

Rank in the world (183 countries)	Country	Score	Region Rank (20 countries)	Region	Sources	Confidence range
164	Kyrgyzstan	2.1	18	Eastern Europe and Central Asia	8	2-2.3


Another organization which explores corruption is the World Bank. It conducts the research on corruption through the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI). As mentioned above, WBG views corruption and governance linked to each other very closely, and it sees correlation between them, in other words if governance is weak and ineffective, corruption level will be high, and vice versa. WGI consist of 3 areas each of them has 2 indicators, totally six indicators of governance covering over 200

countries since 1996 (Kaufmann, Kraay, & Mastruzzi, 2010), they are Voice and Accountability (VA); Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism (PV); Government Effectiveness (GE); Regulatory Quality (RQ); Rule of Law (RL); Control of Corruption (CC) (Kaufmann, Kraay, & Mastruzzi, 2010).

Through 6 indicators in the WGI it is possible to see on what level and in which situation is the Kyrgyz Republic.

From the table 2, it is seen that during period from 1996 till 2010, almost all indicators became worse, especially if we take period from 2005 till 2010, which clearly shows that the country has a weak governance. And we can see that VA, RL, GE and CC have the same dynamics, because all these indicators are very close correlated to each other. The negative progress of VA, RL, GE and CC during 2005-2009 caused the revolution in 2010. As a result from the latter one, the PV in 2010 dramatically decreased.


Table 2. Comparison of WGI of the Kyrgyz Republic from 1996 to 2010



Source: Kaufmann D., A. Kraay, and M. Mastruzzi (2010), The Worldwide Governance Indicators: Methodology and Analytical Issues
 Note: The governance indicators presented here aggregate the views on the quality of governance provided by a large number of enterprise, citizen and expert survey respondents in industrial and developing countries. These data are gathered from a number of survey institutes, think tanks, non-governmental organizations, and international organizations. The WGI do not reflect the official views of the World Bank, its Executive Directors, or the countries they represent. The WGI are not used by the World Bank Group to allocate resources.

Also according to WGI the Kyrgyz Republic is on the lowest position in the world, and has the worst control of corruption both in comparison with the same income category countries (Table 3.) and in the regional aspect (Table 4.).


Table 3. Comparison of WGI – Control of Corruption with the same income categories countries in 2010.



Source: Kaufmann D., A. Kraay, and M. Mastruzzi (2010), The Worldwide Governance Indicators: Methodology and Analytical Issues
 Note: The governance indicators presented here aggregate the views on the quality of governance provided by a large number of enterprise, citizen and expert survey respondents in industrial and developing countries. These data are gathered from a number of survey institutes, think tanks, non-governmental organizations, and international organizations. The WGI do not reflect the official views of the World Bank, its Executive Directors, or the countries they represent. The WGI are not used by the World Bank Group to allocate resources.

Table 4. Comparison of WGI – Control of Corruption with the countries in

the region in 2010.



Pursuant to data from the 2 organizations, the Kyrgyz Republic up to now turned to be one of the most corrupt countries in the world with the weakest governance. Corruption became very serious problem in the country; even President of the country Almazbek Atambaev during his speech on March 2012 to the Defense Council stressed that corruption became one of the dangerous threats to national security of the country. What to say if the top persons of the country realize that corruption with its devastating effects to the Kyrgyz Republic took place in the same position as terrorism, drug trafficking and other threats. But actually it was a well-known factor and everyone in the country knew and knows its consequences.

For the Kyrgyz Republic it is very important to deal with the corruption very effectively and find best ways to decrease its level. Realizing the problem of corruption, it is necessary to put all efforts of every person in the country. Thus, it is fair to say that this report is significant and can make its contribution in the process of decreasing the level of the corruption.

Usually before researching any issue, it is necessary to define it. However, in the case of corruption there is still no unified and general definition, which can cover this issue fully. Maybe therefore it is commonly described as phenomenon by many scholars. Nevertheless each country and each international organization has its own definitions. According to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) “there are as many different definitions of corruption as there are manifestations of the problem itself. These definitions vary according to cultural, legal or other factors. Even within these definitions, there is no consensus about what specific acts should be included or excluded” (2008, p. 22). Actually it is true that corruption in each case may have different forms, peculiarities and explanations. It is important to mention that even the corrupt behaviors are defined individually, because each country has its own values, traditions, cultures, history, geographical situation, resources and many other differences, which can influence on the whole picture of corruption. But it is also fair to say that corruption in each country has many common features. As Rose-Ackerman mentioned that “there is one human motivator that is both universal and central to explaining the divergent experiences of different countries. The motivator is self-interest, including interest in the well-being of one’s family and peer group” (1999, p. 2). Hence today one definition is dominating in the international community with small differences. For example definition of corruption is given by Transparency International. TI uses it, as the starting point or better to say as the basis for their policy, evaluations, researches and other activities. TI defines corruption as “the abuse of entrusted power for private

gain” (2009, p. 14). Another example is the OECD, which uses two types of definitions, which are also used in the UN Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC). First, the OECD Glossaries (2008, p. 22) gives the definition of corruption in criminal law, but in a fact the OECD, the Council of Europe (CE) and the UN Conventions do not define corruption; they just “establish the offences for a range of corrupt behavior”. The second definition of corruption the Glossaries gives for policy purposes, and underlines that political definitions of corruption in the world are almost the same, and the most often used one is “the abuse of public or private office for personal gain”. It stresses that this definition probably will be useful for development of policies, strategies and prevention measures (OECD, 2008, p. 22). In most cases international community refers to the definition of corruption as abuse or misuse of entrusted power, public or private office for personal gain, so this report refers to this definition when it talks about corruption.

Today it is also difficult to talk about types, forms, varieties and manifestations of corruption. There are so many of them in the world, almost each case has its own shape. It is not surprising because corruption is mutating every time under different conditions. Just some examples of different variations of corruption are grand, petty, political, systemic, endemic, pervasive, parochial, pecuniary, sporadic, routine, trivial, bureaucratic, administrative, “state capture”, without theft, with theft, conditional, regional, a fact of life, a way of life, by outside forces, by the state itself and many others. Of course some of them are common and it is possible to find them almost everywhere, but some of them unique. And still it is possible to find and

explore other new types. Sometimes corruption in particular cases can include several of types and be mixed. Thus, the report will not try to adapt existing types of corruption for the corruption in the government offices of KGZ, as it can be peculiar, so there is a possibility to find something new.

To sum, it is clear that corruption nowadays is very flexible. Nevertheless there are many international attempts to find and implement unified approaches to it. However, in reality, when it comes to particular country, sometimes those approaches cannot work. It is logical because every community is unique and has its own peculiarities. Therefore it is better to have individual approaches; it can be in the regional aspect or in each country separately.

Considering all above-mentioned factors, the focus of the report is to explore how the corruption in the government offices of the Kyrgyz Republic is look like, to draw the whole picture of the issue by identifying present causes of corruption in the government offices of the Kyrgyz Republic, and to find ways to decrease the level of corruption by eliminating causes of corruption.

The report consists of several chapters. The literature review chapter includes summary of the previous researches made on corruption in the region of post-communist countries and the Kyrgyz Republic (KGZ) itself. Chapter 3 is fully devoted to the methodology of the report. Chapter 4 is discussion and analysis of the situation of the government corruption in KGZ. The fifth chapter includes ways of decreasing the level of corruption by comparing practical experiences of other countries, which can be used in KGZ. And last chapter is conclusion.

Chapter 2: Literature Review

One of the main goals of the report is to identify the shape of the corruption in the state organs of the Kyrgyz Republic. In order to reach the goal this chapter is divided in two parts. First part is on corruption in the post-communist countries, which is review of books, articles and reports concerning the situation in the region. There are several reasons of exploring corruption in the region. First, these countries have many common features, such as history, political culture and so on. Second, peculiarities of corruption are also similar. Third, a better understanding is given under regional context, thanks to a variety of such researches. Becker, Egger, & Seidel (2009) discovered that “with few exceptions, corruption is a regional phenomenon; it spreads from one country to its neighbors and more generally, the degree of spread decreases with geographical distance between regions identified by common political culture”. Second part is on corruption in the Kyrgyz Republic, which includes researches that reflect the particular case in KGZ and show real situation, condition, shape and causes of the corruption.

2.1. Corruption in the post-communist countries.

Post-communist countries are former member-countries of the USSR and Warsaw Pact, countries situated in the Eastern Europe and Eurasia, including Central Asia and Caucasus, which sometimes called as countries in transition. The Kyrgyz Republic is considered to be a part of this region. All former USSR countries, which

are the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) members, had more similarities among them than between other Baltic and Eastern Europe countries. Hence, the literature review in this part covers the region, which includes only CIS member-countries. After the collapse of the USSR almost all of them were in the same position and faced many identical problems in creating and forming new democratic modern states. International community's approach to these countries in order to assist them in building democratic, free market societies was more Western based. However soon everyone realized that it would be tough work, because they faced many difficulties and specific issues in changing old norms and forming new states. One of those difficulties was the growth of corruption level in each sphere, which was difficult to control and deal with.

Karklins in her article "Typology of Post-Communist Corruption" (2002) discusses that "a decade after the transition from communism began; corruption is the chief obstacle to democratic and economic progress in the post-communist region". In her article she stresses that governments have been doing few things to improve the condition of corruption, and people "feel helpless and see themselves as being played for fools. Many cynically believe that in order to get along they have to "play the game" - that "the System" compels them to do so". She points that post-communist corruption includes many sub-types, some of which are institutionalized, and that both petty and grand corruption take place in the region. She underlines that corruption in many of its manifestations is similar in the world, but in the post-communist states is distinctive, because they had monopolies in political, economic

and social spheres during communist regimes. Karklins points that data from the post-communist region show low levels of public trust, democratic legitimacy, and rule-of-law credibility. According to her research the typology of Post-Communist corruption includes first, low-level administrative corruption, which is displayed by bribery of public officials to bend rules; deliberate over-regulation, obfuscation, disorganization; using licensing and inspection powers for extortion. Next self-serving asset stripping by officials or in other words grand corruption, which is exercised through diverting public resources for civil servant spoils; mismanagement and profiteering from public resources; profiteering from privatization; malpractice in public procurement; nepotism, clientelism, and “selling” of jobs (Karklins, 2002). And last is “state capture” by corrupt networks, which is displayed by de facto takeover of public institutions for private business or criminal activity; forming collusive networks to limit political competition; undermining free elections through slush funds, hidden advertising, etc.; misuse of legislative power; corruption of the judicial process; misuse of auditing, investigatory, and oversight powers; using special information for political blackmail and coercion; corruption of and in the media (Karklins, 2002).

In another work, Karklins (*The system made me do it: Corruption in post-communist societies*, 2005) investigates the corruption in the post-communist societies, where she states that the most harmful corruption is the systematic acts that go beyond wrongdoings by individual citizens or officials. Also, she stresses that “dominant political habits are linked to unofficial “rules of the game”, which again

tend to take on a systematic nature”. About the social aspect in the region, Karklins (2005) says that people in the post-communist region rely on networks of friends and peers to get things done, and that they themselves often use the term “system” when they refer to corruption, in the sense of what it constitutes and also when they make excuses for themselves by saying “the system made me do it”.

According to her researches, it becomes clear that the corruption in the post-communist countries occurs both at a low and high levels of politics and bureaucratic interaction, usually public officials initiate the corrupt acts, which involves a network and became systematic. It is based on the network, where unofficial rules dominated among officials, and even where corruption acts, defined as crimes, became commonplace and perceived as normal or even necessary habit.

Brower (2001) examines the reasons for corruption and its impact on the process of democratization. He states that “faces” of corruption may vary from country to country and have differing realities, but its roots lie in several factors leading to misuse of public office that are relatively similar, and that these factors especially share the unique “face of corruption” in the former Soviet countries”. He says that both civil servants who receive small wages that cannot cover the living expenses and the oligopolies that dominate the post-Soviet markets are creations of corruption. Another contribution to the spread of corruption is a weak civic culture (Bowser, 2001). Also he in details examines the influence of cultural aspects in the widening of corruption in the region such as thinking that corruption is an unavoidable part of life in the countries, which is reflected by the attitude like

“everyone does it” (Bowser, 2001). The report shows that the use of “clans” or social networks, which typifies post-Soviet clientism, nepotism and cronyism, is often not viewed in a negative light, and that the ethical and honest members of public administration are considered to be too naïve and a part of prevailing system (Bowser, 2001). He underlines that the widespread system of informal social networks, based on achieving goals or “getting things done” form essential factor in the corruption. Also he underlines that the strong regional (between the North and South) and ethnic aspects of the country facilitate corrupt practices. Another factor pointed in his report is misperceptions of corruption, where a public perception of corruption is limited to “grand” corruption. According to him kleptocracy is an outcome of chaotic markets, which created common thinking that “if all property is theft, then the best way achieve property is through theft”, and this perception brings civil servants in rent seeking for public services. He says that society in general is being separated from the system of governance and “hour-glass” societies are being created in which those that govern are far removed from those that are governed (Bowser, 2001).

To sum Browser’s findings, it is seen that main reasons of widespread corruption are low wages of civil servants, oligopolies trying to control markets in the region, weak civic culture, and cultural aspects such as social networks, which are reasons for clientism, nepotism and cronyism, strong regional and ethnic division, misconception of corruption, and other defective common beliefs.

Two other scholars Iwasaki and Suzuki (2012) describe the situation of corruption in the post-Soviet countries as “in the process of systemic transformation to a capitalist market economy in the post-communist countries, corruption began to take place more for self-interest than as a socially necessary evil in the former socialist states. This started to occur mainly due to a faltering enforcement of law and weakened police authority as well as generally poor living conditions against the background of a culture of abuse nourished in the socialist life”. In their paper, they empirically examined the determinants of corruption in the region by using panel data covering almost all transition economies in the world. As a result, they state that a centralized administrative system can become a hotbed of corruption and the stronger the “institutional inertia” (or historical path-dependency) of the communist regime is, the more serious the corruption problems are in a country.

In addition to above mentioned researches, the problem of corruption particularly in the post-communist countries was explored by Holmes (2009). He shows some specialties of the issue. He states that as with crime generally, many cases of corruption are never reported in the region; and that the problem is redoubled, because the victim of corruption is often an abstraction (‘the state’, ‘society’), and hence will not report crime. He shows other several facts of not reporting corrupt acts; such as citizens’ fear of being charged themselves, lack of trust in the authorities, and a perception that the authorities are ineffectual. Also according to him, educational levels can also affect the frequency of reporting; better-educated people are more likely to report crime than less educated people. His next statement

(Holmes, 2009) is that the communist legacy or the “ghost from the past” can explain the culture of bureaucratic corruption and the tradition of organized crime in some states. Also he underlines that many officers of the state were seriously underpaid, making corruption a more attractive proposition than it would have been under better circumstances. In short, it is seen from his report that the tradition of misperception and lack of knowledge of corruption, interrelationship between state and market, historical impact, and low wages of civil officers are the main causes of the growth of corruption.

Next research, made by Cheloukhine and King (2007), covers only Russia, not the whole region, but it can reflect the overall situation in the region, because many post-Soviet countries usually copy development approaches made by Russia, and in fact consequences are similar. Therefore, many issues are almost identical, with small deviation in specific factors. According to Cheloukhine and King (2007), low salaries, lack of social guarantees at retirement and legal vulnerabilities are the factors causing corruption. They stress the impact of unsustainability in getting work, where bureaucrats sometimes got their positions for just two-three month of probation period and could be thrown out. Other important finding in their research is the existence of a buying and selling of positions in the government, from a minister and a chief of a department to the secretaries. As Cheloukhine and King note, the price vary widely, which depends on functions and duties of positions. In addition, they explored the corruption networks, which they define as “the patron-client relationships form certain networks of individual ties between officials and particular

corporate interests in commercial and financial spheres”. Their report indicates that these connections involve the bribing of a particular bureaucrat in the interests of a specific organization, or usually officials must join a network for receiving certain permanent profits of the organization instead of bribes. Also their crucial finding is that the corruption networks are formed both vertical and horizontal. According to them the vertical relationships are informal and illegal interdependences between bureaucrats within one organization. The horizontal ones are between different agencies and other structures. They show that the nature of corruption in Russia is based on the system of social relations, and that this system has close relations with other social relationships that make corruption a systematic factor. They underline that the danger of contemporary corruption is in the existence of extensive and steady corruption networks which not only profit by their illegal activities, but invest in further corrupt developments, and that this demonstrates how difficult it would be to attempt to counteract the problem. To summarize, the report shows that corruption is caused not only by low wages, bad working conditions and permanence of the work of public officials, but also by the widespread and strong corruption networks both vertical and horizontal between different members, with buying and selling positions. Also the report underlines how deep nowadays corruption networks are rooted in the government institutions, and that their main purpose is not only to gain temporarily profits from different corrupt acts but to invest and develop further sustainable corrupt developments (Cheloukhine & King, 2007).

From the abovementioned reports it is possible to make out that corruption in the post-communist countries, as in the whole region, has its own shape. Basically, the corruption in state organs of the region is generally caused by low wages of civil servants, creating opportunities for corruption acts; cultural aspects, such as historical background from communist regime, misperception of corruption, vision of corrupt acts as normal everyday attitude and the part of the system, and social networks (family, friendship, same region and etc.); self-interest or self-enrichment. The main features of the corruption are bureaucratic links between existing corruption at a low and high levels of public officials; corruption networks both vertical and horizontal, based on unofficial rules, and with purposes of making money through corrupt acts and future development of them.

2.2. Corruption in the Kyrgyz Republic.

In order to see factually what kind of corruption is in the government offices of the Kyrgyz Republic, this part includes a number of reviews of previous researches conducted on the issue. Actually many researches have been made in different period of time by both citizens of the Kyrgyz Republic and foreigners, and during the review it is possible to see that the corruption in state organs in KGZ both has similarities during the period and has been changing and mutating or developing. The main purpose is to get them together and to assemble the puzzle of the corruption in the state organs of KGZ. The review of literature is shown in chronological order.

Today many researches were made by the World Bank, which examines corruption in each country from the view of business sector and shows under what conditions the country is. The World Bank scholars, Hellman, Jones, and Kaufmann (2000) state that some firms in transition economies have been able to shape the rules of the game to their own advantage, at considerable social cost, creating a “capture economy” in many countries. According to them, in the capture economy, public officials and politicians privately sell underprovided public goods and a range of rent-generating advantages separately or “a la carte” to individual firms. They differentiate three types of relationships between the firm and the state - state capture, influence and administrative corruption. “State capture is defined as shaping the formation of the basic rules of the game (i.e. laws, rules, decrees and regulations) through illicit and non-transparent private payments to public officials. Influence refers to the firm's capacity to have an impact on the formation of the basic rules of the game without necessary recourse to private payments to public officials. Administrative corruption is defined as private payments to public officials to distort the prescribed implementation of official rules and policies”. So they found that within the CIS, the high regional average is driven by the very high levels of administrative corruption in the Caucasus countries and Kyrgyzstan, and that in KGZ, defined as a high capture economy, more than a quarter of the firms surveyed reported a considerable impact of state capture on their business. Next almost similar analysis is made by scholars of the World Bank, Anderson and Gray (2006), which focuses on the period from 2002 through 2005 and shows that firms reported increases in the frequency of bribery in

the Kyrgyz Republic in 2005, and that the Kyrgyz Republic continued in 2005, as in 2002, to have the worst corruption indicators of the 33 countries surveyed. They found that firms in KGZ reported a worsening situation on the corruption as a problem for business, and that the country in the region stayed on the highest level of unofficial payments of firms to get things done. They state that the Kyrgyz Republic faces a big challenge in addressing the problem of administrative corruption. According to them in 2005 it rated first among all countries surveyed in the frequency of bribes, second in the level of the amount of bribe, and second in the extent to which corruption is a problem for business. Moreover, two of the three indicators—the frequency of bribes and the extent to which firms see corruption as a problem for business—increased from 2002 to 2005. Another research of the World Bank (2011) covering the period from 2005-2008 shows that the Kyrgyz Republic, as it was in 1999, remained as a country with most severe corruption problems in 2008. The frequency and volume of “kickbacks” necessary to obtain government contracts increased in the Kyrgyz Republic from 2005 to 2008 (WB, 2011). Corruption ranked as the second biggest problem for firms in the country (WB, 2011). According to the report (WB, 2011) bribe frequency fell in 23 countries, including KGZ, but despite this progress, bribe frequency is still more widespread in the Kyrgyz Republic than in any other country in the Eastern Europe and Central Asia region. Report (WB, 2011) makes clear that still the Kyrgyz Republic has the highest administrative corruption in the region.

Another scholar Cokgezen (Corruption in Kyrgyzstan: the facts, causes and consequences., 2004) states that “low income level, massive state intervention, weak democratic institutions, poorly operating legal system and the cultural background of Kyrgyz people provoked corruption in Kyrgyzstan”. He stresses that during reforms government officials’ wages had declined dramatically, so these circumstances created situation where civil servants could not resist bribe offers. He indicates that corruption in KGZ is stimulated by an inadequate use of the regulatory system; improperly investigated and sentenced corruption cases; and weak enforcement despite existence of adequate laws. Another factor is cultural structures, “strong, informal and traditional links among friends, family and clan members and in society”, promote and justify corruption activities (Cokgezen, 2004). He gives an example of the effect of the traditional system of respect in the society so-called “Urmat system”, where one needs to respect elderly and high-ranking people, and if one receives favors from them, he or she will have sense of obligation and is required to repay favors received. He notes that “the police (internal affairs officers), customs, courts and prosecutor offices are found to be the most corrupt bodies in Kyrgyzstan” (Cokgezen, 2004).

Next report (Koichumanov, 2004) indicates that “analysis of socio-economic situation in the Kyrgyz Republic, made by international experts, shows that the main obstacle for reforms today is ineffective state management, consequence of which is the growth of shadow economy and corruption”. Koichumanov states that increase in public officials’ remuneration alone does not necessarily lead to decrease of

corruption level in state organs. He suggests that often small group of the high-level officials causes more damages from the view of corruption than wages, as they create favorable conditions for corrupt acts. His other statement indicates that level of corruption will decrease, if recruiting, promotion and dismissal in civil service are based on meritocratic approach. Also he says that there is an assertion that the incentive for corrupt behavior in the state organs of KGZ appears when officials have unclear duties and few responsibilities (Koichumanov, 2004).

The research, conducted by Sydykov (2007), is more specific; it explores criminological aspects of abuse of public office in the Kyrgyz Republic. His report is mainly based on judicial statistics. He states that a few perpetrators in the crime of “abuse of public office” appear in the courts, but among those only some of them, mostly low-level officials, are sentenced to the real criminal penalties. According to his analysis, crimes of “abuse of the public office” are committed mostly in the sphere of law enforcement – 38%, tax and customs – 40 %, and economic activities of the state organs – 11%. This situation, he says, is because of the inadequate regulations, lack of supervision and control of personnel and activities, and improper fulfilment of office duties by officials in these spheres. Also his analysis shows that the majority of the subjects of these criminal acts are men (82%) in their ages 30-49 (53.4%), 37% of whom are low and middle level officials. And 54% of subjects are with high education degree. Those perpetrators, as a rule, previously not convicted, and positively characterised in their jobs. He says that the motives of committing these crimes are often self-interest and fear of responsibility for shortcomings in their

works. He also underlines that most of the convicted persons for abuse of public office are people with family (66%); the reason is the desire to make the life of their family secure, accommodated and fed, which pushes the government officials to commit this crime. Also report shows that law enforcement forces solve very few cases of abuse of public office, despite the real indicators on them, which is due to lack of professionalism of officers and that these organs are by themselves highly corrupted. Finally he underlines that over the years of uncontrolled public activities, officials created mechanism of committing crimes of “abuse of the public office”, which allows them to escape judgement in courts, and that everyday manifestations of corruption have already become an integral part of the social reality of the Kyrgyz Republic.

Another research (Zagainova, 2007) shows that the post-communist countries, as a group, are considered among the most corrupt in the world. Zagainova indicates several origins of post-communist corruption such as an excess of bureaucratic control and the absence of private property in the Soviet system, which in turn gave rise to clientelism and shortage. And she also argues that the networks of multilateral barter and illicit exchanges, which were tolerated by the authority, have fostered the development of corruption. Another origin was that Soviet administrative and economic elites overlapped, and were sometimes embodied in the same person: one day a man was a head of the committee of the city party and next day he was a mayor or director of a company. As a result informal networks mixed Party’s representatives, directors of companies, and civil servants, which contributed to the

modern system of clientelism (Zagainova, 2007). In her report she shows that during transition non-transparent privatization and imperfections of the institutional system open the way for creating favourable conditions for corruption. Zagainova found that the ex-Soviet countries in Central Asia and the Southern Caucasus are the most corrupt, and that the reason is the closeness of economic and political systems with the old communist structure, which correlated with a persistent high level of corruption. In her research she divides countries in 4 groups, endemic corruption, bureaucratic corruption, political corruption and virtuous countries. According to her findings the Kyrgyz Republic is in the first group, endemic corruption, which is characterised by strong bureaucratic corruption, significant state capture. In the group of countries with endemic corruption the concentration of political power makes obstacles against the emergence of institutional reforms (Zagainova, 2007). She underlines that the countries suffering from endemic corruption are principally least advanced in marketization and institutional reform, and that economic liberalisation has created new conditions for bribes. In addition she states that “political corruption increases in strongly concentrated political systems and that governments corroded by political corruption have little motivation to self-regulate, since beneficial conditions will be foregone, which is reflected in statistics showing little change in levels of corruption after more than ten years of policy initiative, and fifteen or so years of transition” (Zagainova, 2007).

Research made by Spector (2009) analyzes “how some bazaar owners in Kyrgyzstan acquire and secure bazaars”. Bazaar means market in the Kyrgyz

language. She describes the Kyrgyz Republic as an “oligarchic, patrimonial system” of government. She found that in the absence of reliable rule-of-law institutions, successful owners of bazaar seek to penetrate the state itself by entering patronage relationships with office holders and running directly for office themselves, and that many of them are active in politics as Parliament members. She stresses that informal social and political networks between business and the state, or in other words, informal patronage-based relationships, are more significant than formal rule-of-law institutions in the country, and that informal relationships and access to formal institutions such as Parliament are the tools to have and secure private property.

Analysis of administrative reforms in the Kyrgyz Republic, made by Baimyrzaeva (2011), shows that “poorly informed and hastily designed reform interventions, such as privatization, conducted with limited capability, transparency, accountability, and oversight of government actions, facilitated emergence of covert corrupt networks in the country”. And the power and influence of these networks were speedily reinforced. According to her analysis quickly conducted reforms of government created institutionalized corruption in the country, where business elites started to use political offices to influence economic and regulatory policies, to create favorable conditions for their businesses as well as to secure immunity from persecution. Baimyrzaeva stresses that low salaries and high turnover among government officials made them see their positions as an instrument for improving their own economic interests. To talk about turnover, her analysis indicates that the frequent replacement of civil servants became a common practice, because almost

every new political appointment drives to replacement of a civil servant in a given agency or unit. She underlines that despite the existence of legislative documents for civil servants, implementation of them was just on the paper not in the practice, and most reforms of government affected low level officials, but not high officials, where the problems, such as duplication of functions exist. In addition, her report indicates that extensive patronage networks, very low salaries, replacement of experienced civil servants by people loyal to the authority, inconsistent and frequent changes in legislation, political instability, and endemic corruption in the state organ are the main obstacles for setting up a professional merit-based civil service. Also she states that during Akaev and Bakiev's ruling periods, their families involved in extensive corruption by selling and reselling government institutions as a source of "rent," and raiding or "reiderstvo" were widespread. Her other finding is that the accountability gap between government, politicians and public allowed presidents and their followers to systematically and continuously use the public administration system and new reforms to serve their own private interests. Finally, she notes that high ranking politicians do not want to implement necessary administrative reforms because changing bureaucratic system to meritocratic and transparent one would damage a resource of political rents for private gain (Baimyrzaeva, 2011).

"Our state is not able to fight against corruption in the country, not because it is impossible to do it, and not because of the lack of legal acts, but because activities of extermination of corruption purposefully are not being fulfilled until their logic termination" is stated by Samigullin (The Genesis of Corruption in Kyrgyzstan, 2011)

in his report on corruption in the Kyrgyz Republic. According to surveys conducted by him and his colleagues, respondents often named several reasons of corruption in the state organs of KGZ such as: recruitment and staff development; lack of labor discipline; non-specific, unclear or excessive duties and responsibilities; lack of feedback in the management (lack of control); unfair assessment of labor (career development, remuneration and retirement); bribery is not condemned in the office. He underlines that the corruption in state organs is promoted because of the absence of the system of performance discipline in the state organs as an effective tool of management, and that it is seen widespread at all levels of government, when decisions are not fulfilled properly or even without any results; and the absence of strict system of obligations to perform duties. Also Samigullin states that it is well-known that laws are not followed not because they are imperfect, but because the government officials are confident in their impunity for violation of laws. And he stresses that it is state's failure that high ranking officials do not appreciate the labor of professionals, especially in the sphere of governing state and municipal power, and that instead of encouraging and promoting them, they replace them by unprofessional party fellows, clans and family members, and by other secondary personnel.

Another deep research was made by Engvall (2011); his main idea is that the Kyrgyz Republic as state became investment market. He states that "whereas the Kyrgyz state is Weberian on the surface, the main logic is that the state, particularly public office is approached as an investment object. Investing in public office in Kyrgyzstan should be understood as being grounded in rational calculations of

expectations of making a return on the initial investment. It is essentially similar to an investment on financial markets or the real estate market”. He says that KGZ created government institutions and organizations like in many modern countries, but like the shadow state, “the lifeblood of the Kyrgyz state is informal highly corrupt practices”. He notes that corrupt acts or behaviors like bribery, abuse of public office for private profits and other forms of pecuniary corruption in the Kyrgyz Republic are outcomes in a state which has the same principles of investments in a market, at the center of which is the sale and purchase of public offices. According to him the developed market within the Kyrgyz state is similar to a market with continuing relationships, or repetitive transactions. So, the state, as he mentions, is more than just buying or selling a post, commodity or service; the key is that political and administrative posts are bought for the purpose of continuous collection of incomes over time which are regularly shared with superiors. Another his statements shows that “although information about where and when positions in the state hierarchy can be obtained through personal contacts, these contacts are increasingly just a precondition for access to the state since acquiring office normally requires informal monetary payments. Instead of earning posts and titles by educational achievements, professional merits or demonstrated political skills, these are purchased”. However, he underlines that “money alone does not guarantee access to the market. In order to access the market, individuals must be able to demonstrate loyalty, in addition to a willingness to provide financial payments. Tangible resources of personal connections, loyalty and trust, are all important for ensuring reciprocal economic

exchange and for assessing the credibility of potential participants, and thus they heavily influence on hiring decisions”. So his central claim is that neither merit nor personalistic ties are the decisive factors, for posts must be purchased, however Engvall realizes that money is one layer in this system; an additional informal layer is personal ties and networks, and usually latter one is an additional advantage for the monetary aspect. Also, Engvall states that the sale of offices is accepted practice by the state, and that this practice is defined from the top. His other finding is that officials are forced to collect bribes not because of the low wages, but because they need to pay certain sums of money for being appointed in their positions, and that appointments are determined not by candidates’ abilities and reputations, but by money and connections. Engvall shows that influence of money differs according to the positions in the services of government, because some positions are more beneficial than others. However, Engvall states that in the country even for unprofitable positions, recruit pays small sums of money as symbolic significance, which shows that paying bribes for jobs is becoming a social norm. His next finding is that high and low levels corruption or grand and petty corruptions in the country use the same basic mechanism, related to each other, and act as one system, thus forming behavior from top to bottom. He observes that when “the ruler sells to ministers or regional governors, who release offices for sale at subordinate levels and down to street level officials, who extend the financial exchange by collecting their proceeds from citizens and businesses”, this structure shows that corruption in the state is under control. So, Engvall states that the sale of offices in the state organs has

a pyramid structure, where superior officials ask bribes in exchange for positions on lower levels as well as continuing supply of profits in order to maintain these positions. So, he emphasizes that “informal financial exchange is the glue that binds the state together into a well-organized pyramidal system” (Engvall, 2011).

Chapter 3: Methodology

It is well-known that in order to achieve any goals it is very important to choose right strategy and implementation tactics. The same is with any report, in order to answer questions or to find best probable conclusions it is very necessary to select right and suitable methodology. As McNabb (McNabb, 2008) states that “there are many acceptable ways to conduct research; the only selection criteria that makes sense is that the method chosen must provide the best possible conclusions”. So, as it was mentioned above the report has two main objectives. First is to see and clarify real situation of the corruption in the state organs of the Kyrgyz Republic, in other words, to assemble the puzzle of corruption in the government of the state. Second objective is to find out possible ways (practical tools, methods, mechanisms) to decrease the level of the corruption in the state organs by using international experiences.

In order to reach objectives, the report generally has qualitative design. According to McNabb (2008) “the qualitative research describes a set of nonstatistical inquiry techniques and processes used to gather data about social phenomena”. To be more specific this research is qualitative explanatory study; Thomas Schwandt (cited in McNabb, 2008) defined explanatory research as studies that are conducted to develop a causal explanation of some social phenomenon.

Although the report is qualitative explanatory research study, it uses different types of methods in achieving the objectives. For the first objective the type of qualitative explanatory research is more like a case study, because it explores the corruption only in the state organs in the country, which is executive branch, and does not reflect the whole corruption situation in the Kyrgyz Republic; for example it does not include corruption problems in judicial branch, in private sector, in education and medical service, in the society, in the elections process, however, in the report it is seen the close connection between them. Therefore, the first part uses methods of case study, which have intention to show the features of the problem in the government of KGZ, however it also studies the corruption issue in the post-communist region, because as it was mentioned in the second chapter, there are several similar features of corruption both in the region and in KGZ. The findings from the first part (objective) are used to reach the second objective. In order to get the results for the second part of the report, it uses method of comparative study. The report compares international experiences of countries that had or have the same situations as in KGZ, and explores their best experiences or practices for the purpose of possible use of them in the case of KGZ.

The qualitative data of the research was collected from different sources including previous researches made by scholars on corruption issues in the post-communist countries and in the Kyrgyz Republic; official documents; reports on corruption of government and international organizations; legal acts; personal observations and experiences; opinions and views of officials and experts shared in

different media sources, relevant news in media; comparative studies of corruption in various countries, and reports on corruption in the countries.

All collected qualitative data are brought together, summarized and analyzed in order to draw the real picture of corruption in the state organs. Features of today's corruption in the government of KGZ are compared with other countries, especially those which had analogous situations, and succeeded to solve or decrease the influence of the corruption issues, with the purpose of extraction of the best practices applicable in the government offices of KGZ. At the end all findings from the second part are analyzed so as to form suitable practical methods, tools and actions for reducing the level of corruption in the executive branch of KGZ.

Chapter 4: Real situation of corruption in the Kyrgyz Republic. Discussion and Findings.

The Kyrgyz Republic, as mentioned above, became one of the most corrupt countries in the world. Many international organizations and scholars who explored this issue realize that the corruption in the country penetrated in all spheres of the life. Something has gone wrong in the Kyrgyz Republic, especially inside executive branch. The whole system works but works in its own way, it started to have two faces, one official face, as it should be according to legal acts, and the other unofficial face or corruption, which is illegal but became common, normal and accepted activity. And the most worrying fact is that corruption every time is deepening, spreading and wrapping the government system, and changing the mission of the executive branch of the country not only inside but outside also, in the minds of society. One of the indications of the worsening situation is that corruption became number two issue in 2008, after electricity, as the most severe problems for doing business in the country (BEEPS, 2010). Electricity problem is possible to explain, it was because of shortage of power and blackouts. But corruption problem is very difficult to explain in two or three words, especially in the country where everybody, from ordinary person in the village to the Parliament and the President, realizes its harmfulness and talks about it, however, nothing changes. What to say if during the Kyrgyz Republic Defense Council meeting on 31 May 2012, where new Concept of National Security was introduced, corruption was discussed as the main threat in the

country, and the President of the Republic stated that “we need to accept that fight against corruption is inhibited at the organizational level. The Anticorruption service has not developed new approaches to fight corruption. Government unreasonably delayed the development of legal acts aimed to fight corruption” (Press Service, 2012). It means that they realize the problem, but cannot do anything or do not want or do not know how to fight it. Why is it happening in the country even after experiencing two so-called revolutions, what are the main obstacles to fight it? One way to answer it is to see what is happening in the executive branch itself, how the real corruption looks like.

According to researched materials and gathered data, it is inevitably seen that the government offices have two faces, as mentioned above, or better to say two types of existence or living, one is official, as any modern government with its official structure, goals, rules, procedures, activities and etc. And the other is unofficial, something like shadow. However, the informal one became the reality of everyday and common among officials and is becoming normal for ordinary people. Why it has not already become normal for ordinary people is because of the protests and manifestations, which resulted in turnover of the former authorities of the country. But, for those officials inside the government it is acceptable fact, because they have no other choice but to adapt to it, or even worse because they want to do it. So, according to collected data, corruption in the government of KGZ nowadays has two sources of causes, one is inside the government, the other is outside it.

4.1. Causes of corruption inside the government.

The main factor inside the government causing officials to commit corrupt acts is the unofficial organization or corrupt organization within the official organization. If we look to the problem from the management perspective, any organization consists of people with formally assigned roles who work together to achieve its goals (Dessler, 2011); so in the government office we have official people with their official roles, working together to achieve official goals of the office, but, at the same time, the same official people carry their unofficial roles, and work together to achieve unofficial goals. The government offices in KGZ have their own structures, and the official structure is pyramidal from top to bottom. So the corrupt organization inside the government office also uses the same structure from top to bottom, and it is like a pyramid. Next is that any organization has its authority, like director, manager, minister and etc., who manages the organization. Hence, any organization has its management process; according to Dessler (2011), management basically includes five functions, namely planning, organizing, staffing, leading, and controlling. The government offices of KGZ also use management process with its functions, however, this process is duplicated. First, management is official according to laws with its official functions. The other is unofficial with its peculiar functions, which support and develop corrupt organization. All found causes of corruption inside the government are perfectly suitable under each framework of official management. It is possible to distribute them as following:

Planning function: establishing goals and standards; developing rules and procedures; developing plans and forecasting (Dessler, 2011):

- goals – investing, making money, profits and benefits from corrupt acts; self-interest or serve own private interests; self-enrichment;

- rules and procedures - selling, reselling and buying positions in government offices. Political and administrative posts are bought and sold for the purpose of continuous collection of fixed unofficial incomes and benefits of corrupt acts, which are regularly shared with superiors. In other words, rule is to commit corrupt act to make money and profits, and share with superiors.

Organizing function: giving each subordinate a specific task; establishing departments; delegating authority to subordinates; establishing channels of authority and communication; coordinating subordinates' work (Dessler, 2011):

The corrupt network has pyramidal shape. Corruption at high level officials closely related to low level officials. Both of them operate by using established mechanisms like money exchange, personal ties, based on informal and traditional links among family, relatives, clan members and friends (nepotism, cronyism, tribalism and etc.), unofficial rules, and work as one unit. All activities are initiated from the top to bottom, so, usually when petty corruption is committed, high level representatives are informed and approve those actions, and receive their share.

Human resource management function (staffing and personnel management): The process of acquiring, recruiting, training, appraising, and compensating employees, setting performance standards, evaluating performance, and of attending

to their labor relations, health and safety, and fairness concerns (Dessler, 2011). In this section only one activity needs to be excluded, it is compensating employees, because heads of government offices are not in charge of establishing remuneration of employees, it is based on budget of the state and the general remuneration of all civil servants. So the section includes:

- inefficiency of professional merit-based civil service (recruitment, promotion and staff development); unfair assessment of labor; selling and buying of positions;

- high turnover, frequent and unreasonable replacement of government officials, sometimes even without giving opportunity to retirement; especially after new political appointment which means replacement of a civil servant in a given agency or unit;

- purchasing of titles, promotions, ranks without considering real achievements (education, professional merits, skills and etc.);

- ineffective, unclear and sometimes unreal indicators of performance; absence of the system of performance discipline; the absence of strict system of obligations to perform duties;

- unclear or excessive duties and few responsibilities; duplication of functions;

- bribery is not condemned in the office.

Leading: getting others to get the job done; maintaining morale; motivating subordinates (Dessler, 2011):

- most of the civil officials are in the situation where they will do corrupt acts, and be part of corrupt organization, or otherwise they will be derelicts in the government office;

- impunity for violation of laws is encouraging officials to continue to commit corrupt acts;

- motives are easy and quick money for self-enrichment or just for survival or maintaining ordinary standard of living.

Controlling: setting standards, quality standards, or production levels; checking to see how actual performance compares with these standards; taking corrective actions, as needed (Dessler, 2011). In the government organizations of KGZ, controlling of formal and official activities is absent, so as a result we have following causes of corruption:

- lack of supervision and control of personnel and activities;

- lack of labor discipline; improper fulfilment of office duties by officials;

- laws are not followed.

Also, there are others causes of corruption inside the government, which are not the part or outcomes of the corrupt organization; they are the outcomes of the state condition. They are as follows:

Weak economic situation: according to the World Bank's forecast the deficit of the budget in KGZ will increase up to 6,4 percent of GDP in 2012 (Dudka, 2012). So the situation may bring another cause:

- low wages or low income level of civil servants.

Inefficiency of the country's leadership: this problem actually can be separate from this research, but in order to show the existence of the issue, it is necessary to show how the leadership of the state looks like. Now after reforms of the state, KGZ transformed from presidential state to parliamentary-presidential state. Before the transformation, at the top there were two presidents, who concentrated almost all power in their hands, but now the situation is changed, the leadership of the state consists of parliament, prime minister and president. According to the Constitution of the Kyrgyz Republic the Government is headed by Prime Minister, and consists of Prime Minister, vice prime ministers, ministers and chairmen of the state committees. The structure of the Government includes ministries and state committees. The Prime Minister is appointed by Parliament (Jogorku Kenesh – Supreme Council). Then the appointed Prime Minister gives the programme, structure and composition of the Government to Parliament for approval. Also it is necessary to mention that the ministry of defense and the state committee of national security are the part of the Government; however their heads are appointed and dismissed by the President of the Kyrgyz Republic, as he is the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the country. According to the Constitution of KGZ, Parliament, President and Prime Minister have their own roles in forming the Government. So, the question is how they do it and whether it is effective or not especially in conducting anticorruption reforms of the government; this issue will be discussed later in the following chapter in the section about political will. However, the fact remains that inefficiency of the leadership creates another problem:

- reforms of government affected low level, but not high levels of officials; activities to fight corruption purposefully are not being fulfilled.

So, it is seen from above, that the government institutions have two shapes, first is official, outer skin, where everything is official and according to laws, in other words, modern developed organization with all necessary ingredients. Second is unofficial, inside the body, where the other corrupt organization exists, which uses public officials, the official structure, illegal and informal mechanisms and processes, or in other words, corrupt management. The outcomes of the corrupt organization with its quasi-management are different corrupt acts from bribery to frauds with budget moneys, which in any case are harmful for the whole state. Also, it is necessary to add that inside the corrupt organization, officials on different levels (high, medium, low) may act individually, but it happens very rarely because it is impossible for the officials to commit the huge amount of corrupt acts without others' awareness in the office. But the most interesting fact is that the unofficial or corrupt organization inside official organization works much better than the official one, proof of this is the annual growth of corruption level in the country. If all these efforts are directed to the official missions of the government offices, then there are no doubts that the growth of the country in all spheres will be considerably high.

4.2. Causes of corruption outside the government.

The second source of causes is originated from outside the government office, or from society. It is divided in 3 sectors:

Social and Cultural aspects:

- belief that public office became as place for investing and making money.
- social networks; strong, informal and traditional links among family, relatives, clan members and friends (nepotism, cronyism, tribalism and etc.).
- cultural background of the people; for example, so-called “Urmat system”.
- historical background from communist regime; give something to official to have things done within any office.
- lack of knowledge about harmfulness and misperception of corruption;
- vision of corrupt acts as normal everyday attitude and the part of the system.
- paying bribes for jobs, even for unprofitable ones, is becoming a social norm.
- getting things done in unofficial way.

Private sector:

- informal patronage-based relationships are more significant than formal rule-of-law institutions in the country.
- informal relationships and access to formal institutions such as parliament are the tools to protect themselves from raiding or “reiderstvo”.
- business started to use political offices to secure immunity from unfair persecution.
- inconsistent and frequent changes in legislation to worsen business conditions.

Judiciary branch:

Judicial organs are ineffective, because they are also among the highly corrupted organs in KGZ. According to the survey made by the World Bank (Kyrgyz

Republic judicial system diagnostic: measuring progress and identifying needs., 2011), rent seeking behavior of judges is one of the primary obstacles for protecting legitimate interests at court in KGZ. Survey shows that most of respondents (38,9%) indicated that “judges seeking bribes” is the first obstacle at courts (WorldBank, 2011). And even in general assessment most of respondents (23,4%) said that “judges seeking bribes” is the obstacle for protecting legitimate interests (WorldBank, 2011). As a result we have causes affecting government officials:


- lack of rule of law and corruption cases are inadequately sentenced.

It is necessary to mention that the causes from outside are the products of several reasons. First of all, corruption actually exists at all areas of daily life as a social phenomenon, in the government, judiciary, education and health service, and etc. All of them interrelated with society, and in nowadays in KGZ they complement each other. Also, it is seen that corruption in the society or in the country as whole became a way of life, which, according to Quah (2003), means that it occurs at all levels, and is “the norm rather than exception”. A person who wants to get to the government in the recruitment process may already have certain background or he influenced by outside causes of corruption, which may mean he is already half prepared for corruptive acts and even expects doing them. During recruitment process he is influenced more, and when he gets inside, he is totally influenced and such experiences may put him in the situation where he cannot refuse committing corrupt acts, or starts seeking sources for private gains. On the other hand, a person working inside the government is already highly influenced by corruption, and influences the

outside of the government (society, private sector, etc.) by himself. It is clear that while causes both inside and outside make government officials commit corrupt acts, and they, in turn are showing the existence of corruption to the society, which is like a vicious circle. Of course, it is necessary to mention that all causes vary among different ministries, committees and agencies, and in some of them one does not buy positions, but can get inside through relationships or with one's educational achievement and skills, but anyway when he or she gets inside, everything will change. The corrupt organization will force you to commit corrupt act; if one tries to stand apart from it at the beginning, low wages will force him or her to do something illegal, so called "corruption due to need" according to Tanzi (1998), so at the end you will unavoidably become a part of the system. To talk about salary, according to the National Statistic Committee of KGZ, average salary of a government official in January-March 2012 was 9776 som, which is approximately 209,7 USD, and the minimum consumption basket for one person is 4717 som, nearly 100 USD (National Statistics Committee, 2012). However, the real situation is that the minimum consumption basket is much more expensive, according to the conducted journalist investigation (Ivashenko, Noncost of living, or why it is impossible to survive in Bishkek on 100 USD, 2012); the list of goods and services, which was used by the National Statistic Committee (NSC) to calculate the minimum consumption basket, in reality will cost 300 USD per person, what if an official has a family, so it will be doubled or even tripled, and the calculated cost by NSC nor by journalist does not include the rent of the house. The relationship between causes and government

official is reflected in figure 1; in this figure society is separated from government, judicial branch and etc, just for the purpose of showing clear relationship; however all of them are the part of the society.

Figure 1. The relationship between causes and government official.



As mentioned above, there are two sources of causes to commit corrupt acts outside and inside the government. From the analysis made so far, the real situation of the corruption in the state organs is clear enough, which helps to find some appropriate and possible ways to solve the issues, in other words, to fight corruption effectively in order to decrease its level. Next chapter will explore the ways of decreasing the level of corruption in the KGZ government offices by studying international experiences and developing proper tools and instruments to implement them in KGZ.

Chapter 5: Ways of decreasing the level of corruption in the government offices by using international experiences.

According to the real situation of the corruption in the government offices, discussed in the previous chapter, it is clear that there are causes inside, such as corrupt organization in the government office, low salary and inefficient reforms, and outside causes affecting the government organs. It is found that all causes are interrelated and complement each other, thus, to fight corruption effectively it is necessary to do it in parallel by implementing preventive and punitive measures on both inside and outside the government. To find suitable measures, methods, instruments to fight against corruption in the government offices, this chapter will explore, analyze and compare existing international experiences.

In order to find international experiences, this chapter reviews and studies experiences of three countries. They are Singapore, Hong Kong and the Republic of Georgia. The reasons of choosing these countries are that each of them is considered as successful in fighting corruption by many international experts and once had similarities in corruption conditions with the Kyrgyz Republic.

5.1. Experiences of other countries: Singapore, Hong Kong and Georgia.

This part explores Singapore, Hong Kong and Georgia experiences as one of the best examples of dealing with corruption. According to TI in 2011 Singapore and Hong Kong were the least corrupt countries, the fifth and the twelfth respectively, among 183 countries (The Corruption Perceptions Index 2011). Also these countries

had similar situation as the Kyrgyz Republic has now; corruption was a way of life in these two city-states during the British colonial period and after (Quah, 2003). Speaking of Georgia, this country achieved perfect results in fighting corruption in a short period of time from 2003 until now. According to the Corruption Perceptions Index 2011, Georgia was ranked as 64 among 183 countries, and 2 in the region Eastern Europe and Central Asia, versus in 2003 it was 124th among 133 countries, which in the same year KGZ was 118 (TI, 2003). Also it is necessary to mention that Georgia and KGZ have many similarities in historical and cultural aspects, and corruption situation of Georgia in 2003 was almost identical as it is now in KGZ. Each of three countries made a huge job, had its own strategies and implemented several crucial approaches to achieve these results.

Singapore.

Singapore, according to Quah (2003), succeeded in decreasing corruption due to strong political will, which introduced anti-corruption strategy. He states that the main components of the strategy were:

1. Strong political will.
2. The introduction of appropriate anti-corruption legislation: for example, Prevention of Corruption Act enacted in 1960, which states that guilty person for accepting bribe has to pay the same amount of bribe in addition to sentence from court and allows to anticorruption body to investigate any bank account, share or purchase account of suspected person in corrupt act. Also the Act permits

anticorruption officer to inspect civil servant's banker's book and those of wife, child or agent, if it is needed (Quah, 2003).

3. Establishment of a single incorruptible agency solely dedicated to the task of corruption control: Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau (CPIB) was formed in 1952, but got real power in 1960 from Prevention Corruption Act. It has three functions, to receive and investigate corruption complaints in the society, to investigate malpractices and misconduct by civil servants, and to examine the practices and procedures in the public service to reduce corrupt opportunities (CPIB, 2012). CPIB has small size of personnel, which is only 0.13% of whole Civil Service in Singapore (62,739); it has only 84 officers (Quah, 2003). The CPIB is under the supervision of the Prime Minister's Office, and it has three departments, namely, Operations Department, Corporate Affairs Department (management, logistics, administration and IT), and Investigation Department (CPIB, 2012).

4. Improvement of civil service salaries and working conditions: The Government of Singapore improved salaries and working conditions in 1980s following economic growth (Quah, 2003).

Hong Kong.

Hong Kong managed to overcome corruption, as noted by Quah (2003), because of the following factors:

1. The strong political will;
2. Comprehensive anti-corruption legislation;

3. Creation of independent and incorruptible organ: Independent Commission against Corruption (ICAC), established in 1974, is an independent body to fight corruption and based on three approaches: law enforcement, prevention of corruption, and education to fight corruption (ICAC, 2012). It consists of administration branch, operations department, corruption prevention department, and community relations department (education) (ICAC, 2012). Four advisory committees, including citizens appointed by Chief Executive, guarantee integrity and oversee the work of the ICAC. All four advisory committees are chaired by civilian members. They are Advisory Committee on Corruption, which oversees the general work direction of the ICAC and advises on policy matters; Operations Review Committee oversees all the ICAC investigations; Corruption Prevention Advisory Committee advises on the priority of corruption prevention studies and examines all study reports; Citizens Advisory Committee on Community Relations, which advises on the strategies of public education and enlisting public support against corruption (ICAC, 2012).

4. Increase of civil servants salaries.

Georgia.

After “Rose revolution” in 2003, Georgia made a huge progress in fighting corruption in all spheres of the country. Now, it became leader among Former Soviet Union countries in diminishing corruption, notwithstanding there were corrupt leaders in the region before 2003. Corruption in Georgia had similar shape from top to bottom, which is now in KGZ, and in some aspects it was worse, because it was very closely tied with organizational criminal groups. However, now they overcame

all those difficulties, and as the World Bank in its paper on Georgia's reforms notes: "Georgia's experience shows that the vicious cycle of ostensibly endemic corruption can be broken, and—if sustained with appropriate institutional reforms—can be turned into a virtuous cycle" and "Georgia's success destroys the myth that corruption is cultural" (Fighting corruption in public services: chronicling Georgia's reforms., 2012). Also many other international organizations confirm that Georgia achieved great results in controlling corruption. The World Bank in its report (Fighting corruption in public services: chronicling Georgia's reforms., 2012) underlines 10 main principles or "tenets" in conducting reforms, which allowed Georgia to become less corrupt country in the world:

1. "Strong Political Will" – it was the most important factor in fighting corruption in Georgia, which was initiated from the top.

2. "Establish Credibility Early" – a zero-tolerance policy for corruption and demonstration of its results of Georgians politicians from the beginning were very important to establish credibility. To achieve certain results in credibility, they improved and clarified rules and laws on fighting corruption and criminal groups, which allowed them to investigate parliament members for corruption.

3. "Launch a Frontal Assault on Corruption" – Leaderships of Georgia fought corruption in all spheres at once, as they knew that concentrating efforts in one area would not be effective, and that all efforts should be implemented in parallel.

4. "Attract New Staff."

5. “Limit the Role of the State” - Anticorruption measures were directed to create small state with fewer government regulations in private sector.

6. “Adopt Unconventional Solutions” – they created some new approaches with consideration of local peculiarities in fighting corruption; for example, firing of all traffic police personnel in one day, instead of incarceration of officials and businessmen for corruption, they were obliged to pay for harms of their corrupt acts; use of extrabudgetary funds and establishing incentive pay systems in some agencies to increase salaries.

7. “Develop a Unity of Purpose and Coordinate Closely” – Georgia’s reformers saw all anticorruption reforms as the main policy, and always worked together and cooperation between ministries and leaders of the state was very close and intensive.

8. “Tailor International Experience to Local Conditions” – they adopted many international experiences in fighting corruption and crimes, and reforming government, with consideration and adjusting them to local peculiarities.

9. “Harness Technology” – the effective anticorruption approach made by Georgia leaders was to use modern technologies in reforming government, which allowed to minimize conditions for corrupt acts.

10. “Use Communications Strategically”.

Also, the World Bank in its analysis underlines that the main factor of all reforms in all spheres of the country “has been the robust use of executive power”. President of Georgia Saakashvili in his interview (2011) said that they could achieve results in fighting corruption, only because the team of politicians, including him,

really wanted, aimed and put all their efforts and knowledge to overcome corruption. He stated that they knew it would be very difficult and challenging to do cardinal reforms in the country, but they dared to do so, because they realized that corruption was the most harmful in the country; even when they fired all traffic police in the country in one day, they thought that it would be disaster in the street of the country, and for more than 3 months there were no traffic police in the country, but accidents level did not increase, it is even decreased. He said that by implementing real, effective and permanent anticorruption policy and measures, people started changing their thinking and beliefs about corruption, although they believed that corruption is the part of the culture and traditions of the nation.

From 3 cases it is seen that each country has chosen right strategy to solve the problems of corruption. Three of them did it in their own ways; however it is possible to confirm that they have similarities. Each country's crucial and the most important factor in achieving real results was strong political will, when the leadership of countries, whether one leader, party or group of politicians, first accepted the fact of widespread corruption especially among government and state representatives, selected policy based on fighting against corruption, organized and implemented real anticorruption measures suitable for the corruption situation at that moment, controlled all initiated anticorruption activities and kept conducting reforms in all spheres despite the criticism and obstacles. Also leaders with political will to fight corruption in these countries got support from everyone in the country, even some of their acts, considered as against culture and traditions. Actually it is very true that

political will is the first and the most important aspect, because it is also based on zero-tolerance to those with corruption, and all initiatives start from top and go to bottom. Activities dealing with anticorruption will promote other necessary, proper and right changes as in the government and in society. State with strong political will on fighting corruption will choose the direction to better its governance, strengthen rule of law, improve transparency and accountability of the government, cooperate very closely with society, and conduct vital and appropriate reforms in economy, political structure, state institutions, social sector and etc. Leadership with anticorruption political will form ideology of a country directed against corruption, which is vital to form or transform public beliefs and opinions on corruption, change traditions and culture which encouraged corruption.

It may be easier to fight against corruption with strong political will in the country, however as it is shown by three countries, political will must be equipped with effective anticorruption measures which will eliminate causes of corruption and decrease level of it. In Singapore and Hong Kong introduction of anticorruption laws, creation of special agency against corruption, and increase of civil servants salaries were the main tools and methods to achieve positive results. Georgia did the same except for creation of special agency, and even went further by implementing new revolutionary approaches in each government institution. Also it is necessary to mention that anticorruption measures of these countries are effective, because they are based on traditional and universally accepted policies on fighting corruption, such as improving governance condition, promotion of transparency and openness of the

state organs by participating citizens and media, accountability of government institution, participation of society in anticorruption initiatives, use of technologies and promotion of liberal market principles in economy.

5.2. Ways of decreasing corruption level in the government offices of the Kyrgyz Republic.

As it was mentioned in previous chapters, the Kyrgyz Republic's present situation of corruption in government offices has two sources of causes. The first is inside the government, such as corrupt organization itself, inefficient reforms, low salaries, and the second is outside the government or causes from society. In order to minimize corruption in the government offices it is necessary to eliminate reasons causing corruption, as it is shown by three countries used in the report, the first and most important factor is strong political will to fight corruption with its ensuing anticorruption strategies and tactics to achieve the goal. To find effective, efficient and suitable anticorruption measures for the government offices of the Kyrgyz Republic, first it is necessary to identify whether the political will exists or not in the country. There are several factors which make it difficult to identify political will in KGZ. First factor is the time of being in power by the leaderships of KGZ. As it was mentioned previously, the Kyrgyz Republic's top leadership or political leadership, according to the Constitution (2010), includes President, Parliament and Prime Minister. Parliament was elected in October 2010, President was elected in October 2011, and Prime Minister was elected by Parliament in December 2011. All political

leaders have been short time in office, and they have not managed to do real steps to fight corruption. Although, they initiate several anticorruption measures.

First steps of the President of KGZ on showing his political will on fighting corruption was the creation of the Anticorruption Service under the State Committee of the National Security of KGZ on 14 December 2011, which has tasks to prevent, suppress, detect and investigate corrupt crimes, committed by political and high state administrative and municipal officials who work in law enforcement, judicial, other state and municipal organs, as well as the heads of the companies with state shares (Atambaev A. , 2011). Next step was to sign on 2 February 2012 the Decree “About the State strategy of the anticorruption policy of the Kyrgyz Republic and measures to fight corruption” (Atambaev A. , 2012). The Decree (Atambaev A. , 2012) approves the state anticorruption strategy, makes the Government of KGZ, other state organs, and municipal organs to develop plans of actions to fight corruption in the scope of fulfillment of the state anticorruption strategy for short and long terms periods. According to the decree (Atambaev A. , 2012) the Defense Council of KGZ is in charge of coordination of actions for fulfillment of the strategy, and the council needs to create project of bylaw on committees of civil control. President’s initiatives have been already criticized by society and experts. Actually one of the tasks of law enforcement organs including the state committee of national security of KGZ was always to fight corruption on all levels even before the creation service, and each had and some still has special sections to do it; for example, the Ministry of Internal Affairs has special department to fight corruption. To talk about the state

anticorruption strategy, the problems of it are clearly reflected in the analysis done by Musabaeva in her article for the Institute for Public Policy, where she states that “for the period from 2005 to 2012, there were adopted three versions of the national strategy to combat corruption. Analysis of the three texts shows no cardinal and fundamental differences between them. All of them are rather declarative, and have little practical and concrete solutions. In fact, they were adjusted in accordance with the changed political situation or government.” (Musabaeva, 2012). In addition, it is necessary to indicate that according to the decree of the state anticorruption strategy all state organs should develop their own plans of actions, but how they will do it if almost all organs are corrupt from top to bottom and have their own corrupt organizations inside. Of course they develop plans but they will not include real anticorruption measures; the same situation remains with previous strategies, where most of the plans did not reflect real situation in each organ, as they and their leaders could not accept the fact that they are corrupt.

The Parliament initiated several approaches as well. One of them was the creation of the Committee on fighting corruption in 2012 (Podolskaya, 2012).

The Government of KGZ with Prime Minister also did several steps to fight corruption. One is creation of the anticorruption website of the Government of the Kyrgyz Republic on March 2011; it was the idea of the current Prime Minister, who at that moment was the First vice Prime Minister (Government, 2011). Next, the Government developed and approved Plan of activities to fight corruption for period 2012-2014 as it is requested by the state anticorruption strategy (Government, 2011).

Another step to fight against corruption was similar to the Georgia's experience to reform traffic police, but in case of KGZ Prime Minister reformed State Service of Financial Police. Actually financial police was eliminated and new agency called State Service for Combatting Economic Crimes was created. The recruitment to the new service was open and through exams with several phases, which were broadcasted on national TV (Umaraliev, 2012). The Washington Times describes as it was "...not making for riveting entertainment, this novel approach to hiring was aimed at demonstrating a fair and unbiased selection process for the agency as part of its fight against corruption and nepotism" (2012).

As it is seen all three main leaders such as President, Prime Minister and Parliament are doing something to fight corruption, which demonstrates that the country has leadership with political will.

However, there is the other side of the coin that they act separately from each other and criticizing each other. It looks like competition in showing who is better, faster and smarter to deal with the corruption; it is good when this competition brings fruits, but it is harmful when the members of the competition are making obstacles for each other and undermine efforts against corruption. Musabaeva (2012) notes that "we are seeing outright competition and struggle, which involves the President, Parliament and the government." Anticorruption policy in KGZ became as tool to gain political points from people and show or demonstrate to the country that the political will of leaders allegedly exists. Their attempts to fight corruption are becoming as illusion or cover without hard core inside, because their uncoordinated

acts in fighting corruption contribute to illusion. The majority of top leaders in the country, including President, Prime Minister, members of Parliament and cabinet ministers were also at the top of the leadership during previous regimes. The Washington Times quotes N. Mukanova, head of the Anticorruption Business Council (a Bishkek-based anti-corruption group), that "...the new government...is old elite that took the place of the overthrown elite. Thus, it is very hard to believe they can uproot the widespread corruption in the government." Next factor is their deeds, which are very questionable in the frame of corruption. Two examples show that past issue, such as unwillingness to fight corruption, are continuing to exist. First is the interview given by member of Parliament Jeenbekov (Ivashenko, Interview of Ravshan Jeenbekov, 2012), where he stated that the decision of who would be minister is made only by the leader of the party, and that in order to get into the list of the candidate of party for parliament, one needs to pay money, the price depends on whether you are the member of party or not. He further said that those who entered the party in 2010 paid up to 300 thousands USD to get into the parliament and further to be appointed in the government cabinet. Second example is that currently media in KGZ have been saying that current Prime minister is trying to appoint his party members and loyalties to high posts in the government and that he has already dismissed several high officials without any explanations. According to the article on the analytical website (Berezovskaya, 2012) today 60 percent of heads of the regions are the members of the same party as Prime Minister; it is necessary to add that in KGZ village heads, cities and towns mayors are elected by local councils, while

regions' heads are appointed by Prime Minister. Also it is necessary to add that nowadays one of the committees of the Parliament has approved draft of the law on the status of the two main cities or capitals in the country, where the mayors will be nominated to municipal council only by Prime Minister (Akipress, 2012), however before they were elected by municipal council.

So, today it is still very difficult to state clearly whether the Kyrgyz Republic's leadership has political will or not, or maybe as Musabaeva notes it is because of the "lack of political consensus on the objectives and priorities of the fight against corruption". However, facts show that there are some attempts to fight corruption as initiatives for corruption. If we take as an example, the President of KGZ, who announced his priority to fight corruption and underlined the existence of political will to fight corruption in the state anticorruption strategy, still has not done a lot, maybe due to his limited power or to some other reasons. Anyway when the country does not have unified anticorruption approach among leadership, or if only one part of the leadership is not corrupt but other is corrupt, then anticorruption measures will be stuck. As Alatas (Corruption and the destiny of Asia, 1999, p. 93) notes, when non-corrupt leaders had corrupt supporters around them, non-corrupt leaders are worse than a corrupt one for fighting corruption, because "a false sense of security" emerges under these leaders. He adds that "...the presence of weak leaders who are not corrupt in a thoroughly corrupt set-up by no means mitigates against corruption." (Alatas, 1999). As proverb says one soldier in the field is not a warrior. Also there are many other confirmations that the country is lacking of political will; even the head of

the State Service of National Security, under whose supervision Anticorruption Service is operating, stated that “for continuing fight with this evil (corruption) it is necessary to have political will. Everywhere, someone tries to impede our work in this direction” (Akmat uulu, 2012). So, until now it is unclear and very difficult to identify whether actions of leaders reflect their political will or it is just another creation of illusion to calm the people of KGZ. Or maybe they want to do it but are doing it in the wrong direction without understanding the depth of the problem. But in any case nowadays many media, NGOs, ordinary people, and sometimes officials state that the fight against corruption causes mistrust among them. Some of them say that it is just another creation of illusion, some say that the fight aims only those who are disagreeable to government or in opposition, some say the fight is inefficient as it is directed to small potatoes (low and sometimes middle level officials) not to the big ones.

Therefore, in order to find suitable and effective ways to decrease level of corruption in the government of KGZ, the report emphasize to confirm if there is political will to fight against corruption exists in the country. But, it is fair to mention that if the country has leaders with strong political will, they are on the half way to achieve positive results in decreasing corruption. Usually leaders define policies and strategies of country. Anticorruption policy of the country, initiated by the top leadership of the country, will affect all spheres and determine further development of the country. Anticorruption strategy with really strong political will among all leaders in the country (President, Parliament and Prime Minister) will definitely

eliminate most of the causes of corruption such as corrupt organization and management in the government offices, conduct efficient reforms of state institutions, promote rule of law, create sound policies to improve private sector and etc. Also joint political will in KGZ will contribute changes in society, such as cultural, social, historical aspects, which are creating causes of corruption, as the leadership of KGZ will become an example for the society.

However, what to do if there is absence or lack of political will among leaders of the country. There are some possible ways to create political will or to encourage fight against corruption in the right direction, which can be seen in the world. If the political leaders and the government are not able to curb corruption in the country, the only way to do it is to rely on civil society. As noted by Bhargava and Bolongaita (2004) anticorruption measures have to be taken without relying on government leadership and regulation in the countries with poor governance and extreme corruption in all levels. They say that “this is because state institutions are generally weak and the agencies and officials are more likely to be part of the problem” (Bhargava & Bolongaita, 2004). They recommend five policies to conduct anticorruption reforms by “external actors”, in the case like KGZ with weak governance and widespread corruption among government; they underline main three, which are considered as the most effective ones. They are “building wide scaled civil anticorruption coalitions”, “following policy reforms that eliminate administrative opportunities for corruption”, and independent media and citizen participation, which are explained as “such external demand can help shift the

balance of forces for change within and outside government” (Bhargava & Bolongaita, 2004). The effectiveness of their recommendations is perfectly seen now “from revolutionary change in the Arab world, to powerful anti-corruption movements in India and Brazil, to the Occupy‘ movement in some western countries...” as noted in the World Bank Group’s Updated Strategy and Implementation Plan (2012). The reason of these “new social contracts” is that people “are seeking a relationship with their government based on transparency, accountability and participation” and demand “the need for strong checks and balances” (WBG, 2012). At the core of these new attitudes in the society is “a new generation of tech-savvy citizens empowered by transformations in new communications technologies that enable unprecedented opportunities to access and share information and forge global networks” (WBG, 2012).

So, in order to wake the political will of KGZ leadership up, it is necessary for people to act jointly, form coalitions. Particularly building coalitions in KGZ is not difficult nowadays, because according to Samigullin (2011) there are nearly ten thousands NGOs in KGZ, and people after two revolutions have confidence that they can force leadership to make changes. But necessary thing is to demand new and efficient anticorruption reforms in the scope of the laws of the country. Also, society’s demand should include sound anticorruption reforms and policies that will improve civil control of the government and the government itself. However, the society itself has problems, which are the causes of corruption. They are, as it was mentioned previously, historical, cultural and social aspects. In this case it is

necessary that the NGOs fighting against corruption, independent media, and civil activists use information and communication technologies to agitate other society members to struggle corruption. Agitation should include explanation and definition of corruption, causes of corruption, harms of corruption including how the corruption affects each person in the country, and their human rights. These groups of civil society should direct their efforts not only toward society but also toward civil servants, especially at the low levels who want changes, in order to encourage them to start demanding reforms from the superiors. Also it is necessary to add the role of international organizations and donors, especially those who support NGOs in KGZ; they must demand real results, not just some reports on small activities. Today in KGZ there is an opinion that many NGOs are opened just to get money from donors and they do not really contribute to society, and sometimes they create some obstacles in the society. So, international organizations, donors and sponsors should be more attentive in the activities of NGOs. Next is media, which is considered as another branch of power in any country, especially those who are really independent and not corrupt; they need to highlight and stress corruption problems everyday, no matter whether there are other important issues. Religion confessions, especially Islam (75% of population) and Russian Orthodox (20%), which criticize corruption and prohibit doing corrupt acts, need to emphasize their efforts in these aspects, as they are one of the sources of education of society and formation of social values. Another private sector, especially small and middle entrepreneurs, also needs to start to resist corruption; they must realize that committing corrupt acts by doing illegal

business is worse for them, because they will never get favorable, secure, fair, and open conditions for business. Civil society must use all their legal rights to fight corruption; one of them is the right to initiate laws in KGZ by ten thousand people, which is very strong tool to act, while today even President of KGZ does not have the right of initiating laws. So, it is necessary to start doing comprehensive actions to show that it is time to make real anticorruption reforms. Another good and easy opportunity to implement civil control is in the villages and cities decentralized after the introduction of 2010 Constitution, as their heads are elected by local councils. Territories and population is small, so it is easy to encourage them for anticorruption reforms, in turn they can influence state leadership. If municipal leaders show their improvements on fighting corruption, neighboring districts and villages will try to implement the same approaches and then it will be like good virus, which will spread everywhere and come to the top leaders of the country. KGZ needs a clear example of possibility to decrease corruption in the country, as it will encourage people to demand for those changes and force government to act. In short, civil society with its actions against corruption will make the leadership to realize that it is time to concentrate political will to fight corruption. As Pr. Yamagami noted in one of the seminars (13.06.2012) that critical mass is needed to make changes in a country. Political will play crucial role in breaking the corrupt organization, as new ministers and directors will be appointed on meritocratic basis or at least those with the same views and motivations to fight corruption. New leaders or managers will use appropriate management. To encourage new heads of the government to work in new

direction it is necessary to show zero-tolerance on those who commit even small corrupt acts. The effect of political will to fight corruption is great to society, as it promotes trust among people to leadership; usually leaders are the best examples for the society, and their desire to overcome corruption will infect ordinary people as well.

And if **the political will** is there, the question emerges what to do next, what are the further steps to eliminate causes such as corrupt organization, low salary and causes in the society. Although political will it is the most important, it is only halfway.

Next is **to create appropriate strategy**. It should be supported by all three rulers of KGZ, President, Parliament and Prime Minister. They need to show their political will to cooperate and work together, as joint political will between leaders is the decisive factor in further anticorruption efforts. The strategy should reflect anticorruption nature of the country. It will help to eliminate causes as inside and outside the government.

Then it will be effective **to create state anticorruption body**. International experiences in Singapore and Hong Kong show that special anticorruption agencies are very effective with conjunction of political will. It will be perfect solution for KGZ. However, today in KGZ there are many different state organs and NGOs, which deal with corruption; for example Ministry of Internal Affairs has department to fight against corruption as law enforcement; Anticorruption Service in State Committee of National Security is law enforcement; Prosecutor General's Office has

an independent separate anticorruption division; and according to the laws of KGZ the investigators of Prosecution Service are the only ones who have competence to investigate crimes related to misuse of office and corruption (Progress Report of the Kyrgyz Republic. OECD., 2011). The Parliament has separate committee as a legislative branch. There is Department of Declaration of income of civil servants in the State Personnel Service of KGZ. The ombudsman office is the state organ protecting human rights in KGZ. So, in KGZ almost every organ is concerned with corruption, but corruption is still the one of the worst in the world, which because each organization does it on their own way without clear coordination and unified clear anticorruption approach. Therefore, there is a need to have the anticorruption body in KGZ. The body should include representatives from legislative, executive (Prime Minister), judiciary branches, President's representative, society, NGOs, private sector, and media. Chairmanship in the body should have principle of rotation as in the majority of the international organizations. It should consist of several sections such as prevention, law enforcement, research and education. The purpose of agency should be to respond to corrupt act by coordination between agencies; it should be like official state club where different professionals from state organs and society will work together to overcome the problem. It should be as intermediate organ between society and state, where all corruption issues will be gathered and directed to other state organs which are in charge of them, and then it will monitor the status of execution and receive results and announce it. It needs to have rights to access to any state organ and explore the problems of corruption. The cooperation

should be done by using each representative from each branch. This body must create and support database on all corrupt persons in order to prevent them to get into the government offices in future. Actually it should have similar purposes as Hong Kong's anticorruption organ in prevention and education. The most important thing is that this organization will not require a lot of financial expenses as most of the staff in high level and low level will be sent by their organizations where they are paid. So, KGZ needs to create an independent, representative, transparent, open and high professional anticorruption organ, which will include tasks of prevention, coordination between law enforcements organs, prosecutorial office and courts, cooperation between civil society, private sector, media and government, education on corruption, conducting studies about corruption, recommendations on corruption, collecting data on corruption, maintaining database on corrupt people and activities, etc.

Any anticorruption efforts need to be backed up by **legal provisions**. So, it is necessary to develop anticorruption legislation. Now in KGZ there are several legal acts in fighting corruption, but they became old and inappropriate or they are lacking of necessary provisions for anticorruption measures. Even the Deputy Director of the Anticorruption Service of KGZ, Jorobaev, stated that anticorruption legislation of KGZ does not permit the service to conduct full scale activities and measures against corruption (Osmongazieva, 2012). There is a need to update old rules and create new anticorruption laws, which will be able to meet new challenges. Anticorruption legislation of KGZ should correspond to the international standards; for example

KGZ ratified the UN Convention against corruption in 2005, however, many international standards, such as corrupt offences, shown in the convention are not introduced in national laws. It is necessary to include detailed punishments in anticorruption laws; especially penalties should be applied more rigidly. The penalties should be used compound of fines corresponding to the actual financial or economic damage, and imprisonment. In addition to severely applied penalties, it is useful to use penalties as public works (cleaning streets, garbage etc.) with wearing special costumes for corrupt persons, which will influence society and deter others to be involved in corrupt act. KGZ needs more alternative penalties for corruption than imprisonment, as we see many of the suspected corrupt officials escaping from imprisonment in the courts, and also in society, people believe that many officials are forced to commit corrupt acts just to survive, and they sometimes criticize severe punishments as many of arrested persons are from low and middle level of government, but bosses are always clean and untouchable. Low and middle level officials are just the part of the corrupt organization, and society knows this fact, and when small officials are caught in committing corrupt act and punished severely, society reacts negatively as they know that big fishes are safe. Recently, such case happened in KGZ; one low level traffic police officer was caught with bribe of 100 USD, arrested and put into remand center, where he made suicide (Niyazova, 2012). There were several demonstrations made by family and relatives, and by colleagues - police officers (Niyazova, 2012). So, this case made huge resonance in society, as the traffic officer had 5 children, but everybody believed that he did not have other

choice, because he was the part of the corrupt organization and he needed to give results such as money to the superiors, while nobody from the top of this government office was punished. The analysis of the media about the incident shows that everybody criticizes the top, which is important, and somehow justifies the officer. This incident shows that nowadays KGZ needs improvements to law. It is necessary to include alternative punishments, however they should be applied only for the low level officials, but for the high officials and especially for the top of the government offices there should be no tolerance and the punishment must be severe including all penalties. Laws are always the basis for any legal action in the state, and further development and success of anticorruption policy usually depend on their contents. Appropriate, detailed, updated, clear laws are one of the crucial instruments in decreasing corruption and eliminating its causes.

Establishing transparency, openness and accountability of the government office is another strong tool to eliminate corruption and decrease its level. Here it will be good to use Japanese experience of information disclosure. Japan's national Information Disclosure Law came into effect in 2001, according to the law (Repeta & Schultz, 2002) people have right to access to any Japanese government offices and their files. According to Kingston (2004) the disclosure law gives anyone the right to request information from any government offices and government-owned companies, which made government offices to be accountable to people. The opportunity to access and require government Information in Japan permitted to citizens to discover several corruption deeds and violations. As Kingston (2005) states "this surprisingly

successful experience has fundamentally changed citizens' assumptions about the nature of political power and raised their expectations, forcing bureaucrats and politicians to scramble to keep pace". From personal observations during staying in Japan, I see how the government and municipal offices are constructed; if one goes inside they will see that every department, section is open, without walls, windows and doors. Heads of sections and their subordinates sit together. Both civil servants and all visitors see each other; even those who are waiting for their turns will sit behind and see the process between citizen and public official. This environment creates feeling of trust, and opportunity to monitor for the work of the officials as everything is open and transparent. Also it will be very useful for KGZ to join Open Government Partnership (OGP). As noted by World Bank, OGP is perfect choice for those countries which really aim to make their governments open, transparent and accountable, and that the content of this international partnership includes "all steps in the direction of instituting a new model of governance and tackling corruption" (WBG, 2012, p. 5). Nowadays OGP includes 55 countries, and "aims to secure concrete commitments from governments to promote transparency, empower citizens, fight corruption, and harness new technologies to strengthen governance." (OGP, 2012). Without active and valid transparency, openness, accountability of government offices and deep, close cooperation with citizens, it will be almost impossible to eliminate causes of corruption, because causes as inside and outside of the government, as it was shown, complement each other, so the elimination of them should be by involving society and government.

The role of free media is one of the leading parts in the fight against corruption. However, according to the Global Press Freedom Rankings in 2012 made by Freedom House, KGZ is considered not to have free press and 155th among 197 countries (Karlekar & Dunham, 2011). So, in order to have advantages from media in fight against corruption, it is necessary to create conditions for independent media without any illegal interference of the government offices. And then both the government and the society should use media's capabilities massively in decreasing the level of corruption. The government of Georgia, when it started implementing anticorruption measures, used media in its anticorruption activities, which served as an announcement of zero-tolerance against corruption and had deterrent and preventive effect to government officials and citizens (Fighting corruption in public services: chronicling Georgia's reforms., 2012). So, the government should use media in full scale to inform society about corruption. It must create programs dedicated to corruption, detailed short information movies like advertisements, which will include causes, outcomes, harms, in other words, all negative features of corruption. All information transmitted through media by government must explain connections between corrupt acts and social, economic, medical, educational issues and etc. by simple language in order to reach everyone. There should be special short movies for private sector, especially for small and middle entrepreneurs (who are not always with high education) to explain them that their conditions for doing business will not change if they keep giving bribes, and that their benefits gained from corrupt transactions will decrease their benefits from social sphere. During election periods

the government and media should show damages and harms for the state if people will vote for bribes and gifts. The government must use media greatly in order to mould and change public opinion in the anticorruption direction. Society (citizens, NGOs, private sectors) also has to use media to influence the leadership of the country and the government to force them to conduct anticorruption policy. Society must cooperate with media, send them information, and share their views and ideas on anticorruption issues. The media from itself should be open and create easy access for everybody. Also, it is necessary to mention that representatives of media should never try to justify any corrupt acts. On the contrary they must always criticize all manifestations of corruption, encourage and give access to those who are fighting it, conduct journalistic investigations on corruption, highlight all corrupt activities and anticorruption achievements. Media, as an anticorruption tool, is very effective and efficient; it affects all causes as inside and outside the government office and makes a huge contribution for decreasing corruption's level.

Other very significant and effective tool to overcome corruption is **information communication technologies (ICT)**. ICT, especially internet, proved that it is very powerful weapon against corruption. In the contemporary history, we have seen that so many events and changes happened in the world due to this weapon. Internet with its social networks, websites, chats, and blogs can unite people to struggle for better changes and make other side to make those changes. There are so many successful examples when citizens achieved their goals. One of the examples is the creation of web site in India, called "I Paid a Bribe", where anyone can send complain or story

on corrupt incident, and nearly 17 countries joined to this initiative, as “web sites give citizens voice against corruption” (Strom, 2012). In KGZ citizens can get internet without any problems. Nowadays ICT are developing very fast in KGZ; according to Global Mobile Awards 2012, the country got fourth place among 196 states in the development of telecommunication sphere (K-news, 2012). By using internet capabilities, they can influence government anonymously. And it is agreeably to see that people in KGZ started to realize immense opportunities of internet and its power; an example for it is the video taken by a layman from years before, which was uploaded on the internet, where elder soldiers beat freshmen. This video became public, and all media and citizens were condemning the incident and the government for inaction. So, the government reacted immediately; Prosecutor’s office brought a case, and perpetrators were identified and caught even after 4 years the incident happened (Akipress-Svodka, 2012). It is a brilliant example and encouragement for people of how internet is influential, especially in fighting corruption and other illegalities and making the government to act for the sake of the society. To talk about the Government, information communication technologies should be introduced by it widely, especially those which minimize personal contact between officials and citizens, provide transparency and strengthen control among officials. There are many examples in the world when several sates achieved desired results in curbing corruption by implementing capabilities of ICT from ordinary websites to e-government and etc. In KGZ the Government also started to introduce ICT several years ago. Now almost all government offices have their own websites with

necessary information, chats, and blogs. Besides websites, there are other projects initiated by the government; for example the State Tax Inspection started to use project e-declaration, called “Electronic filing of a tax return”, in the capital Bishkek and two other districts (State Tax Inspection, 2012). The Ministry of Finance recently introduced e-procurement, called “Bulletin of the state procurement”, where private sector representatives can get exact information on procuring goods, works and services, bidding or tendering documents, notifications about state tenders in different spheres, and watching the process of tenders (The portal of the state procurement of the Kyrgyz Republic. The Ministry of Finance., 2012). And it started to use e-budget, called “Open budget”, where one can see data on income and expenditure of the state and municipal budgets through internet (The Portal "Open Budget". The Ministry of Finance of the Kyrgyz Republic, 2012). Also, there are many statements of the leadership on introducing e-government portal. It is very necessary to introduce it as soon as possible, because it will be another useful instrument in decreasing corruption, as Andersen (E-Government as an anti-corruption strategy, 2009) concluded that corruption will decrease after using e-government significantly. Thus, the government should continue introducing ICT widely and essentially, and spread them not in the certain region but in the whole country. The government should continue to improve anticorruption web sites and create special web sites with information and data on corruption to educate, inform, and advice the private sector, citizens, government officials, and etc.

Several previous attempts to decrease corruption by introducing anticorruption strategies of KGZ failed; on the contrary they increased to some extent the level of corruption among government offices. One of the main reasons is the lack of clear understanding of what is happening inside the government. It means no proper research was conducted to see sources of the issues. Therefore, there is a huge necessity to **explore fundamentally and in details each government office** to identify the real situation of issues. All of the government offices have the same structure of corrupt organization and similar causes in general. However, at the same time due to different tasks, seals and functions, opportunities for corruption differs in each government office; for example, tax inspection and ministry of culture. So, researches need to be made in each sphere by seeing the problem of corruption as inside and outside the government office.

Creation of suitable, fair, open, secure and favorable conditions for private sector is very important factor, as businessmen generate causes for corruption, which influence the whole society. According to the Defense Counsel of KGZ the turnover of the shadow economy of the Kyrgyz Republic in 2011 is estimated as 60% of GDP, and makes 2,5 – 2,7 billion USD (CaspioNet, 2012). The leadership of KGZ should put all their efforts to withdraw businesses from the shadow sector; one of the tools can be the declaration of amnesty for covered businesses. It is necessary to create measures against raiding or illegal capture of businesses, simplify taxation and custom procedures, and remove as many obstacles as possible in opening businesses. It is important to create program to support new small and middle entrepreneurs,

which will provide them with access to necessary information for smooth developing, anticorruption measures, and explain their rights and duties.

Several **functions of the government offices should be removed or changed**, especially those which are not beneficial neither for government nor for society. According to Georgian President, they eliminated several inspections in the country such as phytosanitary, useless inspections in the sphere of construction and agriculture, several licenses in different spheres and etc. (Saakashvili, 2011). This tactic should be implemented especially in those offices which have controlling, licensing, inspecting, issuing documents, and permitting functions.

The increase of responsibility of the ministers, directors, managers, heads, chiefs, in other words, leaders of the government offices for their subordinates is crucial in breaking corrupt organization with its management. If low level official committed corrupt act, his supervisor, chief of department and minister or head of the ministry should be responsible for it and should be at least punished disciplinarily. And the punishment of supervisors and ministers should be written in details in laws and in each government office's regulations. The supervisors in charge for the corrupt official should be at least reprimanded immediately or even more by the state leadership. Because supervisors and ministers are in charge of controlling, staffing and recruiting of personnel, they must be asked their responsibility. If it happens second time, then the punishment must be more severe especially for the ministers.

Many researchers and experts always underline **the factor of salary** and its influence to corruption appearance. Actually salary for one's job is one of the most

crucial factors of corruption. If the salary is not enough to survive and civil servants cannot have another jobs, then the question will arise - how to survive? Rose-Ackerman (1999) states that corruption becomes “a survival strategy”, when remuneration in civil service is very low. The corruption will decrease if salaries are increased (Tanzi, 1998). Both Rose-Ackerman (1999) and Tanzi (1998) stress that the increase of wages decreases level of corrupt acts, but it also can increase the amount of bribes, so the increase of salaries should accompany with other measures. As experiences from three countries, Georgia, Hong Kong and Singapore, show, the increase of salaries with conjunction of other measures gave perfect result in curbing corruption in the public service. In KGZ salaries are really low than the minimum consumption basket for one person as shown previously in the report, so it put government officials who condemn corruption in difficult situation. It is becoming a serious problem for the state, as the Deputy Head of Border Guard Service of KGZ announced that 500-600 officers are ready to resign because of the low salary and bad working conditions, which creates shortage of professionals in the service (VestiKg, 2012). Almost all government offices complain about salaries, and the leadership of the country knows about it, however, still no changes are done in this direction. Even more, one of the members of Parliament criticized the chairman of the State Service of National Security for the similar complains, by saying that he should not complain as his service officers get higher salary compared with other law enforcement and military organs (Sagimbaev, 2012). Of course some leaders sometimes use the fact of low salaries and bad working conditions as an excuse for their failures, but their case

has some validity. And another interesting fact is that some politicians cover their inaction toward solving the problems, by comparing government offices salaries, which is like comparison between worse and the worst. What to do if the average salary of civil servant is twice less than real minimum consumption basket for one person in a month in KGZ, while the average salary is two times bigger than the minimum consumption basket. The position of KGZ statistics committee is understandable, as they are tied to the government, so sometimes they need to adjust numbers. However, the leadership should accept the fact and act to overcome these issues. The more they extend to solve it, the worse the situation due to small wages becomes. According to the Ministry of Internal Affairs the amount of bribes is increasing every year dramatically in parallel with corrupt acts, and in 2010 average price of bribe among civil servants (low and middle level) was 600 USD, to compare with previous years, when they were from 50-250 USD (Niyazova, 2010). According to Anticorruption Business Council 1,2 million som bribes (nearly 27000 USD) are becoming usual cases (Niyazova, 2010). It is “normal” development, because prices for everything every year go up and do not go down. But salaries are the same, or even if they have some increases, they are very scanty; there is no substantive increases in comparison with market prices. Usually politicians and leaders, when it comes to issue of salaries, refer to the weak economic situation and deficit in the budget and to the fact that KGZ is really poor country. However, leadership, politicians and citizens realize that by having corruption we have enormous shadow economy and losses as the secretary of the Defense Council stated that damages

caused by corruption in KGZ is 30 billion som (nearly 640 million USD) every year (Kabar, 2012), which is 1/3 of the budget in 2011, and amounts approximately 90 billion som (almost 2 billion USD). In 2012, according to KGZ Government's forecast, the deficit of the budget will be approximately 18,5 billion som (nearly 394 million USD) (Tolgonay, 2012). In addition, according to a political party "Ar Namys", represented in the Parliament, which calculated general damages from the corrupt schemes by using the smallest prices or estimates, KGZ loses nearly 20 billion som (more than 427 million USD) (Ar-Namys, 2011). As the party mentions showed sum of money does not reflect the wide-scale of the negative influence of corruption to economy and the development of society (Ar-Namys, 2011). According to National Statistic Committee of KGZ in March 2012 we had 59213 government officials with average salary 209,7 USD (National Statistics Committee, 2012) which is nearly 12,4 million USD. If we raise the salary in three times it will cost 37,2 million in total, and the salaries will become higher than the real minimum consumption basket 300 USD. Thus, the losses from corruption are really huge, and if the increase of salaries decreases corrupt acts, then the increase will justify itself. Of course increase in wages is always difficult decision, when country's budget has deficit; however it is very important and fair to consider real figures concerning living expenses, to make salaries of the government officials at least the same with the real and actual minimum consumption basket, and to give him chance to survive. Next is to do increase with conjunction of other procedures, as did three example-countries; otherwise, the increase will result in bigger problem, such as the dramatic

increase of price of bribe. Another important point is that before increasing it will be useful to make a reduction of personnel in government offices, especially those who have similar and duplicating functions; but the reduction should not be just firing people, and be accompanied with special programs to help officials to adjust in society.

Improvement of working conditions, creation of bonuses and development of factual indicators of performance are significant factors for eliminating causes of corruption. In some government offices working conditions are much to be improved. If one wants someone to work properly one is to provide normal working place with all necessary tools to accomplish the work. Nowadays government officials are not provided by all officially promised inventory and technical support; for example many government offices are lacking cars, technical devices, and sometimes stationery and etc. Usually government officials need to buy necessary tools and pay transportation fees by themselves or use their personal cars and fuel to accomplish the assigned job. When they travel inside the country they get such a small travel expenses that sometimes are only enough for one lunch; so they must cover other expenses from their pockets. With personal expenses for accomplishing government jobs, officials start to seek how to refund their losses or find money to cover expenses. In Georgia, the government paid a huge attention on this factor; for example, the patrol police was equipped with new cars, new uniform, protection devices, weapons and buildings; as a result with conjunction of other factors, according to Transparency International's 2010 Global Corruption Barometer,

Georgian police is one of the world's least corrupt, the second among 86 countries after Finland (WorldBank, Fighting corruption in public services: chronicling Georgia's reforms., 2012). Therefore, it is necessary to provide proper support for officials, at least provide them the real minimum to accomplish their jobs, such as fees for public transport, real minimum travel expenses, and others. And those government offices whose tasks cannot be fulfilled without proper technical support, such as law enforcement, emergency services and etc., should be provided with new, professional and effective equipment. Another part is to create effective social support such as medical service, special credits, housing and support of families. For example, today in KGZ no bank will give any credit to government official directly, as his official income, which is salary, is not enough. Normal bank will not give credit for car for the person with salary 200 USD, thus the government should set up program for crediting officials. The accommodation is huge issue now in KGZ; one room apartment in Bishkek costs nearly from 25000-38000 USD, which is impossible for an official to buy. The rent fee of the same apartment in Bishkek is nearly from 100-500 USD, depending on the district, thus special programs in this direction need to be created.

The leadership of the country should focus on designing new bonuses in the government offices. In KGZ many people are ready to give bribes only for the speed and effectiveness, especially when one needs urgently a document or certificate. In this case it will be better to legalize in some government offices to pay official fee for the fast procedure and make them as bonuses for performer. However, on the other

hand, the office needs to have strong control over the execution of ordinary procedure to escape intentionally created delays. Another bonus should be established for performance of civil servant. For example, if tax or custom officer collected taxes more than it was required, some percentage of collected fees should be given to the performer. These bonuses should be applied in all government offices where possible. Actually there were attempts to introduce such bonuses in the law enforcement organs, especially when they retrieved moneys from crimes; however nobody used it, as the procedure to get those bonuses were very difficult. So, it is necessary to establish simple and fast procedures to get bonuses.

The existing indicators of performance became one of the causes for corruption in the government offices of KGZ, because most of them are old, which were developed for USSR, and do not reflect real performance of officials in many government offices. Also, existing indicators are usually used by superiors as an option to pressure subordinates to perform them, which are impossible to follow in reality, and when they fail, other option immediately will be proposed, which is payment or favor. Therefore, there is a huge need to develop new factual indicators for government officials by conducting detailed research in each government office and using successful international experiences.

In KGZ it is significant to **recruit** new, fresh and young people not only for low levels but for high levels of government offices, because they have fresh ideas; but nowadays most of the high level positions are occupied by old people who studied and started to work during the USSR; as a result they sometimes cannot be creative

and innovative. In Georgia, according to President of Georgia (Saakashvili, 2011), the oldest leader is himself, and he is 44 years old. Other is to **rotate** the staff in the government office; it will not permit an official to create his stable corrupt network. And rotation of civil servants is “a precautionary measure” to fight against corruption as suggested by Abbink (2004). Next, government officials need to update and upgrade their **knowledge** as often as possible; it will increase productivity, professionalism and motivation for good performance. Also it will be useful to create **competition** inside the government offices, it means to permit citizens to use other branches of the same office. As Rose Ackerman (1999) notes “the possibility of reapplying to a new official will then limit the bribe potential of any single bureaucrat”, and she states that it will be helpful among offices issuing licenses and permissions. By allowing citizens to choose officials, it will create competition among officials, which will increase quality of service and ease to detect corrupt and unprofessional officials for superiors, as citizens will try to find government official, who is uncorrupt and with good service. It will be like in the service market, if a price is low and service good, people will come to you. So, it can be used as another tool to decrease corruption.

In each case to fight corruption and reduce its level in the example-countries required a set of special and particular measures, tools, tactics, techniques and instruments, which most of them were implemented simultaneously and in parallel according to their particular situation of corruption. In the case of KGZ, especially in the government offices, where we have several causes such as inside - corrupt

organization, small salaries, ineffective reforms, and outside from society, all suggested ways to decrease corruption's level in the government offices should be implemented simultaneously and in parallel. By implementing them in parallel, it is possible to eliminate causes; otherwise if the measures are concentrated only in one of the sources of causes, the whole anticorruption policy could be failed. And as was mentioned, first the role of society is the most important if there is no political will, and if political will appears, the role of the leadership of the country will be the most crucial. Then, leadership should become an example for the whole society; the leaders need to act properly and then ask others to do it. And all anticorruption measures to fight corruption and decrease its level should be used similarly for everyone; a zero-tolerance policy should be spread everywhere, and the best example will be to start these measures from leadership's entourage, as proverb says "beat your owns so others will fear". Another thing is that anticorruption measures should not become a tool to persecute, remove and catch only opponents and unwanted persons; it should not become as Franco, ex-president of Spain, who said "for the friends – everything, for enemies - law". The base of anticorruption initiatives should be fairness and openness. These ways to decrease corruption in the government offices are only one part of the whole fight against corruption in the country; the whole fight of corruption in the country should be very broad and detailed as there are many other highly corrupted spheres in the country, such as education, health service, state companies, judiciary, and etc. However it is fair to note that if the causes are eliminated and the corruption level in the government offices decreases, it

is possible to say that some decreases will take place in other spheres too, as they are closely related to each other. Other significant point is that the implementation of the anticorruption measures should be continuous and updated frequently according to changes in the situation; otherwise all achievements will disappear immediately as soon as they stop. According to Swaleheen (2012) it is very important to have continuous and persistent decrease in the level of corruption in order to see real positive outcome such as economic growth. Also it is necessary to mention that the leadership of KGZ should do their best to try to fulfill all international recommendations to fight corruption, especially suggested by OECD. The KGZ in 2004 got 31 recommendations from OECD, however, during assessment in 2007 KGZ implemented only 2, largely implemented – 4, while 15 are partially fulfilled and 10 were not implemented at all; in the same year it got another 31 recommendations (OECD, 2012). In 2012 after second assessment KGZ improved only 7 recommendations to compare with previous one, hence, “2 recommendations are fully implemented, 4 – largely implemented, 20 – partly implemented and 5 recommendations are not implemented” (OECD, 2012). In 2012 KGZ was suggested to implement another updated 22 new recommendations (OECD, 2012). It will be perfect and very useful contribution in fighting corruption if the leadership fulfills all OECD recommendations. The leadership should realize that without accepting existence of causes of corruption in the government office and eliminating them it will be almost impossible to have significant decrease in corruption. And it is suggested that causes are possible to be eliminated in the conjunction of all measures;

emphasizing only in one, for example law enforcement, will not give the desired result, but on the contrary, it can be resulted in the appearance of further issues; catching all suspected officials will not be effective, as the expert of polygraph from the State Personnel Service of KGZ stated that in 2011, according to the conducted questioning on polygraph of the tax service officials, 80% of questioned were found lying when they answered the question about receiving illicit income. It means that 80% are potentially can be arrested for corruption, but others will come and the situation will become similar. Therefore, it is very important and crucial to apply the set of anticorruption measures and they should be developed and monitored beyond the government offices.

Thus, according to the found causes of corruption in the government offices, the suggested anticorruption measures, most of which are based on the explored international experiences, are the ways to decrease the level of corruption, which is considered to be successful in the case of KGZ.

Chapter 6. Conclusion

The Kyrgyz Republic in 21 years of its independence became one of the most corrupt countries in the world. Experts, scholars and international organizations call KGZ's corruption differently; they say it is endemic, state capture, or the state itself became market where one gets profits from corruption; despite different descriptions of corruption in KGZ, all of them agree in one fact that corruption is widespread, high and in all spheres of the life. The corruption became so harmful for the country, as it makes real obstacles for development in KGZ. As a result KGZ has weak economy, lack of rule of law, weak governance, undeveloped and vulnerable social sector, shadow economy, weak education and health service, and so on. But the worst is that corruption became a real threat to national security. To talk about instability in KGZ, corruption has already showed that it is one of the main causes for instability, and the evidence is two revolutions in 5 years, where the last one took several human lives. Other thing is that in KGZ everyone realizes corruption's harms, it still became social norm, and corruption is a way of life. Sometimes one can be surprised when ordinary citizens somehow justify it. And it is understandable because people think that there is no other choice but committing corrupt acts. However, there are a lot of ways to break this norm and overcome harmfulness of corruption by decreasing its level. The evidence is seen in several countries, which had the similar situation in the past and found ways how to fight against corruption.

As it was noted all spheres in KGZ are highly corrupt. Each of them needs to be separately explored in details to draw real pictures of their corruption, which will include causes of corruption, peculiarities of the sphere, problems and etc. And these pictures will further help to find proper instruments to overcome the issue. The report aims the executive branch or government offices of KGZ as they first of all reflect state condition and corruption level. As was mentioned, weak governance and high corruption depend on each other. The report had two main objectives. First objective was to determine real situation of corruption in the government offices, or how it looks like, by finding causes of it; second objective was to find suitable ways to decrease level of corruption in the government offices by exploring and analyzing international experiences. The report used qualitative methodology to achieve its objectives.

Thus, by exploring materials, collecting necessary data and deep analysis, it is possible to consider that all objectives were achieved by report. The puzzle of corruption in the government offices was assembled. And it was found that the real situation is that all government offices in KGZ, despite their different functions, have similar causes. By categorizing the causes it was found that they are originated from two sources. They are inside government offices and outside it. By analyzing the inside causes it was found that government offices have their own corrupt organizations which is similar to official one, as they use the same organization structure and personnel for corruption, and that they have their own corrupt management procedures. Also two other inside causes were noted; they are low

salary and ineffective reforms. They are inside the offices; however, do not depend on offices themselves. Outside causes were from historical, cultural and social aspects of the society, and from private sector and judiciary, all of them were categorized as causes from society. Next finding was that all causes are very closely interrelated, complement each other, which showed that there is no use to find which is to blame, and choose priority to address efforts. This finding means that anticorruption efforts will work only if measures are taken and directed simultaneously and in parallel toward outside and inside causes.

Next was necessary to find the possibility of eliminating inside and outside causes to achieve second objective. In order to do it, three example-countries were explored on their experiences in fighting corruption as the basis for creating necessary tools for KGZ. Hong Kong, Singapore and Georgia were selected, as it was found that these countries had almost similar situation in the past and that they successfully solved those problems. The analysis of countries showed that each of them had similar features and approaches in fighting corruption; first and one of the main requirements was the strong political will, and others were introduction of necessary anticorruption laws and increase in salary. In Hong Kong and Singapore, creation of anticorruption body also played crucial role in fighting corruption. In Georgia fast and revolutionary approaches (eliminating unnecessary functions, using of ICT, firing all personnel of agencies, recruiting young specialists, and so on) in fighting corruption showed its effectiveness and strength in decreasing level of corruption.

Thus, according to three example-countries and other countries (Japan, India) experiences, a set of necessary anticorruption policies and measures were developed. First and the most important was to have strong political will among leadership of the country, President, Parliament and Prime Minister. As analyzed in the report it is still difficult to determine whether KGZ's leadership has the real political will to fight corruption or it is just illusion. Therefore it was suggested that if there is no political will, the crucial role in promoting political will rely on society. And if the political will is achieved, implementation of anticorruption reforms will be easier, faster and more effective. However if there is still lack of political will, society or critical mass will need to have clear steps to fight corruption. Then, the anticorruption measures can be effective, which may become starting point.

Also, it was found several anticorruption approaches, which can be effective in the case of KGZ; they are creation of appropriate anticorruption policy and strategy; creation of the state anticorruption body; introduction of necessary and efficient anticorruption laws; establishment of transparency, openness and accountability of the government offices; use of free media; use of information communication technologies; conducting deep researches in each government office; creation of necessary and favorable conditions for private sector; removal or change of functions of the government offices; increase of responsibility of the leaders of government offices; increase the salary at least to the same level as real minimum consumption basket; improvement of working conditions by providing minimum necessity for normal execution of duties; creation of bonuses; development of factual indicators of

performance; and other techniques such as recruitment of new staff, rotation of civil servants, education and training, and creation of competition. All these findings are considered as important and effective in the case of the government offices of KGZ to eliminate causes and decrease the level of corruption.

There were several other findings such as the necessity of recognizing real problems and solving them as soon as possible, despite the economic and financial difficulties in the country. It concerns the increase of salary and improvement of working conditions, and the leadership should provide at least real minimum, required to survive and fulfill duties.

It is necessary to add that political will ensures half way to successful decrease of corruption in the government offices, and that it is not mainly depending on leadership but it could be promoted by society. Society must use all their capabilities to influence the top of the country and fight against corruption. It is very necessary to demonstrate an example of successful combat against corruption to the whole country, which nowadays is possible to do, in the villages where heads are elected by community. Or in the government office by itself, as heads of ministries are approved by the Parliament, and sometimes at least they can be from different party than Prime Minister. However it is crucial to implement anticorruption measures in all spheres at once without priority and they should be persistent and updated every time.

Actually all anticorruption measures can be used in all government offices, however, it is recommended to conduct detailed research in each government office separately, as each of them has their own tasks, functions, peculiarities and different

problems. These researches can create more detailed and peculiar measures for each government office.

At the end of the report, after all work done, it is necessary to add that corruption can be the result of unexpected causes such as corrupt organization itself, which are the product of the set of problems, failures and personal interests. Also if corruption continues to develop and increase like in the Kyrgyz Republic, it will infect all spheres of the country and put down roots very deeply, and as a result corruption will become as a main relationship between state institutions, and even between citizens. In this case corruption is like a dangerous and harmful weed, which spoils all good products on the land. It may mean very little to eradicate one by one, but the only possibility is to do it at once and everywhere by using massive efforts. And any massive efforts should be initiated and guided by someone, so leadership and citizens are in charge for them. From their side they should stop ignoring the problem of corruption; the statement of Alatas (Corruption and the destiny of Asia, 1999) perfectly describes that “he who ignores the problem of corruption, ignores the problem of evil. He, who ignores the problem of evil, assists in the development of evil. He, who assists in the development of evil, is part of the universe of evil”. So it is necessary for everyone to make tremendous efforts and contributions in fight against of corruption, especially when the corruption started to take human lives. Otherwise the description of the country will be, as it was mentioned at the beginning of the report, that the Kyrgyz Republic is a country of “incredible natural beauty” as

only nature will remain uncorrupt in the state, and thus beautiful, while all other parts of the country will be corrupt and ugly.

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